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Sir Michael Howard has observed that Douglas Haig was a military manager in 
the mould of Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower rather than one of the 
“Great Captains” of military legend. Unfortunately, Howard did not elaborate. To 
date, this crucial aspect of Haig’s role on the Western Front has not been explored. 
The contention of this thesis is that Haig was an exceptional military manager 
who pursued the organising principle of unity-of-effort within the BEF on the 
Western Front to facilitate the defeat of the German Army in concert with the Allies.  
In 1909, Haig established unity-of-effort as the first principle of war 
organization in FSR-II.1 Haig did not define the precept possibly in the belief that it 
was a commonplace. However, a study to establish the contemporary understanding 
has revealed that unity-of-effort was, and is, the raison d’être of all forms of human 
organization including the military. It was regarded as a tangible and effective 
principle and not a mere rhetorical gesture or oratorical flourish. Its nature was 
immutable, and uniquely coordinative. Unity-of-effort found expression in its 
compound character, which had distinct mental, physical and moral components, 
specific to each organization. The principle was considered to be a normative ideal, 
and not an absolute standard.  
Haig strove to optimise unity-of-effort by developing operational, 
organizational and administrative doctrine in pursuit of unity-of-mental-effort; by 
inculcating the teachings of doctrine through progressive training methods to achieve 
unity-of-physical-effort; and by promoting the will to fight through sustained morale 
and discipline to attain unity-of-moral-effort. Haig managed the process to attain 
unity-of-effort through the coordinative function of the General Staff. 
  
                                                 
1 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration), (London: HMSO, 1909). 
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Sir Douglas Haig is the single most controversial figure, in the most 
controversial war in British History.2 The question is, why is it that Haig remains 
such an enigma?3 Gary Sheffield provided a simple explanation that ‘can be summed 
up in one word: casualties’.4 This focus feeds directly into a more nuanced rationale 
from Stephen Heathorn, who was surely right to argue that Haig has become a ‘lieu 
de mémoire’ for the ‘perceived futility and tragedy of the British effort’.5 Military 
historians, with some notable exceptions including John Terraine and Gary Sheffield, 
have largely been responsible for creating this metonym by bearing down, almost 
exclusively, on Haig’s character and personality, the impact of his agency 
particularly on casualties, and questions of leadership. They have failed to lift their 
gaze in any sustained way to consider his role within the context of ‘a host of 
structural factors – technological, logistical, political, economic, cultural, [and] 
demographic’. In particular, fixated by the ‘accretions of meaning attached to Haig’s 
name’ little attempt has been made to consider Haig’s role in what Michael Howard 
calls ‘Total War Mk 1’6 Here ‘the entire resources of the state were mobilised to 
sustain armies in the field whose only formula for victory was attrition, and whose 
commanders were military managers’. In this scenario, heavy casualties were 
                                                 
2 Preface pp. ix, Douglas Haig, Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, 1914-1918, ed. G. D. Sheffield 
and J. M. Bourne (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005).  
3 Brian Holden Reid, " Douglas Haig, 1861-1928," The International History Review 12, no. 1 
(February 1991) p. 150. 
4 Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London: Aurum Press Limited, 2011) 
p. 372. 
5 Stephen Heathorn, Haig and Kitchener in Twentieth-Century Britain (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).  
p. 147. 
6 Ibid. p. 148. 
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inevitable, and victory could only be secured by the most outstanding military 
manager, rather than the most brilliant “Great Captain” of military legend.7  
The contention of this thesis is that Haig was a highly competent military 
manager, with a natural flair for military organization and administration. Moreover, 
he used his managerial talent and pre-war experience to optimise unity-of-effort in 
the BEF. By reaching out for this supreme managerial challenge, Haig delivered the 
military means to obtain the military end of assisting the Allies to defeat the main 
German army on the Western Front in 1918.  
This thesis will demonstrate that under Haig’s close supervision, the British 
army was given a doctrine for both operations, and organization and administration 
in the shape of the FSR, 1909.8 Furthermore, in respect to the latter, Haig established 
‘unity-of-effort directed with energy and determination towards a definite object’ as 
the first principle of military organization.9 Unfortunately, he did not define this 
precept possibly in the belief that it was a commonplace. However, from a study that 
determined the contemporary understanding, it will be shown that unity-of-effort was 
considered the raison d’être of all forms of human organization including the 
military. It was thought of as a tangible and effective maxim and not merely a 
rhetorical gesture or oratorical flourish. Its nature was believed to be immutable and 
uniquely coordinative. Unity-of-effort found expression in its compound character, 
which had distinct mental, physical and moral components, specific to each type of 
organization. It was considered a normative ideal and not an absolute standard.  
 
                                                 
7 Michael Howard, "How Much Can Technology Change Warfare," in The Revolution in Military 
Affairs (Carlisle P.A.: USAWC Strategic Studies Institute, 1994) p. 2. 
8 Field Service Regulations, Part I (Operations), (London: HMSO, 1909). Henceforth FSR-I by date. 
Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration). Henceforth FSR-II by date.  
9 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) p. 22. (Emphasis in original). 
 11 
 
Paraphrasing Marshal Foch, Haig gave the BEF a common manner of thought, 
action and belief.10 The tactical doctrine set-out in FSR-I was adapted and evolved 
during the war driving unity-of-mental-effort. Haig ensured that these principles and 
best practices were inculcated into his armies through progressive training, thereby 
building unity-of-physical-effort. In turn, by promoting morale underpinned by 
discipline he engendered unity-of-moral-effort, giving his armies the will to fight. 
Haig may not have been a ‘heroic warrior’ conforming to the popular stereotype 
associated with Marlborough, Wellington or Nelson, but this thesis will demonstrate 
that he was a ‘heroic manager’. 
Key Research Questions 
Arising from the proposition, five overarching research questions frame and 
inform this thesis: 
1. What are the typical representations of Haig in the relevant British military 
historiography, and to what extent has his role as a military manager been 
recognised?  
2. What was the magnitude of the management challenge that confronted Haig on 
the Western Front, as judged by the unprecedented increase in the scale, 
complexity and plasticity of the BEF’s organization? 
3. What was Haig’s understanding of the principle of unity-of-effort? 
4. How, and to what extent did Haig achieve unity-of-mental-effort,  
unity-of-physical-effort and unity-of-morale effort within the BEF?  
5. What process of management did Haig deploy in pursuit of unity-of-effort  
in the BEF? 
                                                 
10 Marshal Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War, trans. Hilaire Belloc (London: Chapman Hall, 1918) 
p. 7.  
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Representations of Haig 
A study of the historiography has revealed that there were four common 
representations of Haig: The Butcher and Bungler, where both his stupidity and 
callousness was directly responsible for the careless deaths of his men. The Donkey, 
where a combination of Haig’s military incompetence and poor leadership was 
rewarded by an anachronistic system of patronage that promoted him beyond his 
ability resulting in heavy British casualties.11 The Educated Soldier, where Haig has 
been cast as the best soldier of his generation, who overcame great and unforeseen 
external challenges to lead his army to eventual victory, albeit at a high human cost. 
Lastly, The Master of the Field, where he was depicted as the supreme commander 
without flaw. Since the war, Haig has not been represented as a military manager in 
any sustained way by historians. 
Haig’s historiography is vast. Countless books, articles, and newspaper reports 
have been written about Britain’s engagement on the Western Front. Inevitably these 
works examine Haig’s role as a stereo-typical top field commander. Added to this 
body are films, television and radio programmes, and even theatre productions. It has 
not proved practical to review all of these works. However, a sufficiently thorough 
examination has been made to identify and assess the typical representations of Haig. 
Only those works with something new or important to contribute have been included 
in this review. Due to limits of time and space, even within this select group, this 
study is not exhaustive. Although each of the four representations appear to draw 
sharp distinctions of Haig, the selected works show wide latitude. Overlap is 
common, the strength of opinion differs within depictions, and authors are not 
always consistent in their portrayal of Haig either within specific works or over time.  
                                                 
11 Martin Stephen, The Price of Pity (London: Leo Cooper, 1996) p. 57. 
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Good-morning; good-morning!’ the General said 
When we met him last week on our way to the line 
Now the soldiers he smiled at are most of ‘em dead 
And we’re cursing his staff for incompetent swine 
‘He’s a cheery old card,’ grunted Harry to Jack 
As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack 
But he did for them both by his plan of attack. 
 
Siegfried Sassoon, June 1918.12 
 
Sassoon’s depiction of the unnamed General, paradoxically published just 
before the German army was crushed by Haig and Foch, is the poetic centrepiece of 
the butcher and bungler caricature.13 It has promoted the unvarnished myth that ‘a 
generation of young men, their heads full of high abstractions like Honour, Glory, 
and England went off to war to make the world a safer place for democracy. They 
were slaughtered in stupid battles planned by stupid generals’.14  
Following the war, Lloyd George gave this representation its impetus and 
political legitimacy when he mounted a ‘sustained and embittered attack on all the 
soldiers except Foch’, focusing his ire on Haig.15 In the foreword to his abridged War 
Memoirs, the former Prime Minister made his position plain:  
I aim to tell the naked truth about the war as I saw it from the 
conning-tower at Downing Street. I saw how the incredible 
heroism of the common man was being squandered to repair 
the incompetence of the trained inexperts (for they were 
actually trained not to be experts in mastering the actualities 
of modern warfare) in the production of equipment, in 
                                                 
12 Siegfried Sassoon, Counter Attack and Other Poems (London: William Heinemann, 1918) p. 26. 
13 The unnamed General is believed to be either Generals Gough or Haking. 
14 Samuel Haynes, A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture (London: Bodley Head, 
1990) p. x.  
15 H.M. Stannard, "Mr. Lloyd George and the Soldiers", TLS 26/09/1936. p. 755. 
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transport, in tackling the submarine menace, in the narrow, 
selfish and unimaginative strategy and in the ghastly butchery 
of a succession of vain and insane offensives. The last great 
struggle revealed not only the horrid and squalid aspects of 
war but its muddles; its futilities; its chanciness; its 
precariousness; its wastefulness of the lives, the treasure and 
the virtues of mankind.16  
The Passchendaele chapters of the War Memoirs ‘probably did as much as any single 
source to stigmatise indelibly in popular memory the role of the military elite in  
the war’.17  
With the aim of avoiding any responsibility for British casualties on the 
Western Front, Lloyd George attempted to salvage his reputation by savaging Haig’s. 
He characterised Haig as being ‘abnormally stubborn’, ‘incapable of changing 
plans’, ‘failing to grasp the military situation’, of being wilfully deceitful and 
wasting his own fighting men and reserves at the rate of five to three of the enemy.18 
Lloyd George vilified Haig as having a ‘ridiculous cavalry obsession’, described him 
as a ‘second rate commander’, lacking the qualities of a Generalissimo. He criticised 
him for his lamentable choice of associates, accused him of under-handed intrigues, 
and blamed him for the disaster in March 1918.19 Finally, Lloyd George was reported 
to have said, Haig was ‘brilliant to the top of his army boots’.20 Despite this apparent 
shortcoming, after resorting to ‘deviousness on a magisterial scale’, the former Prime 
                                                 
16 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, II vols, (London: Oldhams Press 
Limited, 1938). New Foreword, pp. v-vi. 
17 George W. Egerton, "The Lloyd George War Memoirs: A Study in the Politics of Memory"  
The Journal of Modern History 60, no. 1 (March 1988) p. 90. 
18 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (1917), VI vols, vol. IV (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1934) pp. 508-509;531; 595;383-384;527. 
19 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (1918), VI vols, vol. VI (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1937). Index. pp. 401. 
20 J. H. Boraston, ed., Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches : (December 1915-April 1919). Foreword by 
John Terraine. (London: Dent, 1979) p. vi. 
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Minister did not have the courage to sack Haig, which potentially would have 
consolidated his strategic control over the BEF in France.21 
Following World War II, the butcher and bungler caricature, largely framed by 
Lloyd George, gained fresh momentum from military historians. In 1963, A.J.P. 
Taylor, wrote a typically pithy description of the Somme offensive that observed: 
‘brave helpless soldiers; blundering obstinate generals; nothing achieved’.22 
Elaborating further he angrily asserted: 
Third Ypres was the blindest slaughter of a blind war. Haig 
bore the greatest responsibility. Some of the Flanders mud 
sticks also to Lloyd George, the man who lacked the supreme 
authority to forbid the battle.23  
Other historians followed in Taylor’s wake, most notably John Laffin and 
Denis Winter. The title of Laffin’s book British Butchers and Bunglers of World War 
One was brutally uncompromising. He rationalised:  
I have concluded that some British generals were bunglers 
and butchers. The two went together because, under the 
conditions of warfare, butchery was the result of bungling. I 
am referring not to the butchery of enemy soldiers – this is 
the legitimate if deplorable business of war – but to the 
wholesale slaughter of British and Empire troops.24  
Haig and other British Generals must be indicted not for 
incomprehension but for wilful blunders and wicked 
butchery. However stupid they might have been, however 
much they were the product of the system which obstructed 
                                                 
21 Keith Grieves, "Haig and the Government, 1916-1918," in Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On, ed. 
Brian Bond and Nigel Cave (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999) p. 111. 
22 A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated History (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963)  
p. 105.  
23 Ibid. p. 148. 
24 John Laffin, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (Stroud: Alan Sutton Publishing 
Limited, 1992) p. 6. 
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enterprise, they knew what they were doing. There can never 
be forgiveness.25 
As Brian Bond observed, Laffin was ‘almost apoplectic’ in his attack on Haig and 
British generalship, ‘repeatedly’ charging him with ‘criminal negligence’.26 
Laffin found support for his thesis from Denis Winter, author of Haig's 
Command; A Reassessment. Winter asserted that ‘British generals [were] an 
uninspiring collection; [and] Douglas Haig was the most uninspiring – and disastrous 
– of the lot’.27 According to him, Haig ‘looked on at Mons, walked away at Le 
Cateau and panicked at Landrecies.’28 Neuve Chapelle was a ‘fiasco’ where Haig had 
deployed ‘48 battalions [as] useless cannon-fodder.’29 At Loos, Haig blundered; the 
Germans ceased firing after being nauseated by the sight of ‘the field of [British] 
corpses’.30 Winter further asserted that the French were not severely weakened at 
Verdun. He insisted Haig’s defence that the Somme had been imposed on him was 
‘complete poppycock’.31 He speculated that the ‘fatal results on 1 July [1916]’ of the 
British forces under Haig’s command were caused by an ‘utter lack of concern with 
[artillery] accuracy’.32 Winter claimed that the instructions issued by Haig ‘on the eve 
of the Somme...would kill thousands in July’.33 For Winter, Third Ypres was the 
‘culmination of horror’, comparing Haig’s deficiencies ‘with ‘Marshal de Saxe’s 
mules, which campaigned often and learned little’.34 According to him the net result 
of the Passchendaele campaign was that the British army suffered approximately a 
                                                 
25 Ibid. p. 168. 
26 Brian Bond, The Unquiet Western Front: Britain's Role in Literature and History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp. 78-79. 
27 Michael Dockrill, " Haig's Command. A Reassessment," The English Historical Review 109, no. 432 
(June 1994) p. 789. 
28 Denis Winter, Haig's Command: A Reassessment (London: Viking, 1991) p. 36.  
29 Ibid. p. 38. 
30 Ibid. p. 41. 
31 Ibid. p. 50.  
32 Ibid. pp. 60. 
33 Ibid. p. 61. 
34 Ibid. p. 157. 
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third more casualties than the enemy.35 In 11 pages, Winter gave the victorious 
Hundred Days campaign short-shrift. In so doing he had Foch making the decision to 
end the war in 1918; Haig ‘sabotaging Foch’s battle’ at Amiens’,36 Haig ‘attack[ing] 
as little as he could, with as little force as he could get away with, and as much 
complaint as possible’. Winter concluded that ‘since March 1918, Haig had merely 
been the tea boy to Foch’s managing director’. Thus, despite Haig’s ‘mulishness or 
bloody-mindedness’, Foch won the war for the Allies. 37  
Upon examination the evidence base of these writers has proved to be very 
slight indeed. Sassoon and other literary writers, who in the main were junior officers 
and men, reflected on their narrow personal experiences without attempting to 
address some of the intractable problems of the war. ‘Could the war have been 
stopped? Were the endless offensives necessary?’ Sassoon, Graves, Aldington, and 
Maddox Ford had little to say on these matters.38 Lloyd George rarely cited his 
sources. In his criticism of Haig there is no traceable evidence for his assertions. 
Notwithstanding Taylor’s celebrity as an eminent historian, he too provided little 
tangible evidence to support his arguments. Basically he synthesised Lloyd George’s 
memoirs and those of others, and neglected archival research. This approach led 
Taylor to make the serious accusation that on March 26th 1918 Haig was going to 
‘surrender in open field’.39 Perhaps, in keeping with some of his picture captions, he 
intended this wild and unsubstantiated assertion to be a joke. John Laffin also shied 
away from attending the archives and his citations lacked any semblance of 
illumination. The only evidence he offered to support his arguments was the empty 
                                                 
35 Ibid. p. 111. 
36 Ibid. p. 199. 
37 Ibid. pp. 209-210.  
38 Correlli Barnett, "A Military Historian’s View of the Great War," in Essays by Divers Hands, ed. 
Mary Stocks (London: Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 15. 




and self satisfied claim that ‘I have studied millions of words in memoirs, official 
histories and dispatches concerning the war’.40 
By contrast, Winter did cite his sources. After consulting the National Archives 
in Britain, Canberra, Ottawa and Washington, he concluded that the British records 
including Haig’s personal wartime diaries were falsified on a ‘considerable scale’.41 
Michael Dockrill persuasively dismissed this assertion: 
[Winter] alleges…an elaborate cover-up by successive 
British governments down to 1940. One wonders what 
conceivably could have motivated successive Prime 
Ministers such as David Lloyd George, Ramsay Macdonald 
and Neville Chamberlain to help sustain the myth of Haig’s 
omnipotence? Nor are Winter’s various explanations for this 
conspiracy convincing.42  
Winter challenged Haig’s account of his command during the war by 
comparing and contrasting the generally accepted record with his newly found 
evidence. In doing so, Winter was highly selective in the use of Haig’s diary and 
papers. He also went well beyond the evidence where necessary and made frequent 
assertions and allegations to build his arguments without citing his sources. As 
Dockrill observed, this is where ‘one begins to lose one’s confidence in the author’s 
judgement’.43 John Ferris agreed, commenting that Winter’s conclusions were 
‘demonstrable nonsense’.44 
                                                 
40 Laffin, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One. p. 5.  
41 Winter, Haig's Command: A Reassessment. p. 3.  
42 Dockrill, "Haig's Command: A Reassessment" The English Historical Review (1994) p.789. 
43 Ibid. p. 789. 
44 John Ferris, "Haig's Command: A Reassessment" The Journal of Military History (1992) p. 512. 
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As is evident, Haig’s representation as the butcher and bungler has largely been 
discredited by revisionist military historians.45 However, it is this caricature that still 
grips the public’s imagination mesmerised by casualties and exploited feverishly by 
the media. On November 6th 1998, coinciding with Remembrance Day, The Daily 
Express fuelled popular public sentiment by shamelessly subverting the truth when 
using its front page to declare: 
Eighty years after Armistice Day we ask if Earl Haig, the 
man who led a million men to their deaths, should still be 
overlooking Whitehall.46 
In 2011, Mark Bostridge writing in the New Statesman alleged that ‘Haig is etched 
on the popular imagination as the most villainous of generals of the First World 
War’.47 In the same year, Nigel Jones in the Telegraph ranked Haig as ‘arguably the 
most reviled man in British history’.48 In the TLS Brian Bond rightly cautioned, 
‘Douglas Haig is one of those historical characters whose name can unleash 
paroxysms of unreason’.49 
The Donkey 
Ludendorff: “The English fight like lions”. 
Hoffman: “True. But don't we know that they are lions led by donkeys”. 
FALKENHAYN: Memoirs 50 
Published in 1961, Alan Clark’s work The Donkeys cemented the ‘bloody 
fools’ representation of Haig’s generalship and gave the school its epigraph.51 
                                                 
45 Brian Bond, "Mud Blood and Poppycock (Gordon Corrigan)," The Times Literary Supplement, 22 
August 2003. 
46 "Why do we let this man cast a shadow over our war dead?," Daily Express, 6th November 1998. 
(Emphasis in original). 
47 Mark Bostridge, "The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army by Gary Sheffield," New Statesman 
24/08/2011. 
48 Nigel Jones, " The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army," The Daily Telegraph 11/08/2011. 
49 Brian Bond, " Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters (Gary Sheffield and John Bourne),"  
The Sunday Times, 16th September 2005. 
50 Alan Clark, The Donkeys (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1961). Frontispiece. 
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Nonetheless, Michael Howard was right to observe that Clark’s work was 
‘entertainment and not history’.52  
While the butchers and bunglers school charged Haig with murder, colleagues 
in the donkeys school dammed him on virtually the same grounds, albeit with the 
lesser charge of corporate manslaughter. The central proposition of the donkeys 
school was that constrained by internal factors including deficiencies in intellect, 
personality, and the doctrine and personalised structure of the pre-war officer corps, 
Haig, the donkey-in-chief, was grossly inept and failed to adapt to the conditions of 
mass industrialised warfare. This led him to engage in overly ambitious and extended 
offensives at Loos, on the Somme and at Passchendaele resulting in high British 
casualties that were disproportionate to the lower losses of the enemy.  
The donkeys school drew its membership from a broad church. Following 
Haig’s death in 1928, and in the light of Lloyd George’s Memoirs, senior soldiers 
became emboldened, finding their own public voice. Perhaps the most of influential 
of these men, ‘who dominated the inter-war scene’ were the two celebrated military 
thinkers Maj.-Gen. J.F.C. Fuller and Capt. B.H. Liddell Hart.53 Fuller in his study 
Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure was highly critical of top-ranking British 
generals on the Western Front as a class, although he did not single out Haig for 
special treatment. Fuller indicted these leaders on the basis of old age. Leaning on 
Napoleon for support, he declared that ‘no general of over forty-five years of age 
should be allotted an active command in the field’.54 Fuller argued that advanced age 
deprived generalship of its powers of command in the physical, mental and moral 
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spheres. Fuller’s criticism was challenged by Brig.-Gen J.E. Edmonds who observed 
that ‘the volume is a hasty and unconvincing piece of writing. General Fuller has not 
put his finger on the disease, although he is probably right in thinking there is one’.55  
By contrast, Liddell Hart, while convalescing from wounds received on the 
Somme in July 1916, wrote a ‘fulsome eulogy of the British high command and 
staff’.56 However, in the early 1930’s he was appointed by Lloyd George to act as 
military adviser for his Memoirs. He was not only flattered by this engagement but 
became sympathetic to his paymaster’s ideas.57 Consequently, he vented his spleen 
on Haig. According to John Mearscheimer, Liddell Hart confided to his diary his 
reversed opinion of Haig:  
He was a man of supreme egoism and utter lack of scruple – 
who, to his overweening ambition sacrificed thousands of 
men. A man who betrayed even his most devoted assistants 
as well as the Government which he served. A man who 
gained his ends by trickery of a kind that was not merely 
immoral but criminal.58 
By this time Liddell Hart had convinced himself that during the war the 
military leadership had been grossly incompetent. His overriding concern was that as 
many of these officers had remained in-post after the war, they would repeat the 
same mistakes in any future continental conflict. Thus, according to Liddell Hart’s 
lights, ‘every piece of evidence pointing to misconduct in the Great War served to 
condemn the interwar leaders’ in the eyes of his primary political audience.59 
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Following a quiet Second World War, the donkeys school rediscovered itself in 
the ‘turbulent decade’ of the 1960s revitalising and rebuilding its membership.60 In 
1959, Leon Wolff’s poignant study of Passchendaele In Flanders Field was 
published.61 With ‘its highly developed dramatic sense’ the book was ‘a prototype 
and a portent’ of the works to come.62 In 1961, the writer Charles Chilton encouraged 
the donkeys school with pure entertainment. His radio production of The Long, Long 
Trail, a satirical BBC musical parodying Haig’s generalship was well received.63 This 
work formed the basis of Joan Littlewoods’s ‘most memorable’ Theatre Workshop 
play Oh! What a Lovely War.64 In 1969, Richard Attenborough directed a film 
version of this production with what appeared to be the support of the entire British 
acting profession. In 1989, John Lloyd presented his iconic and hugely popular BBC 
Television series Blackadder Goes Forth. This production recruited a new generation 
of supporters to the donkeys school. On average, 11.7 million viewers watched the 
six episodes.65 These enterprises were ‘arguably the most important then and since’ in 
sustaining the donkeys myth.66  
In 1983, now Professor Gerard De Groot produced an in-depth study of Haig’s 
early life up to 1914. Following exhaustive and painstaking research, De Groot 
concluded that ‘the Boer War was the terminus of Haig’s development as a soldier; 
his strategical and tactical beliefs underwent no significant change after 1902’.67  
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Support for De Groot’s thesis can be found in The Killing Ground written by 
Tim Travers who was one of Haig’s most formidable critics. In his influential study, 
Travers delivered a well-argued case against the pre-1914 GS where he singled out 
Haig for particular criticism.68 His central theme was that the GS, nominally the 
‘brain of the army’, placed an ‘overwhelming emphasis on human solutions to 
modern firepower’ in preference to corresponding technological solutions. In 
evidence he offered the FSR which he says Haig ‘was responsible for writing’.69 At 
this point Travers invoked the work of Thomas Kuhn who popularised the idea of the 
‘paradigm shift’ to explain scientific discovery as a complex development extended 
both in time and space, rather than a simple unitary event favoured by historians.70 
Kuhn’s conceptualisation was also helpful to Travers because it fed into the highly 
charged Military Revolution debate initiated by Michael Roberts in the mid-1950s.71 
Travers depicted what he disparagingly asserts was Haig’s qualitative ‘Napoleonic’ 
paradigm of warfare as the ‘psychological battlefield’, in juxtaposition to the 
Western Front reality, which conformed to what he called the modern quantitative 
paradigm of the ‘technological battlefield’.72 Travers concluded a lengthy argument 
by observing that ‘by far the greatest problem was the way in which the late 
nineteenth-century paradigm failed to come to grips with the twentieth-century 
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paradigm’ that embraced the ‘technical firepower reality’.73 Consequently, on the 
Western Front, the needless sacrifice of British troops ensued.74 
Travers largely blamed Haig for this failure. He argued that ‘Haig’s personality 
and understanding of the role of Commander-in-Chief, learned at the Staff College, 
were so structured as to make change, innovation and suggestions difficult’. He 
further asserted that the ‘crux of Haig’s problem’ was having ‘given his allegiance to 
the late nineteenth century concept of war…he could not, and never did, transfer his 
allegiance fully to a twentieth-century image of war’.75 Even ‘more damaging’ was 
Haig’s ‘aloof and inner directed personality’ which isolated ‘Haig and GHQ from the 
rest of the BEF’ resulting in ‘group think conformity’; this time invoking a theory 
promoted by Irving Janis.76 According to Travers, the unfortunate combination of 
these factors created ‘a paralysis’ or ‘a command vacuum’ at the top of the BEF that 
‘prevented change, innovation and rational planning’. This situation ‘led to changes 
in tactics, and ideas and training filtering upwards and sideways to avoid GHQ, 
rather than downwards from GHQ’.77  
Travers’s depiction of late nineteenth century and twentieth century battlefields 
as psychological and technological respectively, and his suggestion that a paradigm 
shift occurred from one to the other, is at least questionable. In respect to the 
psychological battlefield he appears to conflate the nature of war, with the conduct of 
warfare on the battlefield. Clausewitz posited ‘the condition of the mind has always 
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the most decisive influence on the forces employed in war’.78 By this reckoning, 
arguably all warfare regardless of time and space was ultimately psychological, and 
not strictly a late nineteenth century phenomena. Indeed, the latest British military 
doctrine posits that ‘warfare is a human activity and the moral component exerts a 
decisive influence both individually and collectively’.79 Furthermore, ‘all historians 
do agree, however, that a systemic change in the conduct of war was brought about 
in the nineteenth century by the technical transformations of the industrial age’.80 
Thus, it can also be argued that on the late nineteenth century battlefield the conduct 
of warfare was increasingly technological, and not simply a new phenomenon in the 
twentieth century. As Jonathan Bailey observed, the paradigm shift that did occur on 
the Western Front in respect to the character of warfare was associated with the 
technological transformation. For the first time, this allowed fighting in the third 
dimension through the deployment of aircraft and the advent of indirect artillery fire. 
Moreover, Bailey posited that this ‘discontinuous increase in military capability’ 
amounted to a ‘Military Revolution’.81 This transformation fitted in with Kuhn’s 
conceptualisation of a paradigm shift.  
As for Travers’s personal criticism of Haig, contradicting himself, he conceded 
that Haig was not a luddite. In fact, he claimed that Haig was ‘desperate to use 
[tanks] as a breakthrough weapon just as he had been eager to use gas on September 
25th 1915 at Loos’.82 He might have also added that as early as June 3rd 1916, Haig 
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had developed a policy for strategic air bombing operations behind enemy lines on 
behalf of the Air Board in London.83  
Travers’s claim that Haig’s style of leadership was aloof and remote is also not 
supported by the evidence. As shown in Figure 17, (p.72) in the seven month period 
January to July 1917, during the prelude to the Third Ypres campaign, Haig held 492 
meetings with over 1000 people; he entertained 281 visitors at his HQ on 198 
separate occasions. As these figures relate to only those recorded in Haig’s war diary, 
it can be assumed that the actual numbers exceed those indicated. It should also be 
added that during the latter half of 1917 and in 1918 Haig spent little time at his 
Montreuil HQ; rather he was based at his advanced headquarters where he was in 
daily contact with his army, corps and divisional commanders conducting operations. 
In the final analysis the obvious truth that cannot be ignored is the BEF’s role, 
led by Haig, in the Allied victory. Travers did not directly address this issue in The 
Killing Ground. Five years later in his next major work, How The War Was Won, he 
corrected this omission by conceding, ‘it cannot be denied that Haig’s wearing-down 
strategy finally did wear out the German army…through determination, technology, 
wearing down, sacrifice, and German strategic and tactical errors, the enemy had 
finally been conquered’.84 In the forlorn hope of salvaging his earlier argument, 
Travers concluded that ‘to a considerable extent the German Army defeated itself 
through its own offensive from March to July’.85 To some, this proposition may have 
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weight and an element of truth; but as observed by John Terraine, Travers was apt to 
‘direct and bend…research to “yield the appropriate lessons”’.86 
With a few notable exceptions, members of the ‘donkeys school’ often used the 
same secondary sources. This possibly accounts for the high degree of repetition and 
overlap in these works. In fairness to the early writers, some primary sources, 
particularly in the Public Records Office, were not opened until the late 1960s, and 
full access to Haig’s private papers was restricted until 1961 when the documents 
were placed by the late Earl Haig in the National Library of Scotland. Of the writers 
identified here, Fuller relied on his first-hand experience and did not cite his sources. 
As for Liddell Hart, as T.H. Thomas observed, his work ‘stands out by the dialectical 
skill with which hostile criticism is presented as a narrative of fact’. Thomas wryly 
claimed that ‘more than once the author’s text is at odds with the sources listed in his 
impressive bibliography’.87 Leon Wolff relied almost entirely on secondary sources 
and accessed Haig’s diaries through Robert Blake’s edited work.88 As Falls observed, 
‘though most evidence is relevant, it is selected to prove a case’.89 Alan Clark was 
cavalier in his use of sources. Richard Holmes investigated the veracity of the 
alleged conversation between Ludendorff and Hoffmann quoted above. He reported 
that there is no evidence, ‘not a jot or scintilla’ that it ever took place.90 In a typically 
scathing review of De Groot’s book Douglas Haig 1861-1928,91, Terraine observed 
that De Groot relied on ‘a priori judgements, suppression of contrary evidence, and 
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elimination of context...often with a strong dose of malice added’.92 As would be 
expected, Tim Travers engaged closely with primary sources and his assessment of 
Haig was supported by the usual scholarly apparatus. Although David Woodward 
judged that this ‘fine book [was] only marred by the author’s occasional acceptance 
as evidence of what amounts to hearsay or gossip in the letters and diaries of senior 
officers’.93  
As David French observed ‘since 1945, Haig has passed into popular historical 
mythology as the archetypal “donkey” who created a lost generation of British 
manhood by his supposedly insensitive and incompetent handling of his forces on the 
western front’.94 Although this note was written in 1985, and despite the tireless work 
of later revisionist military historians, in the general public’s mind at least this 
appears to be the abiding impression. A recent Leader article in The Times claimed 
that ‘the phrase “lions led by donkeys” has become one of the great clichés of 
schoolroom history’. The tactical failures of the First World War not only tainted the 
British GS, but ruined the names of several commanders. Even today, Earl Haig is an 
undeserving monument to ineptitude’.95 In June 2014, the popular military historian 
Dan Snow received hate mail for attempting publicly to debunk this myth.96 
Nonetheless, revisionist historians have turned to the mass-media in new attempts to 
balance the record: Max Hastings wrote a feature length article in The Sunday Times 
cogently arguing that Britain’s generals including Haig ‘were far from donkeys, the 
bloodshed was no worse than in other wars and the front-line soldier’s lot no more 
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terrible’.97 The National Archives has run a series of research-based workshops for 
budding historians, one of which directly addressed the question of ‘lions led by 
donkeys?98 As was reported in The Times, when Michael Gove became the Secretary 
of State for Education in the Coalition Government, he ‘let off a fusillade against 
“Blackadderisation” of the Great War in schools, and against the prevailing idea that 
this was a war of “lions led by donkeys”’.99 What effect these initiatives have had on 
popular sentiment, only time will tell.  
The Educated Soldier 
 
Alike in personal efficiency and professional credentials, Sir Douglas Haig was 
the first officer of the British Army. He had obtained every qualification, 
gained every experience and served in every appointment requite for General 
Command. He was a Cavalry Officer of social distinction and independent 
means, whose whole life had been devoted to military study and practice…It is 
impossible to assemble around any officer a series of appointments and 
qualifications in any way comparable with [Haig’s]. 
Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, 1927.100 
 
The representations of Haig discussed so far rely for their potency on ‘internal 
factors’ or defects in intellect and personality to account for his perceived disastrous 
and costly role on the Western Front.101 Norman F. Dixon has provided a fulsome 
diagnosis of these factors in his influential study On the Psychology of Military 
Incompetence.102 In defence of Haig, the educated soldier school juxtaposed these 
‘internal factors’ against the formidable ‘external factors’ that he overcame to 
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vanquish the German army from France and Belgium.103 These external factors are 
discussed in-depth in the 14 Western Front volumes of The Official History of the 
Great War (1914-1918) compiled by Brig.-Gen J.E. Edmonds.104 These tomes, the 
first of which was published in 1922 and the last in 1947, have had their detractors 
including Liddell Hart, Winter and Travers. One of their principal objections was 
that Edmonds appeared determined to protect the reputations of Haig and his most 
senior commanders. There may be some truth in this sentiment, but following a 
thorough investigation of how Edmonds personally and professionally approached 
his task historian Andrew Green concluded: 
Edmonds in fact took his historical responsibilities extremely 
seriously and was determined to publish a true and accurate 
account of the operations of which he wrote. He was not 
blindly supportive of Haig and where he did see shortcomings 
he was prepared to detail these in his official works.105  
It was John Terraine in his refreshing study Douglas Haig – The Educated 
Soldier who first characterised Haig in this way, relying upon external factors for his 
defence of Haig.106 Alex Danchev provided a masterly summary of Terraine’s thesis:  
First, that it was necessary to fight and beat the Germans on 
the Western Front; second, that this involved a protracted war 
of attrition to accomplish the ‘wearing out’ process of the 
enemy forces which was an essential precondition of a 
favourable and decisive outcome; third, that in the absence of 
obliging German offensives the requisite attrition could only 
be achieved by British ones; fourth, that there was no 
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alternative to this strategy, costly as it was, and the 
exceptional constraints on the tactics it imposed, given the 
prevailing technical and operational conditions; and last, the 
strategy was a demonstrable success.107  
Terraine’s work has been the subject of criticism from a number of highly 
respected military historians. For example, Brian Bond has observed that there is a 
pronounced determinism in Terraine’s approach, which he deployed in an attempt to 
deflect criticism away from the conduct of the war that cost so many lives, towards 
his Panglossian view that, in the circumstances, Haig achieved the best possible 
outcome.108 Furthermore, ‘in book after book (and in numerous articles) Terraine has 
reiterated his main points’.109 In a conciliatory tone, Bond did point out that ‘Terraine 
had his limitations and his blind spots, and it would not be surprising if at times he 
was driven into dogmatic or more extreme positions in fending off his critics’.110 Fifty 
years on, Terraine’s study is still considered to be Haig’s standard biography by 
military historians of all shades of opinion.111 
In 1999, John Bourne called for a new study of Haig ‘which places him in the 
context of the much changed landscape of Western Front operational 
historiography’.112 This call was answered by a series of essays written by leading 
revisionist military historians and published under the title of Haig: A Reappraisal 
70 Years On. John Hussey pointed out that Haig ‘would not tolerate early Victorian 
methods’, and he had an open mind to technology like aircraft, where he and 
Trenchard created a doctrine for the RFC, which later paved the way for air 
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superiority over the British front. 113 J.P. Harris showed that Haig was able to grapple 
with other new technologies including the tank. Michael Crawshaw went further and 
argued that:  
In Douglas Haig, the British Army in the Great War was 
fortunate in finding a leader who, contrary to caricature, 
possessed an openness of mind to technical innovation and 
the clarity of vision to concentrate on the applications which 
offered the best prospects of success.114  
Peter Simpkins in a lucid and enlightening chapter on Haig and the Army 
Commanders, concluded that as the war progressed, there was a ‘detectable ‘learning 
curve’ in the command relationships of Haig’s BEF, just as there was in its tactics 
and techniques’.115 This suggested that Haig was able to put lessons learned into 
practice; even in the narrow sense of interpersonal relationships. Ten years later, 
Haig: A Reappraisal 80 Years On was published.116 It is telling that editors left the 
text from the original unchanged. Perhaps this showed support for a statement made 
by Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, that ‘we need no more books devoted exclusively 
to Sir Douglas Haig’.117  
It is apparent that this advice has not been heeded; three new biographies of 
Haig have appeared revealing little that is new.118 The latest volume, Gary Sheffield’s 
The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, has the distinct merit of placing him 
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within the context of his time. This approach showed the development of Haig’s 
standout quality as a professional ‘in an officer corps dominated by amateurs’.119 In 
his assessment of Haig, Sheffield advanced on the same lines as Terraine.120 
However, Sheffield has not been afraid to serve up criticism where he thought this 
was due. For example, he wrote ‘Haig bears a large share of the responsibility for the 
disaster of 1 July…and likewise Haig deserve[d] censure for the Battle of Third 
Ypres in 1917 – not so much for his optimism but for neglecting to curb that of his 
subordinate, Hubert Gough.121 Nonetheless, like Terraine, Sheffield found that in the 
Hundred Days campaign Haig ‘won the greatest series of victories in British military 
history’.122  
As would be expected, Sheffield’s use of primary evidence and scholarly 
apparatus is impeccable, and the same applies to J.P. Harris. The other two authors 
use secondary sources extensively. Unfortunately, Terraine’s methods are open to 
criticism. As Andy Simpson observed, it is a surprising coincidence that nearly half 
the books used by Terraine formed the majority of books cited by Alan Clark.123 It is 
also surprising that his biography of Haig sufferers from almost a complete lack of 
source references that ‘vitiate[d] much solid research and a quarter of a century’s 
reading’.124 This approach was frustrating for scholars, and provided fertile ground 
for Terraine’s critics. 
While the caricature of Haig as the educated soldier has had little impact on 
popular public opinion, it appears that it is now becoming, partially at least, the 
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settled view of the younger generation of revisionist military historians. Jonathan 
Boff suggested that Haig did not stand aloof and isolated from the proceedings of the 
Hundred Days campaign but was an active participant.125 Andy Simpson credited 
Haig with having a ‘far better’ judgement than Ludendorff in the conservation of 
manpower in the Summer of 1918.126 Paul Harris in his recent ground breaking PhD 
thesis “The Men Who Planned The War” discussed in detail Haig’s vital role in the 
pre-war development of the GS.127 He also pointed to the two salient external factors 
overcome by the staff namely ‘the vast expansion of the British army and having to 
fight a continental war of attrition’. In this context Harris suggested Haig ‘supported 
any efforts to improve Staff expertise’.128 Simon Robbins acknowledged that internal 
factors were contributory factors to the mistakes Haig made in 1915-17 including 
‘poor operational planning’. However, he argued that these were of secondary 
importance to the presence of formidable external factors, like ‘British inexperience 
of continental warfare, new technology and tenacious German resistance, [which] 
provide[d] a much more reliable means of understanding the problems faced by the 
British Army when apportioning blame for the heavy losses of the war’. Robbins 
argued that ‘by mid-1917 the British had a masterplan for winning the war, which 
saw a shift from a strategy of annihilation to a strategy of attrition [where] the pattern 
of Haig’s methods of attack in 1917-18…were the model of military excellence for 
Montgomery’s style of warfare in 1942-45’.129  
                                                 
125 Jonathan Boff, "British Third Army, the Application of Modern War, and the Defeat of the German 
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The Master of the Field 
 
[Haig had] strategic ability, firm will, strength of character, acceptance of 
responsibility and political insight...By means of these powers he saved 
France in 1916 and 1918 and pre-eminently on the historical day, 26th March 
1918…He really remained MASTER OF THE FIELD. 
German Staff Officer.130 
 
According to Edmonds, this epigraph was bestowed on Haig by the ‘foremost 
of German military societies’, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und 
Wehreissenschaft in its publication Heerfuhrer des Welkriegs.131 Arguably this 
representation of Haig was initiated in 1922 by G.A.B. Dewar and Lieut.-Col J.H. 
Boraston in their two volume Sir Douglas Haig’s Command 1915-1918. As an 
anonymous American book reviewer observed ‘at times it ceases to be an apologia 
and becomes almost an apotheosis’.132 Essentially for this reason, this work was 
dismissed by British critics including Edmonds.133  
In 1929, the first unofficial biography Field Marshal Earl Haig appeared. 
Written by John Charteris, this is an intensely personal study based on the author’s 
close association with Haig over 20 years. Despite this, contemporary commentators 
found that Charteris’ book contained ‘few surprises’. Nonetheless, the quality of 
Haig’s professional judgement revealed by Charteris did prove a revelation to some. 
The Australian Official Historian, C.E.W. Bean, not generally thought to be one of 
Haig’s supporters, concluded that ‘if he was slow in his thinking, he was 
extraordinarily sure. Again and again his judgement, and his alone, proved right.’ For 
evidence Bean cited the German retirement to the Hindenburg Line in 1917; Haig’s 
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prediction that the Germans would overreach themselves in the spring of 1918 and 
that the Allies would find an opportunity for a decisive blow; and last but not least, 
Haig alone anticipated the end of hostilities in 1918, while the general consensus was 
that the war would continue in 1919 and even into 1920.134 Of course, Bean could 
have added several other examples of Haig’s sound judgement. For instance, Haig 
was a lone voice in predicting a long war at the first war conference held at Downing 
Street on 5th August 1914.135 Haig also argued against the imposition of onerous 
peace terms on Germany because he predicted that this type of settlement would only 
result in a continuation of war within 20 years.136 
In 1938, Liddell Hart observed that Duff Copper, the author of the official 
biography, characterised Haig as a ‘soldier without flaw’.137 Later, Maj.-Gen. Sir 
John Davidson’s volume Haig: Master of the Field elaborated upon this theme: 
[Haig] fulfilled his task with tenacity, consummate skill and 
complete success, in the face of almost insurmountable 
difficulties, and in spite of the fact that, for a long period, 
Britain was fighting alone. He met every crisis with careful 
forethought calculated prevision and sound judgement. He 
gave his allies all the help he could, to tide them over their 
difficulties and misfortunes…He conducted the final series of 
battles to victory with masterly proficiency. The strategy was 
his strategy, adopted by Foch in preference to his own.138 
Foch’s advocates may have refuted these assertions, and even Haig might have 
found them too effusive. Nonetheless, Davidson’s final assertion was an accurate 
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reflection of Haig’s state of mind as shown in a letter he wrote to Churchill in 1928, 
and shortly before his death:  
In order to enjoy reading your writings it is not, I find, 
necessary to agree with all the opinions you express. As for 
the criticisms for what I did or did not do, no one knows as 
well as I do how far short of the ideal my conduct of the 1st 
Corps & 1st Army was, as well as of the BEF when C-in-C. 
But I do take credit for this, that it was due to the decisions 
which I took in August and Septr 1918 [sic] that the war 
ended in Nov...139  
As for the quality of the evidence base used by these biographers, Duff-Cooper 
alone had unrestricted access to Haig’s papers and his personal wartime diaries that 
run to over 10,000 pages. Of course, this may lead to the justifiable criticism that 
Duff-Cooper’s work was a portrayal of Haig by Haig. Charteris and Davidson made 
extensive use of their private papers and documents as the former acknowledged:  
Almost all the documents to which I referred during the years 
1907-1918 passed through my hands, and are now in the 
official archives. All the conversations which I reported were 
either in my own presence, or were related to me by Lord 
Haig. In the preparation of the book I have used all available 
published data.140 
While Haig’s critics may have vehemently disagreed with the analysis, 
findings and conclusions of the master of the field school, perhaps the source of the 
evidence of its members, apart from Duff Cooper, is harder to criticise. Although this 
provenance has not prevented Denis Winter at least from doing so.  
                                                 
139 Robin Prior, Churchill's World Crisis as History, First ed. (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1983).  
p. 262. Note 18: Haig to Churchill 13/3/1927, Churchill Papers 8/211. (Emphasis in original). 
140 Brigadier-General John Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig (London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 
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The Heroic Manager 
 
In 1920, the American military attaché in London, observed ‘there is 
probably no more complex and complicated organization in the world 
than the British Army’.141 
Col. Oscar Solbert. 
Haig’s representation as a military manager has been alluded to, but the case 
has not been made. In 1991, Hew Strachan foreshadowed this line of enquiry when 
he posited that ‘Liddell Hart completely failed to understand that the skills demanded 
in the leadership of mass armies in an industrialized age were more managerial than 
heroic’.142 In 1994, Michael Howard made a similar point when he observed that 
Haig was a military manager comparable to Dwight D. Eisenhower, Georgi K. 
Zhukov and Gerd von Rundstedt.143 In his chapter on Haig, “Portrait of a Commander 
Chief,” John Hussey, quoted Wavell and declared the ‘matter of administration is the 
crux of generalship’. He observed that:  
[Haig] was thus the principal director of Britain’s newest and 
greatest corporate enterprise, comparable in size to the 
administration of the largest city in the Kingdom (with the 
sole exception of London), the governance of which was the 
more delicate since it was based within a jealous and 
suspicious foreign state. To make the BEF run smoothly as it 
did is an achievement as remarkable as it is under-praised.144    
In a review of J.P. Harris’s Douglas Haig and the First World War, Sheffield 
made a similar observation: 
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This work has some distinct weaknesses…in particular, 
Haig’s critically important role in transforming the BEF 
during the course of the war – presiding over and actively 
participating in developments in logistics, organization, 
technology, tactics and training – is reduced here to a 
distinctly minor theme when it deserved to be a major one.145  
Fortunately for this writer, Sheffield did not follow his own advice when writing his 
later biography of Haig. Thus, although Haig’s managerial competence has been 
referred to in passing, it does not appear that his vital role as military manager on the 
Western Front has been examined in any sustained way. 
Thesis Structure and Content 
In pursuit of the research objectives, a thematic approach has been adopted for 
the structure of this thesis. Chapter 2 evidences the unprecedented management 
challenge which confronted Haig in 1916 by examining the dynamic scale, 
complexity and plasticity of the BEF’s ultimately epic organization. Chapter 3 
reveals the results of a study, drawing upon contemporary sources, that investigates 
the nature of unity-of-effort and its characteristic component parts from common 
usage. The outcome of this research has allowed the construction of a definition of 
the principle based firmly upon the contemporary understanding of the term. Most 
surely, and at the very least, Haig would have been familiar with the embodiment of 
this definition. Chapter 4 demonstrates how unity-of-mental-effort, utilising the 
agency of doctrine, evolved under Haig’s leadership to overcome the novel tactical 
challenges experienced on the Western Front. Chapter 5 examines how this doctrine 
was inculcated into the BEF through the use of progressive training methods and by 
an organization instituted by Haig with the aim of achieving unity-of-physical-effort. 
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Chapter 6 shows how Haig strove to achieve unity-of-moral-effort by promoting 
morale underpinned by discipline within the officer corps and ranks of the BEF. 
Chapter 7 explores Haig’s contribution to the establishment of the GS and the role 
this body played in building unity-of-effort in the BEF through its coordinative 
function. Chapter 8 draws the research findings together, pointing in conclusion to 
Haig’s exceptional military organizational, administrative and management ability. 
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2. The Anatomy of the BEF on the Western Front 146 
By the armistice on November 11th 1918, the BEF became the most effective 
British military organization in the nation’s history. During the ‘Hundred Days’ 
campaign, with the full cooperation of the French, Belgians and Americans, and 
spearheaded by Dominion forces, the BEF delivered the resounding defeat of ‘the 
single most powerful military machine in the world’.147 This chapter will discuss the 
unprecedented management challenge that confronted Haig in 1916 by examining 
the scale, complexity and plasticity of the organization of the BEF. Scale will be 
illustrated by focusing on the dramatic increase in the BEF’s manpower, material 
consumption and firepower. Complexity will be evidenced by the application of 
three fundamental organising principles: the chain of command, the span of control 
and the ‘sphere of influence’. Plasticity will be demonstrated by the BEF’s resilience 
in the face of huge casualties, its organizational responsiveness exemplified by the 
reaction to a logistical crisis in 1916, and its ability to adapt to the novel tactical 
conditions on the Western Front in a manner that initiated modern warfare.  
Scale and Scope 
Following the ‘race to the sea’ in December 1914, the Western Front  extended 
from Nieuwport on the Belgian coast to Pfetterhouse on the Swiss border, a distance 
of some 540 miles (Figure 1 below). By September 1918, the length of line held by 
the Allies was reduced to approximately 311 miles.148 This contraction was partly due 
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to German strategic withdrawal eastwards to the Hindenburg Line in the spring of 
1917, and to the enemy’s fighting retreat in the autumn of 1918. During the war, the 
British line averaged 80 miles from the River Somme northwards to the North Sea. 
The BEF occupied a hinterland of roughly 3,000 square miles encompassing large 
areas of northern France and Flanders, with arterial supply lines extending back to 
the Channel ports of Calais, Boulogne and Le Havre.  




The BEF’s manpower growth during the war was exponential. In August 1914, 
the force comprised 126,309 men of all ranks. During the course of hostilities, 
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History of the War (London: HMSO, 1931). [Cmd.1193], "General Annual Reports of the British 
Army (1913-1919)," (London: HMSO, 1921). 
 43 
 
5,146,998 British troops embarked for France from home ports.150 This figure 
included men returning to the front after medical treatment. Figure 2 shows that on 
November 1st 1918, the ration strength of British officers and men on the Western 
Front was 1,561,370. Relative to the BEF’s original strength this indicates a growth 
multiple of over 12 fold.  
Figure 2: Estimated Ration Strength of BEF in France (1914-1918) 
 
A closer examination of these figures shows that when the BEF embarked for 
the Western Front from August 9th to the 11th, 1914 the force had a total strength of 
6,061 officers and 120,248 NCOs and men. The force proceeded to France with four 
infantry divisions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th) assembled into two Army Corps. I Corp 
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was commanded by Haig. Following the untimely death of Lieut.-Gen Sir James 
Grierson on August 17th, II Corps was led by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. 
These formations were supported by a Cavalry Division under Maj-Gen. Edmund 
Allenby, plus the independent 5th Cavalry Brigade.151 The infantry divisions were 
based upon the large Indian Army pattern, comprising three infantry brigades of four 
battalions organised into the new four company formation.152  
Each division had an establishment of 18,073 men of all-ranks and 
specialisations including divisional mounted troops, artillery, engineers, signal 
service, supply and transport train, and field ambulances. Of these, 12,165 were 
infantrymen supported by 24 machine guns and 3,928 artillerymen equipped with 76 
guns (54x18-pdrs, 18x4.5-inch howitzers and four 60-pdrs).153 The artillery was 
organised into three brigades of three batteries – the latter with six field guns or 
howitzers each, and one battery of four heavy guns. The Cavalry Division comprised 
four brigades of three regiments; plus cavalry divisional troops, consisting of 
artillery, engineers, signal service and medical units. The total strength was 
approximately 9,269 men of all ranks, 9,815 horses, 24 mobile machine guns and 
24x13-pdr field guns.154 The total ration strength of military forces in Britain 
immediately prior to hostilities was approximately 120,000 men, excluding 
reserves.155 By contrast the French mobilised 3,781,000 men between August 2nd and 
18th; while in ten days the Germans carried 1,500,000 men by train to the French 
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frontier to ‘launch the most massive offensive seen in history to that date.’156 Given 
the huge weight of French and German forces coalescing in northern France and 
Belgium, the influence of the small British force concentrating around Maubeuge 
was moral rather than physical.157 




A particularly challenging aspect of the BEF’s massive manpower increase was 
its multiculturalism. Figure 3 shows that by the end of the war the BEF was a multi-
national, multi-cultural organization, catering for the prejudices, habits, diets and 
various peculiarities of men drawn from a wide variety of European and non-
European cultures. These men were engaged in multifarious duties and comprised 
troops, native labour and camp-followers from every corner of the Empire. Also on 
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the strength were Belgian, French, Portuguese and American liaison officers and 
soldiers, plus 178,687 enemy prisoners of war. The rapid integration of this rich 
cultural diversity, without any undue organizational dislocation or administrative 
disruption, shows the remarkable tolerance and elasticity of the BEF’s organization.  
The dimension of manpower that most consumed Haig’s attention in the latter 
stages of 1917 up to summer 1918 was the critical condition of the BEFs fighting 
strength. On August 4th 1914, the BEF was mobilized and ‘in all essentials 
“everything went according to plan”’.158 This presumes that when the BEF arrived in 
France its war establishment was complete, except for known shortages of staff 
officers. As reinforcements arrived the establishment grew peaking in 1917 to 
1,851,662 soldiers of all ranks. By comparing this data series with that of effective 
strength, the official published figures show that the BEF’s officer corps was slightly 
over-strength and its other ranks understrength between 1916 to 1918. Tellingly, at 
the end of 1917, there was an all-ranks shortage of 161,906 men. Haig’s own 
statistics, prepared by his Adjutant General’s Branch and retained in his diary, 
reported an even greater deficit. The AG estimated that by March 31st 1918 the BEF 
would suffer a shortage of 248,226 men, reducing average battalion other ranks 
strength to 542 men, or by approximately 37%.159 The estimate includes the negative 
impact of six divisions that Lloyd George dispatched to Italy, and an Australian 
division that was reformed into a depot division.160 In January 1918, Haig predicted 
that without the release of manpower held back at home by Lloyd George, the BEF 
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would be reduced to approximately 30 divisions by September.161 In the event, seven 
British divisions were broken up to improve the fighting efficiency of the 44 
divisions that remained and brigade strength was reduced from four battalions to 
three.162 The flow of reinforcements to the BEF improved after Foch was appointed 
Generalissimo, and as troops were returned from Italy.163 Despite this improvement, 
by June the BEF had 211,000 fewer bayonets compared to the 12 months previous.164 
This caused Foch to accuse Lloyd George to his face of having done nothing to avoid 
this shortfall – an accusation that the Prime Minister hotly denied.165  
Nonetheless, in June Haig advised the WO that based on the number of British 
infantry effectives available, and to maximise tactical efficiency, he proposed 
maintaining 39 divisions in the field comprising 29 British and 10 Dominion 
formations. Each division was to consist of three brigades, with a total per division of 
10 battalions comprising a minimum of 900 men each.166 With the needed weight of 
the British military presence at the armistice conference table in mind, the Army 
Council was ‘most strongly opposed to any reduction in the number of divisions 
while operations [were] in progress’. Haig was advised that ‘every endeavour 
[would] be made to keep 59 divisions [including Dominion forces] in the field’. This 
included a proposal to effectively dismantle the Cavalry Corps in France and 
redistribute the men released to machine gun and tank units with any remainder 
deployed as reinforcements to the infantry.167 Haig baulked against this advice on the 
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grounds of tactical efficiency, fighting effectiveness and the continued value of the 
cavalry.168 On November 9th, the WO urged Haig to maintain 51 British and 10 
Colonial divisions concluding:  
I am therefore to request you to ensure that in case of an 
armistice all divisional cadres are filled, even if infantry 
battalions are considerably reduced below an establishment 
of 900 other ranks.169  
Figure 4: British Regimental Strength of the BEF including TF (1914-1918) 
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The analysis of combat strength of the BEF’s regimental troops (Figure 4 
above), clearly shows the rapid increase in ‘mechanicalisation’.170 Excluding the 
Royal Engineers, the proportion of the new mechanised arms including the artillery, 
RFC the MGC and the TC nearly doubled between 1914 and 1918 from 21% to 36% 
respectively. As will be shown below, this trajectory increased the firepower of the 
BEF on an exponential basis. The impact of ‘mechanicalisation’ (Figure 5) produced 
a commensurate rise in the proportion of non-combat to combat troops (9% in 1914 
vs. 24% in 1918). These non-combat troops, including over 100,000 non-white 
labourers, were required to support the logistical infrastructure, systems and 
processes vital to this transformation. 
Figure 5: Comparing Combat to Non-Combat Strength of BEF in France (1914-1918) 
 
 
                                                 




The BEF’s enormous growth in manpower was matched by its equally huge 
consumption of supplies and war-like stores. In total, 438,997 vehicles of all types 
including 15,889 guns and carriages, 27,466 trench guns and bomb throwers, 610 
locomotives, 19,858 railway trucks and 59,898 motor vehicles were shipped to 
France for use by the BEF.171 As shown in Figure 6, the shipment of stores, including 
4,959,236 DWT of ammunition, amounted to 27,256,179 DWT.172 The BEF in 
France consumed approximately between 80% and over 95% of all stores and 
supplies shipped abroad. Hidden from view within this tonnage were approximately 
136,396,000 socks, 57,421,000 shirts and 46,973,000 boots.173 
Figure 6: Distribution of Men and Material in and to British Theatres 
 
In respect to food supplies, the entire output of meat from Australia and New 
Zealand was put at the disposal of the Army, together with all frozen meat from the 
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Theatre/Matériel France/Belgium Italy Egypt Salonika Mesopotamia East 
Africa
Total 
Strength of Expeditionary Forces on 01/11/1918 
(All ranks excl. Natives other than Troops)
1,859,246 80,283 305,967 158,707 222,399 33,666 2,660,268
69.9% 3.0% 11.5% 6.0% 8.4% 1.3% 100.0%
No. Guns & Howitzers in Theatre (01/10/1918) 10,153 523 445 833 549 23 12,526
81.1% 4.2% 3.6% 6.7% 4.4% 0.2% 100.0%
Approx. Gun & Trench Warfare Ammo. Tonnage 
Shipped to Theatre During War (DWT) 4,959,236 32,718 803 5,130,268
96.7% 0.6% 0.0% 100.0%
Shipment of Stores from All Ports from 09/08/1914 
to 26/03/1920 (DWT) 22,296,943 10,304 22,452,242
99.3% 0.0% 100.0%
No. Aeroplanes Employed on Each Front (week 
ending 30/11/1918) 1,397 70 234 58 51 0 1,810
77.2% 3.9% 12.9% 3.2% 2.8% 0.0% 100.0%
Sources: 
Strength of Expeditionary Forces: Statistics Table (ii) p.p. 64 iii, vi, ix, xv,xii.
Guns & Howitzers: Statistics Table xxi p. 451
Tonnage of Gun & Trench Warfare Ammunition: Statistics Table 10 p. 484







Plate (Argentina). Additional supplies had to be obtained from the United States, 
Canada, Brazil, Patagonia and South Africa.174 It might be a surprise to learn that in 
France, ‘a large proportion of the daily fresh [vegetable] requirements of the British 
armies was grown by the troops themselves’ to free up shipping space. Furthermore, 
‘20,000 acres of cereals, which otherwise would have been left derelict, were 
harvested’.175  
While these statistics are impressive and demonstrate the sheer scale of the 
behind-the-lines operations, perhaps there is nothing more astonishing than the total 
cost to the British nation of the BEF in France. As shown in Figure 7 (below), in the 
1913-14 fiscal year the British Army cost the taxpayer £32.13 million.176 This figure 
rose to £974 million in 1918-19.177 Of this total, it is estimated that £779 million can 
be attributed to the BEF.178 The total wartime cost of the BEF is estimated at £2.6 
billion. This equates to approximately £855 billion in current (2011) prices.179 To 
produce the quantity of stores and supplies required in France, the entire British 
economy was mobilised at a ruinous cost to public finances. By 1917, GDP rose to 
£5,108 million where defence spending equated to 47.1% of this amount. To fund 
this and later expenditure, National Debt increased to £8,078.20 million in 1919-20 
or 135% of GDP. As GDP fell in the immediate post-war period, this percentage 
continued to increase reaching a potentially bankrupting 182% of GDP in 1923-24. 
This compares to 89% in 2015 and a record low of 31% in 1991.180 
                                                 
174 Ibid. p. 842.  
175 Ibid. p. 583. 
176 (87), "Army Appropriation Account 1913-1914," (London: HMSO, 1914-16) p. 4. 
177 (41), "Army Appropriation Account 1918-1919," (London: HMSO, 1920) p. 6. 
178 A factor of 80% has been applied. This roughly equates to the total number of men and tonnage of 
matérial sent to France as opposed to other theatres.  
179 http://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/ (02/12/2015). This figure of relative values (UK £) 
has been calculated using a factor derived from the relative labour cost for each year between  
1914-1918.  





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The sheer scale of the BEF’s rapid increase in firepower can be demonstrated 
in two ways. The first builds on earlier references by charting the growth of 
manpower in the fighting arms. The second way examines the growth of British gun 
and howitzer ammunition expenditure by amount, type and timing on the Western 
Front. Figure 8 provides an indication of the increase in firepower expressed by 
manpower between 1914 and 1918. While the infantry’s strength increased by a 
factor of seven, the combined strength of the artillery, air force, heavy machine gun 
and tank corps, increased over ten-fold.181 This disparity illustrates the BEF’s rising 
mechanicalisation and its growing dependence on heavy weaponry and airpower. 
 
Figure 8: Increase in Regimental Strength of BEF including TF in France (1914-1918) 
 
 
By November 1918, such was the dramatic increase and scale of the BEF’s 
firepower, that 15,889 guns, howitzers and carriages had been shipped to France.182 
                                                 
181 [Cmd.1193], "General Annual Reports of the British Army (1913-1919)." pp. 52-56. 
182 TNA/WO/394/20, "Statistical Abstract: Armies at Home and Abroad (1914-1920)," (1920) p. 515. 
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These weapons were used to fire approximately 165 million rounds of high explosive 
and shrapnel shells of all calibres (Figure 9).  





















































































A macabre interpretation of this statistic is that it required an average of roughly 100 
medium to heavy artillery shells to kill or wound one German soldier in the British 
sector. This calculation excludes the billions of small arms ammunition fired by the 
British at the Germans.183 The peaks and troughs of the bar chart register the disparity 
between intense periods of fighting approximating to major offensive operations, and 
the quieter periods in between. 
Figure 10: Distribution of Ammunition Expended by Guns & Howitzers (1914-1918) 
 
Figure 10 shows the distribution of ammunition expended by weapon calibre. 
The 18-lb quick firing gun and the 4.5-inch howitzer were the British field artillery’s 
main weapons of choice. As the war progressed, the growth and reliance on medium 
                                                 
183 Statistics Of The Military Effort Of The British Empire During The Great War: 1914-1920. Section 
7, p. 358. The Official Statistician estimates that between February 1915 to October 1918 inclusive 

























































and heavy guns and howitzers up to calibres of 15-inches became increasingly 
significant. With greater clarity, this trend is depicted in Figure 11.  





Figure 12 indicates that the proportion of heavy and medium artillery to field 
artillery increased from 1:9.9 at Neuve Chapelle in 1915 to a high of 1:1.3 at Menin 
Road in 1917. Clear evidence is also provided of the increasing weight of firepower 
that the BEF was able to deploy. At Neuve Chapelle the Germans were exposed to 
64,466 artillery shells, mainly of light calibre, whereas at the Menin Road 3,500,000 
rounds were fired in the 8 day build-up and attack, with a relatively high proportion 
of shells fired by medium to heavy calibre guns. That said, the concentration of guns 
at Neuve Chapelle was higher at 3 yards per gun, firing 44 rounds per yard per day. 
Combined with the element of surprise, this factor probably accounts for the early 
success of this offensive, when the village was captured by Haig’s troops before the 
inevitable counter-attack was delivered. 
Figure 12: Comparison of British Firepower in Evidence at Periods of Intensive Fighting *  
 
* Note: Statistics for the incidence of rounds expended have not been adjusted for “dud” shells, nor for the 
impact of the 106 Fuse. This is because the necessary data records have not been located. 
 
 




























Neuve Chapelle 10/03/1915 1 1,450 535 486 49 64,466 3 1 : 9.9 44 64,466 44
Aubers Ridge 09/05/1915 1 3,900 637 570 67 77,696 6 1 : 8.5 20 77,696 20
Festubert 13/05/1915-16/05/1915 4 5,080 637 570 67 83,284 8 1 : 8.5 16 20,821 4
Loos 21/09/1915-25/09/1915 5 11,200 871 758 113 384,053 13 1 : 6.7 34 76,811 7
Somme 24/06/-01/07/1916 8 24,640 1,437 1,010 427 1,732,873 17 1 : 2.4 70 216,609 9
Arras 02/04/1917-09/04/1917 (Vimy) 8 6,160 1,100 723 377 898,295 6 1 : 1.9 146 112,287 18
Messines 26/05/1917 - 07/06/1917 12 15,840 2,250 1,510 740 3,258,000 7 1 : 2.0 206 271,500 17
Third Ypres 15/07/1917-02/08/1917 19 26,400 3,091 2,092 999 4,283,550 9 1 : 2.1 162 225,450 9
Menin Road 13/09/1917-20/09/1917 8 14,080 1,295 720 575 3,500,000 11 1 : 1.3 249 437,500 31
Amiens 08/08/1918 1 18,700 2,070 1,386 684 448,918 9 1 : 2.0 24 448,918 24




In relation to the higher organization of the Army, General Sir Ian Hamilton 
wrote ‘any military organization should conform to certain set principles: (1) power 
must go with responsibility (2) the average human brain finds its effective scope in 
handling from three to six other brains’.184 These two principles adhere respectively 
to what is commonly known as the chain of command and the span of control. There 
was a third principle that Haig put to work which can usefully be referred to as the 
sphere of influence. This principle captures the complex formal and informal 
methods deployed by top ranking military officers to impose their will on the 
external and internal stakeholders of the organizations they command. These three 
principles are essential to coordination, the need for which in military organization is 
‘overwhelming’.185 To be clear, in brief, coordination is the process deployed through 
the agency of management to deliver unity-of-effort. 
The chain of command aims at perpendicular coordination with its vital 
ingredients of authority and the delegation of duties. The span of control targets 
horizontal coordination ‘through the universal service of knowledge’.186 The 
difference between these two forms of coordination allows us to make the useful 
distinction in military organizations between ‘line’ and ‘staff’ functions. Sphere of 
influence facilitates the improved effectiveness of both types of coordination. The 
challenges associated with the practical implementation of these principles in 
operational conditions peculiar to the Western Front is discussed below.  
                                                 
184 Sir Ian Hamilton, The Soul and Body of an Army (London: Edward Arnold & Co, 1921) p. 229. It 
should be noted it is not claimed here that Hamilton was the author or originator of this principle. In 
fact, Hamilton suggests that it is a ‘military axiom’, thus its origins are possibly lost in the mist of 
time. See p. 230.  
185 L. Urwick, "Organization as a Technical Problem," in Papers on the Science of Administration, ed. 
Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (New York: Columbia University, 1937) p. 52 
186 James D. Mooney, "The Principles of Organization," in Papers on the Science of Administration, ed. 
Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937) pp. 93-95. 
Mooney and his colleague were leading American contemporary administrative theorists who gained 
their experience working for General Motors in the 1930’s.  
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Chain of Command  
The chain of command is the hierarchical pyramid-like structure imposed on 
military and other organizations to link the highest authority to the lowest 
subordinate. The primary object is to secure unity-of-effort by achieving vertical 
coordination via delegation throughout the entire structure of the organised body.187 
In the military, the chain of command imposes a hierarchy of unambiguous authority 
and strict discipline on the organization. The intention is to ‘ensure that every man in 
the force acts promptly in response to the will of the Commander’.188 This authority is 
expressed down through successive and expanding layers of subordinate 
commanders until every officer is reached, and every man has his orders:  
These orders are founded on the original directions of the 
Commander-in-Chief, with modifications and details added 
by each lower authority in the chain, so as to suit the special 
circumstances of his own Command.  
The principle combines unity of control with decentralisation 
of command and devolution of responsibility. In no other 
way can ready and effective co-operation of all fractions of 
the force to a common end be ensured.189  
The principle of unity of command is embodied in the effective and efficient 
operation of the chain of command insisting that each subordinate should only 
receive orders from one superior.190  
FSR II states that ‘the successful issue of military operations depends mainly 
upon combination and unity of effort directed with energy and determination towards 
                                                 
187 John F. Lyndall Urwick, The Elements of Administration (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd, 
1943) pp. 51-52. 
188 Hubert Foster, Organization: How Armies Are Formed For War (1911) (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd, 
1911) p. 3. 
189 Ibid. pp. 5-6. 
190 Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management, trans. Constance Storrs (London: Sir Isaac 
Pitman & Sons, Ltd, 1961) p. 24, 34.  
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a definite object’. The chain of command provides the C-in-C ‘with the means of 
exerting the required influence over the work and action of every individual’. It also 
allows the ‘due sub-division of labour and decentralisation of responsibility among 
subordinates, combined with central control and co-ordination of subordinate parts 
for the attainment of common objectives…[which is] the essence of all efficient 
organization’. Within this context, men of average powers could be allotted definite 
functions that they can perform well. A degree of elasticity was also available ‘to 
meet the varying conditions which may arise and which it is impossible to foresee’.191  
While these benefits could be expressed easily enough on paper, in practice 
they were never fully realised by the BEF due to the formidable complexity of its 
organization. A combination of factors produced a debilitating effect on the chain of 
command. These factors included the vast numbers of men dispersed across wide 
battle fronts; highly congested theatres of operation making messaging and passage 
to the front line slow and laborious; and the relatively high attrition rates amongst 
field commanders of all ranks, which generated arbitrary dislocation in the chain of 
command at critical moments.  
To take but one example, The Fourth Army’s chain of command in front of 
Amiens on 8th August 1918 consisted of 441,000 troops of all ranks, comprising one 
cavalry corps, three infantry corps made up of 15 divisions. This force, together with 
100,000 horses and mules, 1,386 field guns and howitzers and 684 heavy artillery 
pieces, 604 tanks, and 800 aeroplanes was concentrated behind a congested front of 
21,000 yards.192 The final objective for the first day of the offensive at its furthest 
point was 14,000 yards from the starting line. To achieve this concentration, in 
                                                 
191 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) pp. 22-23. (Emphasis in original). 
192 Mark Adkin, The Western Front Companion (London: Aurum Press Limited, 2013) p. 77; Major 
General Sir Archibald Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred 
Days, August 8th to November 11th 1918,II vols, vol I (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919) p. 13. 
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addition to the ordinary supply trains for food and engineering material, 230 special 
trains were required for personnel and guns, and upwards of 60 special trains for 
ammunition. 193 The cavalry, tanks and a portion of artillery were deployed by road. 
Figure 13 (below) attempts to illustrate the complexity of Fourth Army’s chain 
of command. Due to a lack of computing-power, the chart is limited to 891 links in 
the chain of command down to battalion level.194 The aim of the drawing is to provide 
a simplistic, and perhaps some would say naïve impression, of the depth and breadth 
of the Fourth Army’s command and control scheme. Given there were five armies 
attached to the BEF, the organogram hints at the complexity and overwhelming 
difficulty that Haig and his commanders had to synchronise the actions of the whole 
organization towards a common strategic objective.  
The most serious obstacle to the effective and efficient operation of the chain 
of command was the BEF’s rudimentary communications system, exemplified by 
‘the lack of mobile real-time communications’. This was ‘the supreme technological 
deficiency of the 1914-1918 era’.195 As a result, commanders of all ranks, with the 
possible exception of platoon and section leaders, became ignorant of battle 
outcomes immediately after men went ‘over-the-top’. Furthermore, when telephonic 
and telegraphic communications failed, which was a common occurrence, it could 
take between two to three hours for relays of runners to reach Army HQ from the 
frontline. ‘The confusion that arose from the lack of accurate, ‘real-time’ information 
resulted in the loss of initiative and momentum.196  
                                                 
193 The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 11th 
1918, 1. p.13, 22. 
194 Ibid. Appendix F pp. 301-327. 
195 Crawshaw, "The Impact of Technology on the BEF and its Commander." p.167 
196 Brian N. Hall, "The British Expeditionary Force and Communications on the Western Front" 
(University of Salford, 2009) p. 166, citing TNA, WO 158/374, ‘Report on the Operations of the IVth 






































It must be added that even during static preparatory phases communications 
continued to present serious problems.197 Experience showed it could take up to eight 
hours for divisional orders to reach a platoon commander.198 Lieut.-Gen. Walter 
Congreve V.C. went further. He observed that:  
When troops are engaged in close contact with the enemy it 
has been calculated that it takes an average of at least 24 
hours from the time Divisional Operational Orders are issued 
before a Platoon Commander in the front line is in a position 
to carry out his part of the attack.  
It is not safe to assume that a message sent from Divisional 
Headquarters will reach a Platoon Commander in the front 
line in less than 4 hours.199  
In defence, the situation could sometimes be even worse. ‘The upshot of the German 
offensive on 21st March [1918] was the almost complete paralysis of the B.E.F’s 
command and control system’.200  
By 1917 it was standard procedure to allow a lapse of 24 hours between issuing 
an order and having the expectation that company and platoon commanders would 
have had sufficient time to respond. At the end of 1918, the time lapse was increased 
to 36 hours.201 Without detracting from the ‘organizational, procedural and technical’ 
communication innovations that were introduced, under these conditions it is hardly 
surprising that the efficiency of the BEF’s chain of command was compromised.202  
                                                 
197 LHCMA:Montgomery-Massingberd:7/3, "Notes on Somme Fighting," (1916). Notes on Experience 
Gained During Recent Operations, HQ., 2nd Division 16.8.16. p. 1. Here it is recommended that 
relay staging posts should be placed every 400 to 500 yards along the route. 
198 Ibid. Questions relating to an initial attack after lengthy preparation. Que.11.  
199 Ibid. XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced; No. 17, Issue of Orders p. 10. (Emphasis in original). 
200 Hall, "The British Expeditionary Force and Communications on the Western Front." p. 283. 
201 "S.S.135: The Division in Attack (November 1918)," (AP&SS) p. 18. 
202 "The British Expeditionary Force and Communications on the Western Front." p. 349.  
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Span of Control 
This organizational principle addresses the question of how many subordinates 
should be controlled by one superior to optimise horizontal coordination. Too few 
creates opportunities for ‘confusion and undue interference’. Too many produces 
‘considerable difficulty in making [men] act together’. Col. J.S. Rothwell, Professor 
of Staff Duties and Military Administration at the Staff College, Camberley, circa. 
1893, believed that in well organised military systems, the number of subordinates 
controlled by a commander should not be less than four, and not more than eight.203 
Apparently Napoleon stated, presumably in French, “You can’t command more than 
five units”.204 As mentioned above, Hamilton observed: 
The average human brain finds its effective scope in handling 
three to six other brains.205 
The nearer we approach the supreme head of the whole 
organization, the more we ought to work towards groups of 
three; the closer we get to the foot of the whole organization 
(the Infantry of the Line) the more we work towards groups 
of six.206 
This apparent discord between experts is ultimately reconciled by considering 
three factors: ‘the first, the element of diversification of function; second, the 
element of time; and third, the element of space’.207 In an organization where the 
work load is based on a single speciality, where it has been established for a long 
time and its growth is stable, and where it is located in a single building, the span of 
                                                 
203 Col. J. S. Rothwell, "Army Organization," ed. Military Society of Ireland (Dublin: Sibley & Co, 
1893) p. 5. 
204 Lieut.-Gen. Sir H.S.G. Miles, "Army Administration," JRUSI 68, no. 469 (1923) p. 24  
205 Hamilton, The Soul and Body of an Army. p. 229. 
206 Ibid. p. 230. 
207 Luther Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in Papers on the Science of Administration, 
ed. Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937) p. 8. 
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control can be wider than for an organization like the BEF that obviously displayed 
the opposite of these characteristics.  
V.A. Graicunas, a management consultant based in Paris, sought to establish an 
empirical basis to support this generally accepted military axiom. In 1933, he 
published his findings in the Bulletin of the International Management Institute.208 
Graicunas’s proof was a set of complex equations that computed the number of direct 
single, direct group, and cross relationships that occur in groups of one to twelve 
subordinates.209 John F. Lyndall Urwick M.C., a brigade major on the Western Front 
provides an accessible introduction to Graicunas’s equations:  
No superior can supervise directly the work of more than five 
or, at the most, six subordinates whose work interlocks. The 
reason for this is simple. What is supervised is not only the 
individuals, but the permutations and combinations of the 
relationships between them. And while the former increase in 
arithmetical progression with the addition of each fresh 
subordinate, the latter increase by geometrical progression. If 
a superior adds a sixth to five immediate subordinates he 
increases his opportunity for delegation by 20 per cent. but he 
adds over 100 per cent. to the number of relationships he has 
to take into account. Because ultimately it is based on the 
limitations imposed by the human span of attention, this 
principle is called The Span of Control.210 
Graicunas asserted that ignorance of ‘this single fact explains many notorious 
military disasters’.211 However, he added the proviso that the span of control could 
exceed this ideal of four subordinates in circumstances where the work of one or 
                                                 
208 Fred Nichols, "The Span of Control and the Formulas of V. A. Graicunas," located at 
http://www.nickols.us/graicunas.pdf (02/12/2015), p. 2. 
209 V.A. Graicunas, "Relationships in Organization," in Papers on the Science of Administartion, ed. 
Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (Washington: Institute of Public Administration, 1937) pp. 186-187. 
210 Urwick, The Elements of Administration. p. 52-53. (Emphasis in original). 
211 Graicunas, "Relationships in Organization." p. 185. 
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more subordinates did not interlock, thus significantly reducing the number of cross 
relationships. Graicunas cited the British divisional commander as a good example 
who, according to him was assigned six subordinates, three of which, namely the 
three Brigade commanders, did not share formal cross relationships.212  
Broadly, the span of control principle was formally acknowledged by FSR II, 
stipulating that: 
The command of military forces is exercised on the following 
principles: The C.-in-C., aided by his staff, exerts his authority 
over a limited number of subordinate commanders. These, aided 
by their staff and assistants, convey his will to a limited number 
of subordinates under them, each of whom carries it down still 
lower, until all ranks are controlled by it.213  
As shown in the organogram of GHQ (Figure 14 below), in 1915 the principle 
of the span of control was respected. Sir John French had four top ranking 
subordinates reporting directly to him as well as a military secretary and two army 







                                                 
212 Ibid. pp. 183-187 
213 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) p. 24. 
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Figure 14: GHQ Organization (Late Summer 1915) 214 
   
 
However, as shown in simplified form (Figure 15 below), by 1918 the 
complexity of the reporting structure at GHQ and its five armies had dramatically 
changed. When GHQ arrived in France it had a complement of ‘about thirty Staff 
Officers’.215 In 1918 this had risen to approximately 5,000 officers and men. It 
appears from the diagram that Haig’s span of control was stretched beyond the limit, 
when the direct reporting relationships of his four army commanders is added to his 
tally of subordinates. However, what is not shown is the coordinating role of the GS 
that was devised by Haig between 1907-09 at the WO. As will be described below, 
                                                 
214 Dan Todman, "The Grand Lamasery Revisited: General Headquarters on the Western Front 1914-
1918," in Command and Control on the Western Front. The British Army's Experience 1914-1918, 
ed. Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (Staplehurst: Spellmount Limited, 2004) p. 47. 
215 Ibid. p. 41. 
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this body acted to reduce the organizational risks associated with of an over extended 
span of control.216 
Figure 15: GHQ Organization (Summer and Autumn 1918 ) 217  
 
Sphere of Influence 
The sphere of influence is a term borrowed from geopolitics where it is 
generally used to depict the management of relationships between countries.218 Here 
it serves as a prism to examine the complex methods that Haig deployed to impose 
his will on the BEF’s external and internal stakeholders. All military leaders have 
                                                 
216 This aspect is examined in Chapter 7. 
217 Todman, "The Grand Lamasery Revisited: General Headquarters on the Western Front 1914-1918." 
p. 61. 
218 Richard A. D'Aveni, "Corporate Spheres of Influence," MIT Sloane Management Review 45,  
no. 4 (2004). 
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this opportunity; the vital open question is whether or not they choose to manage 
their spheres of influence? 
In Haig’s case and that of the BEF these external stakeholders included the 
Crown, Parliament, the War Cabinet, the Army Council, the Press, the British and 
Empire public, and Allied politicians and military leaders. Internal stakeholders 
included commanders, officers and troops of all ranks. Haig choose to manage his 
sphere of influence and he did so by formal and informal meetings, visits, media 
briefings, ceremonies and what today might be called public relations ‘stunts’. Haig 
was motivated by the strong desire to help ensure that the BEF achieved its mission 
by enhancing its good reputation. To some extent, his motives were also driven by a 
degree of self-interest to fuel his legacy, and his natural instinct for job preservation. 
On Haig’s appointment as C-in-C, and in accord with Kitchener’s instructions, 
he immediately turned his attention to ‘assist the French and Belgian Governments in 
driving the German Armies from French and Belgian territory’. Haig knew that the 
BEF would need the most capable officers, the manpower, and the full technological 
and material resources of Britain and the Empire to fulfil this task.219 To this end, he 
methodically set about promoting and extending the BEFs ‘sphere of influence’ 
among external and internal stakeholders. 
 An analysis of Haig’s daily diary between January 1st and July 31st, 1917 
demonstrates how this was achieved. This period has been selected because it was 
arguably Haig’s most testing time on the Western Front due to a combination of 
political, allied and military factors. Following high casualties on the Somme, the 
Prime Minister’s confidence in Haig’s generalship was shaken. Apart from being 
openly critical of the BEF’s performance, Lloyd George subordinated Haig to French 
                                                 
219 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Secret Document: Kitchener to 
Haig; 28/12/1915. n.p. 
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General Nivelle’s command for the forthcoming 1917 Allied spring offensive.220 
Much to Prime Minister’s chagrin the campaign failed, General Nivelle was sacked, 
and elements of the French army dissolved into a serious state of indiscipline. 
Combined with British success at Vimy Ridge, this turmoil strengthened Haig’s hand 
but Lloyd George remained obstructive by curtailing the BEF’s manpower and 
material resources. He diverted men, heavy artillery and ammunition to other theatres 
that he considered to be more fertile. Confiding to his diary Haig bleakly observed: 
‘it is too sad at this critical time to have to fight with one’s allies and the home Govt., 
in addition to the enemy in the Field’.221  
Before examining the findings, a brief explanation of the data is desirable. Haig 
recorded only those meetings and persons that he considered were of importance to 
posterity. Thus, routine meetings with his senior commanders, administrative staff 
and attached officers go largely unrecorded, understating the number of meetings, 
visits and contacts.  
It has been asserted by some historians that while Haig’s men were exposed to 
the brunt of the fighting he and other commanders were comfortably ensconced in 
their châteaux well behind the lines.222 The former is true, while the latter is not. Of 
the 212 days in question, Haig spent only 52 nights at his modest Château 
Beaurepaire situated 2 miles outside the town of Montreuil. The bulk of his time was 
spent at a temporary advanced HQ located in relatively close proximity to the front 
line and within heavy artillery and aerial bombing range. While at advanced HQ, the 
majority of Haig’s recorded meetings took place at army, corps, division, brigade and 
even battalion HQ. Haig typically worked 7 days a week and approximately 12 to 14 
                                                 
220 Ibid. Entry 15/01/1917; 26/02/1917.  
221 Ibid. Entry: 28/02/1917. 
222 Gordon Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britian and the First World War (London: Cassell, 
2003). Kindle Loc. 3231. Winter, Haig's Command: A Reassessment. p. 304. 
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hours per day. He generally exercised before breakfast and worked late into the 
night. After-dinner meetings with visitors and his senior commanders were a 
common practice. Apart from nine days leave in England, he did not have any days 
off. During this ‘holiday’ he enjoyed the odd game of golf with his wife, and as a 
dutiful father he took his children to the ‘West End’ of London to be entertained by 
the ‘Bing-Bong Brothers’.223 Other than this, he grossed himself in military business. 
Figure 16: Methods Haig Employed to Establish and Enhance the BEF's Sphere of 
Influence (January to July 1917) 
 
Haig used all the means at his disposal to secure and extend his own and the 
BEF’s sphere of influence (Figure 16). These included meetings, briefings, attending 
to guests at his headquarters, press briefings, inspections and ceremonies. In total 
Haig had 492 meetings where he met 1,184 people, the majority on more than one 
occasion. This approximated to an average of two meetings with six people per day. 
He also had to contend with a constant stream of visitors from rich and varied 
backgrounds including royalty, politicians, Allied soldiers, journalists and civilians. 
These people ranged from King George V and Queen Mary, the President of France, 
British and French Prime Ministers and respective members of their war cabinets. In 
addition, he had to accommodate visiting British, French and Allied top ranking 
army and naval officers and their staffs, bishops and assorted civilians. While these 
people were essential to enhancing and protecting the BEF’s sphere of influence, for 
                                                 
223 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry 07/06/1917. 
Methods (Number) Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Total
Meetings 48 58 68 93 78 82 65 492
Persons attending meetings 152 121 204 148 197 178 184 1,184
Visits made to Haig's H.Q. 35 35 28 24 22 28 26 198
Visitors attending Haig's H.Q. 49 52 35 25 34 32 54 281
Briefings made by Haig 4 3 9 5 5 4 3 33
Haig mentions in the press 1,188 1,272 1,494 1,712 1,894 1,916 1,604 11,080
Other activities incl. ceremonies and inspections 5 33 10 2 3 1 5 59
Source: NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's War Diary (Typed Version).
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Haig they were also a source of continuing distraction from the vital business of 
managing his armies and fighting the Germans.  
Figure 17: Methods that Haig Employed to Establish and Enhance the BEF’s Sphere 
of Influence by Location and Type of Stakeholder (January to July 1917) 
Stakeholders Meetings  Contacts Visits to BEF Visitors Briefings Ceremonials 
HOME        
Royal Arena 6 6 4 11 5 0 
Political Arena 7 12 13 20 7 0 
War Cabinet 10 50 1 1 1 0 
War Office 14 28 15 19 14 0 
Media Arena 1 1 6 6 5 0 
Total 38 97 39 57 32 0 
ABROAD        
French Military Arena 18 53 24 41 0 7 
French Political Arena 9 42 4 14 0 0 
French Media Arena 0 0 4 8 1 o 
French Public Arena       1 
Total  27 95 32 63 1 8 
ABROAD        
Allied Dignitaries & Officers 5 10 19 36 0 1 
Total 5 10 19 36 0 1 
EMPIRE        
Military Arena 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Political Arena 2 2 2 5 0 0 
Total 3 3 2 5 0 0 
WESTERN FRONT        
Lieut.-Gen. and Above 167 243 26 26 0 0 
Maj.-Gen. 154 302 27 28 0 0 
Brig.-Gen. 41 198 14 15 0 0 
Maj. to Col. 37 53 13 14 0 0 
Sub. To Capt. 2 3 12 23 0 0 
Other Ranks 0 0 1 o 0 3 
Others 18 180 13 14 0 47 
Total 419 979 106 120 0 50 
GRAND TOTAL 492 1184 198 281 33 59 
Source: NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's War Diary (Typed Version). Entries: 01/01/1917 to 31/07/1917
 
Figure 17 provides an analysis of the incidence of methods deployed by Haig 
to protect and enhance the BEF’s sphere of influence by the geographies of 
stakeholders. The home front presented Haig with his most vitally important and 
difficult challenge. It was here that the BEF derived its higher strategic direction, 
manpower and material resources. It was also here that, at best, Haig had a fractious 
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relationship with Lloyd George. In all, Haig attended the War Cabinet in London on 
10 occasions, mainly to defend his planned offensives. As a counterweight to his 
deteriorating relations with Lloyd George, Haig sought to influence other high 
ranking politicians, particularly Lord Esher and Lord Derby, the Secretary of State 
for War. He was also enjoyed a close relationship with the former Prime Minister, 
Herbert Asquith. It is no accident that Haig’s private secretary, Sir Philip Sassoon 
was an able and influential serving M.P.224 Haig was not beyond using his patronage 
to further the careers of politicians and their progeny at the front, provided he 
considered they were up to the job.225 Haig also curried favour with King George V 
whom he met often at Buckingham Palace and in France. During periods of 
particular difficulty, the King sent his private secretary and emissary, Col. Clive 
Wigram to Haig’s HQ with messages of support. The King was adamant that Haig 
should not resign in the face of Lloyd George’s behaviour and criticism.226 Haig also 
ensured that he had the full support of the WO, and in particular the CIGS. He met 
with senior members of the War Office, including Derby and Robertson on at least 
29 occasions.  
In France, Haig worked tirelessly to promote the BEF’s interests within the 
French military and political establishment. Unlike his predecessor, Haig had a 
reasonable fluency in the French language. This allowed him to promote empathy 
and understanding with his allies including Clemenceau, Foch, Joffre and Pétain. 
Haig attended meetings, made courtesy calls, exchanged visits with his French 
                                                 
224 Sassoon was the Member for Hythe from 1912 until his death in 1939, and a prominent member by 
marriage of the highly influential Rothschild family.  
225 Over lunch on Sunday 7th February 1917, Haig arranged for the son of Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the 
Scottish Representative in the House of Lords, to secure a commission in the Guards. NLS-
Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 07/01/1917. In 1915, Haig also 
placed Churchill in command of a battalion after his services were dispensed with by the Admiralty. 
It must be said Churchill wanted a brigade, but Haig insisted that he had to prove that ‘he could bear 
responsibility in action as a CO of a Battalion’ before he would sanction this promotion.  
Entry 14/12/1915.  
226 Ibid. Entry: 11/03/1917. 
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counterparts, brought senior French liaison officers into his confidence, handed out 
British military awards to French officers and took the salute at their parades with 
great aplomb.  
Allied dignitaries and officers visited HQ quite frequently. This enabled Haig 
to extend the BEF’s sphere of influence to men like the King of the Belgians, the 
Portuguese Minister of War, and General Pershing, the American C-in-C. Politicians 
from Canada and Australia also visited Haig’s HQ, including the Canadian Prime 
Minister and two of his ministers. Australian politicians were distinguished by their 
absence during this period. However, in September 1917, Haig did receive a 
representation via Keith Murdoch, the Australian journalist, from the Prime Minister 
Billy Hughes with the demand to organise the five Australian divisions into “an 
Army”, which of course he resisted.227 
Haig’s most frequent meetings were with his senior commanders, allowing him 
to stamp his authority on the organization. He was not a consensual leader, but, 
despite a reputed lack of fluency in speech and a natural reserve, Haig’s first instinct 
was to meet his commanders face-to-face at their headquarters. Haig used these 
meeting to weigh-up their immediate plans and methods; to assess the calibre of the 
commanders, their subordinates and staffs, and to offer congratulations or 
remonstrations. What is perhaps surprising is that officers of all ranks, and not just 
general officers, were made welcome at Haig’s HQ. These encounters helped him to 
check the pulse of his officer corps. During major operations it was Haig’s habit to 
inspect on horse-back captured ground and rear areas relatively near to the front lines 
with members of his personal staff. These inspections allowed Haig to gauge for 
                                                 
227 Ibid. Entry: 01/06/1917. Murdoch was knighted in 1933 and became one of Australia’s most 
influential newspaper magnates.  
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himself battlefield conditions from key vantage points, to become familiar with the 
ground, and to speak to commanders with authority in a manner that gained respect.  
Figure 18: Incidence of Haig's Visitors by Month (January to July 1917) 
 
Figure 18 depicts the incidence of Haig’s visitors by month. As can be seen, 
the underlying pattern is dictated by the BEF’s major offensive operations. The 
incidence of civilian and military visitors varies inversely between planning and 
periods of fighting. The table also shows that British and French politicians made 
constant demands on Haig’s time. In July 1917, immediately before the Third Ypres 
offensive was launched, Haig had to contend with all the formalities of a ten day visit 
by King George V and Queen Mary. Haig was also distracted by Lloyd George’s 
Contacts and Visitors/ Months 1917 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Total
British Representatives:
Royal Arena 0 0 4 1 0 0 12 17
Political Arena 1 10 4 1 8 6 2 32
War Cabinet 12 0 14 1 0 24 0 51
War Office 8 3 10 5 7 13 1 47
Media Arena 4 0 0 1 0 2 0 7
Total 25 13 32 9 15 45 15 154
French Representatives:
Military Arena 16 11 19 14 12 9 13 94
Political Arena 5 7 13 3 8 0 20 56
Media Arena 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 8
Total 21 26 32 17 20 9 33 158
Allied Dignitaries and Officers: 13 13 1 1 8 2 8 46
Total 13 13 1 1 8 2 8 46
Empire Dignitaries and Officers:
Military Arena 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Political Arena 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 7
Total 0 0 3 0 0 4 1 8
British Soldiers and Civilians on Western Front:
Lieut.-Gen. and Above 18 23 47 53 44 38 46 269
Maj.-Gen. 43 32 47 47 61 32 68 330
Brig.-Gen. 19 21 31 20 46 26 50 213
Maj. to Col. 4 23 4 4 13 13 6 67
Sub. to Capt. 16 1 3 0 1 0 5 26
Other Ranks 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Others 40 21 21 39 22 23 0 166
Total 140 121 153 164 187 132 175 1072
GRAND TOTAL 199 173 221 191 230 192 232 1438
Source: NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's War Diary (Typed Version). Entries: 01/01/1917 to 31/07/1917
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prevarication concerning the formal approval for Third Ypres, belatedly received on 
July 21st, and the Prime Minister’s continuing attempts to divert men and guns to 
Italy. This made Haig ‘anxious for the future’. Both the King and Lord Derby did 
what they could to personally support Haig. The King knighted him with the Insignia 
of the Thistle, and Derby offered him a peerage that Haig turned down.228  
Haig also extended the BEF’s sphere of influence through a carefully managed 
press campaign. Haig met and briefed British press barons and British and French 
war correspondents,229 in the case of latter, sometimes with unfortunate results.230 
GHQ issued daily communiqués that were censored and filtered to the press via the 
WO in London. These were syndicated throughout the regional press in Britain and 
the Empire. In addition, Haig oversaw the preparation of official despatches 
published in the London Gazette. Without disclosing any sensitive information, he 
ensured that the operations of the BEF were received in the most favourable light.  
Figure 19: Newspaper Coverage (1st January to 31 July 1917) 
 
                                                 
228 Ibid. Entry 03/07/1917; 24/06/1917; Letter: Derby to Haig 28/07/1917 ; Letter: Haig to Derby 
29/07/1917. 
229 Ibid. Entry 01/06/1916. 
230 Ibid. Entry 01/02/1917. ; 18/02/1917. See pp. 258-259 below. 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Total
The London Times 21 20 16 16 32 30 19 154
British Regional Newspaper (BL) 229 174 145 217 242 258 185 1,450
Australian Newspapers 920 1,055 1,317 1,451 1,601 1,602 1,383 9,329
The Toronto Star 3 4 3 4 2 5 0 21
The New York Times 8 10 6 16 10 8 5 63
Le Figaro 3 6 5 3 2 6 6 31
La Croix 4 3 2 5 5 7 6 32








Search phrase "Sir Douglas Haig".
Results = no of articles which include the phrase 'Sir Douglas Haig'. 
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Figure 19 (above) shows the results of a ‘dipstick’ press clippings survey. This 
relates specifically to mentions of “Sir Douglas Haig” that appeared in a relatively 
very small selection of newspapers published in Britain, Canada, America, and 
France. For Australia, a comprehensive on-line database via the Government’s 
TROVE portal is available for interrogation. This includes national, regional and 
local press. The results, heavily skewed by the Australian figures, indicates that 
between January 1st and July 31st broad-scale awareness was achieved for both Haig 
and the BEF driven by 11,080 press mentions. Of this figure, 1,751 mentions 
appeared in the non-Australian press. This awareness of Haig was likely to have been 
generally positive as the press refrained from negative criticism that probably would 
undermine the war effort. Had it been possible to properly measure press coverage 
particularly in Britain and Canada, it is likely that high levels of broad-scale 
awareness of Haig would have been obtained. Given the extent of press coverage 
dealing with the war, combined with the huge public interest, it would also have been 
most odd if Haig and the BEF were not household names with the informed general 
public in all parts of the Empire and beyond.  
To conclude, it appears that Haig’s proactive endeavours to manage, protect 
and enhance the BEF’s and his own sphere of influence were successful. Throughout 
the war, the Western Front remained the main British theatre of operations, despite 
Lloyd George’s determination to do otherwise by fighting in Eastern theatres. 
Although restrictions were applied to transfers of manpower from home during 1917 
and the early months of 1918, the supply of material resources were maintained. 
Haig’s standing with the King, the British public and with his armies in France 
remained firm throughout his tenure to the extent that Lloyd George could not sack 
him without serious risking his own position. It is also true that after the set-back at 
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Cambrai in November 1917 and the politicization of the Press barons, Haig did lose 
the unequivocal support of some quarters of the British press.231 Haig’s rapport with 
his French allies was such that when unity of command was established in the spring 
of 1918, the military coalition was productive. The findings also reveal that for a 
man infamously inarticulate, deskbound, and supposedly luxuriating in his ‘château’, 
Haig did a lot of talking and in periods of intense operations he located himself close 
to the front lines in comfortable but comparatively sparse quarters.232  
Plasticity 
Recently the Editor of the Harvard Business Review commented that ‘no 
business survives over the long term if it can’t reinvent itself.’ As people within 
organizations are habitually resistant to change, ‘leading change is both absolutely 
essential and incredibly difficult’.233 However, in the present era of disruptive 
technological innovation, the ‘long-term’ can be more meaningfully measured in 
months rather than years. Thus, it is not surprising that change management is one of 
the most, if not the most vital business topic today.234 Academics, commentators and 
practitioners in the business arena would benefit from studying the BEF’s ability to 
reinvent itself successfully under conditions of extraordinary duress and in a matter 
of months between 1916 and 1918.  
Three aspects of the organization’s plasticity under Haig’s leadership will be 
examined. The first provides evidence of the BEF’s resilience, both in physical and 
moral terms, to huge casualties. The second shows its responsiveness to a potentially 
                                                 
231 Stephen Badsey, The British Army in Battle and Its Image 1914-1918 (London: Continuum, 2009).  
p. 28 
232 Todman, "The Grand Lamasery Revisited: General Headquarters on the Western Front 1914-1918." 
pp. 51-53. 
233 John P. Kotter, "Leading Change: Why Transfromations Efforts Fail," Harvard Business 
Review,January (2007) p. 2. 
234 Bernard Brunes, Managing Change: A Strategic Approach to Organizational Change, Fifth ed. 
(London: FT Prentice Hall, 2009) p. 1. 
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crippling failure of logistics, the highly successful resolution of which underpinned 
its operational achievements in 1918. The third demonstrates the BEF’s ability to 
harness technological and associated organizational innovation to revolutionise its 
conduct of fighting within a period of 18 months, ushering in the era of modern three 
dimensional warfare. 
Resilience 
Military organizations in the field have to be mentally, physically and, above 
all, morally resilient in the face of continuous human and material losses. The BEF 
was no exception. As indicated in Figure 20 (below), on average the force’s annual 
manpower turnover rate was 57.4%, due to permanent losses of officers and men. 
The rate was slightly higher for officers (59.9%), than other ranks (57.2%). The 
BEF’s turnover rate was highest in 1915 (70.6%), when the force fought with the 
largely untrained troops of the new Kitchener armies, and when heavy guns and 
munitions of all calibres were in short supply.235 (To put these figures into the context 
of a large scale and complex civilian organization, currently the NHS experiences 
annual turnover rates of 10% for doctors and 9% for nursing staff).236  
In particular, the importance cannot be overstated of the negative impact of 
high officer turnover rates on morale, on the preservation of in-theatre training, and 
on small unit cohesion.237 This factor, which also manifests itself by showing a lack 
of training and inexperience in the junior and middle ranks of the officer corps, 
partially explains away criticism that the BEF’s generalship was slow to respond to 
the realities of modern industrial warfare during 1915 and 1916. 
                                                 
235 G. D. Sheffield, "Officer-man Relations: Morale and Discipline in the British Army, 1902-22" 
(University of London, 1994) p. 252. 
236 http://www.qualitywatch.org.uk/indicator/staff-turnover-nhs (02/12/2015). 
237 Hew Strachan, "The Morale of the German Army, 1917-18," in Facing Armageddon, ed. Hugh 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is not possible to draw a comparison of casualties between the BEF, and the 
French and German armies because of the lack of relevant and reliable statistical 
data. However, as will be shown in chapter six, under Haig’s command the BEF 
improved its own trajectory of unity-of-moral-effort throughout the war. Specifically, 
the BEF did not suffer a moral crisis similar to the one experienced by the French 
army in 1917, or like the enemy’s catastrophic collapse of fighting spirit in 1918.238  
It is clear from this brief analysis that the medical staff succeed admirably in 
their arduous and debilitating task of manpower conservation on the Western Front. 
Haig paid a fitting tribute to the Medical Services in his final despatch when he 
observed that ‘there has been no war in which the resources of science have been 
utilised so generously and successfully for the prevention of disease, or for the quick 
evacuation and careful tending of the sick and wounded’.239 
Responsiveness 
In August 1916, the demands of the Somme campaign stretched British 
logistical infrastructure to breaking-point. A rupture would have had catastrophic 
consequences for the BEF’s fighting power.240 Under Haig’s leadership, and within a 
period of just eight months, the organization and administration of British logistics 
was entirely re-engineered. The success was such that this work laid the foundation 
for the BEF’s contribution to the Allied victory in 1918. Moreover, it is a clear 
demonstration of the organization’s ability to respond to a crisis. The result was an 
impressive managerial achievement given that the required reforms were carried out 
under the most intense battle conditions. Unfortunately, despite the reforms carried 
                                                 
238 Sheffield, "Officer-man Relations: Morale and Discipline in the British Army, 1902-22." p. 334. 
239 Douglas Haig, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, December 1915-April 1919, ed. by J.H. Boraston 
(London: J.M. Dent & Co, 1919) p. 342. 
240 William Philpott, Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth 
Century (London: Little, Brown, 2009) p. 155. 
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out after the South African War the seeds of the crisis were sown before the BEF 
arrived in France. 
In the light of lessons learned in South Africa, the British system of transport 
and supply had been modernised, motorised conveyance was introduced, and 
recognition was given to the principle that supplies had to ‘pushed’ rather ‘pulled’ 
from the rear to the front. As stated in FSR-II, this implied that ‘troops in action 
should never have to turn their backs on the enemy to fetch ammunition; what they 
require should be sent up to them on the initiative of the troops or services in the 
rear’.241 In addition, not only were the methods of transport revised, but following an 
intensive study by the WO to examine the supply processes of continental armies the 
services offered by the ASC were overhauled and thoroughly tested through the use 
of administrative staff tours. By 1914, the consensus was that these reforms ‘brought 
the maintenance organization of the field Army abreast of all modern conditions. 
Moreover, they were susceptible of adaptation to all sorts and conditions of warfare 
as was subsequently proved in practice’.242 This promising statement by the ASCs 
official historian, Col. R.H. Beadon, glosses over the fact that in spite of all the 
improvements that had been made the BEF’s logistical infrastructure, just like that of 
its manpower and firepower, was grossly under-resourced to meet the demands of 
modern continental warfare.  
There was another vital factor that had severe and unintended consequences for 
the efficiency of the BEF’s logistics. This was the agreement made during the pre-
war Anglo-French staff talks that the French would take responsibility for all British 
movement by rail. This decision was sensible enough given the fundamental 
                                                 
241 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) pp. 73-74.  
(Emphasis in original). 
242 Colonel R.H. Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps: A History of Transport and Supply in the 
British Army, 2 vols, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931) p. 61. 
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differences in policy, operating practices, equipment and track between the two rail 
networks. When the BEF was mobilized at 4pm on August 4th 1914, orders issued to 
the IGC, Lieut.-Gen. F.S. Robb, confirmed this arrangement:  
The entire railway service is manned and controlled by the 
French, who undertake the work of construction, repair, 
traffic management and protection, not only in French 
territory, but beyond the frontier [into Belgium].243 
However, as will be seen below, the agreement broke down when resources were 
constrained and priorities became conflicted on the Somme in 1916. 
Other problems emerged during the course of 1914 that also undermined the 
efficiency of the BEF’s logistics, some of which had been identified during the 1912 
and 1913 Administrative Staff Tours. These issues included the potential for 
conflicted decision making between the QMG and the IGC on the supply chain. 
Ironically no action was deemed necessary by Sir John French, then the CIGS. 
Possibly he had been lulled into a false sense of security by the joint-staffs 
agreement. This particular problem was patched-up in the field by ad-hocism and 
pragmatism prior to the crisis in 1916. 244   
However, in summary, as Col. M.G. Taylor, Assistant Director of Movements 
observed ‘the melancholy truth is that in 1914 our ideas were rudimentary. Our small 
force of six divisions went to France…with no more than a rudimentary organization 
for transport’. In all, this contingent comprised a staff of 31 officers.245 By the end of 
1915 the ration strength of the BEF reached 1,047,700 men, up nearly 10-fold by 
comparison to August 1914. In addition, approximately ‘220,000 animals, 460,000 
                                                 
243 TNA/WO/33/686, "Instructions to I.G.C. (1914)," (1914) part II, para.1. 
244 Ian Malcolm Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 (Westport: Praeger 
Publishers, 1998) See particularly Chapters 1 and 2.  
245 M.G. Taylor, "Land Transportation in the Late War," JRUSI 66, no. 464 (1921) p. 700. 
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tons of forage, 305,000 tons of food and 120,000 tons of ammunition and hundreds 
of thousands of tons of other stores and foods had been landed and moved forward 
from the base ports to the front’.246 Given that the original Anglo-French agreement 
was predicated on a British contribution of six infantry and one cavalry division, the 
fact that the French rail network and the rudimentary BEF logistical capability was 
able to absorb this huge expansion reflected great credit on the administration of both 
armies and the French civil authorities.  
In October 1915, in a pre-emptive intervention to avert the brewing crisis, 
Kitchener sent Brig.-Gen. Sir Percy Girouard, a leading authority on military rail 
transport to investigate. He reported on October 24th proposing that ‘in imitation of 
the French System, the full control of the Railways, the Mechanical Transport and of 
the Services should be concentrated at Army Headquarters [GHQ] ’.247 This proposal 
was implemented and marked the first step in what would become under Haig’s 
leadership the full integration of the BEF’s logistical organization.  
When Haig took command of the BEF at noon on Sunday, December 19th 1915 
he was well aware of the perilous state of British logistics. For instance, he had been 
‘striving to get a light railway organization ever since January 1915’ built to operate 
between railheads and the front line. His efforts fell on stony ground.248 This inertia 
only increased Haig’s anxiety. He caustically commented ‘those in charge of our 
railway department [have] been backward in their arrangements to assist the troops at 
                                                 
246 Ian Malcolm Brown "The Evolution of the British Army's Logistical and Administrative 
Infrastructure and its Influence on GHQ's Operational Decision-Making on the Western Front,  
1914-1918" (King's College London, 1996) p. 146. 
247 TNA/WO/32/5144, "Report Upon the Rail Transport Arrangements of the British Army on the 
Continent," (1915). 24th October, 1915, p. 14. 
248 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry 12/09/1916. 
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the front’.249 His deep concern was captured by a stinging remark he made later to Sir 
Eric Geddes: 
Warfare he said, consists of Men, Munitions and Movement. 
We have got the men and the munitions, but we seem to have 
forgotten the movement.250 
Furthermore, French requests for assistance had been dealt with by the British 
authorities at home with a failure to supply, or at best delay supply of vital personnel, 
locomotives, rolling stock and track. Naturally, when the British placed increased 
demands on the French, these requests were met grudgingly instead of urgently. For 
the BEF, these problems resonated in shipping delays, port congestion and critical 
rail capacity shortages compounded by ‘a lack of engine power, a lack of drivers and 
a lack of coal’.251 
To help ameliorate the consequences of these problems, and following a 
wholesale reshuffle of top ranking officers at GHQ, Haig retained the valuable 
services of the former administration’s QMG, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Ronald Maxwell. 
Notwithstanding shortages of munitions, Maxwell’s adept management lessened the 
deepening logistical problems early in 1916. However, in the spring and early 
summer 17 new British divisions arrived, the availability of guns and howitzers 
increased from 324 pieces in January to 714 pieces in July, munition shortages were 
overcome and so the full impact of maintaining supplies to front line divisions was 
felt most particularly on the Somme.252 To put this demand into context, the quantity 
of imported supplies and stores needed for the offensive totalled approximately 2,200 
                                                 
249 Ibid. Entry: 24/12/1915. 
250 Col. A.M. Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front, History of the Great War (London: 
HMSO, 1937) p. 190. (Emphasis in original). 
251 Taylor, "Land Transportation in the Late War" p. 704. 
252 Capt. W. Miles, Military Operations: France and Belgium: 2nd July 1916 to the end of the Battles 
of the Somme, ed. Brig.-Gen. J. E. Edmonds, II vols, vol. II (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 
1938)., 2) p. 565. 
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tons per mile of front per day. This equated to one full load daily carried by around 
440 standard rail trucks containing 1,500 tons of ammunition, 300 tons of supplies 
and 400 tons of material for road maintenance. This factor alone placed an 
impossible strain on British logistical infrastructure and the French rail network.253 
Haig firmly believed that it was “only by the most complete understanding and 
cooperation between the military and civilian elements that we can hope to win”.254 
As a result he readily accepted and promoted civilianisation within the top ranks of 
GHQ. On August 2nd, Haig received a letter from Lloyd George, now the Secretary 
of State for War, offering him the expert services of Sir Eric Geddes, formerly the 
General Manager of North-Eastern Railway Company, to investigate the BEF’s 
transport arrangements (railway, road, canal and docks) both at home and in 
France.255 On August 4th, Haig sent his reply: 
We are all anxious to afford Sir Eric Geddes every possible 
facility for conducting his enquiry, and I shall be glad to 
make all arrangements for his visit on hearing from you when 
to expect him.256  
On Geddes’ arrival for a perfunctory two day visit, he gained Haig’s immediate 
respect, (‘a most pleasant and capable man’) but his presence was not universally 
well received. For one, Lieut.-Gen. F.T. Clayton, the IGC, was outspoken in his 
resentment of the civilian’s intrusion into military matters. Haig rebuked him by 
stating that he ‘was glad to have practical hints from anyone capable of advising’.257 
                                                 
253 Philpott, Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth Century  
p. 155. 
254 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 11/11/1916 quoting 
Lloyd George. 
255 TNA/WO/32/5163, "Geddes Appointment," (1916). Letter: Lloyd George to Haig 01/08/1916. 
256 Ibid. Letter: Haig to Lloyd George 04/08/1916. Sir E. Geddes was formerly head of the North 
Eastern Railway Company before joining L.G. at the Ministry of Munitions. 
257 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 24/08/1916. 
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On August 30th Geddes returned to GHQ together with his team to commence 
investigations.258  
On September 11th Geddes produced a report that for the first time was based 
on a scientific assessment of current tonnage capacity set against numerical forecasts 
of supply and demand. The results pointed to the requirement for ‘a drastic overhaul’ 
of the British transport system.259 To Haig’s obvious satisfaction, Geddes proposed 
the installation ‘without delay’ of a light railway network.260 On the following day at 
GHQ the two men had little trouble in securing the full backing of Lloyd George for 
what was an ambitious project.  
The necessity for 60 centimetre railway was quickly shewn, 
[sic] and the difficulty of obtaining the plant, the engines etc. 
was discussed. L.G. promised to help me to the utmost of his 
power. The total cost will be 3 million pounds, not much in 
comparison to our other expenses…. 
It is interesting to note how I have been striving to get a light 
railway organization since January 1915 when the 1st Army 
was formed. But it requires a civilian railway expert (Sir E. 
Geddes) to come on the scene and make a report to convince 
our Government and War Office that such an organization is 
a necessity.261  
On September 24th, Geddes accepted Haig’s offer to join him at GHQ with the 
title of Director General of Transport and the temporary rank of Major General. 
Under Geddes, Haig placed the directorates of broad gauge railways, narrow gauge 
railways, inland water transport, roads and ports.262 While Geddes officially reported 
                                                 
258 Ibid. Entry: 26/08/1916. 
259 Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front. pp. 184-186. 
260 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Memorandum: Light Railway 
Development on the British Front, France. 11/09/1916. p. 7. 
261 Ibid. Entry: 12/09/1916. 
262 Ibid. Entry: 24/09/1916. 
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to the QMG, in practice he answered directly to Haig. The responsibility for motor 
transport remained with the Director of Transport, who in any case reported to the 
QMG.263 Geddes’ position was immeasurably strengthened when Lloyd George made 
him the Director General of Military Railways at home. In October, Haig abolished 
the post of IGC briefly making Geddes the Inspector General of Transportation, 
before returning to his original title, adding ports to his portfolio.  
In November 1916, Geddes told Haig that the French railway network was in a 
dire condition, struggling to meet the needs of the burgeoning BEF as well as its 
own. The two men agreed to enlist the support of Lloyd George to provide 
locomotives, rolling stock and skilled manpower as requested by Joffre.264 The War 
Committee immediately approved 350 locomotives, 20,000 wagons, 32,000 sleepers 
and 12,000 railwaymen for France.265 In December, the pre-war railway agreement 
was terminated. In its place it was agreed that although the overall responsibility for 
mainline rail traffic remained with the French, the BEF would be expected to take up 
a much greater share of the burden on other routes.266  
By December 11th, and within ‘a fortnight after the order was given’, Geddes 
had built his HQ in a hutment camp three miles from GHQ staffed by 100 officers 
and 600 clerks, batmen and others. Not unsurprisingly this bureaucracy was 
colloquially named “Geddesburg”. ‘A wonderful performance’ observed Haig.267 It 
was said that Geddes appointed double the staff he really needed to increase 
productivity by 30%. ‘In this he was successful’; expedient perhaps, but hardly a 
                                                 
263 TNA/WO/106/358, "Transportation Organization," (1916).  
264 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 16/11/1916. 
265 Ibid. Entry: 01/12/1916. 
266Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front. pp. 13-15; 245-251. 
267 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 11/12/1916. 
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hallmark of efficiency.268 Nonetheless, representatives of the DGT were appointed in 
every army and corps. 11,000 men of suitable trades were combed out of the BEF. 
Others were brought from home bringing the full strength up to 76,000 men. In 
addition, 13 companies of civilian plate-layers from the railways in Britain were 
engaged on lucrative short-term three month contracts under civilian engineers. This 
of course caused friction with the standing railway troops and ‘further offers of 
assistance of this kind were declined’.269  
In January 1917, Geddes was appointed a member of the Army Council.270 He 
now had sole responsibility for the complete British military supply chain on both 
sides of the channel from the factory to the front.271 Thereby, the full integration of 
the BEF’s transport service was achieved: 
[Geddes] linked up ports to railways, railways to roads, 
inland waterways to both. He also secured the regulation of 
sea transport with direct reference to port capacity, and to the 
possibilities of clearance from the ports inland. He developed 
ports, railways, and roads by construction until they could 
reasonably be expected to carry out the work required of 
them, and he brought the whole under one unified control 
responsible for co-ordination of effort. He showed what 
transport meant.272  
In May 1917, Geddes returned to an Admiralty appointment in London. His 
successor was his deputy, another civilian, Sir Philip Nash of the Great Northern and 
East Indian Railways. Nash later became a member of the Inter-Allied Transport 
                                                 
268 Brig.-Gen. J. E. Edmonds, "Introduction," in Transportation on the Western Front, Official History 
of the War (London: HMSO, 1937) p. xiv. 
269 Ibid. p. xiv. 
270 Keith Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1989) p. 31. 
271 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)."Letter: Lloyd George to Haig 
27/09/1916. 
272 Taylor, "Land Transportation in the Late War" p. 705. (Emphasis in original). 
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Council formed in December 1917 ‘to deal with the transportation means of the 
Allies as a whole’.273 In March 1918, Nash was followed by Maj.-Gen. Sir Sydney 
Crookshank, an officer of the Royal Engineers and the DGT returned to military 
control. In May 1918, the QMG was called to a conference in London to discuss 
placing the DGT under his direct control. Haig strongly opposed this measure 
because he believed the additional responsibility would overburden an already 
overstretched branch.274 In this case Haig’s objection was overruled. In June the 
Army Council placed the DGT under the QMG. 
During the winter of 1917-18 the development of the BEF’s integrated 
transport network had now reached a state of high efficiency. Although the French 
maintained overall responsibility for the standard gauge rail network, GHQ exercised 
control in its own zone of operations. This included rail construction, the work of 
which had been augmented by 13 battalions of the Canadian Overseas Railway 
Construction Corps; road building supported by over 100,000 ‘native’ labourers 
working under the expert eye of the gifted civilian engineer Sir Henry Maybury, who 
was credited with saving the road situation in France; and the operation of the light 
rail, motorised transport, horse drawn transport and waterways.275 Haig was now able 
to closely align his operations with the capability of transportation services, for 
which he had high ambition:   
I look to the railways to do much more than supply the 
army’s needs. I feel confident that at a certain moment they 
will give us that mobility which will enable me to out-
                                                 
273 Edmonds, "Introduction." p. xv. On the first day of the Conference, Lloyd George left the transport 
negotiations to the technical experts while he ambushed Haig and Robertson in an attempt to achieve 
Allied unity of command on the Western Front under a French generalissimo, General Robert 
Nivelle. After much indignant protest by the soldiers, a compromise was reached whereby Haig 
agreed to subordinate himself to Nivelle for the duration of the forthcoming major offensive at Arras 
and on the Aisne. 
274 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 23/05/1918. 
275 Taylor, "Land Transportation in the Late War." p.p. 715-716. 
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manoeuvre the enemy, and enable me to bring a superior 
force of guns and men at the decisive moment to the decisive 
point before the enemy can take counter measures.276  
Unfortunately, the German spring offensive intervened and Haig had to wait 
until July 1918 before he could realise this ideal. A Transport Progress Report for 
the Year 1918 located in Haig’s war diary summarised the enemy’s impact on the 
BEF’s transportation infrastructure: 
The military operations during the year 1918 cast an 
unprecedented burden upon the Transportation Services. The 
deep and rapid progress of the enemy advance during April 
and May resulted in the loss of the lateral line between 
Amiens and Arras, and made precarious the working of the 
second lateral from Ypres via Chocques and St. Pol; Amiens 
and other vital points were seriously threatened, thus 
throwing the main north and south communication upon the 
coast line. The territory between the ‘front’ and the sea had 
been considerably narrowed by the enemy advance; in 
consequence considerable congestion arose, and the position 
was of the utmost gravity.  
With the successful counter-offensive of the Allied Armies in 
August, the position was relieved, but, in order to keep pace 
with the advancing armies, a vast amount of construction 
work had to be undertaken upon a greater and more intensive 
scale than ever before during the war. Owing to the rapidity 
of our advance, and to the fact that the fighting was very 
heavy and of a continuous nature all along the British ‘front’, 
the traffic problems entailed were very complex and difficult 
to deal with.  
During the year under review the railways and ports were 
constantly bombed by enemy aircraft, thus adding to the 
                                                 
276 Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front. p. 396. 
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difficulties of operation, besides which the enemy in the 
course of his retreat, used every modern artifice in the 
thorough destruction of railways, bridges, roads, etc.277  
Although a great deal of damage was caused by the enemy and the retreating 
British troops to the transport infrastructure during the German offensive, the vital 
organization and administration at GHQ remained intact. This enabled reconstruction 
to commence immediately, and on the right lines. By August 1918, when the major 
Amiens offensive commenced, the BEF’s fully integrated transportation network was 
effectively back in service. As a case in point the number of loaded trains run 
between July and September reached 23,417, the highest on record. The loaded 
wagon-kilometres run on broad gauge lines by the British in France and Belgium 
increased by 145% over 1917. The tonnage carried on the light railway network 
between April and June increased by 79% relative to the previous year, despite 
extensive damage during the German offensive.278 
The spring offensive provided the German Army with its greatest tactical 
success on the Western Front thus far. Paradoxically, this outcome led to the greatest 
strategic failure of the war; attributed principally to the inefficiency of the enemy’s 
supply and transport organization.279 After the British Fifth Army was driven back on 
the Somme in March, the German high command ‘had an unparalleled opportunity 
for effecting something decisive’.280 Tactically, the German troops had shown their 
superiority; the challenge that remained was to press home this advantage. The fact 
that this proved impossible, owed less to the dogged opposition of the British and 
                                                 
277 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)."Report: Transportation Progress 
Report for the Year 1918, para 1. p. 1.  
278 Ibid. p. 6, 7, and 13. 
279 Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps: A History of Transport and Supply in the British Army, II. 
Chapter 5; Maj.-Gen. A. Forbes, A History of the Army Ordnance Services (London: Medici Society, 
1929). Chapter 7. 




French forces, and much more to the failing German logistical capability.281 The 
attacking enemy troops had simply lost their means of support and the impetus of 
their offensive stalled, allowing the Allies, well supported by their superior logistical 
capacity, to regain the lost initiative.282  
The ultimate dividend of the BEF’s logistics was paid in the Hundred Days 
campaign. Up to the end of 1916, the BEF’s logistical capacity was sufficient to 
support one major offensive a year (the advance to the Aisne in 1914, Loos in 1915, 
and the Somme in 1916). In 1917, the improvements made to the transportation 
network by Geddes under Haig’s authority supported three major offensives (Arras– 
First/Third/Fifth Armies; Third Ypres–Second/Fifth Armies; Cambrai–Third/Fourth 
Armies). However, as shown in Figure 21 (below), such was the efficiency of British 
logistics that by the beginning of summer 1918, and within the following four month 
period, Haig was able to mount ten major offensives. He simultaneously deployed 
divisions from up to three armies, was able to rapidly change the axis of attack, and 
ensured that his formations never lost the means to maintain forward momentum 
across 80 miles of front. ‘The German army was unable to match British tempo’.283 
Thus, the BEF’s logistical organization was the handmaiden to tactical success on the 
battlefield, which in turn delivered the strategic success evidenced by the Allied 
victory. Reflecting on the war years, Geddes described Haig as ‘the best chief’ and 
finest gentleman’. As far as his work in France was concerned, he described this as 
the ‘happiest time of my life.’284 
 
                                                 
281 Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919, p. 198. 
282 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Notes on the Present Situation. 
n.p. ; Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps: A History of Transport and Supply in the British Army, 
II, p.145. 
283 Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front; The British Army and the Defeat of 
Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p. 203; p. 226. 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As the process of the BEF’s tactical adaptation to the novel conditions of 
trench warfare will be assessed at length below, to avoid unnecessary repetition, only 
a summary focusing on the evolution of combined arms tactics is necessary here.  
Dominick Graham persuasively argued that the general limits of political and 
military policy imposed on the readiness of BEF, ensured that the force ‘was ill 
prepared to fight divisional [combined-arms] battles’ at the commencement of 
hostilities in 1914.285 Nonetheless, FSR-I did insist that ‘the full power of the army 
can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination’.286 However, in this 
combination it is true that the role of artillery was visualised as an adjunct to that of 
the infantry ‘breaking down hostile opposition…enabl[ing] it to obtain superiority of 
fire and to close with the enemy’. While the cavalry’s primary role was to ‘obtain 
information and to combine attack and surprise to the best advantage’.287  
By 1917-18 the BEF ‘had come to rely upon the intelligent combination of all 
arms to overwhelm the defenders by weight of firepower’.288 By this time the 
deployment of aircraft had reached the level of technical sophistication where all 
arms offensives could be combined in three dimensions, revolutionising warfare. In 
this scenario the artillery conquered, the infantry occupied, fighter planes offered air 
superiority, and the cavalry was deployed to exploit fleeting tactical opportunities.289  
                                                 
285 Dominick Graham, "Sans Doctrine: British Army Tactics in the First World War " in Men at War: 
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Archer (Chicago: Precedent, 1982) pp.71-76. 
286 Field Service Regulations, Part I (Operations) p. 12-13. 
287 Ibid. p. 13. 
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An attempt has been made to outline the sheer magnitude and complexity of 
the organizational and administrative challenge that confronted Haig when he 
assumed command of the BEF in December 1915. During peace-time, the 
management task required to transform the BEF from an Imperial police force into a 
first class army capable of fighting, let alone defeating a first class continental foe, 
would have been a herculean challenge. Under conditions of intensive warfare, and 
in the short time available, the degree of managerial difficulty was unprecedented. 
Moreover, seldom has this potentially crippling management burden fallen directly 
onto the shoulders of one man. It was within this   context that Haig strove to apply 
and achieve unity-of-effort within the BEF. 
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3. The Principle of Unity-of-Effort 
Unity-of-effort is the raison d’être of all human organization,290 including the 
military.291 In 1909, Haig established unity-of-effort as the first principle of war 
organization. Unfortunately, he did not define the precept possibly because he 
believed it was a commonplace. Furthermore, despite a thorough investigation, it has 
not been possible to uncover a contemporary definition at least in the British military 
context. Therefore, this chapter aims to establish the importance that Haig attached to 
the principle; to discuss the method and findings of a study conducted to furnish a 
plausible explanation of his understanding of the term; and finally to examine Haig’s 
early military learning and experience which underpinned his capacity to manage the 
implementation of unity-of-effort within the BEF. 
The Importance Haig Attached to the Principle of Unity-of-Effort 
In 1909, Haig established unity-of-effort as the first principle of ‘War 
Organization’ in FSR-II: 
The successful issue of military operations depends mainly 
upon combination and unity of effort directed with energy 
and determination towards a definite object.  
Unity of control is essential to unity of effort. This condition 
can be ensured only by vesting the supreme authority in one 
man, the C-in-C of the forces in the field; and by providing 
him with the means of exerting the required influence over 
the work and action of every individual. The main object of 
war organization is to provide him with these means.292 
                                                 
290 Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations, Foundations of Modern Sociology (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1964) p. 3 An organization is defined as a ‘social unit (or human grouping) 
deliberately constructed to seek specific goals’. 
291 Urwick, "The Function of Administration: With special reference to the work of Henri Fayol." p. 
123. 
292 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) p.22. (Emphasis in original). 
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Fresh evidence is revealed in Chapter 7 which establishes beyond reasonable 
doubt that Haig was responsible for incorporating the principle of unity-of-effort into 
FSR-II when he was the DSD at the WO between 1908-09. It is not clear when Haig 
recognised unity-of-effort as a principle of military war organization, although in 
1896 he alluded to the maxim in one of his two Staff College strategy notebooks. He 
observed that ‘unity in battle can only be obtained by the various independent units 
striving for one common object’.293 An article in The Times commenting on the 
organization of the Cavalry Division later reported that Haig, among other officers, 
had recommended the re-establishment of the post of Inspector of Cavalry to 
preserve ‘unity of military effort’.294  
During and after the war Haig continued to use the term further demonstrating 
the importance he attached to the principle. On February 27th 1917, Robertson wrote 
to the War Cabinet stressing that in the forthcoming Nivelle offensive, ‘unity of 
effort’ could be ‘adequately ensured without absolute unity of command.’295 On 
March 11th 1917, in a continuation of this exchange, Haig told Robertson in a secret 
note that he feared the Calais Agreement would ‘impair rather than promote unity of 
effort.’296 On the same day, in a discussion between Haig and the French War 
Minister, General Lyautey, he drew the distinction between unity of command and 
unity-of-effort. Haig said the former was ‘the means’ and the latter was ‘the end’.297 
A week later Haig stressed to his Army Commanders the importance of working 
‘cordially with the French,’ emphasising that “Unity of Effort” was the object...’.298 In 
1921, an article in The Times reported that Haig stressed the need for soldiers to 
                                                 
293 NLS-Acc.3155/20, "Strategy Notes II," (n.d.). n.p. 
294 Military-Correspondent, "The Cavalry Division," The Times, 13th September 1909. p.4. 
295 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Note by the Chief of the 
Imperial Staff regarding the Calais Agreement of 27th February 1917. p. 2. 
296 Ibid. Secret Note from Haig to Robertson, 11th March 1917. 
297 Ibid. Entry: Monday 12th March 1917. 
298 Ibid. Entry: Saturday 17th March 1917. (Emphasis in original). 
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maintain ‘unity of effort’ in peace, as had been done in war.299 He then proceeded to 
use his convening power to help form the British Legion.300   
In 1923, FSR-II was revised to reflect the recent combat experience, and the 
tome was reordered as Vol. I. The new priority given to this volume was not 
explained, but perhaps the decision was made in response to the important 
recognition accorded to organization and administration in the successful outcome of 
total war. Under the heading ‘General principles of war organization’, unity-of-
effort was established as the second principle of war organization after mobility.301  
Research Methodology 
Professor Eric Leed encountered and overcame a similar methodological 
obstacle to the one faced by this research in his study No Man’s Land – Combat 
Identity in World War 1.302 At the outset, he readily admitted that ‘in the last analysis, 
it is difficult for any history to “prove” that the events of battle changed the character 
of participants’. Undaunted, Leed strove to find a method of determining a reliable as 
opposed to a perfect proof. Drawing on a wide variety of sources he used an indirect 
‘strategy of “boxing in” the phenomenon of the transformation of human character 
by events, rather than by attacking the phenomena directly’.303 In all essentials, the 
same type of historical investigative approach has been adopted here. Nonetheless, 
the unvarnished truth remains – while there is certainty of the importance that Haig 
attached to the principle, there is no absolute surety as to precisely what he 
understood by the term unity-of-effort or its interpretation.  
                                                 
299 "The Canterbury War Memorial ", The Times, 10th October 1921. p. 7 
300 This refers to influence that Haig brought to bear to co-opt people of influence in pursuit of a 
common objective. 
301 Field Service Regulations Vol I: Organization and Administration, (London: HMSO, 1923) p. 5. 
302 Eric J. Leed, No Man's Land: Combat Identity in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979). 
303 Ibid. p. x. (Emphasis in original). 
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The method of ‘boxing in’ has been conducted in three stages: the first stage 
established what was the general understanding of the term in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. This relies on evidence drawn from a historical study of 
national and provincial newspapers published during this era in Britain where the 
nature of unity-of-effort has been judged by the context of its usage in news reports, 
commentaries and articles. The second stage revealed the character of unity-of-effort 
within the context of the contemporary British Army. Here a process of deductive 
reasoning has been used, informed by the works of military thinkers known to have 
influenced Haig, identifying the most likely components comprising military ‘effort’ 
that were unified by him in the BEF. Findings from the first two stages allowed a 
working definition of unity-of-effort to be offered. The third stage examined Haig’s 
pre-war career. This showed that he had the organizational and administrative talent, 
skills and experience that allowed him to recognise the significance of the principle 
before 1914, and enabled him to manage its implementation on the Western Front. 
The Nature of Unity-of-Effort 
To determine the nature of unity-of-effort in its historical context, the Gale 
News Vault database has been interrogated using a delimited search for the phrase 
“unity of effort”.304 This produced 391 instances of usage between the years 1793 and 
2007. A sampling interval was chosen to provide a randomised sample of at least 100 
instances of usage up to 1928 – the year of Haig’s death. Using a digital random-
number generator, a sampling start point between one and three was selected. This 
procedure produced 108 instances of unity-of-effort up to December 1928. This 
                                                 
304 http://gdc.gale.com/products/gale-newsvault/ ‘Gale NewsVault delivers definitive cross-searching 
experience for exploring Gale’s range of historical newspaper collections. Users can simultaneously 
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sample is sufficient to produce quantitative findings with a satisfactory degree of 
accuracy within the range of error of +/-5%.305 
This survey method is subject to a number of limitations. Due to KCL’s limited 
subscription, it was not possible to access the entire Gale NewsVault database. 
Nonetheless, the publications that were accessible did provide sufficiently broad 
coverage for the purposes of this study. Of these, only The Times and the Economist 
archives cover the twentieth century.306 As the emphasis of this study is on the 
nineteenth century, this restriction does not have a meaningful impact on the results. 
Also, a digital search method was employed to identify occurrences of the use of the 
term unity-of-effort in newspaper articles. This approach is subject to scanning error 
from two sources: spelling mistakes, and optical character recognition scanning error 
caused by imperfections in the text digitization process. In an attempt to compensate 
for both types of error, a method of ‘fuzzy searching’ was tested.307 However, this 
routine was discarded because it produced a high incidence of false-positives. 
Finally, the results produced by subsamples are subject to error beyond the range 
specified above, and should only be regarded as indicative.  
Summary of Findings 
The results show that the term unity-of-effort was in common usage throughout 
the period under consideration. The incidence of usage appeared highest (70%) 
between 1851 and 1900. The latter part of this time coincided with Haig’s formative 
years at Oxford (1880), Sandhurst (1883), and the Staff College (1896), when he 
would have been exposed to the expression. Up to 1920, in the vast majority of cases 
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(95%), unity-of-effort was used strictly within an organizational context. In rank 
order, reference was made to the following types of organization: religious, industrial 
and commercial, charitable, political and military. The term was generally used in an 
intra-organizational, rather than an inter-organizational context (73% vs. 22%).308 
In the great majority of cases (94% vs. 6%), ‘unity of effort’ was framed as a 
tangible and effective organising truth or principle.309 In 1793, Richard Sheridan, 
debating with Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox over Parliament’s support for a 
war against the French Republic, stated ‘a phalanx, whatever its extent, must consist 
of a united band acting in a body, animated by one soul, and pursuing its object with 
identity of spirit and unity of effort’.310 In 1845, general medical practitioners, 
qualified as surgeons, were advised to pursue the Crown for a charter of distinct 
incorporation ‘with unity of effort and confidence of eventual success’.311 In 1861, at 
a meeting of weavers convened to agree strike action, a Mr Garner told the meeting 
he ‘believed that by perfect unity of effort they might accomplish wonders’.312 In 
1905, in relation to the Australian Navy, a question was asked ‘if unity of effort in 
action [was] deemed necessary for success, why [was] unity of effort not essential to 
the preparation of that action?313 It is also clear that in the spoken word, particularly 
in political oratory, the term was often used purely as a rhetorical flourish. 
Crucially, the findings revealed that within the organizational context, the 
essence of unity-of-effort was coordinative. As this appeared to be the case through 
time and across organizational types, small and large, this feature can reasonably be 
                                                 
308 In the remaining 5% of instances, the organizational context is not implied. 
309 "Signor Orlando on Unity of Effort," The Times, 4th October 1918. p. 5  
310 "British Parliament," Morning Chronicle, February 18th 1793. p. 1. 
311 "Leading Article: The Council of the College of Surgeons," The Times, 31st January 1845. p. 4. 
312 "Weavers Meeting," Preston Guardian, 23rd March 1861. 
313 "Letter to the Editor," Sydney Morning Herald, 28th June 1905. p. 8. On 10th July 1911,  King 
George V granted the title of Royal Australian Navy to the Commonwealth Naval Forces. 
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described as the principle’s immutable nature. Usage of the principle supported  
this conclusion: 
[1820: Mr Justice Bayley, summing up to the jury in a case of 
conspiracy. (The King v. Hunt and others).] “Unite and be 
Free” – If that merely recommended the harmony essential to 
the enjoyment of freedom, it was harmless; if it meant to 
insinuate a unity of effort to promote an object inconsistent 
with the spirit of the law, then it was criminal.314  
[1835: An address by Lord Stanhope to the landlords, 
agriculturists and deputies from various associations, 
comprising the Central Agricultural Society.] No person 
could be more impressed with the advantage which was to be 
derived from the union of those assembled in their efforts to 
obviate these distresses than he (Lord Stanhope) was; for he 
was conscious that from a unity of effort alone they could 
hope for the redress of those grievances and evils under 
which the agricultural community laboured.315 
 [1882] Nothing is more desirable than there should be an 
identity of interests between the employers and the employed. 
If the object for which they are working is common to both, 
there will be unity of effort which never can be attained if 
their aims are antagonistic.316 
[1918: Bradford Dyers’ Association Annual General 
Meeting] Unquestionably one of the greatest stumbling 
blocks in the way of progress has been the absence of unity of 
effort. If Germany, already possessing by far the most 
powerful and highly organised chemical and colour industry 
in the world, has felt the need for complete cooperation and 
                                                 
314"York Assizes," Morning Chronicle, 29th March 1820. n.p. 
315 "Central Agricultural Society," The Morning Post, 16th December 1835. 
316 "Miner's Conference," The Economist, 2nd September 1882. p. 1086. 
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co-ordination, how incomparably more urgent is the need for 
it here...317 
 [1918] Meanwhile we may note the recommendations of Mr 
House's report. The first insists that the “United States shall 
exert all their influence to secure entire unity of effort, 
military, naval and economic between themselves and the 
countries associated with them in war”.318 
[1918] Commenting on the “splendid cooperation of the 
British and American troops”, senator James Hamilton 
Lewis, Democratic Whip and Leader of the Administration 
forces in the United States Senate said “...this unity of effort 
is attracting the attention of the world, and is regarded as an 
assurance of victory”.319  
 [1918: A Times Correspondent’s comment on a Bill in the 
French Chamber to modify the working of the French 
railways during the war.] Since the beginning of hostilities 
military transports have taken precedence on the railways as 
regards personnel and rolling stock; but the ever-increasing 
military necessities call now for more perfect concentration 
and unity of effort, if the military and civil need are to be 
grappled with successfully.320  
[1919] Letter to the Editor lamenting the lack of co-
ordination amongst the official, semi-official and voluntary 
agencies working on behalf of ex officers.] All of this [misery 
and hardship] can be overcome quickly with unity of effort, 
mutual cooperation, and determination.321 
The conclusion drawn from the findings that unity-of-effort was innately 
coordinative also found support from Messrs J.D. Mooney and A.C. Reiley, two 
                                                 
317 "Bradford Dyers' Association," The Times, March 1st 1919. p.17. 
318 "Mr House's Report," The Times, 5th January 1918. p. 7. (Col. House, Head of the US Special War 
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319 "US Confidence in Victory," The Times, 26th August 1918. p. 8.  
320 "French Railways to be Taken Over," The Times, 12th October 1918. p. 5.  
321 "Distressed Ex-Officers: Need for Co-ordination," The Times, 23rd August 1919. 
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leading American management scientists who held top managerial positions at the 
General Motors Corporation. In 1931 these men posited:  
 The purpose of all organization is to unify effort, that is co-
ordination. This term expresses the principles of organization 
in toto; nothing less. This does not mean that there are no 
subordinated principles; it simply means that all the others 
are contained in this one of co-ordination.322 
The findings also showed that while the immutable nature of unity-of-effort 
was uniquely coordinative, this aspect was compound rather than simple in its 
construction. In this sense, the evidence showed that the principle was conferred with 
permutations and combinations of human mental, physical and moral components. 
Generally, the mental component included ideas, professional knowledge, and 
experience. The physical component comprised the commitment of relevant training, 
skill and expertise. The moral component had attributes associated with courage, 
conviction and commitment, all virtues of the human will. The following extracts 
demonstrate these qualities. 
[1848] The extensive ravages of the fire appeared at one time 
to preclude the possibility of such a concentration or unity of 
effort by the fire brigade as might lead to its subjection....323 
 [1850: Formation of an Independent Democratic Association 
in Ireland] ...in future the movement party in both countries 
[England and Ireland] will be animated by the same 
principles, and struggle for the same objects. This will of 
itself produce an identity of feeling and unity of effort 
amongst them which cannot fail to be a fruitful source of 
strength to both.324 
                                                 
322James D. Mooney and Alan C. Reiley, Onward Industry (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1931). cited 
from Urwick, The Elements of Administration. p. 43. 
323 "Destructive Fire," Caledonian Mercury, 3rd January 1848. n.p. 
324 "The People Movement in Ireland," Northern Star, 16th March 1850. n.p. 
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 [1855] Letter to the Editor: So this love of man 
[philanthropy] is diffused from mind to mind, it produces 
unity of effort and object, and its effects are glorious to 
behold....325 
 [1857] We deem it no unpleasant sight to see 282 teachers of 
different denominations commingling together, deeply 
interested in one common movement, with one common aim 
and end in view. Such unity of effort has seldom, if ever, 
been manifested in this town [Halifax] before.326 
[1892] The orchestra, composed mainly of the principal 
members of Sir Charles Halle's band, was a fine combination 
of instrumental skill, and rendered the orchestral portions of 
the work with a precision, judiciousness and unity of effort 
eminently satisfactory.327 
[1897: Lord Provost's speech] The unity of effort between the 
Sovereign and her advisers, which a sound constitutional 
Government admits of and fosters, has secured innumerable 
blessings for the Country.328 
[1899] The French shipbuilding programme bears the impress 
of unstable policy on the part of the Ministry of Marine. The 
continuity and unity of effort which have given certitude to 
this country in the increase of the Navy, being based upon a 
rational conception of the strategic conditions of defence, 
have been denied to France ever drifting to and from between 
the traditional policy which would strive for command of the 
sea and the views of the school of Admiral Aube which are 
founded upon the ideas of evasion, commerce destruction, 
and the local defence of coasts.329 
                                                 
325 "Letter to the Editor," Derby Mercury, 27th June 1855. p. 2. 
326 "Sunday School Extension Movement," Leeds Mercury, 13th August 1857. n.p. 
327 "St. Celia Concert at Blackburn," Blackburn Standard, 16th January 1892. p. 6. 
328 "Dundee Celebration – Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee," Dundee Courier & Argus, 23rd June 
1897. p. 11. 
329 "Naval Construction in France and in Russia," The Times, 7th February 1899. p. 13. 
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[1912: A report commenting on the state of China, and the 
mistrust that existed between the north and south of the 
country.] There can be no unity of effort for the regeneration 
of China while these mutual apprehensions prevail.330 
 [1918: Lord Curzon observing the Supreme War Council] 
There is now a single strategy, single-minded though of a 
composite mind and unity of effort is applied to the military 
direction of the war.331 
[1918] The Empire’s Call – Unity of Effort Desired.332 
[1921] Lord Haig in his address, referred to the reputation 
which had been so well maintained by the Buffs and pleaded 
that the spirit of comradeship and sense of unity of effort 
shown in the war might be maintained in peace.333 
The results revealed that the necessity for an essential complement to unity-of-
effort was implied in only approximately one third of instances (38%). Moreover, in 
the majority of cases (64%), unity-of-object was identified as the essential 
complement to unity-of-effort. This was followed by unity-of-spirit (16%). The 
remaining cases included an assortment of other factors. It is perhaps surprising that 
unity-of-command was not specifically mentioned or implied in any case.  
Lastly, the research indicated that unity-of-effort was considered a normative 
ideal rather than an absolute standard. In 1926, an article that appeared in The Times 
under the caption ‘UNITY OF EFFORT’ bares testimony to this finding:  
But we know that perfect unity of effort is an ideal which 
must be fought for: it does not come to stay by mere wishing. 
Each day the machine must be “tuned up”. We know that 
unity of effort is not obtained by one will in ultimate control, 
                                                 
330 "The State of China," The Times, 7th June 1912. p. 9. 
331 "Debate on the King's Speech," The Times, 13th February 1918. p. 10. 
332 "The Empire's Call," The Argus, 12th April 1918. p. 7. 
333 Special Correspondant, "Cavalry Not A "Dead Arm"," The Times 1921. p. 7. 
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but by having the will of every man and women in the 
Organization set on the same end.334 
The Military Character of Unity-of-Effort 
If the coordinative nature of unity-of-effort is immutable, this implies its 
compound character, comprising mental, physical and moral components, must be 
capable of adaption to the different and distinctive circumstances of every type of 
human organization; or in other words its character is ‘chameleon-like’. Assuming 
this is allowed, then the characteristics of unity-of-effort appropriate to the British 
Army immediately prior to the war can be considered. Three obvious candidates 
present themselves, all of which ultimately serve to bind the organization’s human 
element into a single collective whole. The first is doctrine, which is ‘essential to 
ensure uniformity of thought’, facilitating unity-of-mental-effort.335 The second is 
training, which shaped by doctrine aims, for uniformity of action facilitating unity-
of-physical-effort. The third is morale, under-pinned by discipline, which secures the 
will to fight across units and formations, facilitating unity-of-moral-effort. In military 
organizations, these three components combine to promote unity-of-effort. 
The urgent question that must be asked is would Haig have concurred with this 
argument? Without resorting to a séance (as Haig might have done when faced with 
a similar challenge) this question cannot be answered with certainty.336 Nonetheless, 
as discussed above, two avenues pointed the way forward. The first avenue required 
an assessment of the published works of contemporary military thinkers known to 
                                                 
334 CALLISTHENES, "Unity of Effort," The Times, 1st April 1926. p. 7. 
335 David French, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-
1945 (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2000) p. 12. 
336 Reid, Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig. pp. 142-143. On 20th September 1906, Haig attended a 
séance with his sister Henrietta where he sought advice as to whether the expansion of the Territorial 
Army would be more satisfactory on a company or battalions basis. He was advised by the spiritualist 
a Miss McCreadie to adopt the former rather than the latter. Apparently, when Ms McCreadie gave 
this advice she was under the control of a native girl called ‘Sunshine’, who had Napoleon by her 
side. Haig must have found this circumstance most reassuring.  
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have had a direct impact on the formation of Haig’s military thought. The 
opportunity for this influence was prodigious. As early as 1892, Sir Henry Evelyn 
Wood VC, then General Officer Commanding at Aldershot, observed that Haig ‘was 
probably the best read officer in the Army’.337 Thus, the object here was to determine 
the extent to which these military thinkers recognised that doctrine, training, and 
morale underpinned by discipline, offered the properties to bind or glue the human 
resources of an army together into an efficient and effective fighting whole. The 
second avenue involved the examination of Haig’s pre-war career to determine the 
contribution that he made to the formation of doctrine, the development of training 
and the promotion of morale within the service arms in which he served. This  
provided an indication of both his understanding of, and the importance he attached 
to, these components.  
Research Methodology 
In pursuit of the contemporary military thinkers known to have influenced 
Haig, books read by him have been consulted, together with his notebooks complied 
at the Staff College. Haig’s reading material has been identified by a book catalogue 
prepared by Christie, Manson and Woods Ltd ahead of an auction on Wednesday 21st  
December 1977. The 100 listed lots included books, pamphlets and papers, collected 
and owned by Haig during the course of his pre-war military career. This material, 
published in English, French and German was ‘copiously annotated, underlined and 
side-lined, [by Haig] indicating [his] thorough study of military affairs’.338  
The catalogue included 49 books published before the war that can be 
categorised as ‘philosophical military works’. The mix of these books by German 
                                                 
337 Sir Evelyn Wood, Winnowed Memories (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1917) p. 127. 
338 Miscellaneous Printed Books including a Silver Collector's Library, (London: Christie, Manson & 
Wood Ltd, 1977) p. 5.  
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(26), English (14) and French (9) military thinkers demonstrated the broad scope of 
Haig’s investigation. It also indicated that Haig paid greater attention to his future 
German enemy than to his French ally. Furthermore, it was also apparent that he 
engaged more closely with empirical works (Nation in Arms); than the more 
theoretical or esoteric works such as J.F.C. Fuller’s almost impenetrable volume – 
The Foundations of the Science of War that does not appear to have reached his 
library.339 Brian Holden Reid described this work as a ‘monument to a failed effort to 
fuse philosophical, or at any rate, esoteric ideas with the practical demands of 
soldiering’.340 Those works most relevant to this study in respect to both subject 
matter and evidence of Haig’s close reading are identified in Figure 22 (below).  
 
  
                                                 
339 Col. J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, First ed. (London: Hutchinson & Co, 
1926). 
340 Brian Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought (Lincoln: Univeristy of Nebraska Press, 
1998) p. 33. 
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Figure 22: Thinkers and Mentors that Influenced Haig’s Military Thought 
Edition Author Title Christie’s Bibliographer’s 
Annotations  
1873 Clausewitz On War Cited in Haig’s Staff 
College note books. 
1876 Jomini The Art of War Cited in Haig’s Staff 
College note books. 
1887 Goltz A Nation in Arms Signed on title by Haig, 
many passages underlined. 
1888 Derrecagaix Modern War – Part 
I, Strategy 
Signed inside cover by 
Haig, some MS marginal 
notes and side-lining. 
1895 Ropes The Campaign of 
Waterloo and 
Military History 
Annotated and copiously 
side-lined by Lord Haig. 
1897 Furse Military 
Expeditions Beyond 
the Seas 
Signed on title by Douglas 
Haig, annotated and 
underlined throughout. 
1902 Wartenburg Napoleon as a 
General 
Pencil and underlining. 
1903 James Modern Strategy Signed by Haig, some 
passages underlined in 
pencil. 
1905 Henderson The Science of War Henderson lectured Haig at 
the Staff College. Haig 
formed a great respect for 
Henderson and his work 
both at the Staff College 
and during the Boer War. 
1905 Caemmerer The Development of 
Strategical Science 
during the 19th 
Century 
Signed by Haig and with 
many pp. underlined in 
pencil. 
1918 Foch The Principles of 
War 
Inscribed by Foch to Field 
Marshal Sir Douglas Haig 
on fly leaf. 
n.d. Henry Napoleon's War 
Maxims 






The works by Antoine-Henri Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, and Col. G.F.R. 
Henderson were not annotated by Haig. However, they are included here because 
there is sufficient evidence elsewhere that he did reflect on, and absorb the ideas, 
theories and opinions of these authors.341 In a list of books that Haig read and 
recorded at the end of his 1910 personal diary, he wrote that Clausewitz’s On War is 
‘the most profound book on the subject, showing how much there is in it, and still the 
best guide on general principles’.342 Henderson was Haig’s professor of military 
history at the Staff College and both men worked together on a project to reorganise 
military intelligence during the South Africa War.  
In respect to Haig’s pre-war career, primary source material has been examined 
including his personal papers, diaries and letters. These documents are collated in the 
Haig Papers kept at the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.  
Research Findings 
The phrase ‘unity-of-effort’ is notable by its absence in any of the works 
identified above. Perhaps understandably, it is apparent that these writers generally 
left aside questions of military organization and administration, concentrating instead 
on the nature of war, strategy and tactics. However, many of these authorities alluded 
to the principle in various ways. For example, Henderson posited that ‘if there is one 
principle more than another which is important in war, it is that in unity there is 
strength’.343 Von Wartenburg, the author of Napoleon as a General, agreed; he quoted 
                                                 
341 See Haig’s note books, Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155: 17 – 25.  
The copy of On War in Haig’s library and inscribed by the translator to him was the 1909 English 
edition translated by Miss A.M.E. Maguire, with Notes by Thomas Miller Maguire. However, it is 
likely that the first English edition, translated by Colonel J.J. Graham in 1873, had the most influence 
on Haig, as this copy was in circulation while he was at the Staff College. For a full discussion see 
‘The English Translation of On War’ Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception in 
Britain and America 1815-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). (Emphasis in original). 
Chapter 5.  
342 Cooper, Haig. Vol I, p. 119. 
343 Col. G.F.R. Henderson, The Science of War: A Collection of Essays and Lectures, 1892 - 1903 
(London: Longman's Green, and Co, 1905) p. 118. 
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General Friedrich von Bülow as stating “...union is strength, division weakness”.344 
He continued, ‘Bülow preached this doctrine, Jomini, and Willisen345 concur in it, 
Napoleon’s actions demonstrates it, and his words confirm it.’346 Goltz added a most 
important dimension by alluding to unity-of-effort, when he stated: 
 The action of the future will demand more of thorough 
preliminaries, a clearer comprehension of the object to be 
attained, a more intimate co-operation of all three arms, and 
the simultaneous employment of all available troops to 
decide the combat.347 
Derrecagaix elaborated further: 
 In order that an army may be strong, it is not sufficient that 
all the officers and soldiers be brave and well equipped. 
There must still be cohesion, unity and constancy in their 
efforts.348  
A number of authors stressed the importance of ‘unity of action’ to the strength or 
success of an army; but was a corollary to ‘unity of effort’ rather than a substitute for 
it.349 Finally, it was recognised that ‘offensive operations cannot be conducted with 
unity, or directed with precision, unless the object to be gained by them is kept 
distinctly in view by those who plan and execute the campaign’.350  
                                                 
344 Bülow, Geist des Neueren Kriegssystems, Hamburg, 1799. p. 57. Cited in Count Yorck von 
Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, The Wolsely Series (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & 
Co Ltd, 1902) p. 179. 
345 Karl Wilhelm von Willisen (1790-1879) was a Lieutenant General in the Prussian Army.  
346 Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General. Vol 1, p. 170. 
347 Lieut.-Col. Baron Von Der Goltz, The Nation in Arms (London: W.H. Allen and Company, 1887) p. 
272. (Emphasis in original). 
348 Gen. V. Derrecagaix, Modern War: Strategy, vol. I (Washington: James J. Chapman, 1888) p. 82. 
349 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G.H. Mendal and W.P. Craighill (West 
Point) 1862, 1992 ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co, 1862); Derrecagaix, Modern War: 
Strategy, I. p. 78 (94);Goltz, The Nation in Arms. p. 283; Henderson, The Science of War: A 
Collection of Essays and Lectures, 1892 - 1903. p. 224.  
350 Lieut.-Gen. Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, The Operations of War: Explained and Ilustrated (London: 




Professor Stephen Badsey posited that ‘the idea of what is meant by doctrine 
was well understood in the British Army of the period, although the term “doctrine” 
was itself rarely used’. Badsey observed that Haig and his colleagues interpreted 
doctrine as the ‘principles’ or ‘fundamentals’ of war, following the terminology 
established by Jomini. Some forms of written doctrine were rejected by the Army, 
and indeed as will be seen by Haig himself, on the grounds of being overly 
prescriptive.351 
Before the Second Boer War, ‘the British Army paid little attention to 
developing a coherent, unified…doctrine.’352 From the mid-nineteenth century at 
least this was primarily because the Army specialised in fighting small colonial wars, 
creating ‘a cult of pragmatism, flexibility and an empirical approach’.353 Moreover, 
the adoption of a formal doctrine would most probably have required its precursor, 
namely the presence of a Capital Staff.354 Throughout the nineteenth century the 
formation of this body had been eschewed by politicians including Liberals like 
Campbell-Bannerman who took an anti-militarist stance, by successive C-in-Cs who 
strenuously objected to any diminution of their power, and by regimental officers 
who feared being usurped by a GS elite. 
In July 1887, Maj.-Gen. Sir Henry Brackenbury, Director of Military 
Intelligence at the WO recommended the establishment of a GS on the German 
pattern before a Select Committee to improve the ‘want of economy and efficiency 
                                                 
351 Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918, ed. John Bourne, 
Birmingham Studies in the First World War (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007) p 3. 
352 Captain A.J. Duncan, "Technology, Doctrine and Debate: The Evolution of British Army Doctrine 
Between the Wars," Canadian Army Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring, 2004) p. 24. 
353 Bond, "Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters (Gary Sheffield and John Bourne)." p. 165. 
354 Dallas D. Irvine, "The Origin of Capital Staffs," The Journal of Modern History X, no. 2. (1938). 
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which to a certain extent exists in our army’.355 In 1890, the Hartington Commission 
made a broadly similar proposal, all to no avail.356  
It was only after the Army’s poor showing in the South African War that the 
political will existed for radical reform. The recommendations of the War Office 
(Reconstitution) Committee, chaired by Lord Esher, led to the abolition of the post of 
C-in-C and the establishment of a GS in 1905. The Esher Committee also pointed to 
the necessity for ‘a general work setting forth the accepted principles as regards the 
training of the Forces for, and their administration in, war’.357 In 1909, this 
requirement was met by the publication of the FSR under Haig’s close supervision in 
his capacity of DSD. Thus, for the first time, the British Army had a set of guiding 
principles endorsed by the Army Council for operations, and also organization and 
administration.  
This proposition poses an immediate and highly controversial question. Does 
the FSR, constitute a doctrine for the British Army? 358 The nub of the problem 
fracturing the argument appears to be the lack of ‘agreement over what precisely 
constitutes doctrine’. The result, according to Albert Palazzo is ‘that scholars and 
practitioners approach doctrine largely on an intuitive level [as there] is no single 
approved definition’.359 Gary Sheffield concurred; he claimed ‘military doctrine 
                                                 
355 Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army, New Edition ed. (Westminster: Archibald Constable & 
Co, 1895) p. 39. 
356 C.5979, "Hartington Royal Commission Report," ed. War Office (London: HMSO, 1890) p. xxii 
357 [Cd.1932], "Report of War Office (Reconstitution) Committee," ed. War Office (London: HMSO, 
1904) p. 23. 
358 For: Col. John K Dunlop, The Development of the British Army 1899-1914 (London: Methuen, 
1938). Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War.… Against: Albert Palazzo, Seeking Victory on 
the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I (University of Nebraska 
Press, 2002).; "From Moltke to Bin Laden: The relevance of doctrine in the contemporary military 
environment," (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, September, 2008).... Qualified: Badsey, 
Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918. French, "Doctrine and Organization in the 
British Army 1919-1932." 
359 Palazzo, "From Moltke to Bin Laden: The relevance of doctrine in the contemporary military 
environment." p. 6. 
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means different things to different people and organizations’.360 The danger of course 
is that military historians could use this ambiguity to serve their own arguments, one 
way or the other, or both. For example, Sheffield, argued concurrently that ‘the 
British Army went through the First World War without a doctrine in the modern 
sense’ and ‘the [BEF], did, however, have a body of doctrine in the form of Field 
Service Regulations’. To reconcile this obvious contradiction, he added the caveat 
‘rather than being prescriptive, FSR set out broad principles for action’, feeding into 
Badsey’s earlier interpretation. Sheffield helpfully added that ‘General Sir Douglas 
Haig was the key figure in the formulation of FSR 1909’.361  
David French was also most careful with his choice of words. He argued that 
‘in 1914 the British Army had no real operational doctrine, except to take the 
offensive in almost all circumstances’. This insight was coupled with the objection 
that FSR-I ‘placed little emphasis on the need to produce a combined-arms fire plan’. 
While this is of course true, in mitigation, it can be argued that the operational level 
of war was not generally recognised in 1914. In fact, according to Lieut.-Gen. Sir 
John Kiszely, the ‘British Military only incorporated this vital link into its doctrine in 
the 1980s’.362 Moreover, the need for this type of doctrine only emerged during the 
course of the war, and it was only turned into a practical reality after ‘a veritable 
revolution in artillery techniques’ had been realised.363 J.F.C. Fuller in his primer 
Training Soldiers for War, posited that ‘originality of thought is always an asset, but 
on the modern battle-field unity of action is the essential, and this unity of action is 
supplied to us by our “Field Service Regulations”.364 Professor Brian Holden Reid 
                                                 
360 Gary Sheffield, "Doctrine and Command in the British Army: An Historical Overview," in ADP 
Land Operations (AC 71819) (London: MOD, 2005) p. 165. 
361 Ibid. p. 170. 
362 John Kiszely, "Thinking about the Operational Level," JRUSI December(2005) p. 38. 
363 French, "Doctrine and Organization in the British Army 1919-1932." p. 498. 
364 Capt. J.F.C. Fuller, Training Soldiers for War (London: Hugh Rees Ltd, 1914) p. 45. 
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observed that ‘in 1914, the British Army had evolved a tactical doctrine aimed at 
fighting a short war in Europe’.365 Col. John K. Dunlop was unequivocal:  
 The existence of this series of authoritative manuals [FSR-1 
and FSR II] was of the greatest value for the inculcation of 
one central doctrine, not only in the Regular Army, but also 
in the Territorial Force, in the Officers’ Training Corps, and 
as a result of the Imperial Conference, in the Dominion 
Forces.366  
As Brig.-Gen. J.E. Edmonds observed the FSR addressed ‘the general 
principles governing the employment of the army in war’.367 As these principles 
received official sanction from the Army Council, it can be reasonably concluded 
that as understood within the contemporary context at least, the FSR constituted the 
first official doctrine for the British Army. Haig agreed: his Final Despatch written 
in 1919 insisted that ‘the principles of command, staff work, and organization 
elaborated before the war have stood the test imposed upon them and are sound’.368 
The Formation of Haig’s Views on the Need for Doctrine  
By reading Jomini’s treatise on The Art of War, Haig would have been exposed 
to the compelling idea that good results in warfare can be reduced to the execution of 
‘a few simple fundamental principles’ which were immutable, independent of 
weapon type, time and country.369 For Jomini the two most fundamental principles of 
all were to operate on interior lines to obtain freedom of movement in the approach 
to battle and to strike the enemy with overwhelming force at the decisive point. 
                                                 
365 Brian Holden Reid, "War Fighting Doctrine and the British Army," in A Doctrinal Perspective (The 
Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1998) p. 14. (Emphasis in original). 
366 Dunlop, The Development of the British Army 1899-1914. p. 293. 
367 Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1914, 1. p. 8. 
368 Haig, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, December 1915-April 1919, ed. by J.H. Boraston. p. 343. For 
evidence that Haig’s self-congratulatory valediction was not universally shared see French, "Doctrine 
and Organization in the British Army 1919-1932.". p. 500. 
369 Jomini, The Art of War. p. 344; Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806 (Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2009) p. 113. 
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Jomini further advised ‘the whole science of great military combination is comprised 
of these two fundamental truths’.370 It is significant that the second of these truths 
found its way into one of Haig’s note books.371 Moreover, from Jomini, he would 
have also learned that the ‘military man who clearly perceives the importance of the 
truths stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate coup-d’oeil… and will be 
in no doubt, in real campaigns what he ought to do…even when his enemy attempts 
sudden and unexpected movements’.372  
When Haig arrived at the Staff College in 1896, he benefited from the tutelage 
of Henderson, who was ‘a thoughtful student of war, a gifted teacher and an 
outstanding historian…[who] wielded an enormous intellectual influence in the 
British Army’.373 It was chiefly through his lectures that Haig became intimately 
familiar with the great military minds including Napoleon, Jomini, Clausewitz and 
Moltke, together with the highly instructive battles of Spicheren, Fredericksburg, 
Woerth, and those of Stonewall Jackson among others. Henderson, who published 
what were, and perhaps still are, the standard works on these battles, devised a new 
method of teaching military history directed at developing military judgement, rather 
than simply exercising the memories of his students.374 His aim was to ensure that the 
principles of war revealed by these masters and battles were understood and 
absorbed in such way that when initiative and judgement was called for in the field, 
they were produced as ‘a matter of instinct’.375 This approach called attention to the 
principles and fundamentals of war and substituted at the time for a formal doctrine 
                                                 
370 Jomini, The Art of War. pp. 328-329. 
371 NLS-Acc.3155/19, "Strategy I," (n.d.). n.p. 
372 Jomini, The Art of War. p. 343-344. 
373 Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought 1815 - 1940 (London: Cassell  
& Company, 1964) p. 171, 217. 
374 Ibid. p. 221. 
375 Henderson, The Science of War: A Collection of Essays and Lectures, 1892 - 1903. pp. 48-49. 
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in the sense that this method was intended to elicit from Staff College graduates a 
commonly recognised intellectual response to strategic and tactical problem solving.  
In 1903, Ferdinand Foch placed the value of Henderson’s teaching methods 
into sharp focus for Haig, if indeed this was necessary. The Frenchman examined the 
question of ‘unity of doctrine’ in his now famous work The Principles of War.376 He 
posited that ‘doctrine...constitute[s] a discipline of the mind common to all’ that 
engendered ‘a common manner of seeing, thinking and acting...’377 Furthermore, 
‘from the same attitude towards things will first result a same way of seeing them, 
and from this common way of seeing arises a common way of acting.378 With 
reference to the Franco-Prussian War, Foch stressed that in the era of mass armies, 
where it was impossible for the C-in-C to exercise personal control over the whole 
force, it was essential that the ‘personal initiative of subordinate chiefs (all working 
in the same direction and complying with the same doctrine) concur in setting up a 
complete direction of armies’.379 Foch warned that ‘when doctrine ceases, a known 
doctrine, a doctrine learned from practice, men act on personal lines’.380 Of course, 
Foch was in distinguished company. For example, Derrecagaix observed: 
The skilful organization of the command is one of the prime 
elements of an army’s strength. It rests upon a fundamental 
principle, unity in command, or, using Napoleon’s happy 
expression, unity of the military thought.381 
                                                 
376 Foch, The Principles of War. p. 13. There is no direct evidence from the part of Haig’s library 
auction by Christie’s that he read the original French language version of this work, Des Principles 
de la Guerre, first published in 1903. However, given Foch’s prominence as a French military 
thinker, and Haig’s deep interest in the principles of war, it would be most surprising if he had not.  
377 Ibid. p. 7. 
378 Ibid. p. 13. (Emphasis in original). 
379 Ibid. p. 290. 
380 Ibid. p. 244 . 
381 Derrecagaix, Modern War: Strategy, I. p. 53. (Emphasis in original). 
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Haig’s Contribution to the Development of Army Doctrine Before 1914 
A review of Haig’s pre-war military career revealed that soon after leaving 
Sandhurst he took a precocious interest in the development of military doctrine. In 
1890, as a junior officer in the 7th Hussars in India, Haig wrote and circulated a 
pamphlet on cavalry reconnaissance, which was then used as the basis for training 
exercises at the annual manoeuvers in 1891 and 1892.382 It is evident that Haig 
believed his ideas could improve this aspect of the cavalry’s performance and that by 
circulating them in printed form they would lead to a common understanding among 
his brother officers. Brig.-Gen. Harcourt Bengough, commander of the Bangalore 
Division appreciated the value of Haig’s contribution: 
I was much interested in your remarks on Cavalry 
Reconnaissance and in the little pamphlet that you sent me 
and it would appear to me excellent. If all our...Cavalry 
officers took as much practical interest in instructing their 
men, we should soon have our Cavalry which General Luck 
says it now is “equal to any in Europe”. I would prefer to say 
the best in the world.383  
In 1892, Haig became an early advocate of dismounted cavalry service, 
circulating his ideas to Brig.-Gen. Sir William Gatacre, who was the Adjutant 
General of the Bombay Army at Poona.384 Haig firmly believed that the new cavalry 
carbine,385 which allowed long range, rapid, and – for the first time – smokeless fire, 
offered the service ‘opportunities of increased usefulness and of obtaining results 
                                                 
382 NLS-Acc.3155/32/A, "Reconnaissance Instruction and Exercises," (1890-1892). n.p. 
383 NLS-Acc.3155/6/e, "Letters and Reports," (1891-1894). n.p.. At the time General G. Luck was the 
Inspector General of Cavalry in India. 
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Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE) used by the infantry.  
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never dreamed of with old fashioned firearms.’ He emphasised that ‘no independent 
or successful action of large bodies of cavalry is conceivable…unless it is capable of 
maintaining combat with firearms…’. Haig added the caveat that it was no part of the 
cavalry’s duty to undertake or be drawn into long fights or cope with the enemy’s 
infantry.386 He was equally adamant that cavalry should not be recast as MI. In this 
respect, it appears that Haig was very concerned that as an expedient cost cutting 
measure, politicians would demand the replacement of the relatively superiorly 
trained cavalry by the more cheaply trained MI.  
In August 1895, prior to joining the Staff College, Haig was asked to complete 
the latest version of the Cavalry Drill Manual left unfinished by Col. John French 
when he was appointed AAG under the AG, Gen. Sir Redvers Buller VC.387 The new 
manual ‘encapsulated the reformed Cavalry thinking as endorsed by Wolseley’.388 As 
Haig was a mere Captain at this time, it is unlikely that he made any significant 
contribution to the doctrinal value of this work other than to draft its text. However, 
he was obviously aware that the purpose of the manual was to formally promote 
unity in British cavalry thought, and to help standardise training exercises. Duff 
Cooper remarked ‘that such a task should have been entrusted to so junior an officer 
is evidence of the high opinion generally held of his attainments’.389 The marked 
improvement of this manual in comparison with its predecessor favourably 
impressed The Times.390  
In 1903, just before taking up the post of IGCav in India, Haig did have the 
opportunity to influence the trajectory of cavalry doctrine. Roberts, then C-in-C, 
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asked Haig to rewrite Cavalry Training, 1898, in the light of the experience of the 
South African War. This he dutifully did, but he refused to endorse the higher 
training priority given by Army Order 39 to the dismounted tactical use of the rifle 
versus mounted shock tactics (armé blanche). The official aim was to subordinate the 
sword to the rifle, and abolish the lance. Haig feared that this outcome would lead to 
the curtailment of cavalry training thereby reducing the arm to little more than 
mounted infantry thus making it irrelevant as a ‘decisive factor’ in future warfare.391  
I am a thorough believer in the necessity of training Cavalry 
to be thoroughly good shots and to act efficiently 
dismounted, but in view of the fact that we have to train 
Cavalry here [India] to be ready to fight Russians and 
savages, I hold that our Cavalry must be thoroughly efficient 
with the lance and the sword.392  
Consequently, after Haig’s departure to India, Roberts ensured that Cavalry 
Training 1904 was revised according to his lights. In the event, the manual was 
issued only in provisional form.393 
 In 1906, following the earlier abolition of Roberts’s post of C-in-C by the 
Esher Committee, Haig was able to prevail when he was appointed DMT at the WO 
by Richard Burdon Haldane, the new Secretary of State for War in Asquith’s 
recently formed Liberal administration. In this post Haig closely supervised the 
publication of Cavalry Training, 1907.394 A close comparison of Haig’s cavalry 
Tactics notebook against the published text revealed that multiple passages from the 
former had been copied word-for-word into the latter.395 In 1909, the lance was 
                                                 
391 Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. p. 34. 
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393 Cavalry Training (Provisional), (London: HMSO, 1904). 
394 Cavalry Training, (London: HMSO, 1907). 
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reintroduced.396 General Sir Hubert Gough, who after his dismissal from the BEF in 
May 1918 was no advocate of Haig’s, summed up his contribution to the cavalry:  
Haig was a profound student of modern war. His ideas on 
strategy – on tactics – and on staff duties, were a considerable 
way ahead of our other generals. In consequence, his 
influence on cavalry training both in England and afterwards 
in India, where he went as Chief of the General Staff, was 
very great.397 
On November 9th 1907 Haig was appointed DSD and became responsible for 
the FSR. Later, following the establishment of the Imperial General Staff, whose 
organization had also been drafted by him, Haig promoted the use of the FSR in 
India, Australia, Canada, South Africa and the Colonies. His aim was to formally 
unify the doctrine of all military forces in the Empire. To help facilitate this process, 
Haig enlarged the Staff College at Camberley, reformed the Administrative Staff 
course at the London School of Economics and helped facilitate the development of 
the Staff College in India. 
In 1909, in the capacity of temporary IGCav, Haig organised two cavalry staff 
rides in March and in June.398 Gen. Sir George de S. Barrow, then a relatively junior 
officer whose duty it was to write-up Haig’s notes, observed after the war that these 
exercises ‘had the inestimable value of uniting staffs, commanders and regimental 
officers in community of method and mutual understanding’.399 These exercises, 
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including the mass charge, were practised under Haig’s direction ‘not so much for 
their tactical value but for their importance in cultivating a shared doctrine’.400  
On the October 8th 1909, after having been knighted by the King (KCVO) for 
services at the WO, Haig sailed for Bombay to take up his post as CGS in India 
under the C-in-C, Sir Garret O’Moore Creagh VC.401 Haig hoped that the new post 
would enable him to establish a GS in India along British lines, and to help increase 
the efficiency of the India Army on the basis of the FSR in preparation for war 
outside the borders of the sub-continent.402 With notable prescience Haig made this 
plain in a letter to Brig.-Gen. L.E. Kiggell who was his deputy at the Directorate of 
Staff Duties and who through his patronage, succeeded him: 
As regards meeting ‘the storm’ [war with Germany] which 
we all foresee, it seems to me that it will last a long time. 
We'll win by wearing the enemy out, if we are only allowed 3 
more years to prepare and organise the Empire. And it is of 
vital importance to have the machinery available in India 
trained as soon as possible, to turn out Staff Officers who 
may be of use when the time comes, and the resources of that 
country organized for Imperial needs instead of only for 
India's as at present. It was this idea that made me accept Sir 
O’ Moore's offer and I honestly think I can do more good 
with him than here over the next three years. He is most 
anxious to work on sound lines and for the GS here to do its 
utmost to help him.403 
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With the valuable aid of Maj.-Gen. Alexander Hamilton Gordon who became 
Director of Military Operations,404 Haig organised the GS on a similar pattern to that 
at the WO, except that staff duties and military training were placed under one 
director.405 He used Staff Tours to train higher commanders and staff officers in the 
application of FSR-I. ‘Each of these Staff Tours was devoted to a definite phase of 
fighting against a European enemy’: namely, manoeuvring for position, the first 
clash of battle, the wearing out fight and the decisive blow, in accordance with the 
principles established in the regulations.406 Haig also used the schemes of collective 
army training, established by his predecessor General Sir Beauchamp Duff, to 
inculcate FSR-I into the line officers. These schemes emphasised the principles in 
Chapter VII, and broadly covered the component parts of the new regulations 
(marches, protection, night operations, camps and bivouacs).407  
Haig’s tenure in India was not an unmitigated success. His ambition to bring 
the Indian army up to a high standard of efficiency based on the new regulations was 
to some extent frustrated. Haig found that while the C-in-C had promised his full 
support, in the event, he did not have the stomach for reform. Instead of helping Haig 
to ‘oust the rascals’, O’Moore Creagh turned out to be one of them.408 Haig’s 
problems were compounded by the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, who kept pressing for 
cuts in the Army estimate. Under the instruction of the pacifist Secretary of State for 
India, Lord Morley, the Viceroy attempted to frustrate Haig’s efforts further by 
ordering him to destroy a mobilization plan he had carefully prepared for an Indian 
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Expeditionary Force.409 Fortunately the plan did survive at the WO because it was the 
subject of the 1911 Staff Tour Report.410 Haig’s relief came in May when Haldane 
asked him by wire if he would accept the post of GOC at Aldershot. This was the 
most prestigious army formation in the British Empire. Haig immediately replied in 
the affirmative.411 He returned by sea to England in December 1911 after playing a 
leading role in the organization of the successful Imperial Durbar at Delhi.412  
At Aldershot, Haig made a significant contribution inculcating the FSR into his 
Army Corps, which consisted of the 1st and 2nd Divisions and the 1st Cavalry 
Brigade. For the first time in his career, Haig had the opportunity to handle massed 
regular troops of all-arms, an experience that would prove most valuable on the 
Western Front. ‘The whole of his time at Aldershot was spent perfecting the Army 
Corps for its future role’.413 In September, Haig exercised the whole corps in the 
complex task of strategic marching at the inter-divisional manoeuvres in accordance 
with FSR-I (Chapter III, Marches). Here the 1st and 2nd Divisions, complete with 
divisional transport, marched ‘hot foot’ upon one road to meet an imaginary enemy. 
To avoid chaos, this feat required highly trained staff to issue exact orders, perfect 
marching discipline and systemised transport. Apparently, ‘the Command Staff were 
eminently pleased with the result’. During the exercise, orders were issued by Haig's 
staff to the Royal Flying Corps for the purpose of aerial reconnaissance. According 
to the report of an in-bedded Times correspondent, these were ‘nearly as perfect a 
vehicle of the General’s intentions as is humanly possible’.414  
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On September 16th, at the Annual Army Manoeuvres, the Aldershot Command 
(Red Force) with Haig in charge was pitted against a scratch formation of similar 
strength (Blue Force) commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Grierson. 415 The exercise 
was directed by French, now the CIGS, with the objects, framed and informed by the 
principles of the FSR:  
i. To afford opportunities to the higher commanders and their 
staffs of handling troops in the field. 
ii. To train the troops in combined operations in the larger 
formations. 
iii. To give the administrative services practice in carrying 
out their duties in the field.416  
Due to an intelligence error caused by one of Haig’s staff officer’s literal 
interpretation of an air observer’s report, the manoeuvers ended early in a draw. This 
outcome enabled Haig’s critics to make the claim that he proved an incompetent 
commander, by being ‘out-generalled’ by Grierson.417 However, The Times military 
correspondent who witnessed the exercise, did not share this opinion. He wrote that 
‘the operations of this year have been more interesting and instructive than any other 
since the war’. Summarising French’s post manoeuvre report, the correspondent 
observed that ‘the main defect in the higher leading appeared to be the absence of 
weight at a decisive point in the concluding engagement’. This was in part due to the 
strategy of both commanders, which ‘was prudent in its broader aspects’. The result 
was that the commanders ignored both strategic and tactical opportunities on risk 
grounds.418  
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Nonetheless, these manoeuvres were not Haig’s ‘shining hour’.419 It appears he 
did not display his characteristic ‘sincere desire to engage the enemy’.420 However, 
the manoeuvers did prove the qualified efficacy of aerial observation. Furthermore, 
lessons were learned in operations and staff work, and where appropriate the FSR 
were amended accordingly.421  
Haig cautioned in the Aldershot Command’s Comments on the Training 
Season, 1913, that ‘good progress has been made towards establishing a uniform 
doctrine throughout the staffs in the command, but improvement in this respect can 
still be effected, and special exercises carried out with this end in view’.422 Given that 
Haig did not extend the context of this comment to include the whole command, this 
indicates that more broadly in other formations, the inculcation of doctrine was less 
than satisfactory.423  
In conclusion, Haig’s notebooks show that many of his ideas and much of his 
inspiration came from the contemporary military thinkers indicated above. Thus, it is 
apparent that in concert with men like Foch, Goltz and Derrecagaix, Haig would 
have acknowledged that the purpose of doctrine was to provide the basis for a 
coherent and cohesive foundation for the Army’s common understanding of the 
principles or fundamentals of war. Moreover, the examination of Haig’s military 
career shows that he may have made a greater contribution to the formation and 
adoption of operational, organizational and administrative doctrine than any other 
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senior soldier of his generation.424 It follows that he recognised and was fully aware 
of the ultimate purpose of this work, which was to deliver unity-of-mental-effort 
across the Army.  
Unity of Physical Effort: Training 
Training delivers unity-of-physical-effort between the man and his weapons; 
between the man and other men in his arm; and one arm in combination with other 
arms. Haig’s military influencers and mentors, including Jomini, Clausewitz, Colmar 
von der Goltz and Henderson, promoted this notion. In addition, Haig’s practical 
experience supported it. He was directly involved with the training of officers and 
men for practically the duration of his pre-war military career.  
The Formation of Haig’s Ideas on Training 
Jomini highlighted the importance of training by making it the subject of three 
of his twelve essential conditions that ‘concur in making a perfect army’. These 
references related to the high standard and uniform instruction of officers and men; 
the instruction of the special arms of engineering and artillery; and ‘having an 
organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical education of its 
officers,’ viz a GS.425 Clausewitz posited that ‘the expertness of an army through 
training...holds the ranks together as if they had been cast in a mould’.426 Goltz 
declared that unity-of-action ‘is guaranteed by a uniform training’.427 In the case of 
officers, he advised that ‘individual and general principles’ should be ‘grafted into 
the flesh and blood of the commanders of troops by teaching and training’ to ensure 
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unity of action.428 Goltz also stressed the importance of training armies in peace, for 
war.429 Henderson too signalled the value of training by devoting one chapter to ‘the 
training of infantry for attack’.430 As Haig’s Staff College notebooks attest, he 
acknowledged the value of these principles.431  
Haig’s Training Experience 
The evidence suggests that ‘being trained by Haig was no joke’.432 On July 25th 
1888, he was appointed Adjutant of the 7th Hussars in India.433 This gave him the 
responsibility for regimental administration and training. Sgt.-Maj. H.J. Harrison 
bore witness and wrote of his methods to Lady Haig: 
Your husband dear Lady at that time was obsessed by one 
item “Soldiering” and he ploughed his soldierly furrows in 
his unique manner. Original he was in most things pertaining 
to Discipline, Inexorable in its execution. Officers, Non-
commissioned Officers and men were all brought under 
Haig’s intensity of purpose and dealt with by their Wizard 
Adjutant in a way which compelled awe.  
On the drill ground, in the riding school, on the field, and in 
Camp or barracks, Haig was the same brilliant worker. At all 
times and in all weathers Haig went about “Soldiering”, and 
Haig’s soldiering was admitted by all who mattered, to be 
unrelated to ordinary military drills and tactics, but were 
embellished with a kind of finishing off process exclusively 
Haig.434 
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Haig held the post of adjutant until July 24th 1892, the full time span allowed by the 
regulations. During this period he markedly improved the training efficiency of the 
7th Hussars. Lieut.-Col. Harrie Reid, the regimental CO, wrote a glowing letter of 
thanks to Haig.435  
In September 1892, Haig left India in an unsuccessful attempt to gain a place at 
the Staff College by examination. Undeterred, and at his own initiative and expense, 
he attended French and German cavalry manoeuvres in Touraine (1893), Limoges 
(1894) and Berlin (1895). In the last instance, Haig spent two months observing the 
German cavalry.436 He attended manoeuvres at Templehofer Field, inspected the 1st 
Guard Uhlans at their depot and dined with the Kaiser at his Schloss who flattered 
him with a toast.437 Haig was particularly impressed by German cavalry training 
methods and organization.438 The intelligence reports that Haig had previously 
prepared and forwarded to the Horse Guards brought him to the attention of Sir 
Evelyn Wood VC, the Quarter-Master General. In 1895, Wood asked Haig to prepare 
a report while he was in Berlin on the role of German Officers and NCOs in the 
training of their men.439 It has been suggested elsewhere that as a result of this paper, 
Haig was influential in the cavalry’s reorganization from eight troops to four 
squadrons.440 This is not correct because this system was adopted on March 1st 1892 
while Haig was still in India, and well before this paper was written.441  
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During this period, Haig had the opportunity to extend his practical training 
experience. In 1894, acting as ADC to General Sir James Keith Fraser, the IGCav, 
Haig assisted with regimental inspections, officiated at manoeuvres, and practised 
new methods of reconnaissance. He was also selected by French to be his Staff 
Officer for the first Staff Ride, which was conducted at Haywards Heath. By the end 
of 1895, Haig had established himself ‘as an authority on the training and 
organization of modern cavalry’.442 For these endeavours Haig was rewarded by the 
C-in-C, the Duke of Cambridge, with a coveted commendation to the Staff College.  
On leaving the Staff College two years later Haig was able to put his training 
experience into practice in the field. On the January 28th 1898, through the patronage 
of Wood, Haig joined the Egyptian Army under Kitchener and served in the Sudan. 
At first, he was assigned no specific post and used his time to assess the state of 
cavalry training. He concluded that both ‘battle training and march discipline’ were 
poor, apportioning blame to the officers rather than the men.443 On March 25th, Haig 
was appointed CSO to the Egyptian Cavalry Brigade commander, Lieut.-Col. R.A. 
Broadwood.444 On April 5th, while on reconnaissance, this formation was challenged 
by a strong force of Dervish cavalry and infantry. In the ensuing melee, Haig took 
control of a rapidly deteriorating situation and prevented a rout. At considerable 
personal risk, and in the face of the enemy, he also saved the life of a wounded 
Egyptian NCO. It has been suggested that had the soldier in question been a white 
man instead of a native, Haig might have won the VC for this action.445 On April 8th 
the Battle of Atbara ensued where victory was assured by a successful cavalry 
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advance which neutralised the opposing horsemen.446 Following these operations and 
on the recommendation of Broadwood, Haig was rewarded with a Brevet Majority 
by Kitchener.447  
Following this promotion Broadwood gave Haig a squadron to command 
which he set about training with characteristic zeal. In a letter to his sister Henrietta 
he explained: 
I have 35 young horses now making 148 in all in my 
squadron. I have a parade every morning except Friday 
(which is the Egyptian Sunday). I have the young horses in 
the afternoon. We have an unlimited drill ground (from here 
to Suakim). Compare that with Wormwood Scrubs, 
Hounslow Heath and Wimbledon Common for training 
Cavalry! So I have grand manoeuvres against men with flags 
to represent the enemy – Not exactly Dervish tactics, but still 
if a squadron can keep together at rapid pace one is all right 
against Dervishes. I also have plenty of dummies (in the 
ground and on posts), which I make the men thrust at every 
day. – So they are getting quite handy now.448  
At Omdurman this rigorous training paid off. Rawlinson, one of Kitchener’s 
two ADCs, observed in his diary that Haig’s methods and confident bearing inspired 
his Fellaheen troopers with such courage that ‘for the first time in history, they were 
able to stand and attack the warlike Dervishes’.449 This experience proved to Haig 
that good organization, training and discipline could have a significant and positive 
impact on the fighting effectiveness of previously indifferent troops.450 
                                                 
446 NLS-Acc.3155/6/b, "Letters to Henrietta Jameson." Haig to Henrietta 11/04/1898.  
447 DeGroot, "The Pre-War Life and Military Career of Douglas Haig." p. 157. 
448 NLS-Acc.3155/6/b, "Letters to Henrietta Jameson." Letter: Haig to Henrietta 07/07/1898. 
449 Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig. cited in * footnote on p. 17. 
450 DeGroot, "The Pre-War Life and Military Career of Douglas Haig." pp. 174-175. 
 134 
 
In September 1898, Haig returned to England where in the following year he 
was briefly appointed Brigade Major to French who now commanded the Aldershot 
Cavalry Brigade. In 1899, following the outbreak of war in South Africa, French was 
given command of the Cavalry Division. Haig accompanied him as his CSO. He had 
a good war,451 enhancing his reputation with the effectiveness of his staff work at 
Elandslaagte, Colesberg, the Relief of Kimberley and the capture of Bloemfontein.452 
He was rewarded with the Colonelcy of the 17th Lancers. Following the capture of 
Pretoria, Haig took command of a column before returning to England on September 
23rd 1902. ‘He had served in every part of South Africa and met success 
everywhere’.453  
On October 30th 1903, following an invitation from Kitchener, Haig arrived in 
Bombay to take up the post of IGCav in India, a command he held until August 12th 
1906.454 In accordance with Kitchener’s wishes, he set about raising the standard of 
efficiency of the British and Native cavalry regiments with the express aim of 
making them ‘thoroughly efficient for war, (both against civilised and savage 
peoples)’.455 Haig also pressed the military authorities to build a Cavalry School. 
After delays due to funding problems, the school was eventually opened in 1910 at 
Saugor in north central India along similar lines to that of the cavalry school at 
Netheravon.456 To provide for the higher training of officers, Haig also found support 
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from Kitchener in his determination to establish ‘the long overdue’ Staff College.457 It 
opened in 1905 first at Deolali before transferring permanently to Quetta in 1907.458 It 
is clear that at this early stage, Haig and Kitchener were anticipating and preparing 
for a European war. Haig’s ambition for regimental training is summed up by an 
expression he included in a letter of advice to his nephew Hugo, who was a relatively 
junior cavalry officer, “aim high perchance ye may attain”.459  
A week after his arrival in India, Haig circulated a memorandum to all British 
and native cavalry regiments setting out in detail his expectations for the programme 
of inspections. In this way Haig was able to both set the standard and manage the 
uniformity of training across the cavalry regiments. He made no distinction between 
British and native units as to his requirements. Haig organised a rigorous 
combination of regimental inspections, staff rides and manoeuvers. According to one 
observer Haig’s ‘instruction was more practical and realistic than anything the 
cavalry in India had known previously’.460 To ensure uniformity with the inspection 
system at home, Haig kept in close touch with Robert Baden-Powell, the IGCav in 
England. According to Baden-Powell, Haig was able to give him ‘far seeing and 
practical advice’.461  
In August 1906, at the instigation of Lord Esher, the urging of the King, and 
the invitation of Haldane, Haig now a substantive Maj.-Gen. was appointed DMT at 
the WO, a post that included war organization. From the narrow perspective of 
training, two of Haig’s major contributions had far reaching effects: first, he helped 
Haldane shape and mould the formation of the new second-line Territorial Force in 
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all its essential details.462 In particular, he devised the training scheme for this new 
formation.463 To enforce a high standard of training, and following the German 
pattern, Haig made the divisional and mounted brigade commanders ‘solely 
responsible for the training and efficiency for war of their commands and such other 
troops as may be placed under them’.464 With the aim of ensuring uniformity with the 
Regular Army, Haig established training units which served to link the Special 
Reserve with the Territorial Force. In peacetime, the principal functions of these 
training units distributed throughout the United Kingdom was to train the Special 
Reserve; to serve generally as a centre for education and instruction of the Territorial 
Force; and to form a school where officers, non-commissioned offers and specialists 
could receive higher training. It was intended that the training units would provide 
‘the establishment, equipment, accommodation and apparatus which would enable 
them to develop their training possibilities to the highest degree’.465 
Secondly, in 1908 as DSD, Haig seized the opportunity, under the imprimatur 
of the new Chief of the General Staff – Sir William Nicholson, to expand the staff 
organization to embrace India and the Dominions, creating the Imperial General 
Staff.466 This initiative had already been promoted by Haldane accompanied by Haig 
at the Colonial Conference staged in London the previous April of 1907.467 The new 
Staff organization was realised at the Imperial Conference in 1909.468 From the 
perspective of training, this was an important development. Not only did the new 
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body ensure that the training of GSOs was standardised throughout the Empire, but it 
was also agreed that the FSR and training manuals issued in Great Britain would 
form the basis of training as far as it proved practical.469 This measure had the great 
potential to establish common standards and bring uniformity to training methods in 
India and throughout the Dominions with those at home.  
In 1910, Haig took the opportunity in India to instruct and train GSOs at GHQ 
and those at divisional HQs in the practical problems of war.470 As briefly mentioned, 
Haig organised three Staff Tours, scheduled to run concurrently over three seasons. It 
appears that nothing of this scale, duration or intensity had been attempted before. It 
is clear that Haig was preparing the army in India for a European war which he 
believed would involve the collective forces of the Empire. Furthermore, the Staff 
Tours were sequenced to foreshadow the requirements of this type of conflict. The 
first tour (December 1909 to March 1910) examined the problems of mobilisation in 
India. The second tour (July to December, 1910) addressed concentration, 
reinforcement and resupply, defence of lines of communication, organization of 
supply transport, medical, ordnance services, railways and transport against a 
backdrop of Indian, Imperial and German organization.471 The third tour (May to 
November, 1911) dealt with embarkation, organization of the sea base, the 
replacement of animal transport by mechanical transport in a theatre where there was 
a good railway system and metalled roads, strategical deployment, the retreat of a 
force whose communications were suddenly threatened and its pursuit, and a counter 
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attack with a large reserve of all-arms.472 This last tour foreshadowed British 
operations in France in 1914 with uncanny accuracy.  
On Haig’s return from India in 1912 his ‘chief interest’ was to train the 
Aldershot Command for war against Germany, which he and other senior officers 
including French and Wilson believed was inevitable.473 In this respect, Haig ‘made 
an immediate impact’. As one officer observed ‘the training of both officers and 
soldiers has become much more strenuous’.474 ‘Not only was Haig indefatigable in 
his study of their training, but he also attempted to form the acquaintance of every 
officer in his command’.475 Ably assisted by Maj.-Gen. John Gough his CS, Haig’s 
aim was to attain the highest pitch of military efficiency; characteristically 
undeterred by the fact that this was his first active command of a large formation.476 
In the knowledge that sound organization was the bedrock of military efficiency, 
Haig’s first priority was to put his administrative staff through their paces. In April, 
an administrative tour was arranged for this purpose. The central idea was an 
unopposed landing, concentration, and an opposed advance of a force with the 
strength and organization of the BEF.477 Realism was the key. A full season of 
brigade, divisional and interdivisional training followed, culminating in the Army 
Manoeuvres in September.478 As discussed, Haig did not live up to expectations at the 
annual army manoeuvers. He proved to be a cautious rather than a bold 
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commander.479 The Times military correspondent wryly observed; ‘we must stop 
placing Scotsmen at the head of our armies if we wish such risks to be run’.480 
In 1913, training exercises for the Aldershot Command followed a similar 
pattern, but the annual army manoeuvres were novel in a number of respects. For the 
first time in peace, two army corps each of two divisions and a cavalry division were 
assembled under one command together with their staffs for a combined arms 
exercise that included the RFC. The exercise was designed as a test for the staff, 
including officers, clerks, typists and the signals service, as much it was for the 
assembled fighting formations. According to leader column of The Times salutary 
lessons were learned: 
Our Military Correspondent, while giving full credit to the 
excellence and efficiency of the field Army…has shown that 
mass-marching is not yet quite perfect; the aerial 
reconnaissance…gave no appreciable results; the protective 
duties of Cavalry were insufficiently performed owing to the 
absence of divisional Cavalry from our organization in peace; 
the new system of supply stands in need of reconsideration; 
the siting and profile of entrenchments in a defended position 
requires more attention….481 
These defects highlighted the need for large-scale exercises in peace, as the most 
effective means of preparing the Army for war; a training practice Haig had argued 
for and pursued in India.  
When the BEF spear-headed by the Aldershot Command embarked for 
Northern France it ‘was incomparably the best trained, best organised, and best 
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equipped British Army which ever went forth to War’.482 Perhaps this effusive 
comment made by Edmonds should not be taken at face value. Tim Bowman and 
Mark Connelly have made a detailed study of The Edwardian Army. They concluded 
that while the BEF may have been the finest force that Britain sent abroad, in of 
itself, ‘this metric did not set a very high bar’ considering that the immediate 
comparators were the expeditionary forces dispatched to the Crimean and South 
African wars. However, while cautioning against overlooking the considerable 
problems of the BEF, the most glaring of which was its small size, the authors  
acknowledged that the force ‘did probably prove itself to be, man for man, the best 
army in Europe’.483  
Unity of Moral Effort: ‘Moral’ Underpinned by Discipline  
Before proceeding with this section it is first necessary to clarify the meaning 
and usage of the contemporary word ‘moral’ used by Haig, and the modern term 
‘morale’. It appears from Haig’s Staff College notebooks that his opinion on this 
matter was shaped and informed mainly by the work of Clausewitz. Haig had two 
different translations of On War in his library, one made by Col. J.J. Graham (1873), 
and the other by Miss A.E.M. Maguire (1908).484 As Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
opined Clausewitz was ‘far from consistent in his terminology, as might be expected 
of a writer who was less concerned with establishing a formal system or doctrine 
than with achieving understanding and clarity of expression’.485 Clausewitz used the 
words moral and morale as synonyms, although he rarely used the latter term. In fact, 
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only two references to the expression ‘morale’ have been found in the earlier edition, 
perhaps reflecting the personal preferences of the English translator. Nonetheless, 
following on from Clausewitz and to a lesser extent Henderson, Haig relied almost 
exclusively on the term ‘moral’ in his writing. To eliminate any ambiguity, and in 
keeping with Haig’s contemporary usage, the term ‘moral’ will be adopted in this 
thesis – apart from in direct quotations accompanied by a citation, or where 
demanded by the context.  
The Formation of Haig’s Ideas on ‘Moral’ 
As a plain thinking pragmatist, Haig surely must have found that Clausewitz’s 
interpretation of ‘moral’ was charged with complexity and ambiguity:  
Moral forces...are the spirits which permeate the whole 
element of war, and which fasten themselves soonest and 
with the greatest affinity to the will, which puts in motion and 
guides the whole mass of powers, unite with it as it were in 
one stream, because it is a moral force itself. Unfortunately, 
they seek to escape from all book-knowledge, for they will 
neither be brought into numbers nor into classes, and want 
only to be seen and felt.486  
Clausewitz observed that ‘the chief moral powers’ encapsulate ‘the talents of the 
commander; the military virtue of the army; [and] its national feeling’.487 It appears 
that for Clausewitz, and his later imitators including Helmuth von Moltke (the elder), 
Colmar von der Goltz and Rudolf von Caemmerer,488 the ingredients or ‘crystals of 
military virtue’ as referred to by Clausewitz,489 constitute ‘intellect’, ‘will-power’, 
‘courage’, ‘loyalty’, ‘daring’, ‘reliance on good fortune’, ‘self-reliance’, ‘coup 
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d’oeil’, ‘resolution’, ‘self-confidence’, ‘hope’ and ‘enthusiasm for the business of 
war’.490 Clausewitz insisted that ‘the military virtue of an army is one of the most 
important moral powers in war’ because it imbues a force with true military spirit.491 
As he recounted: 
An army which preserves its usual formations under the 
heaviest fire, which is never shaken by imaginary fears, and 
in the face of real danger disputes the ground inch by inch, 
which, proud in the feelings of its victories, never loses its 
sense of obedience, its respect for and confidence in its 
leaders, even under the depressing effects of defeat...Such an 
Army is imbued with the true military spirit.492  
Clausewitz also cautioned against ‘confusing the spirit of an army with its 
temper’. This is a distinction with an important difference. While the temper or 
humour of an individual, body of troops, or an army can change from hour to hour in 
response to even trivial stimuli, as suggested above, the spirit of an army is durable. 
Clausewitz advised that the military spirit of an army ‘can only be generated from 
two sources, and only by these two conjointly: the first is a succession of wars and 
great victories; and the other is, an activity of the army carried sometimes to the 
highest pitch. Only by these, does the soldier learn to know his powers’.493  
Before the war, Haig could do little to influence the first but, as shown, he did 
do his utmost to bring units and formations under his command to their highest state 
of readiness. Alluding to Clausewitz, Haig believed that ‘moral force is the result of 
training and daily efforts having as their objective the inculcation of the sense of 
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duty, of the value of discipline, and the spirit of sacrifice’. He wrote ‘the successes of 
Napoleon, Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar are based on these facts.’494 He added that 
all of Napoleon’s combinations aimed to ‘raise the moral of his own troops and 
depress those of his enemies’.495 He posited: ‘one idea seems to inspire all 
Napoleon’s plans of campaign and of battle – that is to break up the enemy’s forces 
morally [by]...threatening his line of retreat and line of supply.’496 In respect to the 
latter, Haig was aware of the fragility of morale, noting that ‘nothing reduces and 
discourages troops more than hunger’. Continuing this theme he observed that ‘the 
exhaustion of the vanquished troops was doubled and trebled by the mental 
depression of defeat’.497 Haig concluded that the ‘bedrock on which every strategical 
and tactical problem depends is the moral of the troops’.498 Haig offered his own 
pithy interpretation of his learning from Clausewitz:  
[Moral,] the psychological element with its infinite versatility 
– plays the chief part in war, and there is no end to the study 
of man! 499 
Elaborating upon this theme, Haig observed that ‘success in battle depends 
mainly on ‘moral’ and a determination to conquer’. In his notebooks he repeated this 
sentiment in other guises: ‘in battle moral factors are of the very greatest 
importance’;500 and ‘we shall always win by reason of pluck’.501 Other influential 
thinkers made similar pronouncements. Goltz declared, ‘moral forces…decide 
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everything in war.’502 Col. Ardant du Picq, the celebrated French military theorist and 
cited by Haig in his notebooks, affirmed: ‘in the last analysis, success in battle is a 
matter of morale’.503 
The Formation of Haig’s Ideas on Discipline 
Haig learned the interlocking relationship between morale and discipline and 
the importance of the latter from military theorists and his mentors. For instance, 
Clausewitz insisted that if discipline breaks down, military virtue is undermined.504 
He observed that while ‘strict discipline may keep up military virtue for a long time, 
but [it] can never create it’.505 Jomini also made the value of discipline plain. He 
posited ‘concert in action makes strength; order produces this concert, and discipline 
insures order; and without discipline no success is possible’.506 However, in reference 
to a ‘perfect army’ he offered the enlightened advice that it should have ‘a strict but 
not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality, based on 
conviction rather than on the formalities of service.’507 Picq pointed to the adverse 
consequences of ill discipline: ‘men...without discipline, without solid organization, 
are vanquished by others less individually valiant, but firmly, jointly and severally 
combined’.508 He concluded, ‘the purpose of discipline is to make men fight, often in 
spite of themselves’, cementing the relationship between discipline and morale.’509  
In February 1903, Henderson picked up and elaborated on Jomini when he 
observed:  
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Discipline is of two sorts: the first, mechanical discipline, 
best illustrated by the solid charge of the two-deep line, the 
men shoulder to shoulder, dressing on the colours, and the 
rear rank with ported arms; the second, intelligent discipline, 
best illustrated, perhaps, by a pack of well-trained hounds, 
running in good order, but without a straggler, each making 
good use of his instinct, and following the same objective 
with relentless perseverance.510  
Henderson used his knowledge of Prussian methods in connection with 
discipline and the issue of orders to posit that ‘an army cannot be controlled by direct 
orders from headquarters’; that ‘the man on the spot is the best judge of the 
situation’; and that ‘intelligent cooperation was of infinitely more value than 
mechanical obedience.’ Henderson’s ideas were resisted by some British officers 
precisely because they believed that individuality and initiative were injurious to 
discipline.511  
Haig was not one of these men. He needed little convincing as the following 
entry in his Strategy notebook shows:  
A subordinate commander must use his judgement in 
obeying: must unite initiative with obedience. 
The Commander of an army cannot, and must not restrict 
himself to a literal obedience of orders. Indecision on the part 
of the C-in-C may quickly destroy the powers of the troops 
and render, in a short time, the whole army unfit for battle.512 
Haig added ‘having clearly indicated to subordinate leaders their respective 
missions, we must leave the execution to them.’513 This shows that Haig’s intelligent 
approach to orders and discipline foreshadowed mission command and the principle 
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that has become known as the ‘man on the spot’, which in 1909 Haig enshrined in 
FSR-I (Operations):514 
It is usually dangerous to prescribe to a subordinate at a 
distance anything that he should better decide on the spot, 
with a fuller knowledge of local conditions, for any attempt 
to do so may cramp his initiative in dealing with unforeseen 
developments.515  
To sum up, and borrowing a quotation from FSR-I, it is reasonable to suggest 
that for Haig morale in the field was characterised by the will to conquer. On the 
battle field, as expressed in FSR-I, this translated into ‘the determination to press 
forward at all costs’.516 In the final analysis, this grim determination was believed to 
be activated by discipline. 
Conclusion: A Definition of Unity-of-Effort 
Now that both the nature and character of unity-of-effort have been explained, 
it is possible to offer-up a working definition of the principle of unity-of-effort within 
the context of the contemporary understanding: 
Unity-of-effort is the raison d’être of all forms of human organization 
including the military. It is a tangible and effective principle, rather than a mere 
rhetorical gesture or oratorical flourish. The nature of unity-of-effort is immutable 
and uniquely coordinative. The principle is compound in character and has distinct 
mental, physical and moral components, specific to each type of organization. It is a 
normative ideal, as opposed to an absolute standard.  
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In military organizations, unity-of-effort is optimised by the development of 
operational, organizational and administrative doctrine to obtain unity-of-mental-
effort; by inculcating doctrine through progressive training to achieve unity-of-
physical-effort; and by promoting the will to fight through sustained morale, 
underpinned by discipline, to attain unity-of-moral-effort. 
In the British Army, unity-of-effort is created and optimised through the 
coordinative function of the GS, although the ultimate responsibility rests with the  
C-in-C in the field. This body exercises its role through the process of management, 
which itself is characterised by forecasting, planning, organising, coordinating, 
commanding and controlling. 
From the findings of the contemporary newspaper study used to determine the 
nature of unity-of-effort, combined with the evidence drawn from the works of 
military theorists who influenced Haig and from his own military experience, it can 




4. Achieving Unity-of-Mental-Effort 
The assessment below summarises Haig’s doctrinal world-view, largely 
formed at the Staff College. In addition, the origins and development of FSR-I will 
be discussed and the impact of Haig’s world-view on the framing of these regulations 
will be examined. It will be shown that at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, the BEF’s 
first major offensive in March 1915, Haig as First Army’s commander, put FSR-I 
doctrine into practice. Haig’s contribution to the continued evolution of British 
tactical doctrine will also be examined and set within the context of the BEF as a 
learning organization. Finally, an assessment will be made of the extent to which 
unity-of-mental-effort was achieved within the BEF by the end of hostilities in 1918.  
Haig’s World-View of the Conduct of Warfare 
Haig’s world-view essentially comprised five principles that are discernible, 
albeit with some difficulty, from the notebooks he maintained at the Staff College. 
The notes included those he later made to record salient features of his continued 
reading. The rough jottings made by Haig lack structure, coherence and elaboration. 
Furthermore, it does not appear that any of the ideas in these notebooks are his own. 
Rather, they are a reflection of Staff College teachings, the works of contemporary 
military thinkers studied by Haig, and to a limited extent of his own field experience. 
A characterisation offered by Brian Holden Reid perhaps typified Haig; he was a 
serving officer with a passion for reform, who thought deeply about his profession, 
but used his advancement rather than writing as a means of propagating his ideas.517  
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Haig’s first and overarching principle of war was that ‘in battle moral factors 
are of the very greatest importance’.518 He believed that ‘the psychological element 
plays the chief part in war’.519 This belief, and in Haig’s case inspired by Clausewitz, 
was commonly held by contemporary commanders regardless of nationality or 
fighting service.  
Haig was a staunch advocate of the offensive, and this was the central feature 
of his second principle. As Holden Reid observed this view was widely accepted in 
the British Army, and ‘its inspiration was the school of Colonels Foch and 
Grandmaison in the French Army’.520 Churchill famously said that the military 
characteristic which defined Haig was his ‘sincere desire to engage the enemy’.521 
Thus, it will come as no surprise to learn that Haig believed ‘defeat is generally 
considered the lot of the defensive’.522 He wrote, ‘offensive strategy alone can quickly 
end a war’,523 where ‘the object of giving battle [was] to destroy the enemy’s forces 
on [the] front’.524 To this end, Haig believed that ‘the fundamental principle for 
bringing an enemy to his knees [was] to concentrate upon one point of the theatre of 
war and win such a victory that would upset the enemy’s equilibrium entirely’.525 
Haig took Jomini’s idea of concentration at the decisive point, a doctrinal principle 
he set out in FSR-I, and alluded to the thoroughly modern notion of equilibrium that 
forms the current basis of the British Army’s manoeuvrist approach.526 This doctrine 
                                                 
518 NLS-Acc.3155/20, "Strategy Notes II." n.p. 
519 Ibid. n.p. 
520 Holden Reid, "War Fighting Doctrine and the British Army." p. 15. 
521 Churchill, Great Contemporaries. pp. 226-227. 
522 NLS-Acc.3155/19, "Strategy I." n.p. 
523 NLS-Acc.3155/31, "Tactical Notes," (n.d.). n.p. 
524 NLS-Acc.3155/20, "Strategy Notes II." n.p. (Emphasis in original). 
525 NLS-Acc.3155/19, "Strategy I." n.p. 
526 Field Service Regulations, Part I (Operations). Section 103, p. 112.  
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‘emphasise[d] understanding and targeting the conceptual and moral components of 
an adversary’s fighting power as well as attacking the physical component’.527  
Haig’s third principle related to combined-arms operations, where Haig was an 
early advocate.528 Alluding to unity-of-effort, he was precise:  
Unity in battle can only be obtained by the various 
independent units striving for one common object. The 
greater will be the results obtained, the more clearly the 
objective is defined, and the more resolute the command of 
each of the subordinate formations.529  
In pursuit of the ‘belief that battlefield could and should be controlled’, Haig 
did not think of the offensive battle as a continuum, but rather a progression of 
discrete steps.530 This notion leads to his fourth principle, that of the staged battle: (1) 
preparation and manoeuvre for position at the decisive point; (2) ‘wearing out’ to 
pull in and use up the enemy’s reserves achieving superiority of fire; (3) the decisive 
assault; (4) exploitation and pursuit.531  
The fifth principle concerned the defensive. Haig emphasised that ‘an army 
making an energetic defence should have but one aim to become the assailant on the 
first opportunity, and prepare for [the] frequent renewal of such efforts’.532 All of 
these principles found full expression in FSR-I, which as will be recalled Edmonds 
claimed governed the employment of the army in war.533  
                                                 
527 "Army Doctrine Publication: Operations." Ch. 5, Sec. 0502. 
528 Cavalry Training (Provisional) p. 197. 
529 NLS-Acc.3155/20, "Strategy Notes II." n.p. 
530 Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought. p. 91. 
531 NLS-Acc.3155/17, "Cavalry Tactics." n.p.. NLS-Acc.3155/20, "Strategy Notes II." n.p. 
532 NLS-Acc.3155/19, "Strategy I." n.p. (Emphasis in original). 
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Haig’s Role at the War Office 
In February 1906, Lord Esher wrote to Haig in India and told him that Haldane 
was in urgent need of his services at the WO. Adding weight in a way that Haig 
could not ignore, Esher emphasised that the King believed that his return to England 
was ‘absolutely necessary’. Furthermore it appears that Haldane was dissatisfied with 
key members of the GS including General Sir Neville Lyttelton, the CGS, ‘who 
[apparently] was really lamentable’. Esher emphasised to Haig that although Haldane 
would offer him the lesser post of DMT, the Secretary of State would look to him for 
‘advice on all points,’ adding ‘you will have to run the G.S.’.534 While Haig was 
disappointed that Haldane had not offered him the more prestigious post of DSD, he 
was left in no doubt about the full extent of his power and influence.  
Apparently, Esher still held some lingering doubt that Haig’s ego required 
bolstering because in his next letter he amplified his earlier pleadings. He confided 
that the King believed ‘most strongly’ that Lyttelton needed guidance because 
‘defence questions’ were in a ‘hopeless muddle’, progress on the creation of the GS 
was slow, and what progress there had been was ‘not in the right direction’. Esher 
observed, ‘you have no idea…how much your clear common sense is wanted, first in 
that branch of the GS [Directorate of Training], and later in the branch of the higher 
education of the army’ [Directorate of Staff Duties]. In a final flourish, Esher 
lamented, ‘so you can imagine how desperately you are required’, confiding that 
‘Haldane will not move until you get home’, and reassured him that he would be ‘of 
the greatest use’.535  
                                                 
534 NLS-Acc.3155/334/e, "Letters and Papers Concerning Haig's Career 1899-1915,"  
(1899-1915).Letter: Esher to Haig: 15/02/1906. 
535 Ibid.Letter: Esher to Haig: 02/03/1906. 
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On the February 26th 1906, Lyttelton formally wrote to Haig and duly offered 
him the post of DMT with a pay grade of £1,200 to £1,500 per annum.536 In the event, 
Haldane ensured that Haig was paid the higher sum. On March 24th, after a months’ 
deliberation, Haig telegraphed his acceptance.537 In response, Haldane’s private 
secretary, Col. Gerald Ellison, told Haig that the Secretary of State was ‘building a 
great deal on having you on hand to help him’.538 Although Haig was formally only 
one of three Directors of the General Staff, informally he became Haldane's closest 
confidante and most trusted advisor on all military matters throughout his three year 
tenure.539 Haldane rightly been given the credit for the success of the great reforms 
that were made at the WO. However, there can be no doubt that Haig’s contribution 
was decisive because from a military perspective he translated those policies into 
action.540 Ellison claimed that ‘Haig’s influence and active assistance, both in framing 
policy and elaborating details of organization, were quite invaluable’.541 He recorded: 
I do say unhesitatingly that, without Haig, Mr Haldane would 
have been hard put to it to elaborate a practical scheme of 
reorganization in the first instance, or to drive the scheme 
through to its logical conclusions.542  
The Origins of FSR-I (Operations) 
The British Army’s experience of the South African War demonstrated the 
need for a combined arms doctrine. In response, the WO published a provisional 
                                                 
536 Ibid. Letter: Lyttelton to Haig: 26/02/1906. 
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542 Ibid. Notes on Certain letters written at various times by the late Field-Marshal Earl Haig by Lieut.-
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Combined Training manual in 1902,543 and in final form in 1905.544 An amendment 
was added in 1907.545 The 1902 version was issued in provisional form presumably 
because the South African War was in progress and lessons were still being learned.  
The 1905 version is similar to the previous edition in its tone and style, but 
there are a number of material differences. The most obvious one is in the title. In 
compliance with a recommendation made by the Esher Committee in 1904, the later 
version is labelled Field Service Regulations, Part I, Combined Training.546 In 
addition, a lengthy but informative chapter (VII) of nearly 50 pages was added 
concerning ‘Training in Peace’. This chapter later formed the basis for the Training 
and Manoeuver Regulations, 1913.547 The other changes made to Combined Training, 
1905 are largely cosmetic. The doctrinal section, ‘Part I. Attack and Defence.’ is 
repositioned as Chapter VI. Although the text is slightly edited and extended, there 
are few salient differences between the two versions. In the light of the recent field 
experience, short sub-sections were added commenting upon wood and bush 
fighting, mountain and savage warfare, the defence of convoys, and opposed 
landings and embarkations. Combined Training, 1905 represented the high water-
mark of the Army’s tactical thought at the beginning of the twentieth century. In this 
respect, the manual bears close comparison to S.S.135 The Division in Attack, 
published in November 1918. Jim Beech regards this pamphlet as ‘a distillation of 
what GHQ considered to be best practice in the summer of 1918’.548 Part-II of the 
1905 regulations dealt with administration and organization, also recommended by 
                                                 
543 Combined Training (Provisional), (London: HMSO, 1902). 
544 Field Service Regulations: Part I. Combined Training, (London: HMSO, 1905). 
545 Amendments to Combined Training, 1905, (London: HMSO, 1907). 
546 [Cd.1932], "Report of War Office (Reconstitution) Committee." p. 23. 
547 Training and Manoeuvre Regulations. 
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(Strategic & Combat Studies Institute, 2008) p. 5. 
 154 
 
the Esher Committee, was the object of persistent internal wrangling at the highest 
levels of the WO military staff, thus preventing its publication until Haig intervened. 
Brig.-Gen. J.E. Edmonds claimed that Combined Training, 1902 was a product 
of the work of Col. G.F.R. Henderson who originally prepared the text for a new 
edition of Infantry Training commissioned by FM Lord Roberts. Progress on the 
latter was interrupted by Henderson’s death whereupon a Committee under Maj.-
Gen. Sir Frederick Stopford, DAG at Aldershot took the decision to publish the 
partially completed manual.549 It is highly likely that this edition was prepared for 
print by Lieut.-Col. Walter Adye, p.s.c., who was a DAAG at the WO, a position he 
had held continuously since 1898 with the brief interruption of the South African 
War.550 In 1899, Adye was ignominiously captured at Nicholson’s Nek along with 
954 officers and men after carrying the white flag in the company of his 
commanding officer to surrender to the Boers – ‘the most humiliating day in British 
military history since Majuba’.551 Adye’s personal valour is not in question. He had 
been recommended for the VC during the Second Afghan War.552  
In 1900, Adye returned to his post at the WO. In 1904, after the formation of 
the GS, Adye was posted to the new Directorate of Staff Duties where he continued 
his work ‘writing, revising and publishing all Works and Regulations relating to the 
Education of Officers’.553 Adye remained in this post until 1908 when Haig promoted 
him to GSO, 1st Grade, and placed him in charge of the renamed section S.D.2. 
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(Principles, Co-ordination, and War Organization) with the substantive rank of 
Colonel. In the reorganization of the Directorate of Military Training and the 
Directorate of Staff Duties instigated by Haig, Major Hon. A.R. Montagu-Stuart-
Wortley took over Adye’s drafting responsibilities.554 Hence, it is likely that Adye 
prepared the 1905 edition of Combined Training and the early drafts of FSR-I and 
FSR-II, while Wortley finalised the later drafts published in 1909. Adye continued in 
service until 1912, when he retired from the WO.  
Apart from extending patronage to Adye, it is also most likely that Haig used 
his influence to shape the Amendments to Combined Training, 1905 published in 
1907. Two of these changes are substantive. The first bears Haig’s hall mark by 
emphasising: the vital role of independent cavalry for strategical exploration under 
the instructions of the C-in-C; the role of protective cavalry for providing first line 
security under the orders of the commander of the force being covered; the role of 
the divisional cavalry for scouting in connection with an infantry advance, flank, or 
rear guards or outposts, and its use for intercommunication purposes.555 Haig’s 
intervention to promote the cavalry’s interests in this way is indicated by the fact that 
he made exactly the same points and used the same language in his volume Cavalry 
Studies, which was also published in 1907.556 The second amendment concerned the 
possible need for entrenchments during the process of establishing superiority of fire 
where ‘in order to enable hasty cover to be constructed under fire, men should be 
trained to work lying down’; advice which admittedly is not characteristic of Haig!557  
                                                 
554 In 1907, Haig reorganised both the Directorate of Military Training and the Directorate of Staff 
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 During Haig’s tenure as DSD, Combined Training, 1905 was entirely revised 
under his close supervision in the shape of FSR-I.558 Haig also managed to break the 
impasse that prevented the publication of FSR-II by completely revising its essential 
content. This volume was formally authorised by the Army Council for publication 
in 1909.559 Unfortunately, little is known about the details of FSR-I’s drafting process 
because the relevant documentary evidence was destroyed by fire during the Second 
World War. Nonetheless, as will be shown below, it is clear that Haig imposed his 
world-view of warfare on FSR-I.  
Haig Doctrinal Influence on FSR-I (Operations), 1909 
To establish a basis for comparison, the salient features of the best tactical 
practice in attack and defence established in Combined Training, 1905 will first be 
summarised. In this way Haig’s doctrinal influence on FSR-I will be crystallised. 
FSR- Part 1. Combined Training, 1905 
Keying off its title, these regulations emphasised the vital interdependence of 
the various fighting arms in both attack and defence. ‘Thus on the offensive, 
mounted troops and infantry compel[led] the enemy to disclose his position and 
thereby afford[ed] a target to the artillery, whilst the latter by their fire enable[d] the 
infantry to approach the hostile position’.560 At close quarters (within effective rifle 
range), the general idea was to bring infantry and field artillery fire, working in 
‘intimate co-operation’, to bear down on the decisive point to gain superiority of fire 
over the defence. This action allowed the infantry to deliver the decisive blow at 
                                                 
558 Field Service Regulations, Part I (Operations). Of particular signficance for the development of 
doctrine is Chapter 7. 
559 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration). 
560 Field Service Regulations: Part I. Combined Training. p. 99. 
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bayonet point.561 Although the manual emphasised combined arms, the decisive 
attack was conceived in one dimensional terms in the sense that it was infantry that 
ultimately conquered and occupied, while field artillery, machine guns and mounted 
arms were deployed in a supporting role.562    
Chapter VI, Attack and Defence, formed the doctrinal core of the volume. The 
chapter opened with ‘general considerations’ where the editorial priority was given 
to ‘defensive action’ over ‘offensive action’. This subtle yet telling emphasis was 
reinforced by the ambivalence shown towards the outright endorsement of offensive 
action where the ‘offensive spirit’ was not even mentioned as a decisive factor in 
battle. The following passage is typical:  
107. Offensive Action 
But, whatever may be the advantages that the defensive gains 
by recent improvements in fire-arms, it is at least open to 
question whether the force that attacks, provided, as will 
generally be the case, that it is numerically superior, does not 
profit in equal measure.  
Moral was conspicuous by its absence from the regulations, except in relation to the 
demoralising effect of a flank attack which threatened the enemy’s line of retreat. As 
argued, offensive and defensive strategy was advocated almost on equal terms. 
Control over the offensive battle was seen as a ‘methodical progression from point to 
point; each successive capture weakening the enemy’s hold on its main position, and 
paving the way for the infantry’s  decisive advance’.563 Thus, the battle was viewed as 
a continuum rather than as a set of distinct stages. Defensive action was considered 
‘undoubtedly a disadvantage’, and the defender was advised to ‘keep in view the 
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defence of the line of retreat and the preparation of the counter-attack’. Perhaps to 
Haig’s chagrin, the value of ‘the passive defence’ was recognised.564  
To Haig’s ire, references in key passages were made to mounted troops rather 
than to the cavalry.565 Moreover, while it was advised that wherever possible flanking 
movements should be covered by cavalry, only the role of independent cavalry was 
specifically mentioned, and this was qualified by the earlier advice that ‘even the 
most mobile cavalry, unless they have a marked numerical superiority, cannot be 
relied upon to drive back hostile horsemen’.566 By understating the role of cavalry this 
treatment may have prompted Haig’s intervention in drafting the 1907 amendment.  
FSR-I (Operations), 1909 
FSR-I elevated best practice to principle. The doctrinal core of FSR-I is 
Chapter VII: The Battle. It is also clear that Haig imposed his world-view on the 
principles set out in this chapter. This was in sharp contrast to the best practice 
espoused in Combined Training, 1905. The other eleven chapters of the regulations 
discuss matters that were largely procedural. There were exceptions. For example, in 
Chapter II – Inter-communication of Orders the famous British military principle 
was established that local decisions should be deferred to the ‘man on the spot’.567 
The first point to make is that unlike Combined Training, FSR-I brought to the 
fore Haig’s first principle, namely the decisive role of moral:  
Success in war depends more on moral than on physical 
qualities.…The development of the necessary moral qualities 
is therefore the first of the objects to be attained.568  
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Secondly, the new regulations displayed none of the ambivalence or 
equivocation found in Combined Training, 1905 regarding the offensive. According 
to Haig’s second principle, the defensive was emphatically subordinated to the 
offensive. The first sentence of Chapter VII declared: ‘Decisive success in battle can 
only be gained by a vigorous offensive’.569 Elaborating further, and alluding again to 
moral, FSR-I emphasised the need for ‘decisive offensive action’,570 positing, 
‘superior numbers on the battlefield are an undoubted advantage, but better skill, 
better organization, and training and above all, a firmer determination in all ranks to 
conquer at any cost, are the chief factors of success’.571  
According to Haig’s third principle, FSR-I declared that ‘the full power of an 
army can be exerted only when all of its parts act in close combination.572 The 
regulations then explain the contribution that each fighting arm (infantry, cavalry and 
artillery) made to combined action, stressing in particular that ‘the attainment of 
superiority of fire over the enemy requires the closest cooperation between infantry 
and artillery’.573  
Although in accordance with Haig’s fourth principle FSR-I did not specifically 
spell-out the battle in distinct stages, this was implied by the editorial structure of 
Chapter VII under the sub-headings: the advance to the battlefield; deployment for 
action; the decisive attack; pursuit, retreat and delaying action.574 The regulations 
emphasised that:  
The general principle is that the enemy must be engaged in 
sufficient strength to pin him to his ground and to wear down 
                                                 
569 Ibid. Chapter VII, Section 99, p. 107 (Emphasis in original). 
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his powers of resistance, while the force allotted to the 
decisive attack must be as strong as possible.575  
Within this context, FSR-I stated that ‘the first object of a commander who 
seeks to gain the initiative in battle is to develop superiority of fire as a preparation 
for the delivery of a decisive blow’.576  
Reflecting Haig’s fifth principle, defensive operations were characterised 
merely as an interruption to the offensive: 
Both opposing forces may endeavour to seize the initiative, 
or one may await the attack of the other. In the latter case, if 
victory is to be won, the defensive attitude must be assumed 
only in order to await or create a favourable opportunity for 
decisive offensive action.577 
As has been discussed in Chapter 3, after the publication of FSR-I, Haig set 
about inculcating these principles into the Indian Army when he was CGS and, on 
his return to England in 1912 when he took command at Aldershot.  
This brief assessment of FSR-I demonstrates that although it was members of 
Haig’s staff at the Directorate of Staff Duties who physically drafted the volume, the 
imprint on the work of his world-view of warfare is clear. Haig was immensely 
proud of this contribution as he observed (and alluding to Henderson) in a letter 
dated  September 20th 1918 to Henry Wilson, then the CIGS: 
We have a surprisingly large number of very capable 
Generals. Thanks to these Gentlemen and to their “sound 
milit[ary] knowledge built up by study and practice until it 
has become an instinct”, and to a steady adherence to the 
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principles of our F.S.R. Part I are our successes to be chiefly 
attributed.578 
It must have given Haig satisfaction to know that the key principles he 
established in FSR-I were retained in the revised volume published in 1924. These 
regulations emphasised that ‘success in war depends more on moral that on physical 
qualities’; ‘decisive success in battle can be gained only by the offensive’; ‘an army 
depends for success on the combined efforts of its component parts’; the staged battle 
is implied in the planning of ‘the deliberate attack’ and the pursuit; finally, ‘the 
defensive, if an offensive spirit inspire[d] its conduct, may effectively create a 
favourable opportunity for resuming the offensive…’.579  
Haig’s advocates and critics have generally overlooked his contribution to 
military doctrine before and during the war. This applies specifically to FSR-I 
(Operations) and the development of the highly influential series of S.S. doctrinal 
pamphlets published during the war addressed to infantry divisions and to platoons.580 
John Charteris, Haig’s first biographer, barely mentioned the FSR.581 Duff Cooper the 
official biographer only mentioned in passing that Haig pushed through the 
publication of FSR-II.582 John Terraine made a similar comment on the second 
volume, but asserted that FSR-I ‘constitutes a major, but almost entirely forgotten 
contribution to later victory’.583 Unfortunately, he provided no further elaboration. 
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Gen. Sir James Marshall-Cornwall asserted incorrectly that the revision of FSR-I and 
FSR-II was one of Haig’s primary tasks as DMT.584 Gary Meade has avoided the 
subject of the regulations entirely, Walter Reid cited Duff Cooper to make a passing 
mention, and Gary Sheffield only briefly acknowledged FSR-II.585  
De Groot emphasised that Haig’s main achievement in respect to the 
regulations was ‘removing the obstacles in the way of publication.’ He incorrectly 
asserted that the content was the work of Col. Walter Adye begun in 1904. As has 
been acknowledged, FSR-I originated in 1902 and was based on the work of 
Henderson. De Groot further asserted: 
The manual did fill an immense gap in Britain’s military 
preparedness. It was intended to be a guide for the Army’s 
new breed of professional officers, providing them with a 
manual covering every conceivable contingency which could 
arise in war.586 
Five years later, De Groot replaced this obviously erroneous assertion with a riposte 
from Haig to critics who argued that the regulations were not prescriptive enough: 
The critics seem to lose sight of the true nature of war, and of 
the varied conditions under which the British army may have 
to take the field. It is neither necessary or desirable that we 
should go further than what is clearly laid down in our 
regulations. If we go further, we run the risk of tying 
ourselves by a doctrine that may not always be applicable and 
we gain nothing in return.587  
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 The problem for De Groot is that on the one hand he posited FSR-I ‘was of 
significant value during the Great War’.588 On the other he argued that Haig was 
‘closed-minded’, suffered from a ‘tactical rigidity’ and displayed a ‘stubborn support 
for traditional cavalry’ arising from ‘an inability to understand the progress of 
military technology’.589 Clearly, these defects would have rendered Haig incapable of 
influencing ‘a modern development’ like FSR-I.590 Any recognition otherwise would 
only serve to undermine De Groot’s charges against Haig.  
J.P. Harris brushed aside De Groot’s thesis acknowledging briefly that Haig 
‘put much work into the revision of army’s manuals’ and allowed that he did have a 
belief in ‘intellectual flexibility and pragmatism’.591 Spencer Jones in a thoroughly 
good study of the tactical reform of the British Army, 1902-1914, did not consider 
Haig’s contribution to FSR-I.592 Furthermore, Paddy Griffith, who wrote a chapter on 
the BEF’s doctrine and training in his standard work Battle Tactics of the Western 
Front (1916-18) overlooked specific Haig’s contribution.593 However, Jim Beach in 
an informative and well researched paper, Doctrine Writing at British GHQ, 1917-
1918, did at least give Haig credit for engaging in the preparation of S.S.198 Tactical 
Instructions for the Offensive of 1918; a pamphlet that was overtaken by the German 
spring offensive, forcing the BEF onto the defensive.594 Timothy Bowman and Mark 
Connelly asserted in reference to FSR-I that ‘the codification of British practice 
[was] largely written by Haig while DSD.595 
                                                 
588 "The Pre-War Life and Military Career of Douglas Haig."p. 313. 
589 Ibid. p. 365. 
590 Ibid. p. 313. 
591 Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War. pp. 45-46. 
592 Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012 ). 
593 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack 1916-18 
(London: Yale University Press, 1994). Chapter 10, Doctrine and Training. 
594 Jim Beach, "Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British G.H.Q., 1917-18,"  
War in History 19, no. (4) (2012) p. 475. 
595 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training and Deploying 
the British Army, 1902-1914  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). p. 95 
 164 
 
Andy Simpson in his penetrating work British Corps Command on the Western 
Front 1914-1918 provided a worthy exception to the rule. He devoted a chapter to 
show how the principles established in FSR-I were applied by Haig to the operations 
of I Corps and First Army from August 1914 to the end of 1915. Simpson examined 
a rear-guard action (the Retreat from Mons), a number of offensives (Battles of 
Aisne, Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos), an encounter battle 
(First Battle of Ypres) and a defensive operation (First Ypres). He concluded:  
Those relatively few occasions upon which [Haig] could be 
said to have diverged from [FSR-I] seem invariably to have 
been the result of manpower shortages or his incorrigible 
optimism when conducting an attack.596 
This observation is supported below by the findings of a short assessment of Haig’s 
planning of the Neuve Chapelle offensive.  
1915: Haig Puts Principle into Practice 
At the Battle of Neuve Chapelle (March 10th-13th 1915), the ‘first significant 
British offensive effort of the war’, Haig took the opportunity to put the principles 
espoused in FSR-I into practice.597 On February 15th 1915, French approved Haig’s 
plan for the offensive. The details demonstrate that he adhered to regulations in the 
following ways: The guiding rule for planning an attack was that ‘the enemy must be 
engaged in sufficient strength to pin him to his ground, and to wear down his powers 
of resistance, while the force allotted to the decisive attack must be as strong as 
possible’ (Sec.104/3). Haig complied by deploying 48 battalions on a front held by 
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some three German battalions.598 He planned to ‘str[i]k[e] unexpectedly and in the 
greatest possible strength’ (Sec.103/3), thereby gaining the initiative at the decisive 
point located on a lightly held front and support line of 2,000 yards immediately 
before the village of Neuve Chapelle (Sec.103/1); to develop superiority of fire 
(Sec.102/3); and to wear out the enemy’s powers of resistance by a surprise 
hurricane artillery bombardment lasting 35 minutes (Sec.103/3). With the enemy 
thoroughly demoralised, and the wire broken, three infantry brigades (one from the 
Indian Corps and two of IV Corps) were then to capture the immediate enemy 
positions, allowing a second 30 minute bombardment to clear the way for the 
infantry to storm and capture the village (Sec.105/3).599 With this objective secured, 
the infantry was to proceed a short distance to the east of the village, occupying a 
position identified as the Smith-Dorrien Trench. In concert with subsidiary attacks 
mounted on both flanks, extending the front to five miles, a strong force of infantry 
and cavalry (if the circumstances permitted) would then widen and pass through the 
gap with ‘the determination to press forward at all costs’ reaching the Illies-Herlies 
line and threating enemy communications from La Bassée to Lille (Sec.105/4). 600  
Haig stressed to his commanders that the ‘keynote of all work [was] offensive 
action’.601 (Sec.99/1, Sec.105/4) Having devised the plan in outline, Haig met with 
his three corps commanders (Monro – I Corps, Rawlinson – IV Corps, and Willcocks 
– Indian Corps) and explained precisely ‘what each corps would have to do’.602 
                                                 
598 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Special Order to the 1st Army: 
9th March, 1915. (Emphasis in original). 
599 Ibid. Entry: 12/02/15; 05/03/15. (Emphasis in original). 
600 Ibid. Entry: 12/02/15, 15/02/15. (Emphasis in original). 
601 Ibid. Entry: 05/03/15. (Emphasis in original). 
602 Ibid. Entry: 05/03/15. See also entry 27/02/15 , where Haig explained to Brigadier-General 
Blackader the necessity for giving each battalion commander ‘a definite responsibility’ and ‘a clearly 
defined objective’.  
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(Sec.104/2/i-iv).603 He then left it to his commanders ‘on the spot’ to develop the plan 
in detail, albeit with his close oversight (Sec.12/2). The day before the battle 
commenced, Haig ‘urged on both Corps Commanders, [engaged in the initial attack], 
a vigorous offensive’ (Sec.105/4).604 Whatever else can be said about Haig’s plan, it 
cannot be described as a ‘half-hearted measure’ (Sec.99/2).  
In the event, the first phase of Haig’s plan was successful to the extent that the 
village was captured, demonstrating that a break-in was possible. But for a variety of 
reasons, none of which had specific bearing on the principles established in FSR-I, 
the break-through proved elusive. Crucial French support was withheld three days 
before the attack,605 prompting Haig to advise GHQ that in his opinion the ‘attack 
would not go far’, and preparations had to be made ‘to organise a new line on 
suitable ground’.606 Haig did not receive the heavy guns he requested, and those that 
were available suffered from a shortage of ammunition.607 New heavy 6-inch (siege) 
howitzers delivered the day before the attack arrived without anchors, and thus failed 
to satisfactorily cut enemy wire. Morale in the Indian Corps was low; small groups of 
Afridis soldiers were deserting to the enemy, and Willcocks, the Corps commander 
was demoralised to the point of resignation.608  
Following the capture of the village, artillery observation broke-down leaving 
the infantry unsupported. ‘Command of the operations became slow and difficult’609 
and an over-cautious Rawlinson checked IV Corps advance until the early evening.610 
                                                 
603 Field Service Regulations, Part I (Operations). Sec.104/2/I. p. 132. All future reference will be 
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604 "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 09/03/15. (Emphasis in original). 
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607 Ibid. Entry: 01/03/15. 
608 Ibid.Entry: 03/03/15; 04/03/15; 08/03/15. 
609 Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1915, 1. p. 151. 
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The Indian Corps suffered a similar fate.611 These delays were against Haig’s express 
instructions. However, Haig was also remiss because he should have been aware of 
the lengthy signalling delays that were bound to occur due to primitive technology. 
This disrupted the swift receipt and transmission of orders.612 In fairness to him, prior 
to the attack, he urged that the advance should be pressed forward with the utmost 
determination and without delay.613 Failure to do so gave the Germans time to call up 
reinforcements, which consisted of 4,000 rifles within 12 hours and 16,000 rifles by 
the evening of the second day.614 Although attempts were made on the following two 
days to regain momentum, the attack faltered and was drawn to a close by Haig on 
March 13th. Nonetheless, John Terraine concluded in reference to Neuve Chapelle: 
The methods and tactics evolved became the standard pattern 
for almost every British attack up to the end of 1916, and 
exercised considerable influence on French and German 
operations too.615  
1916-1917: The Learning Organization 
Between 1916 and 1918, under Haig’s leadership, the BEF was transformed 
into a learning organization, underpinning unity-of-mental-effort. ‘Despite its 
widespread use [today] there is in fact no agreed definition or meaning that can be 
readily attached to [this] concept’.616 However, one current and relevant definition is 
that this type of organization ‘facilitates the learning of all its members and 
continuously transforms itself and its context’. It holds the promise of being an 
                                                 
611 Ibid. p. 103. 
612 Capt. G.C. Wynne, "The Chain of Command," The Army Quarterly XXXVI, no. 1 (April) (1938) 
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616 David Ashton Paula Raper, Alan Felstead and John Storey, "Towards the Learning Organization? 
Explaining Current Trends in Training Practice in the UK," International Journal of Training and 
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‘efficient adaptive unit – always at the right place at the right time to take advantage 
of environmental change’.617 It has been suggested that organizations, including the 
military, approach this ideal through three typical stages: 
Stage 1: Surviving – [Armies] develop basic habits and 
processes and deal with problems as they arise on a 
‘firefighting basis’. 
Stage 2: Adapting – [Armies] continuously adapt their habits 
in the light of accurate reading and forecasts of 
environmental changes. 
Stage 3: Sustaining – [Armies] create their contexts as much 
as they are created by them,…achieve a sustainable, though 
adaptive position, in a symbiotic relationship with their 
environments.618  
Arguably, the BEF deployed to France in 1914 typified the first stage. During 
1916, on the basis of the learning processes established by GHQ under Haig’s 
leadership, the BEF evolved to the second stage. The process of adaptation continued 
throughout 1917, the fruits of which were demonstrated in November at the Battle of 
Cambrai. By 1918, during the successful Hundred Days campaign, the learning 
process reached its zenith, and the BEF had progressed to the third stage.  
The Building Blocks 
FSR-II laid the foundation of the BEF’s development as a learning organization 
by mandating that all field formations and units were required to maintain a daily 
War Diary.619 The object was ‘to collect information for future reference with a view 
to effecting improvements in the organization, education, training, equipment and 
                                                 
617 John Burgoyne and Tom Boydell Mike Pedler, The Learning Company: A Strategy for Sustainable 
Development (London: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1996) p. 3.  
618 Ibid. p. 4 
619 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) p. 128, 137-140, 151. 
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administration of the army for war’.620 These daily reports were processed up through 
the organization and eventually forwarded to the relevant base record office.  
Immediately after Haig was appointed C-in-C, he added building blocks that 
facilitated the BEF’s transformation into a learning organization.621 Before Christmas 
(1915) he appointed Maj.-Gen. R.K.H. Butler, his former CS at First Army, as his 
DCGS at GHQ and gave him specific responsibility for operations including the 
development of doctrine and training.622 In January 1916, Haig established a weekly 
Army Commanders Conference that included top ranking GHQ and army staff 
officers. These meetings, held at each Army HQ in rotation, provided a vehicle to co-
ordinate the learning process across the BEF.623 Haig’s initiatives provided the 
necessary recognition, authority and impetus necessary to drive the BEF’s learning 
organization forward to success.  
Following the Somme campaign, Haig recognised that Butler ‘was over 
working himself’ and required additional support.624 To this end, on the  January 30th 
1917 Haig established a TB at GHQ headed by Brig.-Gen. Arthur Solly-Flood who 
reported directly to the DSD, and ultimately to Butler.625 The role of this branch was 
‘to enforce uniformity of training throughout the BEF’, the keystone of which was 
the development and dissemination of tactical doctrine.626 Staff officers responsible 
for the oversight of training were appointed at army and corps level. In May 1917, a 
further ‘step change in the doctrinal process’ was marked by the appointment of 
Capt. Lord Gorell, who was recruited to improve the writing quality of the S.S. 
                                                 
620 Ibid. p. 138. 
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624 Ibid. Entry 19/12/1916. 
625 Major A. F. Becke, Order of Battle: Part 4, History of the Great War (London: HMSO, 1945) p. 13. 
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pamphlets.627 In March 1918, a new publications subsection of the TB was formed, 
which itself had been absorbed into SDB under Maj.-Gen. Guy Dawnay. Maj. 
Cuthbert Headlam was drafted in by Dawnay to take charge of the subsection. This 
was an important decision because Gorell, a battalion adjutant and ‘erstwhile 
brigade-level [staff] learner’ was replaced by ‘an experienced corps-level staff 
officer’.628 In July 1918, Haig established the Inspectorate of Training under  
Lieut.-Gen. Ivor Maxse. Although the TB continued to function at GHQ, Maxse 
pursued his passion for doctrine writing and published a number of tactical 
pamphlets mainly for smaller units below brigade thereby duplicating the work being 
done at GHQ. 
Anticipating the scale of the learning process, Haig sanctioned the rapid 
expansion of the AP&SS prior to the Battle of the Somme. This organization was 
originally established on August 13th 1914 under the command of Capt. G.S. 
Partridge,629 who retained his post throughout the war and returned to England with 
the rank of Colonel.630 Modern machinery was installed at the main facilities and 
principal plants, and warehousing was established at Le Havre, Boulogne and Rouen. 
Other centres, out-stations and secondary depots were sited near army and in some 
cases, corps HQs. Onwards from 1916, the AP&SS had responsibility for printing 
and disseminating the S.S. (Stationary Service) series of doctrinal pamphlets 
prepared at GHQ. In fact, this series included all of the doctrinal and training 
pamphlets printed and distributed by the AP&SS, including material translated from 
the French and German armies.631 
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The Learning Process In Theory 
A comprehensive record of the formal doctrinal learning process implemented 
by Haig’s GHQ remains elusive. However, the papers of Maj.-Gen. Archibald 
Montgomery-Massingberd, who was CS, Fourth Army, between 1916 and 1919 and 
later became CIGS (1933-1936), are illuminating as demonstrated by his Notes on 
Somme Fighting prepared in 1916.632  
Figure 23: The BEF’s Doctrinal Learning Process (1916-1918) 
 
As reconstructed in Figure 23 these notes reveal that by May 1916 a semi-
formalised learning process had been instituted. This incorporated and augmented the 
daily War Diaries mandated by FSR-II.633 It appears that in large formations, in 
simplified form, the doctrinal learning process comprised four stages: the first stage, 
‘observation’, involved ‘bottom-up’ information and intelligence gathering activities 
including post action reports, written and verbal feedback from raids, prisoner 
interrogation and interpretation of captured documents. In addition, structured and 
                                                 
632 LHCMA:Montgomery-Massingberd:7/3, "Notes on Somme Fighting." 
633 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration).Sect. 113-114 pp. 137-140. 
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unstructured information requests were passed down the chain of command. The 
second stage catered for the progressive ‘synthesis’ of reports passed up the staff 
chain of command from battalion adjutants to army chiefs of staff. These reports 
were edited at each level to ‘redact’ information irrelevant to the formation above. It 
is possible that information was judiciously edited during this process to disguise the 
truth and protect reputations. Divisional commanders’ conferences were also 
organised to share tactical lessons learned from both British and French operations. 
On receipt of this information and intelligence by army HQ, it was assessed and 
consolidated, occasionally into formal tactical notes, before being dispatched to the 
GS at GHQ. 634 The third stage commenced when information from all armies was 
further assessed, synthesised and then translated into ‘doctrine’. The resulting 
pamphlets were printed by the AP&SS before being distributed via army HQ down 
to battalion level. The fourth stage, ‘action’, completed the loop. The doctrine so 
issued formed the basis of training and was proven in the field; whereupon the cycle 
was repeated. 
The Learning Process In Practice 
 The learning process can be illustrated by drawing on Fourth Army Staff 
papers prepared in 1916. It is clear that early in the year, the staffs at GHQ and 
Fourth Army HQ recognised the need to profit by experience and adapt the general 
principles established in FSR-I to address the new tactical conditions.635 To this end 
Montgomery-Massingberd issued instructions to his equivalent number at corps HQ 
to report the experience gained and lessons learned as operations progressed.636  
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In response, just to take one example, X Corps issued a detailed questionnaire to 
lower formations, facilitating a degree of standardisation in the information gathering 
process.637 More typically, corps staff simply transcribed army HQ’s request to 
divisional commanders for onward transmission through brigades down to battalion 
HQ. To augment the post action reports, officers and men who had participated in 
raids and operations were interviewed, prisoners interrogated, and reports were filed 
and passed back up the chain of command. For example, 2nd Division HQ held a 
conference to deduce lessons from the fighting. Reports from brigades and lower 
formations were examined to assess the ‘causes of failure’ and determine ‘how they 
[could] be remedied’.638 It is also clear that senior officers were not afraid to criticise 
current doctrine.639 Divisional reports were submitted to the respective corps HQs. 
where they were distilled into a single document before forwarding to Fourth Army 
HQ.640 The corps reports were consolidated and in some cases enhanced by French 
experience and practice, captured German documents, and prisoner intelligence 
reports. The final report was then submitted to the SDB branch at GHQ.641 
While this process may appear bureaucratic and time consuming, in fact, as 
Paddy Griffith believed, it was surprisingly agile.642 On May 8th 1916, GHQ issued 
the doctrinal memorandum S.S.109 Training of Divisions for Offensive Action under 
the signature of the now Lieut.-Gen. L.E. Kiggell, Haig’s CGS.643 Later in the month, 
Fourth Army issued its own set of Tactical Notes, building directly on the guidance 
given in S.S.109. In July, presumably based on lessons learned and reported by 
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Fourth Army, GHQ updated S.S.109 replacing it with S.S.119 Preliminary Notes on 
the Tactical Lessons of the Recent Operations. S.S.119 confirmed that the general 
principles set out in S.S.109 were essentially correct, but needed amplification.644 
Thus, within the first month of fighting, GHQ issued tactical guidance, lessons were 
learned by Fourth Army, transmitted up to GHQ where they were assessed and 
absorbed before being disseminated down to the other armies.  
It is also evident that GHQ was quick to respond to changes in enemy tactical 
doctrine. On July 31st 1917, the first day of Third Ypres, GHQ became aware that the 
‘enemy’s “major” system of tactics’ had changed. It was apparent that the Germans 
delayed their most serious counterattacks until the later stages of a fight. This 
occurred when the attacking infantry had advanced outside the effective range of 
artillery cover, were weakened by losses, and had disintegrated into some disorder. 
GHQ immediately responded to this intelligence by issuing new guidance to army 
commanders. On August 7th, GHQ advised that in future the depth of each stage of 
an offensive attack should be calibrated to coincide with the effective range of 
artillery protection, combined with the fighting-power of the attacking infantry, 
paying due regard to the state of ground, discipline and training. The idea was to 
‘exhaust the enemy as much as possible and ourselves as little as possible in the 
early stages of the fight’, so that when the counter-attack came its potency was 
blunted, and it was met by troops in a high state of readiness.645 
This depiction of the learning process may suggest that from the spring of 1916 
there existed at GHQ a well-resourced organization. Unfortunately, this was not the 
practical reality. At the outset, the responsibility for GHQ doctrinal output was given 
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sufficient priority by placing it directly under Butler’s charge. However, when 
comparing the form and content of S.S.109 and S.S.119 with Fourth Army’s Tactical 
Notes, GHQ’s lack of editorial competence and haste is apparent, indicating a lack of 
appropriate resourcing.646 Given the vital importance of these doctrinal documents to 
the successful prosecution of the Somme campaign, Haig was remiss in allowing this 
state of affairs to develop. In the circumstances, a far better outcome might have 
been achieved by simply distributing Fourth Army’s Tactical Notes under Kiggell’s 
signature, together with any necessary modification. In the event, GHQ did not attain 
the expected standard of professionalism until the new year when S.S.135 was 
published, and after available manpower and other resources had been improved.  
Output of the Learning Process 
Between 1916 and 1918 the output of S.S. pamphlets and other instructional 
publications was prolific. According to one list, the numbered series reached over 700 
items.647 This does not include instances where a particular series was updated as new 
relevant information became available. A wide range of tactical, technical and other 
subjects were addressed. Of particular importance was the series directed at the 
tactical operations of divisions (Figure 24 below) and those that addressed the tactical 
organization and deployment of platoons depicted in Figure 26. (p. 182). 
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Figure 24: GHQ Divisional-Level Doctrine Publications (1916-1918) 648 
Date S.S. No S.S. Title Comment 
 
1916 
   
May S.S.109 Training of Divisions for 
Offensive Action 
Informed by FSR-1. 
July S.S.119 Preliminary Notes on the 
Tactical Lessons of the Recent 
Operations 
Augmenting content of 
S.S.109 
December S.S.135 Instructions for the Training of 
Divisions for Offensive Action 
Reissued in January, 
amended in May, 
reprinted in August 
1917 
1917    




October S.S.198 Tactical Instructions for the 
Offensive of 1918 
Briefed by Haig, 
drafted and proofed, but 
not issued. 
1918    
January S.S.135 The Training and Employment 
of Divisions 









May S.S.210 The Division in Defence Published belatedly, but 
of value to five divisions 
facing a concerted 
German attack on Aisne.
November S.S.135 The Division in Attack 3rd ed., fully revised. 
Framed and informed 
by FSR-1. 
Divisional Tactical Doctrine 
As Figure 24 shows, in May 1916 GHQ began the development of divisional 
tactical offensive doctrine with the publication of S.S.109 and ended in November 
1918 with the third edition of S.S.135. A number of general observations relevant to 
the task of establishing unity-of-mental-effort can be made:  
                                                 




First, it is clear that Haig’s aim with S.S.109 was to gain unity-of-mental-effort 
by prescription. Retained in Haig’s diary, this foolscap, three page and tightly 
worded set of instructions left no room for judgement.649 This was appropriate for an 
audience of largely inexperienced divisional commanders who were about to 
undertake the largest offensive in the history of the British Army. In March 1916, 
Haig lamented ‘I have not got an Army in France really, but a collection of Divisions 
untrained for the field!650 However, by November 1918, Haig was supported by 
highly experienced and largely very competent men. This is reflected in S.S.135 of 
that date, which set out principles for a division in attack, but which relied entirely on 
the commanders judgement for execution. The following example is typical: 
S.S.109: Every attacking unit must be given a limited and 
clearly defined objective, which it is to capture and 
consolidate at all costs.651 
S.S.135: Each unit in the leading line of attack must have its 
objective definitely assigned to it. 
Units which follow should be given sufficient latitude in 
action to admit of their employment to assist in carrying on 
the advance of the leading units either by means of local 
outflanking movements, or by direct support, if such support 
is required. Nothing should be done to hamper the initiative 
and freedom of manoeuvre of subordinate commanders.652 
In this scenario, it can be seen that Haig was relying on the sound judgement of his 
commanders, rather than prescription to attain unity-of-mental-effort.  
Secondly, all pamphlets in this series, to a lesser or greater extent, invoke the 
principles established in FSR-I. For example, S.S.109 advised that ‘special attention 
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is directed to Chapter V, VI, VII, and IX, Field Service Regulations, Part I’.653 In the 
final edition of S.S.135 this is most obvious in Chapters 2 (Plan of Attack) and 3 
(Preparations for the Attack), that are framed and informed by the regulations.654 As 
Dawnay pointed out, the GHQ divisional level doctrinal publications offer a ‘striking 
justification of the principles contained in F.S.R. Part I’ set-out by Haig.655 FSR-I was 
reprinted in 1917, but not updated or revised, and remained the Army’s capstone 
doctrinal manual for the duration of the war. Headlam wrote the final edition of 
S.S.135.656 He was originally cynical about the application of ‘certain old shibboleths 
and axioms of undoubted truths’, but he did acknowledge the value of the pre-war 
regulations: 
We are now engaged upon a colossal work [S.S.135] which I 
am trying to make revolutionary in character – but its 
changes are really conservative, because they return to the 
oldest and most indisputable doctrines of war. [FSR-I].657 
Thirdly, the principal tenets of Haig’s world-view, moral and offensive action, 
are evident in S.S.109 and S.S.135 (Nov 1918). The concluding remark of S.S.109 
emphasised ‘it must be impressed on all ranks that “decisive success in battle can 
only be gained by a vigorous offensive” (F.S.R. 99.1)’. Training is also coupled with 
high morale.658 S.S.135 emphasised both factors: ‘moral…lies at the root of all 
achievement and endurance in war’; ‘victory can only be won by offensive action’.659 
 Fourthly, the evolution of tactics and the assimilation of technical innovation 
into battle planning can be traced by examining the sequence of publications in this 
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divisional series. Apart from incorporating the developments evident in this series 
into operational plans, it is also clear that Haig aimed to achieve a common 
understanding of the strengths and limitations of new technologies. In all, these 
pamphlets helped facilitate unity-of-mental-effort across his divisional command. 
Haig did engage himself in the process of doctrinal evolution described above. 
This is demonstrated by the role he played in the preparation of S.S.198 Tactical 
Instructions for the Offensive of 1918. Although this pamphlet was only printed in 
proof form and not issued, it did shed light on Haig’s current tactical ideas and his 
interest in the doctrinal process at GHQ. In September 1917, he hurriedly wrote a 
note for the guidance of a committee (Kiggell, Solly-Flood and Capt. Lord Gorell) 
convened for the purpose of producing S.S.198. This note was preserved in Gorell’s 
papers, who as mentioned was appointed to improve the quality of writing at the TB:  
1st Air supremacy. 2. Dominate hostile artillery. 1. When 
possible the ground The problem. 2 objectives. 1st defeat the 
hostile advanced troops holding shell holes etc. but this is 
only a means towards the 2nd objective, viz the subsequent 
destruction of the enemy’s main force which will try & 
counter attack at favourable a point & moment favourable to 
the Enemy. These distinct objectives necessitate a division of 
the attacking troops according to their roles. To make suitable 
dispositions rapidly to meet tactical situations as they occur 
and to influence effectively the action of our reserves, the 
Commanders position of Battalion, Brigade & Div[isiona]l 
Com[mande]rs is of very great importance. Vide German 
Instru[ction]s on this. When the strategical situation permits 
the ground point chosen for attack should be primarily be 
selected on account of the advantages offered which the 
ground may be offered by the ground for the advance of our 
leading detachments by successive steps from defen one 
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defensive position to another. As soon as the advanced troops 
have gained a suitable defensive position, it is to be fortified 
etc. Without delay steps are to be taken to move forward the 
necessary means for exploiting the success thus gained for 
parrying such counter strikes as the enemy may make. Fresh 
troops, M[achine]-guns prepare fire positions etc. field 
co[mpanie]s – a few field guns etc. Barrage plans to be 
worked beforehand for further advance.660 
 
As shown in Figure 25 (below), a thorough reading of S.S.198 indicates that 
Haig’s guidance was closely followed by its writer Major Edward Grigg.661 Of 
particular importance is the fact that S.S.198 acknowledged the new German in-depth 
defence system, and responded by establishing a tactical method based on 
‘successive steps in a continuous offensive’, underpinned by four clearly defined and 












                                                 
660 Beach, "Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British G.H.Q., 1917-18." p. 478, Note 57: 
‘Notes by Sir Douglas Haig as to “Tactics in the attack”, P[ar]t I, General Principles of German 
Defence and deductions drawn there from as to modifications required in our methods of attack’ 
[undated], box 8, Gorell papers, BoL 
661 Ibid. p. 475. 
662 "S.S.198: Tactical Instructions for the Offensive of 1918." p. 1. 
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Figure 25: Broad Comparison of Haig’s Guidance Notes and S.S. 198 
Haig’s step by step idea SS 198: ‘Successive steps in the 
continuous offensive’. 
Page Ref 
Air Supremacy; dominate 
hostile artillery. 
Establish mastery over enemy’s 
aircraft and artillery. 
p. 11 
Two objectives: (i) defeat 
advanced forces (ii) as a means 
destroy enemy’s main force on 
the counter-attack 
Objectives: (i) defeat advance 
forces in a series of attacks, 
compelling enemy to counter 
attack, wear out his reserves and 
weaken his moral. (ii) Launch 
attack against deeper objectives 
with the prospect of far reaching 
strategical results. 
p. 12-13 
Necessitates division of 
attacking forces according to 
their roles. 
It is essential that definite parties 
of troops should be assigned to 
each objective, and should 
consolidate it after capturing it.  
p. 28 
Position of battalion, brigade 
and divisional commanders is of 
very great importance to 
capitalize on tactical 
opportunities and effective 
action of reserves. 
Not addressed in SS.198.  
When strategical situation 
permits point chosen for attack 
should provide ground that 
facilitates a methodical 
continuous advance in steps 
from one defensive position to 
the next. 
To select as the intermediate 
objectives of each attack the lines 
which will best facilitate the re-
organization of infantry for the 
next stage of advance.  
p. 11 
As soon as advanced troops 
have taken the first of these 
defensive positions, it should be 
fortified. Without delay bring 
forward necessary means (fresh 
troops, machine guns and 
artillery) to defeat counter 
attacks and pave the way to the 
next forward position. 
To select as our final objective of 
each attack a good defensive line 
well within the physical capacity 
of our infantry and the zone of 
effective artillery support. This 
line will be so chosen as to 
facilitate the resumption of the 
attack at the earliest possible date. 
Advance proceeded by four 
clearly defined and methodical 
stages of exploitation.  
p. 11 
Barrage plans to be worked out 
beforehand.  







Platoon Tactical Doctrine  
The second series of tactical publications published for the infantry by the TB 
at GHQ were S.S.143 and S.S.144 shown in Figure 26. 
Figure 26: GHQ Platoon-Level Doctrine Publications (1916-1918) 
The most significant of these two publications is S.S.143, which introduced an 
entirely new organization for the platoon, dramatically increasing its firepower and 
tactical flexibility. On February 2nd 1917, Haig witnessed a demonstration of the new 
unit organised by Solly-Flood at the Third Army Training School. The exercise was 
carried out by a company of four platoons, each comprising a bombing section, rifle 
grenade section, a Lewis gun section and a section of scouts and sharpshooters of 
nine men plus a platoon HQ of three men. Haig was suitably impressed by the new 
unit and its organiser. The next day Haig approved the organization ‘as the normal 
                                                 
663 "S.S.143: Instructions for the Training and Employment of Platoons (February 1918)," (AP&SS). 
Front Cover. 
664 Stuart Mitchell, "An Inter-Disciplinary Study of Learning in the 32nd Division on the Western 
Front, 1916-1918" (University of Birmingham, 2013) p. 297. 
 Date S.S. No S.S. Title Comment 
 
1917 
   
February S.S.143 Instructions for the Training  
of Platoons for Offensive  
Action, 1917 
Introduces new platoon 
organization.  
February S.S.144 The Normal Formation for  
the Attack, 1917 
 
April S.S.144 The Normal Formation for  
the Attack, 1917 
The Organization of an 
Infantry Battalion 
(O.B.1919: dated 
07/02/1917 and The 
Normal Formation for the 
Attack (S.S. 144, 
February, 1917 ) – both 
issued together in April 
1917, under 
40/WO/3995.663 
1918    
February S.S.143 The Training and Employment  
of Platoons, 1918 
2nd ed. revised and 








3rd revised ed. May have 




one’, and appointed Solly-Flood head up his new Training Branch at GHQ.665 At the 
same time, Haig commissioned the publication of S.S.144, where his rationale for 
doing so is instructive:666 
The average Officer now does not know enough of tactical 
principles to enable him to adopt a particular formation to 
suit the particular situation confronting him. So I decided that 
a normal attack formation was to be laid down and practised. 
This can be dispensed with in years to come when our 
Officers become more educated in military principles!667  
This statement demonstrates Haig’s desire to achieve unity-of-mental-effort at 
platoon level, and foreshadowed his wish to move from prescription to judgemental 
decision-making at all command levels. On February 7th, this innovation was 
formally introduced (O.B./1919) and, Solly-Flood wrote and published S.S.143, and 
S.S.144 shortly thereafter.  
In February 1918 S.S. 143 was revised when the specialist sections were 
dissolved. This was because there was some concern that men in the bombing and 
grenade sections were holding back in the assault and displayed a reluctance to use 
the bayonet leaving this to the ‘specialist’ riflemen. The revised platoon was 
organised as follows: 
Except Nos 1 and 2 of the Lewis gun section, every N.C.O. 
and man in the platoon is first and foremost a rifleman. All 
men are trained in the use of the bomb, and at least 50 per 
cent. in the use of the rifle bomb. If opportunity allows, it is 
desirable that one of the rifle sections should be trained also 
to act as a bombing team.668  
                                                 
665 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 02/02/1917; 03/02/1917.  
666 "S.S.144: The Normal Formation for the Attack (1917)," (AP&SS). 
667 "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 03/02/1917. 
668 "S.S.143: Instructions for the Training and Employment of Platoons (February 1918)." p. 8. 
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In June 1918, in view of the manpower shortage, it became necessary to reduce 
the standard platoon to two rifle sections each with a minimum of one leader and six 
men, and one double Lewis gun section of one leader and 10 men. Although there 
was insufficient manpower to fight each gun separately, both weapons could be 
brought into action to double the firepower against fleeting opportunities.669 In 1919, 
a new edition of S.S.143 was published where tactical firepower was increased by the 
introduction of a second Lewis gun section in place of one rifle section.670    
Conclusion: Attainment of Unity-of-Mental-Effort in the BEF 
This chapter opened with the proposition that doctrine provides a military 
force, regardless of size, with ‘a common manner of seeing, thinking and acting’.671 
‘When doctrine ceases...men act on personal lines’, and anarchy, and organizational 
dysfunction ensues.672 The bigger the organization, the greater the dysfunction, and in 
military terms, the more easily an army will be defeated by a similar class of foe. 
This feature was not lost on Haig. As Sir Evelyn Wood VC acknowledged, before 
the war he was recognised as one of the leading military practitioners of his era: 
Douglas Haig is one of the most highly instructed of our 
officers...since the death of Sir James Grierson, he probably 
knows more about our Army than anyone in our Service.673  
Haig must have understood the value of doctrine and ensured through study and 
practice that the principles he espoused were on the right lines.  
                                                 
669 TNA/WO/106/411, "Reorganization and reduction of British Divisons contemplated as a result of 
German offensives." Memorandum “Organization of the Infantry Battalion attached to a letter by 
Maj.-Gen. G.P. Dawnay to the Army Commanders 14/06/1918. 
670 "S.S.143: Platoon Training (1919)," (AP&SS). 
671 Foch, The Principles of War. p. 7. (18) 
672 Ibid. p. 244. 
673 Wood, Winnowed Memories. pp. 332-333. 
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Prior to Haig’s arrival at the WO, he contributed to the development of cavalry 
doctrine, thereby helping to maintain the continued presence of the cavalry as a 
fighting arm in the face of powerful and highly influential opposition. In 1908, at a 
General Staff Conference, Haig emphasised the need for uniformity in strategy, 
tactics, organization and training.674 As DSD, he was in the right position at the right 
time to firmly imprint his doctrinal world-view on FSR-I. He then used the agency of 
staff tours and manoeuvres to test and refine the principles he established in the 
regulations. This process cemented the acceptance of FSR-I within the GS and at the 
highest levels of command. Haig helped inculcate these principles into the Indian 
Army when he was CGS. His rigorous training methods facilitated the integration of 
the Indian Corps HQ into the British staff structure on its arrival on the Western 
Front in 1914. When Haig arrived to take command at Aldershot it was apparent to 
the Inspector General of the Forces that each division in the home army still had its 
own way of thinking. Under Haig’s direction, FSR-I principles and practices were 
drilled into the 1st and 2nd Divisions under his command. This meant that when these 
formations disembarked in France their officers and men benefitted from a high 
degree of unity-of-mental-effort in the early stages of the war.  
At First Army, Haig took the opportunity to put his principles into practice as 
demonstrated at the battle of Neuve Chappelle. In 1916, under Haig’s leadership as 
C-in-C, the BEF became an increasingly successful learning organization. This 
progress fuelled the evolution and adaptation of tactical doctrine in response to the 
novel battle conditions on the Western Front, and the rapid introduction of 
revolutionary technologies. Lessons were learned, the evolved doctrine was officially 
disseminated via the S.S. publications, and then inculcated into Haig’s five armies by 
                                                 
674 TNA/WO/279/18, "Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College 7th to 10th 
January 1908." p. 47. 
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a relatively sophisticated training organization. Of course, there is no question that 
progress towards unity-of-mental-effort was an uneven and a challenging process. As 
a result it is difficult to determine with any precision the degree to which Haig was 
able to broadly gain unity-of-mental-effort within the BEF by the end of hostilities.  
However, not surprisingly, Haig and the Official Historian suggested that a 
relatively high degree of unity-of-mental-effort had been achieved. In Haig’s Final 
Despatch, and with a degree of self-satisfaction, he insisted that his world-view of 
warfare impressed on and applied by his armies through FSR-I and the relevant S.S. 
doctrine was vindicated by the BEF’s methods and progression to victory.675 
Edmonds observed that by August 1918, the British armies had all ‘picked up the 
tricks of the trade, they quickly noted and absorbed the tactical lessons, and they 
fought better as the days passed, whereas the Germans fought worse’.676 However, as 
David French was right to signal, Haig’s view was not universally shared by his 
military colleagues including Robertson and Wilson.677  
Nonetheless, a number of historians have been inclined to support Edmond’s 
opinion, arguing that by 1918 the British Army was applying ‘a coherent all-arms 
tactical design’.678 Prior and Wilson said that this required ‘the most thorough co-
operation between the various elements’ for an attack to ‘achieve its maximum 
effect’, which they labelled ‘a formula for success’.679 This notion finds support from 
Dan Todman and Gary Sheffield who have suggested that ‘from the end of 1916 
                                                 
675 Haig, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, December 1915-April 1919, ed. by J.H. Boraston. pp. 325, 
343, 345. 
676 Brig.-Gen. J. E. Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium: 26 September to 11 November 
1918 - The Advance to Victory, ed. Brig.-Gen. J.E. Edmonds, vol. 1918/5, Official History of the War 
(London: Macmillan, 1947) p. 609. 
677 French, "Doctrine and Organization in the British Army 1919-1932." p. 500. 
678 Boff, "British Third Army, the Application of Modern War, and the Defeat of the German Army, 
August-November 1918." p. 139. 
679 Robin and Trevor Wilson Prior, Command on the Western Front (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1992) pp. 309, 289. 
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there does seem to have been an effort to move on from the individualism and 
confusion of previous years to adopt a more consistent and coherent approach’ which 
‘played an essential part in the weapons system that allowed the BEF to establish 
dominance over the German army in the last months of the war’.680 While Robbins 
saw Cambrai as ‘a blue print, which the British would use to produce stunning results 
on the Western Front in the second half of 1918’.681 J.P. Harris and Niall Barr posited 
‘that the BEF at the beginning of August 1918…was a highly sophisticated army 
which had developed and adopted a broad range of operational methods and tactics’. 
During the Hundred Days ‘this repertoire was performed with impressive skill’.682  
However, these historians cautioned against accepting the appealing notion that 
the BEF had developed a ‘winning formula’ demonstrated at Hamel on July 4th 1918 
and refined at Amiens on August 8th. This is because some features of these 
offensives were never repeated. For example, the BEF was never again able to regain 
‘the same degree of surprise’ or achieve the comparative potency of counter-battery 
fire. The weapon systems also proved a great deal more fallible than Prior and 
Wilson would allow and the methods used were only ‘really applicable to only big 
set-piece assaults’.683  
Research by Jonathan Boff, where he examined 202 opposed attacks launched 
by Third Army between August and November 1918, lends support to the position of 
Harris and Barr.684 In a thorough and well-argued chapter on British tactics employed 
during the campaign, Boff demonstrated that although a rich diversity in the 
combined arms tactics was practised by Third Army, these methods were largely 
                                                 
680 Command and Control on the Western Front, ed. Dan Todman and Gary Sheffield, First ed. 
(Staplehurst: Spellmount Limited, 2004) pp. 8-9. 
681 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat into Victory. p. 137. 
682 J.P. Harris with Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice (London: Brassey's, 1998) p. 294.  
683 Ibid. pp. 297, 298-299.  
684 Boff, "British Third Army, the Application of Modern War, and the Defeat of the German Army, 
August-November 1918."p. 152. 
 188 
 
framed and informed by FSR-I, S.S.135, S.S.143 and S.S.144.685 He also contributed a 
valuable understanding of both the internal and external factors that played a major 
role in driving diversity of the combined arms effort.686 In conclusion, and to 
paraphrase Boff, although the development, dissemination and attainment of unity-
of-mental-effort in the BEF under Haig’s command was certainly less than perfect, 
‘it was, however, greater than that of its opponent’.687  
                                                 
685 Winning and Losing on the Western Front; The British Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918. 
pp. 123, 126, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 135, 146. 
686 Ibid. pp. 153-159. 
687 Ibid. p. 246. 
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5. Achieving Unity-of-Physical-Effort 
‘In all armies, and in every war, doctrine is the glue which holds everything 
together, and training is the instrument through which it is imparted’.688 This chapter 
will examine how Haig evolved that instrument in the BEF from its rudimentary and 
improvised beginnings in 1914 to become a relatively well resourced and well 
managed organization in 1918. By this stage both a TB at GHQ and an IT had been 
established with powers to create doctrine, to standardise methods and build 
uniformity of training both in France and at home, supported by an inspection 
regime. Consideration will also be given to the possible reasons Haig delayed the 
implementation of this high priority process. Finally, an assessment will be made of 
the extent to which unity-of-physical-effort was achieved by the end of the war.  
Before the war there was a formidable array of official and unofficial military 
training manuals published including that universal panacea Quick Training for War 
written by Lord Baden-Powell, the Chief Scout, which extended to four editions 
alone in September 1914.689 Given this emphasis on the importance of training, it is 
surprising that historians have tended to overlook the subject in respect to the BEF.690 
Peter Simkins is one notable exception. He addressed the question at length in his 
work on Kitchener’s New Armies. Unfortunately, he restricted his focus to the period 
1914-1916 and deals only with training in Britain.691 Simon Robbins provided a 
competent overview of the BEF’s training regime during the course of the war. He 
rightly pointed to the collapse in tactical expertise that occurred as a result of the 
                                                 
688 John Gooch, "Preface," in Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944 (London: Frank Cass, 
2000). p.vii. 
689 Lieut.-General Sir Robert Baden Powell, Quick Training for War (London: Herbert Jenkins Limited, 
1914). K.W. Mitchinson, The Territorial Force at War, 1914-1916 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014) p. 66. 
690 Geddes, "Solly-Flood, GHQ, and Tactical Training in the B.E.F., 1916-1918." p. 5. 
691 Peter Simkins, Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914 - 1916, ed. Ian F.W. 
Beckett, War, Armed Forces and Society (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). 
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destruction of the Regular Army in 1914, and its replacement by hastily trained green 
troops of the New Armies in 1915. He argued that ‘it was not until late 1917…that 
the British were able to regain standards comparable with 1914’.692 Jonathan Boff 
gave valuable insights arising from his study of the Third Army during the Hundred 
Days campaign where he concluded that although considerable effort was put into 
training, uniformity was not achieved, mainly due to external factors, most notably 
the demands and tempo of the campaign.693 Other historians including Paddy Griffith, 
Gary Sheffield, Bill Rawling, acknowledged the importance of training, but typically 
this vital topic has been dealt with piecemeal. Timothy Harrison Place, has produced 
a finely drawn study of British Army doctrine and training during World War II.694 
He concluded that little learning was carried through from Haig’s experience on the 
Western Front.695  
While established historians have yet to devote their full attention to training, 
support is at hand from a number of capable scholars who have taken an interest in 
the topic. Paul Harris has devoted a chapter of his PhD thesis to staff training on the 
Western Front. Stuart Mitchell in his PhD study of the 32nd Division sketched out 
various aspects of infantry training in France, and finally Alistair Geddes has 
produced a ground-breaking MA dissertation on the subject: Solly-Flood, GHQ, and 
Tactical Training in the BEF, 1916-1918.696 The obvious limitation of this study is its 
scope and depth, an inherent feature of an MA dissertation. Nonetheless, it must be 
                                                 
692 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat into Victory. p. 97. 
693 Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front; The British Army and the Defeat of Germany in 
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695 Ibid. pp. 168-175. 
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gratefully acknowledged that Geddes’s work has been used in-part to frame and 
inform the assessment that follows.  
Evolution of the BEF’s Training Organization 
While the WO and the Army emphasised training in peacetime, it appears that 
much less thought had been given to this vital matter when at war. The 1902 report 
on officer education and training falls into this category.697 The findings of the 1904 
Elgin Inquiry into the war in South Africa has made much of the inadequacy of 
peacetime training and the need for improvement, but little consideration was given 
to the organization of training during hostilities.698 When Haig gave evidence to the 
Royal Commission he offered suggestions regarding the future training of officers 
and men. He stressed the need for the training of staff officers through staff tours and 
said by ‘this means uniformity of ideas in staff management and tactics generally 
would gradually be produced throughout the Army’. He stressed that ‘Generals and 
their staffs should as far as possible be accustomed to work together during times of 
peace, and general officers should have a free hand in selecting their staff from 
qualified officers’. He also stated that the chief danger for training in general ‘arises 
from the utterly false usages hitherto practiced and ingrained into…troops at peace 
manoeuvers; and from these false ideas of war filter to the people of th[e] country, 
and then are voiced by their representatives in Parliament’. Haig was referring to the 
false expectations of the Army’s state of preparedness created prior to South African 
War. As a result, following the opening defeats at the hands of Boer farmers, the 
politicians were wrong-footed and the general public dismayed. Haig emphasised 
                                                 
697 [Cd.982], "Report of Committee on Military Education (Akers Douglas)," War Office (London: 
HMSO, 1902). 
698 [Cd.1789], "Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Military Preparations and 
Other matters Connected with the War in South Africa," War Office (London: HMSO, 1904). 
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that the realism of warfare should be replicated at manoeuvers.699 In FSR-I, the 
overarching aspect of training in the field received only passing mention, and this 
was only within the context of night operations. The Training and Manoeuver 
Regulations, 1913 was also surprisingly silent on the matter.700 Thus, when the BEF 
arrived in France, there were no prior formal plans for in-theatre training. 
While specific plans for training in the field were absent, the object of, and the 
devolved responsibility for, training were absolutely clear. The Infantry Training, 
1914 manual stated that ‘the object to be aimed at in the training of the infantry 
soldier is to make him, mentally and physically, a better man than his adversary on 
the field of battle’. Further, ‘all commanders from platoon commanders upwards, are 
responsible for the training of their commands’. To ensure uniformity of both 
training methods and standards, ‘superiors, while delegating authority for the training 
of subordinate units, [were] themselves responsible that the training [was] carried out 
in accordance with the instructions contained in [the] manual’.701 This alluded to the 
notion of inspection. Similar principles applied to manuals of the other fighting arms 
including the cavalry and artillery.702 These manuals implied that prior to 1914 the 
WO did not envisage that the development of general or specialised training facilities 
in the field would be necessary, and in any event if training was required beyond 
those drills specified this became the devolved responsibility of field commanders on 
the spot.  
At a meeting of the War Council on August 5th 1914, Haig advised that ‘Great 
Britain and Germany would be fighting for their existence’, and that the war ‘was 
                                                 
699 [Cd.1791], "Royal Commission on the War in South Africa: Minutes of Evidence," War Office 
(London: HMSO, 1904) p. 404. 
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701 Infantry Training Manual: 4-Company Organization, (London: HMSO, 1914) p. 1, 3. 




bound to be a long [one], [as] neither side would acknowledge defeat after a short 
struggle’.703 Later, he told Haldane the war would ‘last many months, possibly 
years’.704 Haig’s opinion of the war’s duration was shared by Kitchener, but 
according to Churchill, every one else at the War Council meeting expected it to be 
short including French; in fact the BEF’s mobilisation plan was based on the ‘‘‘short 
war’’ assumption’.705 At the meeting, Haig urged that ‘Great Britain must at once 
take in hand the creation of an Army’ of at least ‘one million’ men. He pointed to the 
fact that the regular army had only a small number of trained officers and NCOs, and 
stressed that these soldiers must be economised because ‘the need for efficient 
instructors would become at once apparent’. He pleaded that ‘a considerable number 
of officers and NCOs should be withdrawn forthwith from the Expeditionary Force’ 
for future training purposes. Haig’s proposal was immediately opposed by French. 
Consequently only three officers per battalion were retained in England,706 resulting 
in a desperate shortage of qualified instructors which became a very serious handicap 
for training at home.707 This problem was compounded by Kitchener’s decision to 
expand the BEF by the creation of New Armies, employing the traditional 
recruitment channel of the Regular Army. This route was preferred to Haldane’s 
established mechanism of the Territorial Force’s County Associations.708 Again 
Haig’s advice was brushed aside, this time by Kitchener.709 
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1914: Training Ad-hocism 
When I Corps arrived in its concentration area of Wassigny around August 17th 
1914 the force had already been thoroughly trained by Haig for a European war to 
the highest and most uniform standard of any British formation.710 Thus, further 
training was not one of his immediate priorities. Besides, little opportunity presented 
itself because I Corps was constantly engaged in action, or on the move from the 
Mons retreat until the closure of the First Ypres campaign in November. It is also 
apparent that training was not considered a particular priority at GHQ. The GS was 
divided into two branches, Operations and Intelligence reporting to the CGS via a 
sub chief (MGGS). As there was no SDB, the formal function of training at GHQ 
was absent.711 If matters of training policy in the field arose, presumably this was to 
be dealt with on an ad-hoc basis by the Operations branch. As discussed, local 
commanders were charged with the responsibility for all training required during the 
campaign. Gen. Sir George de S. Barrow attached to the staff of the Cavalry Division 
under Allenby caustically observed: ‘employed in much training, in moving up to 
positions of readiness to go through the “gap” that never came’.712 
By the end of 1914, training became a priority for Haig due to a number of 
converging factors. First, owing to the high number of casualties in officers and men, 
rapid de-skilling was taking place in I Corps. Secondly, Haig was finding that men 
who had made good commanders in peacetime did not necessarily perform well on 
the battlefield. Brig.-Gen. Ivor Maxse of the Guards Brigade, is one example. Haig 
sent Maxse home (not before promoting him to Maj.-Gen.!) to train a New Army 
division just before he was sacked by Maj.-Gen. S.H. Lomax, his superior in 
                                                 
710 Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1914, 1. p. 10. 
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command of 1st Division.713 It appears that this decision served both men well. 
Lomax was released from the onerous task of ‘degumming’ his brigade commander. 
Maxse returned to France later in command of 18th (Eastern) Division, where he 
performed his duties well before being promoted to take charge of XVIII Corps. 
Thirdly, in November, Haig was promoted to full General for distinguished service 
in the field, and on Christmas Day he was given command of First Army comprising 
three corps (I Corps, IV Corps and the Indian Corps).714The training standards of this 
greatly expanded formation were mixed, and a degree of re-skilling was vital to 
achieve uniformity. Finally, changes were about to take place at GHQ, which had an 
important bearing on the BEF’s future training organization.  
1915: Training Improvisation 
In January 1915, French appointed, Lieut.-Gen. Sir W.R. Robertson as his new 
CGS. Robertson knew that the ‘units were coming out from home indifferently 
trained in their common military duties’ and were completely unprepared for trench 
warfare. In response, he immediately established a SDB under Col. E.M. Perceval, 
albeit a relatively junior officer for this task, with specific responsibility for training 
and other duties not included in the Operations and Intelligence branches. He also 
elevated the staff branches to report directly to him rather than through a sub-chief.715 
Robertson foresaw a grand vision for the development of training given the slight 
resources he had allocated to the task at GHQ:  
Set up machinery for giving…new arrivals the requisite 
additional training before they went into the trenches, the 
machinery to include schools of instruction manned by 
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officers and non-commissioned officers who were specialists 
in their business; to make similar arrangements for the 
training of drafts at the bases; bring formations at the front in 
closer relation with these drafts and cause them to take a 
greater interest in them; and inaugurate systematic instruction 
for regimental officers and non-commissioned officers, 
whose professional standard had fallen to a low level owing 
to the number of casualties we had suffered. 
 Lastly, special means had to be provided for dealing with 
questions regarding new units such as mining companies, 
new inventions such as trench mortars, and a host of others 
relating to new methods of making war in general and trench 
war in particular.716  
In total the resources available to the SDB were four staff officers who also had 
to contend with other duties of policy and organization that possibly were more 
urgent. As Dan Todman observed, although Robertson quickly instituted at GHQ 
much needed organizational improvements, brought in fresh faces, and attempted to 
introduce a new attitude within the staff, further progress was slow and improvised 
due to a lack of trained staff and massive workloads.717  
Meanwhile, Haig and his commanders at the front were soon confronted with 
the arrival of poorly trained divisions of Kitchener’s New Armies. Although these 
troops had undergone six months basic training, they were challenged by a number 
of factors. As Peter Simpkins pointed out the ‘main problem at the beginning was the 
military ignorance of the majority of troops and junior officers alike’.718 While the 
training syllabus was adequate enough in theory, it proved impossible to implement 
in practice due to a critical shortage of experienced officers and NCOs in both the 
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New Armies and the Territorial battalions. ‘Even when [the battalions] acquired a 
reasonable knowledge of drill and discipline, recruits were plagued by shortages of 
equipment at each successive stage of their training’ as Simkins explained:719 
The lack of general supervision and co-ordination of training, 
the delays in revising existing tactical doctrine, and the 
consequent over-dependence of commanding officers on out 
of date manuals all conspired to give field training an air of 
unreality and amateurishness which began to disappear only 
when the first New Armies had gone overseas.720 
When the Government became aware of the acute problems that were being 
felt by industry and other vital services due to the unrestricted enlistment of skilled 
manpower, the measures implemented in mitigation had a serious impact on both the 
methods and continuity of training for many infantry battalions. In particular, ‘the 
value of training in trench attacks was minimal’ for New Army formations. 
Moreover, due to the demand for troops at the front, the training period was reduced 
from 14 to 12 weeks, limiting further the time left to season recruits before their 
arrival in France.721 
While Robertson was reorganising the staff at GHQ, French turned to Haig for 
advice to address the immediate training and seasoning problems of the New Armies. 
Haig recommended that the Regular divisions in France should be reconstituted to 
combine ‘two seasoned Brigades with one new Brigade’.722 This proposal was put 
forward to Asquith and approved. However, Kitchener was furious that French had 
approached the Prime Minister directly, and refused to implement the plan because 
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he claimed, ‘such a use of the New Army would ruin it’.723 This failure to adopt 
Haig’s recommendation to bolster training and compensate to some extent for the 
lack of battle experience cost the New Armies many lives.724  
Reinforcements arriving from the TF at home, suffered similar problems to 
those of the New Armies. While DMT, Haig had prepared detailed plans for the 
training of the TF in which he stipulated that all ranks should undergo six months of 
post-embodiment training prior to operational deployment. After the controversial 
question of overseas deployment had been settled, training did proceed, but not 
according to Haig’s plan.  
Due to the acute shortage of New Army instructors, many of the regular 
adjutants and platoon sergeants responsible for TF training were withdrawn shortly 
after embodiment.725 Equipment was in short supply because it had been diverted to 
the New Armies. Many of the TF divisions were equipped with obsolete 15 pdr. guns 
or worn out 4.5” howitzers.726 In an attempt to compensate for these problems, 
training methods emphasised the make-believe ‘conceptual’ component of fighting 
power.727 Furthermore, newly commissioned junior officers responsible for training 
‘struggled to impart to their platoons the knowledge gleaned from the pages of a 
manual the night before’.728 In addition to all of their other frustrations including the 
inclement weather, shortages of kit, clothing and ammunition, the officers and men 
had to familiarise themselves with the new four, rather than the old eight company 
battalion organization.729 To compound these problems, the urgent need for 
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reinforcements at the front meant that some units like the 14th London (London 
Scottish) Regiment were deployed to France a mere six weeks after embodiment.730 It 
is not surprising that on disembarkation in France, French observed that there are 
‘great differences in the comparative standards of various battalions’.731  
There was another organizational factor that served to undermine the training 
effort throughout the war. While brigades and battalions assigned to divisions were 
permanent fixtures, divisions were rotated through army corps, and army corps 
through armies. This ‘roulement’ made it extremely difficult in practice to establish 
uniform standards of training. The Canadian Corps was the exception, with a fixed 
constitution of four Canadian divisions which invariably fought together. Lieut.-Gen. 
John Monash observed ‘it is impossible to overvalue the advantages which accrued 
to the Canadian troops from this close and constant association…’.732 This problem 
was exacerbated by the continual evolution of both German and French tactics, and 
the British responses to them. Incidentally, the Australians expanded their divisions 
along lines proposed by Haig, and this measure ultimately resulted in a higher state 
of training efficiency.733 
During the course of 1915, Robertson’s vision for training started to become a 
reality. On disembarkation in France, typically at the ports of Le Havre, Harfleur, 
Rouen, Boulogne and Calais, troops were transferred to massive nearby training 
camps.734 These establishments included Etaples, infamously known for its ‘bullring’ 
and a great wilderness of tents and buildings that stretched mile on mile along the 
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dunes.735 Before proceeding to the front, soldiers underwent between two weeks to a 
month of dehumanising battle training where they ‘practised the most efficient ways 
of killing or avoiding being killed’.736 The troops then moved onto the lines of 
communication, or behind the lines at St Omer, where further acclimatization took 
place. This training included digging, wiring and musketry practice before moving 
up to the front lines. On average the process took 20 days from disembarkation to 
arrival at the front line.737 
Unlike the New Army divisions, TF formations were attached to their Regular 
counterparts with the idea that the ‘inexperienced TF junior officers and NCOs in 
particular would learn something of the tactical skills, command and leadership 
characteristics of the regulars’.738 Further training may have been deemed necessary 
by a Regular division or brigade commander before a TF formation was given its 
own section of line to hold. While this description may create the impression of an 
orderly and regulated process, it must be remembered that training in Regular 
formations was also being improvised to a variable standard and this had a ‘knock-
on’ effect on the TF troops.  
As Paddy Griffith observed, ‘an archipelago of training schools did spring up 
to bring all ranks up to the high standards demanded by modern warfare’. Also, ‘a 
very great deal of informal training actually did take place in the trenches, on the 
basis that survival itself depended upon a speedy adjustment to local conditions’.739 
At First Army, Haig urged the need for training on his commanders.740 In response, 
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divisional schools were established for the training of officers and men in specialist 
areas. For instance, the 2nd Division established a school for the offensive training of 
officers, and others for the instruction of grenades, signals, and gas and mortars. 
These schools were mobile and had permanent staffs and instructors who were 
periodically returned to their units so as not to lose touch with the practical reality.741  
Organised training took a number of different forms during the campaign 
season. Before major operations, specific exercises took place. For example, before 
the battle of Loos, all ranks of the 2nd Division were rehearsed and carefully 
instructed in their respective roles for a period of three weeks.742 When I Corps was 
taken out of the line for a period of rest, the opportunity was taken for training, 
particularly in new weaponry like rifle and hand grenades. Exercises were also 
undertaken in coordinated bomb throwing and bayonet attacks by assaulting 
parties.743 Men were also trained on the job. For example, when the Bangalore 
Torpedo was introduced, a party of men in the trenches were given the device, 
simply shown how it worked, and immediately despatched on a raid to demonstrate 
their efficiency and effectiveness in the use of the new weapon.744  
The structure and content of the training courses in 1915 was entirely 
improvised in both First and Second Army and as required by the regulations, left to 
the determination of formation or unit commanders. However, these officers did have 
access to guidance in the shape of FSR-I and other material. From about December 
1914 the regulations were augmented by a short series of pamphlets (the CDS series) 
based upon British combat experience in France. This material was prepared and 
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printed in London and distributed by the WO Central Distribution Section to BEF 
formations;745 e.g. CDS 24 Object and Conditions of Combined Offensive Action 
(June 1915).746 The CDS series also included pamphlets translated from relevant 
French documents.  
After the Battle of Loos, and with the campaign season at an end, it is clear that 
Haig saw the need to move away from the improvisation of the past and to provide 
strong advice and guidance to his senior commanders for training during the winter 
months. Hitherto, Haig had relied upon fairly regular training inspections of his 
divisions, brigades and battalions to monitor their state of training efficiency.747 On 
November 7th, Haig convened a conference at First Army HQ (Hinges), attended by 
his four corps commanders and 12 GOCs of divisions, whereupon he introduced his 
‘system of training to be followed in the coming winter’: 
I pointed out that the Division is our real Battle Unit. That 
therefore the training must be under the personal guidance of 
GOCs Divisions so that they may be able to inspire the Unit 
with their own personal energy and fighting spirit. The main 
role of Commanders of Corps, and myself is to assist and 
guide the instruction. At the same time certain instruction 
must be given in a Corps School e.g. Signalling (because it is 
a Corps organization) and in the Army School e.g. use of 
mortars, smoke, gas etc. Once detachments are trained, it then 
devolves on GOC Divisions to train the Divisions in their 
use. I said that in my opinion the training in Divisions should 
fall into two parts: 
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1. Individual Training. 
2. Combined. 
and I gave an outline of a syllabus for the various “schools” 
to follow.  
Haig also impressed upon his commanders the importance of keeping their men fit 
and well in readiness for a spring offensive. He emphasised that: 
 There must be no policy of “live and let live”. We must be 
continually active and kill as many Germans as possible. It 
most vitally important for our ultimate success that every 
individual become (sic) imbued now with the offensive spirit.748 
Unfortunately, while the syllabus that Haig mentions does not appear to have 
survived, there is not anything particularly new in his training system or in his 
characteristic attitudes to his troops and the enemy. However, this conference does 
show that Haig recognised that improvised methods of training could no longer be 
relied upon, and that it was a vital necessity to impose a common training policy on 
his army.   
1916: Training Development 
On taking command of the BEF in December 1915, Haig continued to grip the 
question of training. He made Butler, his sub-CGS, who was charged with the BEF’s 
training and training schools.749 Hitherto, GHQ had been slow to take the lead in 
these respects.750 To ensure that the BEF’s three armies worked along similar lines, 
Haig quickly arranged meetings with Sir Herbert Plumer (GOC) and his CGS at 
Second Army HQ, and Allenby (GOC) at Third Army HQ. He pressed both men to 
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adopt the same training system he had laid down at First Army.751 At Haig’s first 
weekly Army Commander’s Conference on January 8th 1916, he instructed his 
subordinates to establish training schools at army, corps and divisional levels. In 
addition, Haig emphasised that uniformity of staff work practices was necessary for 
all armies. To this end, he ordered that ‘the principles laid down in FSR-II must not 
be departed from’.752 Judging by the minutes of successive Army Commanders’ 
meetings, it is apparent that Haig used these occasions as a forum to update, monitor 
and coordinate training.753 Haig also negotiated with Joffre for the use of training 
grounds where large scale combined arms exercises with two or three divisions could 
be practised.754 To bolster the recruitment of instructors by using good and 
experienced officers from battalions, as an inducement, Haig changed the regulations 
to allow higher rank and pay to be put on offer. He also made the necessary provision 
to enable officers to return to their units without loss of seniority.755 
In parallel with these initiatives Haig authorised the publication of the S.S. 
series of doctrinal pamphlets which superseded the CDS series.756 These documents 
were prepared by either GHQ or the relevant specialist technical service. The former 
captured the latest tactical lessons as they emerged from battlefield experience; the 
latter addressed the deployment of new technologies.757 These pamphlets were used 
to keep commanders at all levels abreast of the latest developments, thereby helping 
them to unify training methods and standards. Where relevant, the content was linked 
to FSR-I. Haig also used his Army Commanders’ meetings as a vehicle to ensure that 
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S.S. doctrine and training methods was being disseminated down to regimental 
officers.758 To reassure himself that his training instructions were being followed 
Haig made multiple inspections of formations and units during 1916.759 This extended 
to platoons and sections where Haig was ‘anxious to show the importance [he] 
attached to elementary training by personally inspecting troops engaged in it’.760  
 The proliferation of schools catering for the myriad specialist training needs 
for all ranks and specialisations continued to develop at GHQ and within the 
frontline formations. However, there is some suggestion that this growth was 
piecemeal and reactive. Following an inspection at 29th Division HQ, commanded by 
Maj.-Gen. Beauvoir De Lisle, Haig records: ‘he is short of some good Battalion 
commanders for training. He recently started a Divisional School [May 1916]. Other 
Divisions have had them going since November last’.761 De Lisle had some excuse as 
the 29th Division had only recently arrived in France from Egypt. Nonetheless, he 
had taken practical steps to standardise the training of its battalions and lower units. 
For example, the 29th Division had published Notes On Minor Tactics Compiled 
From Lectures To Company Officers.762 This pamphlet dealt with basic training for 
individuals, sections, platoons, companies and combined formations. Although this 
tract is undated, judging by the fact that no reference was made to the new platoon 
organization introduced by Haig in early 1917, it is likely to have been published in 
1916, perhaps coinciding with the opening of the new divisional school.763  
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While training was a high priority for Haig his expectations of what could be 
achieved were realistic: 
The mere provision and preliminary training of large numbers 
of recruits does not make an army. The training must be 
completed. Higher formations must be trained, so that several 
arms can work in combination. Officers must be trained so that 
in the emergencies which occur every moment in every fight, 
they will instantly act correctly. All this requires time. 
Although the commanders of our higher formations are men of 
experience and can be relied on to perfect the training of their 
troops, they cannot do so in a day.764 
1917: Training Management 
During the winter of 1916-17, Haig had time to reflect on the current standard 
of training and future requirements of his forces in the light of the Somme campaign. 
It was apparent to him that the standards, uniformity and resourcing applied to 
training were still inadequate.765 Haig was also aware that the quality of recruits at 
home was deteriorating with the introduction of conscription. This had obvious 
implications for the duration and thoroughness of training in France.766 Moreover, 
Haig recorded a meeting just before Christmas with Butler who told him that he ‘felt 
anxious least [sic] he was not pulling his weight’. Haig retorted that he was afraid 
Butler was overworking himself.767 While Butler may have been angling for a front 
line command, which Haig rewarded him with later, the exchange indicates that at 
the very least, he was under resourced for the task at hand.  
A report prepared for Haig summarising the state of training schools in 
England and in France, at GHQ, army, corps and divisional levels indicated that 
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some progress had been made.768 The document shows a wide variety of training 
needs were being addressed. However, the network of training establishments was 
not evenly distributed across the BEF, nor was the capacity commensurate with the 
burgeoning needs of the five armies. It is also clear that while Butler may have had a 
coherent plan, although the logic is difficult to divine from the report, the 
implementation remained piecemeal. GHQ had both a senior and junior staff schools 
at Hesdin. The former provided a six week course for senior appointments in the 
three branches of the staff (GS, AA and QMG), with a capacity of only 20 officers. 
While the latter dealt with the same specialities, for the same duration, with a 
capacity of only 50 officers. GHQ also had schools for machine guns, aerial gunnery, 
a cadet school for temporary officers and probationers (six week courses with 620 
places), and flash observation (30 places) and wireless schools (10 places). All of the 
armies, with the exception of the newly formed Fifth Army, had established schools 
for infantry, artillery, trench mortar, and sniping. Signalling schools were located 
either at army level or at corps or division. Musketry and bombing training were 
conducted under army, corps or divisional schemes, while anti-gas schools were sited 
with divisions. Unsurprisingly, every corps had a school for mounted troops. Finally, 
on the lines of communication, there were two large base training camps at Etaples 
and others at Calais, Le Havre and Rouen.  
In sum, Haig was still dissatisfied with the general standard of troop training 
and the patchwork of schools. This prompted him to establish the new dedicated TB 
at GHQ ‘for the specific purpose of the supervision of training’.769 As discussed, Haig 
placed Solly-Flood in charge, supported by a GSO2 and a GSO3, and reporting to 
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Butler who had overall responsibility for SD under the CGS.770 It is ‘clear that Solly-
Flood was instructed to enforce uniformity of training throughout the BEF’.771 His 
narrow object was ‘to co-ordinate policy and systems, and to introduce uniformity of 
doctrine’.772 This initiative promised ‘a significant step towards improving the 
training effort in the BEF’.773  
Solly-Flood immediately made his presence felt. Within weeks he had gained 
Haig’s approval to establish a network of GSO1s (Training) and GSO2s (Training) 
within each army and corps respectively. At army level the GSO1 (Training) assisted 
by a GSO3 was responsible for coordination between the TB and the commandants, 
superintendents and advisors of the network of army schools and training camps. The 
GSO2 (Training) had the same responsibility at corps level, helping to facilitate 
training in the fighting formations.774 This had the practical effect of increasing the 
resources of the TB to an estimated 31 staff officers, ‘making the job of enforcing 
uniformity of training much more feasible’.775 Although Haig’s original policy of 
devolving responsibility for training down to formation and unit commanders was 
strictly observed.  
Solly-Flood overhauled and rationalised the entire school system. A distinction 
was made between permanent schools and camps, and temporary classes of 
instruction. The former, whose primary purpose was the training of instructors, were 
located at GHQ, army and corps and supported by an approved establishment. The 
latter were organised by divisions and brigades for the purpose of training personnel 
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using instructors obtained as necessary from the schools of the higher formations. 
These instruction classes extended down to companies, platoons and sections and 
were conducted when the fighting unit was out of the front line, in support, or in 
reserve.776 Inevitably, there was some overlap between these two distinct classes of 
instruction. For example, army infantry schools trained both instructors, providing in 
this case a refresher course, and personnel who were battalion COs, company 
commanders, company-sergeants-major and sergeants. Corps infantry schools only 
trained personnel comprising platoon commanders including NCOs.777 Further, the 
new policy provided rules which catered for the movement and rotation of armies 
and corps, and within them. 
Apart from individual training, which was considered ‘the keynote of 
efficiency’, collective training took place at company, battalion and brigade level. 
This gave the infantry the opportunity to practise all-arms cooperation with the other 
services including cavalry, artillery, tanks, engineers and the RFC.778  
Given the short time and the limited resources available to Solly-Flood at 
GHQ, the new scheme was remarkably comprehensive, and even at home his 
presence had the right effect. Brig.-Gen. R.J. Kentish, Commandant of the Senior 
Officers’ School at Aldershot noted ‘I think Solly-Flood is to be congratulated on 
having achieved in six weeks what his predecessor [Percival] ought to have achieved 
nearly two years ago’.779  
In June 1917, the TB published, S.S.152 Instructions for the Training of the 
British Armies in France in provisional form. This pamphlet formalised the BEF’s 
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training policy, organization, and system. It was written by Solly-Flood although 
Haig’s influence is apparent. The policy was based on the same principles that Haig 
espoused in November 1915 to his commanders at First Army, and framed in 
virtually identical language; e.g. ‘every Commander should inspire his unit with his 
“personal energy and fighting spirit”’.780 The organization of GHQ, army and corps 
schools was harmonised, their respective roles were clearly defined, and the number 
of students per course was quantified. The training systems were elaborated by 
curricula for each class of school, supported by syllabuses for every course utilising 
the relevant S.S. series of doctrinal and training pamphlets. Refresher courses were 
advised to ensure instructors kept up with the latest developments. A degree of 
inspection was also introduced. Visits were made to schools by TB staff and 
feedback was received from the GSOs (Training) attached to armies and corps. It 
was Haig’s continued hope that this action would bring the requisite organization to 
the BEF’s training scheme, capitalising on previous developments and with the aim 
of achieving high and consistent standards, combined with uniform methods.  
While Haig must be credited with facilitating this scheme’s high ambition, like 
Robertson, he did not provide adequate resources at GHQ to support its effective 
implementation. In addition, the scheme could be criticised for not going far enough 
in at least two ways. First, no attempt was made to coordinate training policy at home 
with that in France. Secondly, the new organization lacked an independent inspection 
regime to ensure that Haig’s desire for a high and uniform standard of training was 
enforced throughout the BEF. Both of these omissions had been recognised by 
Kentish in February, 1917. Unfortunately, instead of telling Haig, in an exchange of 
letters he told his friend Maxse soon after it became known that the latter was being 
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promoted to take command of XVIII Corps. It is evident from this exchange that 
Kentish was hoping for Maxse’s patronage to help him secure a new post he 
harboured worthwhile ambitions for, namely an ‘Inspector of Schools’ in France.781  
On October 15th 1917, Haig rewarded Solly-Flood for his work at GHQ by 
promoting him to command the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division. In his place Haig 
appointed Brig.-Gen. Sir Charles Bonham-Carter.782 It appears that the business of the 
TB continued as usual except that the staff under Bonham-Carter was increased to 
five officers. This allowed him to take on inspection duties to a greater degree, as he 
described in his autobiography:  
Though frequently engaged in special tasks, the normal work 
of myself and my staff continued. I visited continually 
Schools of Instruction, Base Depots where reinforcements 
were held and training carried out, Convalescent Camps 
where suitable training was given directly [to] patients [who] 
had recovered sufficiently, and Staff Officers in charge of 
training and their Commanders, with the object of ensuring 
that similar principles and methods of training should be 
adopted throughout the Army.783 
It is apparent that Bonham-Carter, still lacked the resources that would have enabled 
him to implement a broadly based inspection regime with front line formations and 
units designed to ensure adequate uniformity and standards of training in the BEF.  
1918: Training Inspection 
On March 14th 1918, following GHQ’s reorganization prompted by political 
pressure arising from the British reversal at Cambrai, Haig appointed Maj.-Gen. G.P. 
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BHCT 9/2, CAC. (cited from Geddes, "Solly-Flood, GHQ, and Tactical Training in the BEF,  
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Dawnay to take charge of the SDB with its responsibility for the TB. The capacity of 
the TB was increased by reorganising it into three dedicated sub-sections (TI) 
Publications, staffed by a GSO1, GSO2 and a GSO3; (T2) General Training Schools, 
supported by two GSO2s; and an Educational Training Unit staffed by a GSO2.784 
Dawnay reported directly to the new CGS Lieut.-Gen. Sir Herbert Lawrence, while 
Butler was promoted by Haig to command III Corps. Bonham-Carter was later 
replaced by a lower ranking officer, Col. D.J. Bernard. 
During the heavy fighting that had taken place during the German offensive, it 
was found that ‘junior officers owing to their inexperience and the want of tactical 
training [were] usually lacking in initiative and unable to deal with the constantly 
changing situations of mobile warfare’.785 As a consequence, on May 22nd 1918, 
Bonham-Carter advised the five army commanders that consideration was being 
given to revise the training policy at army and corps infantry schools. In particular, it 
was proposed that training would be targeted at company and platoon commanders 
with the object of improving initiative and raising tactical standards. This approach 
reflected Haig’s opinion of the central importance of platoon commanders in modern 
warfare, (see p. 305) and was in sharp contrast to the existing courses that had been 
designed to give officers a general training in their duties.786 A week later, at an army 
commanders’ conference, these proposals were approved after a little refinement.787  
Shortly before Bonham-Carter was transferred from the TB, he prepared a 
valedictory report on the state of the BEF’s training in France.788 This illuminating 
document revealed that robust schemes were in place for the training of individuals 
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(other ranks, NCOs, junior officers and commanding officers), complete units and 
formations, and the GS. A robust network of GHQ, army and corps schools for 
instructor training, primarily junior officers and NCO’s, had been established where 
standardised syllabuses were adopted to drive uniformity. Similar schools were used 
for the artillery. To address specialised tasks, schools had also been established under 
army control for musketry, scouting, observation and sniping, signalling and anti-
gas. Instruction for Lewis guns, bombing and light trench mortars was carried out at 
corps schools. For GSOs, both ‘probationary courses’ and advanced GS courses had 
been instituted. Training for commanding officer took place at conferences held at 
army schools and at the Senior Officers’ School at Aldershot.  
Despite this solid foundation, the standard and uniformity of training remained 
a most difficult challenge for Haig, his army and corps commanders. Reinforcements 
were still arriving in France with only 14 weeks basic training. It was found that 
these men rapidly lost their efficiency without continued elementary practice within 
platoons and companies. For the most part this was not possible because the men 
were continuously employed in the trenches as a consequence of manpower 
shortages and the comparative length of the British line.  
This situation ‘seriously shortened the time available for the training of units 
and battalions’ as it was reckoned that it took at least six weeks of continuous 
training in a back area to bring a division to a thorough state of efficiency.789 During 
the winter of 1917-18 only half of British divisions went into reserve for some period 
in a back area. However, only one division, the 55th, which had to be entirely 
reformed after Cambrai was able to train for the designated six week period. The 
problem was compounded by a lack of adequate training grounds. This constriction 
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arose primarily because the French were understandably anxious to prevent crop 
destruction and they issued the necessary authorizations only with the greatest 
reluctance. In one case, permission was granted, then later refused, only for the 
ground in question to be captured by the Germans!790  
On June 16th 1918, Haig finally addressed the open question of inspection. He 
wrote to the WO advising that as ‘a matter of the highest urgency’ it was necessary 
‘to improve the efficiency of training throughout the Armies in France’. To this end, 
Haig told the WO that he intended to appoint an IGT, with the rank of Lieut.-Gen., 
who would be attached to his staff at GHQ. He rationalised that this officer would be 
provided with the resources necessary to carry out his duties. The manpower was to 
include three Assistant Inspectors with the rank of Brig.-Gen., one Deputy Inspector 
(Artillery), and the necessary support staff. Haig explained that while the IGT would 
have no executive functions, he would be required report to him through the GS on 
the efficiency of formations, units and training establishments in France. Moreover, 
the IGT would be empowered to make impromptu inspections at will with the 
provision of only 24 hours’ notice. In addition, the new IT would be charged with 
assisting field commanders on all training matters and with ensuring that training 
throughout the BEF complied with the FSR, official training manuals and S.S. 
doctrine. Moreover, the IT would be given rights of inspection over all training 
establishments in France and would also become responsible through the WO for 
coordinating the work of these schools with those at home. Curiously, given that the 
TB was to continue in operation at GHQ, Haig also told the WO that IT was going to 
be assigned the task of advising and assisting in the preparation and revision of 
training publications and syllabuses for issue by the GS at GHQ. Haig possibly 
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imagined there would be close cooperation between the two bodies but, as will be 
seen, this did not turn out to be the case.791  
Alistair Geddes argues that the idea for the IT came from Dawnay.792 However, 
this is unlikely.793 It will be recalled that in 1915 Haig sent Maxse home before he 
was pushed by Lomax, his superior. Now in command of XVIII Corps, Maxse began 
to show the same signs of irresolution that he had done under Lomax. Horne, 
Maxse’s First Army commander, personally warned him at a meeting that he would 
be immediately relieved of his command if he continued in this vein; apparently 
‘Maxse’s tone at once changed!’ When Horne told Haig about this incident he was 
advised ‘not to judge Maxse too quickly’. However, Haig also told Horne that he 
would remove Maxse if he continued to make difficulties.794 A little over a month 
later Haig had dinner with Maxse and spoke to him about the post of IGT.795 Five 
days after this meeting Haig refers to Maxse as his ‘Inspector of Training’.796 On the 
July 3rd Maxse’s appointment was officially confirmed.797 The new IT worked 
alongside the TB until the end of the war.798 
On July 5th, Haig briefed the commanders of his five armies, the cavalry, the 
tank corps and the RAF on the role of the new IGT. Haig prefaced his introduction 
by a brief homily outlining his general philosophy in respect to moral, its value, and 
also his method of training. The relevant parts of his personal notes are instructive:  
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Success in war depends more on moral than on physical 
qualities. No amount of skill can make up for a lack of 
courage, energy or determination. But without careful 
preparation and skilful direction, high moral qualities may 
not avail:  
First objective: develop the necessary moral qualities. 
Next: Organization and discipline. (Make them qualities to be 
added and used when required). 
Third: Skill in applying the power thus conferred on the 
troops. 
Fundamental principles of war are simple: application of 
them is difficult and cannot be made subject to rules. Study 
and practice. 
Haig went on to explain that the IGT’s ‘preliminary inspections [must] be devoted 
especially to two points as regards the infantry, namely, (i) the organization of 
subordinate fighting units; (ii) the training of subordinate fighting units’. Haig 
concluded by imploring his army commanders ‘to do everything possible to assist the 
Inspector General’.799 
Maxse, who was still smarting from rumours that he had been ‘degummed’ as 
XVIII Corps commander, set about establishing his new post with relish.800 It appears 
that Haig gave him considerable latitude. He first made himself comfortable in a 
château near Crécy, away from the observing eyes of GHQ. He appointed Maj.-Gen. 
H.C.C. Uniacke to supervise artillery training, and Brig.-Gens. Dugan, Marshall and 
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Guggisberg to deal with the infantry and other training aspects. He retained the 
services of Brig.-Gen. Tom Holland as his CS.801 A personal letter that Maxse wrote 
to Henry Wilson two days after the latter’s appointment as CIGS gives some 
indication of his immediate priorities. Maxse complained about his £500 pay 
reduction and that of his brigadiers by £300 each. Further, to dignify his new post he 
requested his own promotion to substantive Lieut.-Gen. and the promotion of his 
Brig.-Gens. to Maj.-Gens. He concluded without much deference: 
I trust the whole thing can be announced in one gazette, so as 
to start everyone in France with the notion that TRAINING is 
it for 1919.802  
Possibly because of Maxse’s impertinent tone, the new CIGS did not accede to  
his requests.803 
On July 22nd, Maxse convened a conference of his senior staff at his HQ. At 
this meeting he removed any doubts about the role of the IT and presented his short-
term action plan. In essence, Maxse repeated the advice set out by Haig to the WO, 
noting that: 
1. In France, we represent the C.-in-C., and are out to 
help the Commanders to train for battle. Our job is 
to interpret GHQ’s doctrine, as regards training, and 
to inculcate uniformity in the several Armies in 
France.  
2. In England we make representations, either to the 
WO or C.-in-C., Home Forces, regarding methods 
which are likely to expand battle training.804  
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In accordance with Haig’s briefing to his army commanders, Maxse explained that 
the training of platoons was his first and most important priority, observing that ‘at 
present most platoons are untrained and their commanders cannot train them without 
assistance’. Maxse advised that August and September would be devoted to platoon 
training in and out of the trenches, using his “Brown Book,” as the guide. This is a 
primer that he wrote and first issued when in command of 18th Division and then 
later again at XVIII Corps.805 Maxse said that at the beginning of October, he planned 
to turn his IT’s attention to battalion, brigade and divisional training. However, while 
this declaration was Maxse’s public statement of intent, seemingly he harboured far 
greater ambitions. 
Before proceeding, it will be instructive to briefly examine what Dawnay at 
GHQ, with his responsibility for the TB, believed what the IGT’s role was. In a letter 
to Montgomery-Massingberd at Fourth Army, Dawnay lamented ‘fearful tussle today 
on the schools question, trying to get some order upon the chaos of divergent views’. 
He closes with the following observation: 
There is one point I have not mentioned by the way, and that 
is that there is no idea of IGT running the schools. IGT is an 
inspector and general helper, but he has no executive or 
administrative function whatever and he acts only through the 
Training Branch here. This will be the same in regard to 
schools. Nor may I add, has the IGT ever had anything to do 
with our tactical notes and so on, which are entirely the job of 
the GS here.806  
It is clear that Dawnay’s conception of the IGT was in accord with the narrow 
traditional role of an Inspector-General who could inspect and report on the training 
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efficiency of troops, but had no executive authority other than within his own 
organization.807  
Judging by the contents of a paper that Maxse wrote on ‘elementary military 
education’ it is evident that he had other and bigger ideas. The document summarised 
his proposals for the entire reorganization of courses of instruction within 
formations, units and training schools in both England and France, based on a highly 
critical assessment of the status quo. His stated aim was to inculcate in officers and 
NCOs ‘a definite military mind instead of the vague one so often noticed’. Maxse 
makes no mention of inspection duties. The paper concludes: 
In the foregoing paragraphs only the principles upon which it 
is proposed to reorganise our instructional machinery have 
been indicated. Detailed proposals for carrying out these 
principles are in the process of formulation and will be 
submitted if the principles are adopted. 808  
 Clearly, Maxse and Dawnay were at odds over the duties of the IGT and there 
was some confusion in respect to the functions of the TB and the IT. Maxse also 
appears to have ignored the work that Bonham-Carter did in May, which was to 
focus subordinate commander training on the minor tactics of open warfare. Haig 
was partly if not wholly to blame for this situation because in his earlier submission 
to the WO there was a lack of clarity and some overlap between the roles of the two 
bodies. While there may have been much merit in Maxse’s proposals, his vision for 
his IT did not include working in close cooperation with the TB. Obviously this was 
highly desirable to promote unity-of-physical-effort.  
During late July and August, Maxse held a series of what he called ‘Inspector 
General’s Conferences’ at which he briefed corps and divisional commanders on the 
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role of his new IT. His explanation gave the IT wide latitude. He announced: ‘we 
interpret GHQ doctrine as regards training and inculcate uniformity across the British 
Forces. We propose to be practical men and not clerks’. With no intended irony, 
Maxse promised his audiences: ‘starting now with intensive inspections, it will take 
until October to make our infantry organization fool-proof’. He advised that platoon 
organization was to be the focus of attention at these inspections. According to 
Maxse, in conformity with the standing regulations, each battalion had to be 
organised into 16 platoons ‘no more no less’; ‘variations [were] fatal to efficiency’. 
On closing, Maxse reassured the senior commanders present that he wanted them to 
consider his inspectors as friends and not to look upon them with suspicion.809 As a 
token of his esteem, he gave his colleagues copies of his Hints on Training.  
In August, Maxse also sent out the first three of what became a series of 14 
training leaflets to army, corps and divisional H.Qs.810 The quantities issued were as 
follows: 
Sample of a Days Training for a Company  39,426 
Program of Training for a Battalion out  20,443 
of the Line for Ten days 
Battalion Commander’s Conference  15,110 
Towards the end of October, a fourth leaflet was issued, Attack Formations for Small 
Units in a quantity of 41,496 copies.  
None of the first three leaflets dealt specifically with Maxse’s stated priority of 
platoon training. The fourth leaflet, which was published too late to have any 
material impact on operations, contained six platoon drills based upon various 
                                                 




combinations of square or diamond formations incorporating two Lewis guns. No 
attempt was made to tie the exercises into the doctrine of S.S.143. 
During September, Maxse made an inspection tour of training schools in 
England. On September 20th, he addressed a meeting at the WO where he rehearsed 
the points he made at his IGT’s conferences in France. Maxse re-emphasised that his 
main concern was platoon organization, where any fewer than 16 platoons in a 
battalion was a ‘glaring defect’. He also congratulated himself on issuing 35,000 
copies of his ‘Brown Book’ in France and with a little exaggeration told his audience 
he had circulated six types of training leaflet. Maxse closed by offering four points 
on platoon training. He emphasised that officers and cadets had to be given practice 
every day in the handling of men; the officers and cadets had to be told that they 
must be the only teachers of their platoons; and these men had to be instructed how 
to teach without being ‘mere parrots’; and finally sections should be trained as fire 
units with practice in “blob” formations on 200 yard frontages.811 Maxse and his team 
then inspected Special Reserve and Territorial Reserve brigades, and schools of 
instruction in England.  
On Maxse’s return to France in October, he prepared a tour report for Haig and 
the WO. In this document he concluded that ‘much had been accomplished in 
England. Certain units have reached a high standard of training. Individual training 
had been standardised and a foundation exist[ed] for all to build upon’. He cautioned 
that ‘the spirit is lacking in some units, and the human touch in a few others’.812  
So what is to be made of the performance of the IT during the closing stages of 
the war? Although Maxse claimed to be following the priorities established by Haig, 
the reality was somewhat different. In July, Maxse’s first concern was to dignify his 
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office with the appropriate pay and rank for himself and his close colleagues. Next, 
he was determined to build awareness for the IT by holding conferences with army 
and corps commanders which, useful in itself, smacks of further self-aggrandisement. 
During August, it is not apparent from the records the extent to which inspections of 
subordinate units took place and what the results were. What is known is that three 
training pamphlets were produced, although useful in themselves the content did 
elaborate upon S.S.143 or specifically address the question of platoon training as 
Haig and Dawnay had expected. During September, Maxse and his entourage toured 
training brigades and schools in England and Scotland. He must have known this 
would have no immediate impact on the fighting efficiency of subordinate units in 
France. On Maxse’s his return to the BEF in October, one of the first things he did 
was convene a conference with Monash and the senior commanders of the Australian 
Corps. Maxse then spent 10 days with the Antipodeans where he and his staff visited 
each of the five divisions in turn. Why Maxse singled out what was plausibly one of 
the most operationally effective formations in the BEF for special attention is not 
recorded. In a report to GHQ dated November 6th, it appears that all Maxse had to 
show for these efforts was agreement by the Australians that battalion organization 
as laid down in the regulations (O.B./1919) was ‘sound and should be adhered to as 
far as possible’.813  
In response to the distribution of training leaflets and Maxse’s visits and 
inspections, he did receive a polite, if not a ringing endorsement of the IT’s efforts to 
establish and improve uniform standards of training. Lieut.-Gen. Cameron Shute 
(GOC,V Corps) wrote effusively ‘you may rely upon me to carry out your principles 
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entirely’.814 Lieut.-Gen. Charles Fergusson (GOC, XVII Corps) was less enthusiastic; 
‘of course, the moment is not very propitious for training propaganda as the 
immediate question is the amount of M.G. fire coming from the quarry…’.815 Gen. 
Henry Horne (GOC, First Army) gave a muted response: ‘I think the leaflets are 
likely to prove most useful and will help inexperienced commanders along the easier 
path towards efficient training’.816 Lieut.-Gen. Alexander Godley (GOC, XXII Corps) 
was not enthused: 
 I have been so busy Hun hunting, and still are, (sic) that I 
have not really had time to study your leaflets properly, 
but…they seem to me excellent. I have never seen anybody 
of your Training Staff yet, and I am sure it would do them a 
lot of good to come up here and see all the lessons we have 
learned during the last month.817  
While reading these letters must have been a salutary experience for Maxse, 
they did point to the wider challenges and resistance that Haig faced in obtaining 
unity-of-physical-effort. Training was not the first top priority for a number of 
commanding officers. It appears the presumption was prevalent that while training 
imposed from the top down may have been useful for inexperienced commanders, 
experienced officers could rely on their own methods. There are also signs of an 
innate chauvinism in the front line formations that resisted the benefits of shared 
experience emanating from GHQ or indeed from the IT.  
Moreover, it is difficult not to conclude that Maxse was more concerned with 
empire building to support his post war future rather than improving the efficiency of 
underperforming subordinate units, particularly at platoon level. However, this is not 
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a settled opinion; Brian Bond, for one, disagreed. In reference to the tactics adopted 
by the Germans during their spring offensive, Bond observed ‘what is not generally 
appreciated…is the speed with which the Allies learned their lesson. This was chiefly 
due to Haig’s newly appointed Inspector General of Training, General Sir Ivor 
Maxse…’818 By contrast, John Baynes, who wrote a generally flattering biography of 
Maxse posited ‘extensive claims for [the IT’s] influence on the conduct of operations 
are unrealistic’.819 Brig.-Gen. J.L. Jack, of the 28th Infantry Brigade, who attended one 
of Maxse’s conferences was a little more circumspect suggesting that he delivered ‘a 
very sound address and appear anxious to help’, before concluding that his ideas 
were entirely sensible in theory but would be difficult to implement in practice 
because ‘few of the present platoon commanders are professionally fit to instruct 
their men, and we prefer to educate them first, so that they will teach correctly and 
not spread false doctrines among their subordinates’.820 
Rationale for Haig’s Belated Response to the Training Crisis 
When Haig took command of the BEF in December 1915, he was fully aware 
that the training efficiency across his three armies was inadequate and the general 
standard continued to deteriorate with the arrival of New Army, TF formations and 
other reinforcements. This begs the question as to why he did not immediately create 
and properly resource the necessary training and inspection organization to meet 
these challenges. For example, Haig could have established the TB in January 1916, 
instead of a year later. Failing this, from the outset the branch should have been 
adequately resourced to meet the new challenges ahead. The mandate for a training 
inspection regime could also have been introduced in 1916 rather than in 1918. 
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Given Haig’s expert credentials prior to the war in the training arena including those 
of inspection, and his first-hand knowledge and experience of working with the rapid 
influx of green troops gained while he was a corps and a army commander, there is 
no obvious or simple answer to this dilemma. However, there were a number of 
factors at work that might provide some illumination.  
First, as described above, the responsibility for both individual and unit 
training was devolved by the FSR to commanders of the fighting formations and 
units. Down to brigade level at least, these posts were held by Regular Army officers 
in all British formations including the New Armies and the TF. These officers may 
have lacked large-scale operational experience but it would be surprising if they were 
not well versed in basic training methods. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that, 
initially at least, Haig took the optimistic view that the development of a training 
organization at GHQ was not an immediate priority as the function was already in 
the reasonably capable hands of his commanders.  
The second related factor is that according to FSR-I, operational responsibility 
was devolved to the ‘man on the spot’. This may have made Haig cautious about 
imposing a top down training regime on his subordinate commanders for fear that 
this might make these officers feel less accountable for operational success, or at the 
very least, provided them with room for excuse in the event of failure. 
The third factor, well documented by Boff, was the traditional resistance in the 
British officer corps to regulation from the centre. He identified four ingredients that 
may have driven resistance to formal demands for training uniformity emanating 
from GHQ. First, by 1918 many commanders of the lower formations who were 
doing the fighting at division, brigade and battalion were ‘aggressive and self-sure’ 
men. This predisposed them to offer resistance to what they may have deemed as 
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meddling and interference from SOs remote from the battlefield at GHQ. Secondly, 
the army had a ‘long tradition of pragmatism and opposition to what were sometimes 
perceived as theoretical solutions’. It prided itself on flexibility and empirical lessons 
drawn on experience. Thirdly, similar to all large organizations there was ‘a 
continual, and unresolved tension between the centre and periphery’. Thus, GHQ’s 
attempt to establish a foundation of training best practice, which the hugely expanded 
and de-skilled army could draw upon, ‘remained a necessary but uncongenial 
expedient to many of the regular army officers’ serving at the front. Fourthly, 
resistance in the form of institutional insubordination had a long and generally 
accepted tradition in the British army. This came from its strong colonial roots where 
‘a high degree of self-reliance and improvised adaption to local circumstances’ were 
vital to survival and success.821 Thus, ad-hocism continued as a persistent 
characteristic of the British officer corps.  
Of course, Haig as a regimental officer of longstanding and having spent most 
of his time soldiering in India and Africa would have been alive to the mores of his 
fellow officers. Indeed, he was a stereotypical example of this tradition himself, as an 
officer and a gentleman. Hence, the combination of all these factors may have made 
Haig reticent to impose a training and inspection regime from GHQ that he rightly 
knew would be treated with suspicion, resentment and resistance. Thus, it appears he 
was prepared to evolve the training regime he desired gradually; and in the 
meantime, he was satisfied to settle for ‘useful anarchy’.822  
                                                 
821 Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front; The British Army and the Defeat of Germany in 
1918. p. 158. 
822 Travers, How The War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western 
Front, 1917-1918. p. 149. 
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Conclusion: Attainment of Unity-of-Physical-Effort in the BEF 
In the three years that Haig was C-in-C, he was directly responsible for the 
establishment and development of the training organization and administration 
necessary to drive unity-of-physical-effort in the BEF. Training was given a high 
priority at GHQ, but it was not supported by adequate resources until July 1918. 
Nonetheless, under the able leadership of Butler, Solly-Flood, Bonham-Carter, and 
then Guy Dawnay, the TB did develop a school system to provide instructors and 
develop specialist technical skills, supported by standardised syllabuses, teaching 
methods and course content. Training doctrine was developed as tactics evolved and 
technical innovation advanced. The TB proved that it was able to publish and rapidly 
update doctrine for offensive and defensive operations that formed the very basis of 
training. To a degree, the body was able to coordinate the training effort via the 
dedicated network of the GSOs (Training) stationed at army, corps and divisional 
HQs. The IT, the essential counter-part to the TB, was established in July 1918, 
albeit belatedly. This was a well-resourced organization and provided the opportunity 
for independent inspection in France and to closely coordinate training on both sides 
of the channel. Unfortunately, in the event, it made little impact in the remaining 
time available.  
Despite these initiatives, uniformity of high training standards and methods 
were not consistently achieved throughout the BEF by November 1918.823 In part, 
this can be attributed to the de-skilling that took place as a result of battlefield 
casualties. In addition, extensions of the British line coupled with manpower 
shortages, particularly during the winter of 1917-18, inevitably drew commanders 
away from opportunities to train.  
                                                 
823 Geddes, "Solly-Flood, GHQ, and Tactical Training in the B.E.F., 1916-1918." p. 45; Boff, "British 
Third Army, the Application of Modern War, and the Defeat of the German Army, August-
November 1918." p. 286. 
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Haig can be criticised for being slow to establish a well-resourced training and 
inspection infrastructure at GHQ, necessary to provide the vital oversight of uniform 
training efficiency and effectiveness. It might also be added, that Haig did not take 
the opportunity to put training on the agenda for the Expeditionary Force in the field 
when he was DMT in 1906, or to include training in the General Staff Manual 1910, 
when he was DSD.824 Given Haig’s great experience in matters of training gained 
throughout his pre-war army career, and his undoubted recognition of its importance, 
these oversights are surprising.  
Nevertheless, the final and fair assessment of the state of unity-of-physical-
effort in the autumn of 1918 can be left to Dawnay: 
There is no doubt whatever that our training is neither 
perfectly coordinated nor altogether evenly distributed 
throughout the armies in France.825 
Even though unity-of-physical-effort was not perfectly coordinated or altogether 
evenly distributed, the standard achieved by Haig was sufficient to attain his goal of 
driving the German army out of France in 1918. 
                                                 
824 TNA/WO/279/861, General Staff Manual. War. (Provisional.) (London: HMSO, 1911) p. 66. The 
only mention of training is in respect to the selection and training of suitable staff officers to perform 
as spies!  




6. Achieving Unity-of-Moral-Effort 
During the war the BEF’s morale never disintegrated into severe widespread 
disobedience or a ‘military strike’ like that experienced by the German and French 
armies.826 It will be argued below that as a result of Haig’s organizational and 
administrative methods, unity-of-moral-effort was sustained in the BEF for the 
duration of hostilities. This proposition finds support from evidence of the specific 
programmes that Haig implemented in the BEF with the aim of sustaining morale 
underpinned by discipline. This examination will be followed by an assessment of 
the impact that these initiatives had upon morale, and the extent to which unity-of-
moral-effort was attained. Before addressing these topics, Haig’s understanding of 
the principle will be given further consideration.  
Haig’s Understanding of Unity-of-Moral-Effort 
As discussed above, relying on the teachings of Clausewitz and other military 
thinkers, Haig’s understanding of unity-of-moral-effort is captured by his firm belief 
that the decisive factor in war was an army’s dogged determination to win, or at least 
‘press forward at all costs’.827 This required ‘moral’, a term he frequently used, and 
discipline.828 For Haig these two factors were the embodiment of unity-of-moral-
effort, characterised by ‘pluck’ and the ‘offensive spirit’. He expressed these 
sentiments at the Staff College in 1896-97, in the FSR, and in his famous ‘backs to 
                                                 
826 Strachan, "The Morale of the German Army, 1917-18." p. 386. See also Leonard V. Smith, Between 
Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I 
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
827 Field Service Regulations, Part I (Operations) p. 116. 
828 ‘Moral’ and morale, the term applied in modern usage, are for practical purposes synonymous. 




the wall’ Special Order of the Day issued on April 11th 1918.829 Haig believed that the 
‘moral’ of an army was determined by leadership, a sense of duty engendered by a 
belief in the cause, the welfare of his men, and the support of the home front, all 
underpinned by firm discipline.830 In respect to smaller formations, typically the 
regiment or battalion, Haig used the phrase esprit de corps to express its ‘moral’. On 
the parade ground, moral was made manifest by the unit’s bearing – in itself an 
inculcation of tradition, smartness, precision of movement and discipline.831 To Haig 
these characteristics provided a vital indication of the unit’s determination on the 
battlefield to press forwards at all costs.  
Haig’s interpretation of moral finds resonance with the work of modern 
historians who have tried to understand the reasons for the formidable resilience of 
British troops in the abysmal conditions of trench warfare on the Western Front.832 
Typically, three avenues of research have been pursued. These have embraced the 
psychology of the individual soldier, military institutional factors, and societal 
cohesion.833 Of particular interest are those studies that address institutional factors, 
                                                 
829NLS-Acc.3155/20, "Strategy Notes II." n.p. Field Service Regulations, Part I (Operations). See 
Chapter V11, the Battle, pp. 107-120; NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed 
Version)." Special Order of the Day, 11/04/1918. 
830 NLS-Acc.3155/17, "Cavalry Tactics." n.p. ; NLS-Acc.3155/20, "Strategy Notes II." n.p. ; ibid. n.p.; 
Douglas Haig, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, December 1915-April 1919, ed. by J.H. Boraston 
(London: J.M. Dent & Co, 1919) pp. 146-147, 357. 
831 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry 25/10/1917. 
832 Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and 
British Armies, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 2. 
833 PSYCHOLOGY: Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (London: Constable, 1945). Watson, 
Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-
1918. MILITARY INSTUTIONAL FACTORS: (Civil-Military Relations) Maj.-Gen. C.E. Callwell, 
Experiences of a Dug-Out (London: Constable & Company, 1920). (Leadership) John Baynes, 
Morale: A Study of Men and Courage; The Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle 1915 
(London: Cassell & Company Ltd, 1967). Timothy Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War: 
Discipline & Morale (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). G.D. Sheffield, Leadership 
in the Trenches: Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000). (Education) S.P. MacKenzie, Politics and Military Morale: 
Current Affairs and Citizens Education in the British Army 1914-1950 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992). (Discipline);John Peaty, "Haig and Military Discipline," in Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On, 
ed. Brian Bond and Nigel Cave (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999).; Cathryn Corns and John Hughes 
Wilson, Blindfold and Alone: British Military Executions in the Great War (London: Cassell & Co, 
2001). Oram, Military Executions during World War 1; Christopher Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell: 
New Zealanders and military Discipline in the First World War (Auckland: Hodder & Stoughton, 
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including civil-military relations, leadership, education, welfare and discipline. It is 
the management and determination of these factors that fall within the remit of a 
field army C-in-C, to a lesser or greater extent. These relatively diverse studies 
revealed a number of common threads that are relevant to this assessment.  
First, as David French observed ‘morale is a problematic concept’.834 Gerard 
Oram suggested the ‘concept of morale is vague’.835 Similarly, J.G. Fuller opined 
‘morale is an elusive subject’.836 Gary Sheffield agreed and posited that it is an 
‘imprecise term’.837 Jonathan Fennell went further and observed, ‘morale is a 
complex term that can be defined in many different ways’.838 Thus, ‘morale is a 
nebulous and difficult to define concept’.839 While offering differing interpretations 
military historians, like Haig, tended to reach back to Clausewitz and determined that 
morale was typically considered some mélange of fighting spirit, combat motivation 
and resilience.840 Modern British Army doctrine writers have agreed and posited 
limply that morale is ‘the will to fight and a confidence in succeeding’.841 
Unexpectedly, some historians whose studies have made an invaluable contribution 
have remained silent on this thorny problem.842  
                                                                                                                                          
1991). SOCIETAL COHESION: J.G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and 
Dominion Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).  
834 David French, "'Tommy is No Soldier: The Morale of the Second British Army in Normandy, June-
August 1944. ," Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (1996) p. 154. 
835 Oram, Military Executions during World War 1. p. 71. 
836 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918. p. 21. 
837 Sheffield, "Officer-man Relations: Morale and Discipline in the British Army, 1902-22." p. 63. 
838 Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) p. 8. 
839 Ibid. p. 3. 
840 Sheffield, "Officer-man Relations: Morale and Discipline in the British Army, 1902-22." pp. 63-67; 
Oram, Military Executions during World War 1. p. 72; Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, 
Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918. p. 141.; Fennell, Combat and 
Morale in the North African Campaign. p. 9. 
841 "UK Defence Doctrine (JDP 0-01)." p. 34. 
842 Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage; The Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle 
1915.; MacKenzie, Politics and Military Morale: Current Affairs and Citizens Education in the 
British Army 1914-1950. 
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Secondly, given the lack of a standard definition, it was not surprising to learn 
that the question of how to build and sustain morale appeared equally diffuse. 
However, most historians have agreed that high military morale was determined by 
an amalgam of competent leadership, belief in the cause, regimental loyalty, a sense 
of duty, officer – other rank relationships, the sound administration of welfare, and 
strong discipline.843 Moreover, ‘primary group cohesion was a major factor in 
convincing troops to remain on the battlefield’. When cohesion ‘crumbled because of 
heavy casualties, morale suffered accordingly’.844  
Thirdly, it followed that without a commonly agreed definition ‘the problem of 
how to “measure” morale [has been] a major hurdle for historians’.845 This also 
applied to Haig.846 There were no formal qualitative or quantitative methods, 
statistical or otherwise, developed to measure troop morale in the BEF. This had to 
wait until the Second World War.847 Haig was forced to rely on his own observation 
and the intuition of his commanders in an attempt to gain a ‘birds eye view’ of the 
morale of his officers and men. This approach has rarely opened a “window into the 
minds and feelings of the troops”.848 Haig gleaned some insight from postal 
censorship reports compiled by the AG branch. However, as an indicator of general 
troop morale, these reports were not reliable because the findings were coloured by 
the views of the individual complier; subjects considered indicative of morale were 
                                                 
843 Oram, Military Executions during World War 1. pp. 77-78; Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and 
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mentioned in only a small number of letters; and the absence of topics that might 
indicate a state of poor morale may have been suppressed for fear of upsetting the 
correspondent.849 Courts martial statistics have also been used by military historians 
to provide insights into the state of the BEF’s morale. However this method has its 
weaknesses too. Only a small proportion of all crime led to a court martials; the 
correlation between crime and morale has not been proven; and the time lag in the 
trial procedure and publication of these statistics may have introduced bias in the 
results at specific moments in time.850  
Fourthly, unsurprisingly a common complaint made by historians was the 
general lack of primary source material to support studies of the BEF’s morale and 
discipline.851 There are only a few extant copies of postal censorship reports. Two 
copies of which have been retained by Haig in his war diary; and a small number of 
Third Army censorship reports have been located in the papers of Capt. M. Hardie at 
the IWM.852 This lack of evidence has made the process of interpreting the continuing 
state of morale and discipline within the BEF more hazardous than it might have 
been. It is a problem that has also hampered other historians. 853 Thus, John Baynes 
studied one battalion during one battle and proceeded to draw broad conclusions 
embracing the entire BEF for the duration of the war. Alexander Watson relied on 
100 letters and diaries for a comparative study of the British and German Armies. 
Gary Sheffield based his research on the published and unpublished writings of 
junior officers, NCOs and private soldiers, which he acknowledged was less than 
                                                 
849 Ibid. p.2 
850 Ibid. p.3. 
851 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918. p. 2. 
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ideal.854 This study is no different. It has been dependent for its primary sources 
mainly on Haig’s papers including his War Diary. 
 To conclude, it can be observed that in their study of morale modern historians 
face almost the same challenges today as Haig did in his study of ‘moral’. The term 
remains elusive and open to wide interpretation, no standard definition has been 
agreed, and methods used to build and measure morale, in the BEF at least, do not 
appear today to be particularly well understood.  
Haig’s Management of Moral in the BEF 
During Haig’s tenure as C-in-C of the BEF, he employed leadership, education, 
and welfare, and his proactive influence of civil-military relations, underpinned by 
firm discipline, to sustain the ‘moral’ of his armies.  
Leadership 
When Haig was appointed C-in-C he was confronted with a largely untrained 
citizen army expanding on an exponential scale and a dearth of experienced officers 
of all ranks. He was also challenged by a system of seniority and patronage that did 
not serve the general officer class well by filling posts with men not necessarily 
appropriate to the task, according to his lights.855 Haig’s firm opinion was that ‘the 
present circumstances in which the Army was placed justified the selection of the 
best and youngest men to fill the highest commands’.856 In fact, as early as July 1915 
Haig attempted to put this notion into practical effect. At a private meeting at his 
First Army HQ with Herbert Asquith, the Prime Minister, he emphasised the 
‘necessity for promoting young Officers to high command. To make room, some old 
                                                 
854 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the 
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ones must be removed.’ Haig went through the Army List with the Prime Minister. 
He stated that ‘it [was] important go down low on the list and get capable young 
officers’.857 Haig recommended that Maj.-Gens. Morland, Horne, Gough and Haking 
should be promoted to command corps and, eventually, armies. He also had concerns 
about the command of lower formations: 
But even if ample guns and ample ammunition etc. be 
provided progress will be disappointing unless young capable 
Commanders are brought to the front. Some of the present 
Captains should be chosen to command Battalions, Majors, 
Brigades etc.858  
Thus, Haig’s immediate response when he became C-in-C was to move the 
selection process of commanding general officers away from seniority and 
patronage, or perhaps more accurately favouritism,859 towards what is best 
characterised by the meritocratic principle; where responsibility was given to people 
chosen strictly on merit, as opposed to wealth, social class, influence, etc.860 Of 
course, Haig would not have recognised this term, which was only coined in 1958 by 
the sociologist Michael Young. Nonetheless, he emphatically invoked its organising 
sentiment.861 At his first opportunity on December 14th 1915, Haig instructed his 
Military Secretary, Brig.-Gen. H. Lowther, nominally responsible for higher 
promotions as follows:  
                                                 
857 David French, "Colonel Blimp and the British Army: British Divisonal Commanders in the War 
against German, 1939-1945," The English Historical Review 111, no. 444 (Nov.) (1996). See this 
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In my eyes only those who had proved their fitness for 
advancement should be promoted. I [have] no “friends” when 
it [comes] to Military promotion and I [will] not tolerate a 
“job” being done. Lowther fully understood and agreed.862 
Moreover, Haig told Lowther that he had ‘only one idea, namely to do [his] utmost to 
win the war’.863 He was convinced that the fighting effectiveness of a division was 
dependent on the fighting spirit of its commander.864 Up to this time ‘promotion to 
the high command and staff positions went mainly by seniority in the absence of any 
operational experience or prowess to help influence decisions.’865 
At the same meeting Lowther put Haig to the test. He advised him that French 
wished to give Winston Churchill an infantry brigade. Haig retorted that ‘this was 
impossible until W. had shewn (sic) that he could bear the responsibility in action as 
CO of a battalion’.866 In this respect Haig was uncompromising, regardless of rank, as 
has been shown in the case of Maxse. He went on to promote able soldiers even 
those whom, at a personal level, he had found wanting including Rawlinson and 
Henry Wilson.867 In the event Wilson, when in charge of IV Corps, ‘failed as a 
commander in the Field’ and was sacked.868 By the same token, Haig did not oblige 
friends when he believed there were more capable men available to fill a post.  
Maj.-Gen. John Vaughan, a very close friend of Haig’s, was one example.869 
Vaughan pressed Haig for the command of a cavalry division, but as Haig and 
Kavanagh, the Cavalry Corps commander, considered he was not up to the job, he 
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had to settle for being put in charge of a scheme to reduce horse rations!870 The case 
of Haig’s elder brother Bee is another illustration. He was a transport officer with the 
1st Battalion Dorset Regiment where, despite his advanced age, he was employed 
doing fatiguing night work delivering rations.871 Haig did not use his influence to 
alleviate his brother’s discomfort. By the same token he was prepared to come to the 
assistance of men who he believed were capable soldiers. For example, when the 
WO ordered home Maj.-Gen. Maxwell, French’s QMG, Haig pressed to have this 
decision reversed because he believed he was a highly competent officer.872  
When the opportunity arose, Haig was not adverse to directly intervening and 
rapidly promoting able men. For instance, after inspecting a large hospital 
accompanied by its commandant Col. Hickson, Haig was so impressed by his 
‘organising and disciplining faculties’ that he advised his Director of the Medical 
Service, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Sloggett, to immediately make Hickson a General.873 
By contrast, Haig was quick to support his commanders if they wished to dismiss 
under-performing subordinates, irrespective of their social rank or connections;874 a 
key performance factor in a successful meritocracy.875 However, Haig’s meritocratic 
policy did face problems until the end of 1916. This was because there was no deep 
reservoir of officers with the experience of continental warfare available to support a 
proper system of promotion based on professional expertise.876   
Haig expected his subordinate commanders to follow his lead by appointing 
men of ability to command in their lower formations, including men from the ranks, 
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even if this breached the principle of seniority.877 By contrast, in the German army the 
decision was taken to stick with this principle, blocking the promotion of able and 
ambitious officers.878  
In pursuit of his meritocratic policy of promotion Haig made the internally 
unpopular but ultimately sensible decision to employ civilians to high ranking posts 
behind the lines, where capable army officers could not be found.879 He observed:  
There is a good deal of criticism apparently being made at the 
appointment of civilians like Geddes [DGT] to an important 
post on the Head Quarters of an Army in the Field. These 
critics seem to fail to realise the size of this Army and the 
amount of work which the Army requires of a civilian nature. 
The working of the railways, the upkeep of the roads, even 
the baking of bread and a thousand other industries go on in 
peace as well as in war! So, with the whole Nation at War our 
object should be to employ men on the same work in war as 
they are accustomed to do in peace. Acting on this principle I 
have got Geddes at the head of all the railways and 
transportation with the best practical civil and Military 
engineers under him. At the head of the road directorate is Mr 
Maybury, head of the road board in England. The Docks, 
Canals and inland Water Transport are being managed in the 
same way i.e. by men of practical experience. To put soldiers 
who have no practical experience of these matters into such 
positions merely because they are Generals and Colonels, 
must result in utter failure.880   
All organizations aspiring to be meritocratic must have the ability to align 
organizational objectives with performance, and the latter with financial or other 
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rewards. Monetary reward was not in Haig’s gift, but he did have substitutes at his 
disposal including the prospect of rapid promotion, military honours and decorations, 
and his personal approbation.  
The available statistics for British forces show that 2,323 promotions were 
made from and including the rank of brevet Lieut.-Col. during the war. The large 
majority of these promotions occurred in France.881 Excluding 50 officers of general 
rank that were killed, as a rough measure this indicates that beyond the rapid 
expansion of the army particularly up to the end of 1915, officers of ability were fast-
tracked into key positions of high command.882 The galvanising effect on morale of 
this action is illustrated by diary entries made by a brigade runner, Robert Cude, 
when Brig.-Gen. W.A. Wood succeeded Brig.-Gen. G.D. Price at 55th Brigade in 
November 1917: 
At first glance he [Wood] suits, for he looks a thorough 
soldier. The other man [Price] has gone back to England to 
act as a house-keeper to a Suffragette, at least, that is all he is 
fit for.  
[In March 1918 Cude described Wood as a] ‘Grand old man’, 
and an English Gentleman’… I shall not mind going through 
Hell itself for him.883  
[Winning a MM and bar, Cude possibly did.] 
Another study, using figures drawn from the regimental officer ranks, 
corroborates this finding further down the chain of command. At least ‘50 officers 
commissioned into the Army after the outbreak of hostilities were promoted four 
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grades to the rank of Lieut.-Col., the majority of them to command front line 
battalions in action’.884 In addition, 260 civilians of August 1914, were appointed 
Lieut.-Cols of infantry battalions.885 These numbers may not be remarkable given that 
229,316 commissions were granted by December 1st 1918. However, by comparison 
to the other belligerent armies where ‘even two promotions was exceptional’, this 
finding does indicate that officers of ability were more quickly promoted into 
positions of greater responsibility and that ‘dead-wood’ was cleared out.886  
Moreover, it seems reasonable to suggest that quickly putting the right men in 
the right jobs had a positive impact on morale. However, Haig’s drive to promote 
younger men appears not to have been entirely successful within battalions. 
Although the average age of COs dropped from 48 to 35, Peter Hodgkinson, who 
recently completed a through study of British battalion commanders on the Western 
Front, claimed that this should not be taken as evidence of the meritocracy of youth, 
but the winnowing effect that physical and mental stress had on older officers.887  
In Third Army during the Hundred Days campaign, ‘the average member of a 
corps command group had been in place for well over a year’. In a division the 
comparative figure was nearly a year (358 days), and in a brigade it was 314 days. 
However, there were wide variations of tenure within the command groups of 
individual formations. This was caused by promotions, sackings and casualties.888 
Nonetheless, the implied relative stability of the command group does suggest that 
by mid-1918, in higher formations at least, the weeding out process had been 
effective and competent commanders were in post and remained there. Continuity 
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like this should also have instilled confidence in the leadership, positively impacting 
morale amongst the officers and men.  
It is perhaps not surprising that in Haig’s Final Despatch he reported 
‘promotion had been entirely on merit, and the highest appointments were open to 
the humblest, provided he had the necessary qualifications of character, skill and 
knowledge’.889 Hodgkinson did not entirely agree with Haig’s assessment. He 
concluded that ‘the bias towards the regular soldier and away from the pre-war 
amateur meant that promotion to CO was always a weighted process, but one in 
which the unstructured assessment of merit always and increasingly played a part, 
and, in a temporary sea-change for the British army seniority did not’.890  
In summary, as Simon Robbins observed: 
 By 1917-18 a cadre of officers led divisions with a level of 
competence that allowed them to compete with their German 
counterparts…This new blood provided a level of 
competence and professionalism, which made sure that the 
British Army with a good balance of experience and relative 
youthfulness, was now, at last, well-run and able to attack 
with the high level of performance which Continental warfare 
required.891  
Belief in the Cause 
The notion has been advanced that Haig and his field commanders never 
recognised the link between the morale of their soldiers and their general perception 
of why the war was being fought. Furthermore, nothing was done to ‘convince them 
that their sacrifices were appreciated and worthwhile both in the immediate and long-
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term’.892 This claim has been exaggerated. What was true is that unlike the French 
troops who could be relied upon to hold highly developed patriotic sentiment, British 
troops, particularly amongst the civilian volunteers and conscripts, ‘had a markedly 
sceptical attitude towards patriotism’. In respect to morale, to some extent this was 
compensated for by the security of ‘their feelings of national superiority’. Also, ‘the 
bulk of the British Empire armies had no feeling of hatred to their enemies’ and in 
the absence of such feelings troops were more likely to question whether the struggle 
was worthwhile.893  
Under Haig’s leadership, ‘a coherent and sustained educational effort’ was 
employed by GHQ to shape and inform the patriotic belief of the men.894 He wanted 
his fighting men in particular, to have ‘an intelligent appreciation of the magnitude of 
the issues at stake and a firm belief in the justice of their cause’.895 To this end Haig 
first called upon the clergy for support believing as he did that ‘religion and morale 
[were] closely linked’.896 On January 13th 1916, Haig dined with his Deputy Chaplain 
General, Bishop L.H. Gwynn. He took the opportunity to emphasise ‘the importance 
of sending messages to all [Gwynn’s] clergy to preach about the great object of the 
war viz the freeing of mankind from German tyranny’. Haig also observed that he 
found many of the clergy too narrow in their views and that ‘they must be enthusiasts 
to do any good’.897 
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Two days later at his weekly army commanders’ conference, in no uncertain 
terms, he called upon these officers to support the work of their chaplains:  
Nothing should be neglected which will tend to raise the 
morale and confidence of our troops. Army commanders 
must take a personal interest in the work of chaplains, and 
make sure the lessons they teach deal with the great task 
which is before us, and which affects the well-being not only 
of the British Empire but of mankind.898  
I also called attention to the large number of clergymen who 
are now being sent to join the Army. Army commanders must 
look to the efficiency of these as well as to any part of their 
commands. We must have large minded, sympathetic men as 
Parsons, who realise the great cause for which we are 
fighting. Men who can imbue their hearers with enthusiasm. 
Any clergyman who is not fit for this work must be sent 
home. 899 
Two weeks later at a second meeting with Gwynne, Haig discussed ‘plans for 
improving the nature of teaching by the chaplains and for putting the best men in the 
most important positions’.900  
In May, Randall Davidson the Archbishop of Canterbury lunched with Haig at 
Château Beaurepaire. Haig was forthright in his advice: 
I told the Archbishop that I only had two wishes to 
express…Firstly that the Chaplains should preach to the 
troops about the objects of Great Britain in carrying out this 
war. We have no selfish motive, but are fighting for the good 
of humanity. Secondly. The Chaplains of the Church of 
England must cease quarrelling amongst themselves. In the 
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Field we cannot tolerate any narrow sectarian ideas. We must 
all be united whether we are clerics or ordinary troops.901 
This meeting had the desired effect because Gwynne later reported to Haig that he 
had organised a school of instruction for his parsons near St Omer to train them for 
work with troops in the field and that ‘good results had been obtained’.902 
In September 1917 Gwynne recognised that troop morale was beginning to 
suffer and subversive pamphlets were finding their way to the men in the trenches. In 
response, the Bishop organised a conference of senior chaplains to discuss and agree 
countermeasures. This resulted in the publication of a counter-propaganda pamphlet 
that received Haig’s full support in the preface he wrote.903 In addition, Gwynne 
launched on an educational scheme to promote patriotism among the troops using his 
parsons as lecturers.904 
Coincidentally, Bonham-Carter, Haig’s new Director of Training, was thinking 
on the same lines as Gwynne but had arrived at a more ambitious scheme to sustain 
morale. He proposed a programme of current affairs lectures, themed to paint a 
positive picture of the post-war future. Unbeknown to Haig, Bonham-Carter’s 
proposal was initially held up by the AG, Lieut.-Gen. G.H. Fowke, on the grounds 
that the lectures might create unrealistic post-war expectations amongst the men. In 
the light of the future widespread disillusionment, the AG was most probably right.  
In any event, Haig had become aware that informal discussions were taking 
place among the troops regarding “reconstruction after the war” where ‘sometimes 
advanced socialistic or anarchical views were expressed’. Haig called in the AG and 
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told him that ‘our policy should be not to stop free discussion but rather to guide it by 
having really capable men to lecture and control subversive talk’. Haig wisely 
pointed out that ‘it would be wrong to forbid the talk, because the views would then 
be driven underground, and eventually greater harm would result’.905 Later, Haig 
issued a directive to draw up a scheme of education for the troops, ‘the objects of 
which should be (a) to give men a wider view of their duties as citizens of the British 
Empire, (b) to help men in their work after the war’.906 Fortunately for Bonham-
Carter, this scheme was in accord with his earlier proposal and went ahead.  
With Haig’s approval, a new army education organization was established at 
GHQ. In addition, full time education officers were appointed, one to each army, 
division and base HQ. At brigade, a part-time education officer was appointed from 
the staff to organise classes and talks.907 It is worth quoting Col. Lord Gorell’s 
assessment of Haig’s contribution: 908 
Thus at the first opportunity presented to him and at a date 
when his mind must have been engaged in absorbing anxiety 
as to the imminent launching of the great German onslaught, 
the generous-hearted, broad minded Field-Marshal could 
spare time to extend his authoritative support to work outside 
the directly military sphere because it was obviously for the 
durable good of the men, and to grasp instinctively the dual 
nature of that work [education as distinct from training]. It is 
a remarkable and characteristic incident which deserves to be 
long remembered.909 
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Hagiography perhaps; but at the time of writing Gorell was the Deputy-Director of 
Staff Duties (Education) at the WO and Haig had left the Army, so he had no ulterior 
motive to write this passage unless it was his sincere belief. 
Unfortunately, ‘the source material concerning the impact of educational work 
[upon morale] is minimal’.910 However, based on an approach suggested by Professor 
S.P. Mackenzie, an overview of the raw statistics indicated that this work did not 
have the full impact that Haig, Gwynne or Bonham-Carter had desired.911 In 1918, the 
Army Chaplain’s Department had a muster of 3,475 clergymen, which was its full 
strength.912 In total, 5,254,351 officers and men comprising drafts, reinforcements 
and units were sent to France from England during the war and its immediate 
aftermath.913 This meant that at most, each clergyman roughly had a flock of 1,500 
men rotating through their ‘parishes’. Even allowing for sermons that could be 
delivered en-masse, where it is known that the attention span diminishes inversely to 
attendance, the numbers of men inspired by patriotic overtures was always likely to 
have been relatively small. In addition, only 20% of soldiers had any vital connection 
with the churches, and in any case the clergy were widely regarded as being 
‘remarkably out of touch with their troops.914 These results tentatively shows that 
religion was not a particularly fertile milieu to support morale.  
Although in 1918 the secular educational programme was popular amongst the 
men it does not appear to have realised its full potential in promoting broad-scale 
morale. In June for instance, 15,957 men attended general lectures and 6,046 were 
                                                 
910 MacKenzie, Politics and Military Morale: Current Affairs and Citizens Education in the British 
Army 1914-1950. p. 32. 
911 Ibid. Chapter 2: The Effect of Army Education, 1917-1919. All the statistics and general 
conclusions are taken from this chapter unless specifically stated.  
912 Michael Moynihan, God On Our Side: The British Padre in World War 1 (London: Leo Cooper, 
1983) p. 12. 
913 TNA/WO/394/20, “Statistical Abstract: Armies at Home and Abroad (1914-1920).” p. 508. 
914 Moynihan, God On Our Side: The British Padre in World War 1. p. 13. 
 247 
 
enrolled in classes. The programme was hampered by a shortage of lecturers and 
qualified instructors, by the recalcitrant attitudes of some unit commanders, and by 
the fact that the trench experience produced amongst junior officers and men ‘a 
yearning after knowledge often as inarticulate as it was intense’.915 This indicates that 
overall the educational initiatives both religious and secular had a positive albeit 
limited influence on morale. However, these schemes were not the ‘dismal failure’ 
suffered by a programme of ‘patriotic instruction’ reported to be deployed in the 
German Army.916  
Welfare 
‘Nothing reduces and discourages troops more than hunger;’ so wrote Haig at 
the Staff College.917 He clearly understood that ‘food…was central to a soldier’s 
physical and mental well-being’, and that there was a causal relationship between the 
general welfare of his troops and morale.918 Therefore, it will come as no surprise to 
learn that Haig personally ensured that his troops were well looked after:  
Officers made sure the men under their command got what 
comforts were available (such as rum rations and cigarettes); 
food rations were adequate; medical attention was prompt 
and efficient; shows and sports events were regularly staged 
when troops were out of the line; and in addition canteens 
and other amenities were provided by organizations such as 
the Y.M.C.A. The coercive and supportive elements in 
maintaining the fortitude of soldiers was therefore quite 
substantial.919  
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During battalion inspections Haig was known to converse with the cooks to assure 
himself that the men were being well fed.920 He also toured divisional rest camps for 
the same purpose.921 
Haig was fortunate that prior to the war rapid progress in mechanical 
transportation had acted as a catalyst for the modernisation of the RASC along 
continental lines. This service was largely responsible for the distribution of food and 
other supplies in the field.922 As discussed, by 1914 the BEF’s system of supply was 
‘abreast of all modern conditions’.923 One of the most important features of the new 
system was that it allowed fresh foodstuffs, particularly meat and bread, to be 
delivered daily to Haig’s front line troops. For instance, the highest output of bread 
on a single day was 1,735,418 lb. loaves delivered fresh to the troops.924 Previously, 
preserved meats and biscuits formed the basis of the staple diet for British 
expeditionary forces.925 Also, the dietary requirements of the mixed races and 
religions had to be strictly observed. Even German prisoners were fed especially 
baked black bread, albeit at a saving to the Exchequer.926 Another vital aspect of the 
supply system was the introduction of the precursor to ‘just in time’ inventory 
controls; the hallmark of modern logistical systems. The great strength of this new 
system was its simplicity. It allowed for ‘easy and rapid expansion…in most 
essential respects [it] was unchanged from start to finish’ of the war.927  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, Haig made a crucial contribution to the evolution of 
the organization, management and administration of BEF’s logistical systems. The 
impact of these measures was felt most particularly between 1916 and 1918 when 
ration supplies to the front never faltered. This is not to say that Haig’s troops had no 
complaints. In fact, J.G. Fuller asserted that ‘in 1917 food was reported to the War 
Cabinet as one of the principal causes of troop discontent’.928 It would not have been 
normal if there were no complaints about both the quantity and quality of food, most 
particularly on the front line. However, Fuller presses the evidence too far because 
his allegation referred to a Command Depot at Shoreham, and not the BEF in France. 
Moreover, the Cabinet meeting to which Fuller referred concluded that the complaint 
was without foundation.929  
By contrast the welfare of German troops deteriorated, and morale with it. In 
September 1916, intelligence received at GHQ reported that the enemy’s meat ration 
had been cut by 20% due to the weight of the naval blockade. By 1917, rations of 
bread, meat and vegetables had been further reduced to approximately 40% of the 
British equivalent.930 It would have been unusual if this significant food reduction did 
not have a negative impact on troop morale, particularly in the front line. 
Rest and Recreation 
Contrary to popular belief, troops spent only approximately two fifths of their 
time in the front line, or in close support; for the balance, men were either detained in 
billets employed as a brigade reserve or placed in a rest camp as part of the divisional 
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reserve.931 Excepting time spent on training and fatigues, troops out of the line could 
easily have become bored with corrosive effect on morale. As a prophylactic, Haig 
lost no time in telling his Army commanders that ‘every effort must be made to raise 
the “moral” of the troops – amusements, games lectures etc. must be organised’.932 
One regimental officer who wrote perceptively of his battalion’s experience, 
indicated that Haig’s advice was taken seriously:  
It may be stated at once that apparently trivial ancillary 
services…grew to be of supreme importance. I do not believe 
that sufficient attention has been paid to this fact, although 
such services formed often for long periods the sole 
recreative [sic] interest of the fighting Divisions. I refer to 
Divisional Concert Parties, Race Meetings, Horse Shows, 
Football Matches, Boxing Tournaments and suchlike.933 
J.G. Fuller argued that organised entertainment flourished on its own initiative, 
rather than in response to the ‘ordination of the General Staff’.934 This was not strictly 
the case as Haig’s engagement shows. In addition, GHQ was fully aware of the 
‘moral’ value of sporting activities and actively encouraged their development. In 
October 1917, the GS prepared and reissued S.S.137 Recreational Training, the 
original presumably having appeared earlier.935 This 27 page pamphlet offered a 
comprehensive guide for the organization of popular sports and stressed the need for 
voluntary participation, inclusiveness, diversity and esprit de corps. Officers 
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received encouragement to join-in to ensure that inter-unit matches were played in 
the true sporting spirit and to increase empathy with their men.936  
Helpful advice was provided by GHQ in respect to organization, training 
regimes, area organization (including locations of sports fields, pitches, baths and 
changing rooms), team competition, championships, and modification of rules to suit 
local conditions. As prize money was prohibited, GHQ also offered a wide range of 
trophies, cups and medals at nominal prices, presumably to be paid from out of unit 
funds. Suitably qualified referees, equipment and kit were also available on request.  
Haig gave every encouragement to the promotion of these recreational 
activities by making personal appearances at divisional theatrical performances and 
music hall, horse trials and shows, sporting events and other activities. He invariably 
congratulated the organisers and prize winners, gave short speeches to audiences and 
generally received loud thanks in return.937 
Haig also knew that home leave was an essential factor in troop welfare and 
well-being. In 1917 he acted promptly when it belatedly came to his attention that 
657,820 men had had no home leave for 9 months, including 107,748 who had not 
been home for over 18 months. Despite the growing manpower problem and the 
close approach of the Third Ypres offensive, he ordered that at least 5,040 men per 
day should be sent on home leave with immediate effect.938 When arguing with the 
War Cabinet against a French demand to extend his front, he told Ministers that this 
was not acceptable because ‘as much leave as possible is necessary for the men 
[observing] they have earned it and it is a valuable means of keeping them in good 
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heart’.939 Haig had similar concerns for the working conditions of men behind the 
lines. He pressed his Army Commanders to allow office workers to have the day off 
on Sundays.940  
J.G. Fuller concluded that many contemporary soldier observers thought that 
the institutions of sport and music played a role in upholding the morale of British 
and Dominion troops.941 Furthermore, he persuasively argued that the whole gambit 
of recreational activities prevented the development on the Western Front of an 
‘autonomous trench culture’ and ensured that ties with the civilian world were never 
severed. This feeds back into the importance of sustaining morale on the home front 
most particularly that of friends and family. It is also clear that the WO, perhaps 
belatedly, recognised the value, in terms of morale, of organised recreational 
activities. In 1940, the WO set up the Directorate of Army Welfare to organise 
entertainers drawn from within the ranks of the armed service. The body worked 
along-side the civilian Entertainments National Service Association (ENSA) to 
provide theatrical and cinema entertainment for the troops.942 As the latter 
organization earned the sobriquet ‘Every Night Something Awful’, it does not appear 
to have attained the popular status of entertainments previously offered in France.943  
Morale on the Home Front 
 ‘Military morale is in a large sense inseparable from civilian morale because 
each reacts upon the other and both are in large measure based on fidelity to a 
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cause’.944 As discussed above, Haig introduced educational measures to promote the 
belief of his troops in their patriotic duty. He was also aware that to sustain morale 
effectively it was vital that this work was reinforced by positive public opinion from 
home.945 And, as Haig had learned first-hand from campaigns in the Sudan, he knew 
that it was essential to obtain the support of the Press because of its hold on public 
opinion.946 A point corroborated by Maj.-Gen. C.E. Callwell, DMO at the WO who 
acutely observed: ‘the most important point of all, however, is that, when journalism 
and officialdom happen to come into collision, the public in practice only hears the 
Fourth Estate’s side of the story’.947  
These attitudes fed into the generally held and simplistic ‘view that the Press 
somehow held direct control over the views and voting powers of the new mass 
electorate’. This was promoted by the ‘older belief, that a newspaper report or 
editorial spoke for an important section of public opinion, [combined] with the fact 
of mass sales of newspapers…’.948 However, this did not prevent Haig from forming 
a low opinion of military correspondents, and being highly cynical of their work.949 
He shared his opinion with none other than Field Marshal Wolseley who claimed 
publically that the ‘special correspondent was the curse of the modern army’.950  
Before discussing the measures taken by Haig to foster Press support aimed at 
bolstering morale on the home front, to say nothing of his own position and 
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reputation, it is necessary to first comment briefly on the wider context of press 
relations at the WO and in the BEF before he succeeded French.  
In 1912, the Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee was established ‘with 
the object of providing liaison between the Navy and the Army on the one hand, and 
the Press on the other’ to protect military secrecy, during a possible continental 
conflict.951 Valuable work was reportedly done, and secrecy at the opening stages of 
hostilities was strictly observed. However, on August 6th 1914 Kitchener, newly 
appointed Secretary of State for War, acted with characteristic haste. He appointed 
Mr. F.E. Smith, the future Lord Birkenhead, as the official Press Censor. By the 
following day this decision had resolved itself into the establishment of the Whitehall 
Press Bureau. Smith, supported by a scratch staff, had the unenviable task of 
distributing news pre-censored by officers working under the direct instructions of 
WO and Admiralty; advising the press; and initiating press prosecutions if members 
broke any of the censorship rules promulgated under the Defence of the Realm Act 
(DORA) that was passed on August 8th. Later, Smith’s role was facilitated by his 
appointment to the Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee. In effect the 
Government had ‘imposed censorship on all information connected with military 
affairs’.952 It was not surprising that Smith’s role was poorly received by the press 
corps. This animus quickly revived old prejudices at the WO against the Press. For 
the first nine months of the war the public were poorly served, which undermined the 
British war effort.953   
To compound this dysfunction it appears that before the war little or no thought 
had been given by the WO to the organization of press relations in the field. In 1914, 
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GHQ’s immediate response to the Press reflected prejudices at home, and as a result 
correspondents were barred by French from the front.954 In keeping with tradition, the 
principal source of news was a twice-weekly column produced by the ‘Official Eye 
Witness’, Lieut.-Col. Ernest Swinton, which was forwarded to the WO for a further 
round of censorship and then on to the Press Bureau for distribution.955 The Press 
responded badly and took matters into its own hands. ‘Enterprising reporters 
proceeded to the theatre of war without permission’.956 The effect of this system, 
dysfunctional as it was, was unfortunate:  
The public were deprived of reliable information concerning 
the war, and misled by statements of a wildly optimistic 
character.957 
Every trifling success won by, or credited to, the Allies was 
hailed as a transcendent triumph and was placarded on 
misleading posters.958  
In turn, this exuberance placed a check on recruiting and on the production of 
war material; an unforeseen and potentially catastrophic outcome.959 In May 1915, as 
a consequence of these shortcomings, the WO reached an accommodation with the 
Press whereby up to six accredited correspondents were given permission to take up 
residence at GHQ, an arrangement that remained in place until the end of the war.960 
These men included Philip Gibbs, Percival Philips of the Daily Express, William 
Beach Thomas of the Daily Mail and H. Perry Robinson of Times.961 They wore 
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officers’ uniforms with green armbands and were dignified with the rank of honorary 
captain. Swinton, assisted by Captain Earl Percy, continued his activities until mid-
July.962 This then was the state of press relations, both at home and at the front, that 
confronted Haig a few months before he replaced French. 
 In mid-1915, when French’s fortunes were in decline, Haig put aside his 
reservations for the Press and started to build personal relations with correspondents, 
which, with more than a hint of hypocrisy, he declared was ‘my duty to the Army’.963 
On June 13th 1915, at luncheon with the special correspondent from the Daily 
Telegraph, Haig agreed that accredited reporters who showed good cause would be 
allowed to visit previously restricted areas on First Army’s front.964 Following the 
well-established convention, Haig also allowed the occasional interview but forbade 
verbatim reporting.965 On July 8th, following a request from the WO, Haig met 
Repington (‘such a dishonest individual’) and told him that ‘he could go where he 
liked, and see what he liked and write what he liked’ with the proviso that he 
submitted any tactical criticism to the Censor to prevent any information useful to the 
enemy from being published.966 Repington’s private thoughts on this restriction can 
only be imagined, particularly as he held a poor opinion of Haig’s tactical abilities.967 
In 1916, Haig stepped up the tempo by establishing personal relations with 
leading press proprietors including Lord Northcliffe owner of The Times and the 
Daily Mail, and Lord Burnham of the Daily Telegraph. These meetings were 
orchestrated by his trusted and protective Private Secretary, Sir Philip Sassoon, M.P.; 
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a prominent and well-connected man with acute political sensibilities. Northcliffe 
and Burnham offered, both personally and through their newspapers, to assist Haig in 
any way they could.968 Later Haig wryly confided to his diary: ‘so the Daily 
Telegraph as well as The Times is (sic) most anxious to play the game’.969 Northcliffe 
became a frequent visitor to Château Beaurepaire and ‘pledged his complete 
support’.970 Haig gave him free rein to ‘see everything and talk to anyone’.971 
Northcliffe responded by asking Haig to send him a line ‘should anything appear in 
the “Times” which was not altogether to [his] liking’.972 
While Haig garnered support in what was a symbiotic relationship with the 
press proprietors, he ensured that the news flow from GHQ was tightly organised and 
well managed. As the accredited correspondents were formally the organizational 
responsibility of the Intelligence Department, this required an accompanying 
establishment of serving ‘Conducting Officers’ who tended to be experienced and 
older men, to act as chaperones. Their daily routine was fixed. In the late afternoon, 
to synchronise with the release of GHQ’s official daily communiqué, 
correspondents’ reports were cleared through a ‘censorship while you wait’ 
procedure before being released to the WO and then forwarded on to the national 
daily newspapers. ‘As journalists gradually assumed the appearance of pseudo-army 
officers attached to GHQ, these men were required to undertake the quasi-civilian 
task of managing the control of the news-flow’.973 The dominant feature of this work 
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was ‘the ready espousal of sacrificial values’.974 This sentiment was summed up in a 
Memorandum on Policy for Press that Haig prepared ahead of his first accredited 
correspondents’ briefing before the Somme offensive: 
To sum up: The lessons which the people of England have to 
learn are patience, self-sacrifice, and confidence in our ability 
to win in the long run. The aim for which the war is being 
waged is the destruction of German militarism. Three years 
of war and the loss of one-tenth of the manhood of the 
nations is not too great a price to pay in so great a cause.975 
This restrictive regime was not entirely welcomed by the reporters who were 
used to working in open conditions, which allowed free movement and independence 
of thought. This situation caused much friction with the Conducting Officers, 
although the reporters did acquiesce for the greater good of the war effort. ‘From 
pariahs in 1914, the correspondents were to emerge from the war as potential knights 
of the realm for their contribution to victory’.976  
In June 1916, Lord Esher urged Haig to bring influential French newspapers 
into his orbit: 
You must my dear Douglas stimulate a little Press 
Propaganda here [Paris] while these great operations are in 
progress [Somme Campaign]. Some intelligent young fellow 
should be turned on to the telephone through Maurice’s office 
[DMO at GHQ] every night, giving a resume of operations, 
which could be passed on before 11 p.m. to the French 
papers. I can arrange everything at this end, if you can 
arrange it at yours. Then (2) every two or three days a liaison 
officers should bring down some rather extended little story 
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which can be deftly used here. For goodness sake, keep the 
French press in tow. Our people in London are so gloriously 
futile. There is supposed to be a Press Propaganda War. No 
one knows where it is, or who has charge of it. Besides, it 
may at every moment be tainted by views that are not 
yours.977 
It is not clear to what extent Haig acted on Esher’s advice; but he did start 
briefing French correspondents at his HQ. As a result, favourable reports on British 
operations did appear in influential sectors of the French press. Esher reported ‘this 
sort of thing has a mesmeric effect and influences public opinion very materially’.978 
The French news-flow, recycled through the British press, was having a positive 
effect on morale within the BEF and in Britain.  
However, in February 1917 Haig’s cosy relationship with the French press 
caused him a serious problem at home that nearly cost him his job.979 Following a 
briefing to five French deputies who were also journalists at his HQ, he was later 
reported to have declared in a characteristically optimistic tone that ‘there must be no 
peace without complete victory’. Apparently this hubris played well in France but 
when reported back in England it was labelled a ‘blazing transgression’ into politics. 
This comment was made by a Labour MP in a parliamentary question addressed to 
Lloyd George, now the Prime Minister. This complaint quickly placed Haig in an 
embarrassing and invidious position.980  
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In public at least, Lord Northcliffe came to Haig’s aid and publically wrote the 
intervention off as ‘a storm in a teacup’.981 Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for 
War, reluctantly sent Haig a mild rebuke with the firm advice to remove Charteris 
the head of Intelligence at GHQ for allowing the French report to slip through 
uncensored.982 Haig replied in a fit of pique: ‘If L.G. has a man in his eye who will 
run this great Army better than I am doing, let him appoint him without more ado’. 
Haig of course was relying on the continued support of Northcliffe who had 
impressed upon him in a series of recent visits his ability to bring Lloyd George’s 
administration down.983 Nonetheless, in a more conciliatory tone, Haig told Derby 
that for some time he had been thinking about separating the organization of 
‘intelligence proper’ from ‘propaganda’, but he had not found the right man with 
experience for the latter role.984  
In June 1917, such had been the growth and increasing sophistication of 
GHQ’s press activity, a Special Intelligence Section was established within the 
Intelligence Branch to cope with its expanded role.985 By July 1917 this organization 
comprised four subsections:986 I(d) Press, which included units for the British and 
Allied press, the censor, and photography and cinematography. I(f) Visitors, dealt 
with visits from WO, Foreign Office, military attachés, and the Americans. This 
subsection also dealt with propaganda. I(g) War Trade, dealt with information 
regarding the economic situation in Germany and I(h) Postal and Telegraphic 
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Censorship.987 The total war establishment then comprised 61 officers and 269 other 
ranks.988 In February 1918, after a reshuffle of the Intelligence Branch, Haig moved 
the Special Intelligence section to the SDB, renaming it the Censor and Publicity 
Section.989 In September 1918, representations were made to the WO to increase the 
war establishment to 481 officers and men.990  
Unfortunately, following the Cambrai offensive when the press engaged in a 
‘conscious attempt to boost Haig’s popularity [he] lost the support of Northcliffe’.991 
It appears that that he was being out manoeuvred by Lloyd George who recruited 
Northcliffe and other Press magnates including Beaverbrook and Rothermere into 
influential governmental positions. Together with changes in Press policy at the WO 
and GHQ, these developments created an insularity that as Stephen Badsey observed 
resulted in ‘a neglect of the BEF’s achievements in 1918’.992   
Haig did not rely solely on the Press to shape and mould public opinion. 
Conforming with convention, twice yearly he oversaw the preparation of a despatch 
summarising in ‘plain and straightforward language’ the operations of his armies. 
These official commentaries appeared in the London Gazette and were syndicated to 
the Press. They were based upon a comprehensive and rigorous daily information 
gathering system extending from army down to company level, which as Haig 
commented required a ‘high degree of organization and training’.993  
On the home front, Haig personally intervened in labour relations to help 
sustain vital munitions supplies to the BEF. For example, he appealed to 300 trade 
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union delegates, representing 2,000,000 workers for their support at a War Workers 
Conference.994 He also extended a warm welcome to trade unionist visitors at his HQ:  
About 10.30 pm Mr Ben Tillett of the Dockers Union, late 
revolutionist and anarchist, came to see me. He had come to 
spend Christmas in the trenches with some of his dock hands. 
He said that the men were all in splendid spirits – much better 
even than on his last visit which was in July and the weather 
was good and trenches dry! He evidently had been dining 
well, for he found difficulty in coming upstairs to my writing 
room!’995  
Haig also paid attention to small details of public interest, even in times of great 
stress. For instance, he sent a telegram of good wishes to a National Mother’s Day 
celebration on the opening day of the Battle of Amiens. With genuine sincerity he 
told his audience: ‘England’s greatness too is due to the devotion and loving sacrifice 
of our mothers’.996 
A study of news coverage in the columns of The Times relating to the first day 
of the Somme (July 1st 1916), Cambrai (November 20th to December 7th 1917) and 
the German offensive (March 21st 1918) revealed that exuberant reporting typical of 
the early stages of the war gave way under Haig to a much more measured and 
calculated response.997 For the first day of the Somme and at Cambrai the bland 
official communiqués and the more newsworthy correspondents’ despatches were 
sufficiently economical with the truth to give little away to the enemy or the reader. 
If there was any criticism of the military, albeit discreetly veiled, this could be found 
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by the discerning reader in the editor’s comment columns.998 All of this is exactly 
what Haig intended. It is noticeable that as the war went on the Editor of The Times 
did become more forthright, but in the three periods examined at least, Haig did not 
receive any personal criticism that could be construed as a threat to his post. 
Although as mentioned, at the beginning of 1918, he could not take for granted the 
support of the Press. Editorial comment in March 1918 left the reader in no doubt 
that the military situation in France had reached a desperate point of crisis.999 But, 
from a reader’s perspective, being deeply worried was not the same thing as 
suffering poor morale. Given that the whole British press had the same news source 
it appears reasonable to suggest that these comments could be extended to include 
other newspapers, although the flavour of editorial comment would obviously differ.  
Haig’s Management of Discipline in the BEF 
Most military commanders link good morale with strong, but not necessarily 
harsh, discipline.1000 As discussed in Chapter 3, Haig was no exception. However, a 
close reading of Haig’s diaries allows the observation that his approach to discipline 
functioned on three levels: Exemplary discipline (cowardice, desertion and other 
offenses punishable by death under the Army Act); field discipline (lesser military 
infringements, crimes of all types and behaviour that he judged a misdemeanour but 
were not necessarily governed by military law); and regimental discipline, which he 
closely associated with good leadership and high standards of training (smart turnout, 
well drilled, and formal behaviour).1001 
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‘Haig successfully maintained discipline of the British Army on the Western 
Front. He did so by a judicious use of exemplary punishment’ administered under the 
Army Act 1881 and re-enacted annually.1002 Or put bluntly, and to use Wellington’s 
phrase, soldiers were shot “for the sake of example.”1003 The primary object of this 
form of discipline was to act as a deterrent to others, rather than simply punish the 
soldier concerned.1004 Thus, the death sentence was a means to an end, rather than an 
end in itself: On September 25th 1914, Haig was required to approve the death 
sentences of two soldiers (Pte. G. Ward and Cpl. V. Prior of the Royal Berks 
Regiment) convicted by a Field General Courts Martial for cowardice.1005 He minuted 
the AG: ‘I am of [the] opinion that it is necessary to make an example in order to 
prevent cowardice in the face of the enemy as far as is possible’.1006 Haig confirmed 
the death penalty on Ward, although he commuted the sentence on Prior to two years 
imprisonment with hard labour. Haig showed leniency in Prior’s case because he had 
‘stayed with his company and fought on after pulling back without orders’.1007 Haig’s 
support for the death penalty as the ultimate sanction remained robust throughout the 
war as this diary entry for February 1st 1919 shows:  
Received telegram from Churchill indicating his disinclination 
to approve of infliction of death penalty “unless there is serious 
bloodshed”. He awaits full report. But I have power, by 
Warrant, to try by Court Martial and shoot in accordance with 
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the Army Act; and no telegram from S. of S. can affect my 
right to do what I think is necessary for Army.1008 
Between January 1st 1916 and November 11th 1918 when the WO suspended 
the death penalty for military offences, Haig sanctioned the death by firing squad of 
three officers, 15 NCO’s and 232 private soldiers. In 85% of these cases, the men 
concerned were executed for desertion and many were repeat offenders.1009 Although 
this figure (250) appears high, Haig did give offenders a second chance, commuting 
an estimated nine out of ten capital convictions during his tenure.1010 ‘It is also 
notable that death sentences tended to increase in the weeks preceding a major 
offensive as the military authorities worked to stamp their authority on the troops’.1011  
Haig also wanted to be seen as even handed, ensuring that military law applied 
equally to both officers and men.1012 For instance, on December 6th 1916, Haig 
sanctioned the death of 2/Lt. Eric Poole who stood convicted of desertion primarily 
because he believed that ‘it is highly important that all ranks should realise that the 
law is the same for an Officer as a Private’.1013  
It is also true that he felt the full weight of responsibility when he was the final 
arbiter of a man’s life.1014 However, Haig had the onerous job of assessing the fate of 
over 70 capital offenders a month. Although Haig’s signature was required on the 
death warrant, given his other commitments, it is most likely that he delegated the 
detailed work of this unenviable task to Brig.-Gen. J.B. Wroughton, head of the 
Personnel Services Branch, who was a career soldier and barrister.1015  
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Nonetheless, there is no doubt that Haig placed what he considered was the 
higher interests of his armies above those of individual men even when there were 
seemingly mitigating factors, and particularly when judged against today’s standards. 
In the case of Eric Poole, Haig was aware his medical report concluded, that when he 
offended, he could have been suffering from shell-shock.1016 Perhaps a mitigating 
circumstance today, but at the time this affliction was barely understood by doctors, 
and was not recognised in Military Law as grounds for leniency.1017 After the war, 
shell shock became an officially recognised battlefield condition, although the use of 
the term was eliminated from official nomenclature to prevent unfavourable 
reactions from patients and others.1018  
Field Discipline 
In France, as with other theatres, non-capital military and civilian offences 
including absence without leave (35,787), drunkenness (33,063), disobedience 
(11,367), insubordination (10,629), and theft (4,236) were brought to a Field 
General-Courts Martial.1019 In these instances, Haig generally allowed due-process to 
take its course. To protect unit morale, Haig did intervene by exception in cases 
where he considered the sentences were unduly harsh, particularly in the light of a 
soldier’s service record. For example, Sir Iain Colquhoun of the Scots Guards was 
charged and reprimanded for making a truce with the enemy contrary to orders. This 
penalty could have put a serious career-breaking blemish on that officer’s record. 
However, in the light of Colquhoun’s distinguished service and the fact that the 
orders issued to him by his superior officer were ‘somewhat slack’ in delivery, Haig 
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confirmed the proceeding, but remitted his sentence so as not to affect the officer’s 
record.1020 Later, Colquhoun added a bar to his DSO.  
In another case, a junior Regimental Medical Officer, Lt. G.N. Kirkwood was 
charged with gross misconduct for his role in a serious breach of discipline on the 
front line. He was convicted and penalised with removal from the service. This case 
was brought to Haig’s attention, possibly by his respected colleague Arthur Sloggett 
who thought Kirkwood was being scapegoated.1021 Despite the fact that the charge 
and verdict had been ratified by the principal officers of the Reserve Army including 
its commander, General Gough, Haig concluded that Kirkwood had indeed been 
unfairly treated for what he described as a ‘lamentable incident’. He overturned the 
sentence and informally censured the Brig.-Gen. and the Brigade Staff concerned.1022 
Apart from the injustice, Haig knew that Kirkwood was a highly respected junior 
officer within the 11th Border Regiment, and morale would have undoubtedly 
suffered had the perception been created that this officer has been unfairly cashiered.  
Haig intervened in matters where it became apparent that a superior officer had 
wronged a subordinate. This was the case with Maj.-Gen. F.J. Davies, commander of 
8th Division, who after the offensive at Neuve Chapelle was relieved of his command 
by Rawlinson. Apparently, this was because Davies failed to advance on a timely 
basis indicating that he was not ‘a good commander on the Field of Battle.’ It later 
transpired that in fact Rawlinson was responsible for the delay. Haig immediately 
reinstated Davies and severely reprimanded Rawlinson for dishonesty and ‘disloyalty 
to a subordinate’. Ever the pragmatist, Haig stopped short of sending Rawlinson 
home because ‘he had many other valuable qualities for a Commander on active 
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service’. Haig’s intervention boosted Davis’ confidence and ensured there was no dip 
in the morale of his staff.1023  
Regimental Discipline 
At the regimental level, Haig believed ‘good old fashioned discipline’ gave 
men a strong esprit de corps, which according to his lights was the key to battlefield 
success.1024 He associated discipline at this level with basic training characterised by 
parade ground drill, respect (e.g. saluting officers) and smartness.1025 At an inspection 
of the Guards Division in 1917 Haig witnessed the best of these characteristics: 
After the inspection, I dismounted and all the Battalion 
Commanders were presented to me, and I made a short 
address. I congratulated the Division on what it had 
accomplished in battle. I complimented them on their 
discipline and smartness, and fine spirit. It was the spirit of 
the first Expeditionary Force which lived in our New Army 
and made us victorious.  
Today the turnout was very good; men very clean and smart. 
The men handled their arms well and marched well. All this 
reflected the greatest credit on every man in the Division 
from the G.O.C. downwards. I felt sure that the Guards never 
presented a finer sight than they did today – and I could not 
pay them a greater compliment than to say they were a 
pattern for the whole Army.1026  
Haig invariably took the opportunity to direct the attention of army commanders, and 
subordinate commanders to maintaining discipline, training and esprit de corps at the 
battalion level.1027  
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While Haig was the Adjutant of the 7th (Queens Own) Hussars in India he had 
a reputation for being a strict disciplinarian, and some said a ‘martinet’.1028 While 
Haig believed that ‘very strict discipline was necessary’ he considered that petty 
discipline characterised by ‘unnecessary fussiness should be avoided’.1029 Haig was 
not the only high commander who subscribed to these opinions. In 1942, the C-in-C 
Home Forces, Gen. Sir Bernard Paget, is recorded as advising the Army Council: 
Speaking of the Army generally, the Commander-in-Chief 
stressed the need of all-round higher discipline, of the kind 
that promoted fighting efficiency and esprit de corps. Any 
relaxation of saluting and the tendency to instil in the minds 
of the troops the feeling that pride in appearance and a 
soldierly bearing were part and parcel of the worst elements 
of “spit and polish” were a great mistake.1030 
The most severe form of regimental punishment was Field Punishment No 1, 
colloquially known as “crucifixion”. Although this punishment could be imposed by 
courts-martial, it was also available to battalion commanders and was reserved for 
the most serious offences that could be dealt with at this level. Arguably, Field 
Punishment No 1 was exemplary but its primary purpose was to bring shame on the 
offender in front of his battalion or regiment.  
In late 1916, led by the trade union movement at home, supported by 
colleagues in France and Italy and aided and abetted by the tabloid press, great 
pressure was placed on politicians for the abolition of the practice. Both Houses 
bowed to the lobby and the WO was instructed to obtain opinions from the C-in-C’s 
of the various Expeditionary Forces. With the exception of the C-in-C Force D., 
                                                 
1028 NLS-Acc.3155/324/a, "Post War Letters to Lady Haig." Letter Sgt-Maj. H.J. Harrison, 7th Hussars 
to Lady Haig 17/04/1937 and her response 30/06/1937.  
1029 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 15/01/1915. 
1030 TNA/WO/32/15773, "Reintroduction of Death Penalty for Desertion in the Field." Army Council 
Meeting Minutes 11/08/1942 p. 4. 
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Mesopotamia, all of the C-in-C’s including Haig said ‘it was impossible to do away 
with the field punishment’. He argued that its abolition ‘would have disastrous and 
far reaching consequences and that as a result a recourse to the death penalty would 
become more frequent’. However, Haig did offer a compromise whereby the 
application of the punishment was standardised throughout the Army. Thus, although 
offenders could still be shackled, this could not be done in the crucifix position. 
These recommendations were accepted.1031 Proposals for abolition were raised again 
in 1919, and once more Haig successfully argued for retention.1032 After relinquishing 
his command, the practice was abolished in 1923.1033  
It does appear that Haig’s approach to exemplary discipline did stiffen morale. 
For the British Army as a whole 7,361 cases of desertion, the most common capital 
offense, were tried by Field General Courts-Martial between August 4th 1914 and 
March 31st 1920.1034 Of these prosecutions, only 266 or 3.7% resulted in the death 
penalty.1035 When the incidence of desertion abroad (7,361) is compared to the figure 
at home (31,269), the result is instructive.1036 Over four times as many soldiers 
deserted in Britain as abroad. Although there were other obvious factors at play 
including the proximity of refuge, language and the ease of travel, the vital difference 
between the two regimes may have been the deterring effect of the death penalty. In 
Britain, virtually all prosecutions took place under a District Courts-Martial where 
the sanction of the death sentence was prohibited. It is highly likely that the selection 
of this jurisdiction was influenced by political and military concerns to protect 
voluntary recruitment. Abroad, cases were typically tried by Field General Courts-
                                                 
1031 TNA/WO/32/5460, "Abolition of Field Punishment No 1." Memo: Haig to WO 04/12/1916. 
1032 TNA/WO/32/5461, "Enquiry into Field Punishment No 1." Memo: Haig to WO 02/06/1919. 
1033 TNA/WO/32/5462, "Revised Rules for Field Punishment No 1." Extract from London Gazette 
21/08/1923. 
1034 TNA/WO/394/20, "Statistical Abstract: Armies at Home and Abroad (1914-1920)." p. 669. 
1035 Ibid. p. 649. 
1036 Ibid. p. 658. 
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Martial that had the power to impose a capital sentence. This finding indicates that 
Haig was right in his assessment that exemplary punishment was an effective 
deterrent, in part at least.  
The death penalty was abolished in 1930 for military offences against the 
advice to politicians of the Military Members of the Army Council who believed that 
discipline could collapse without it. In 1942, General Auchinleck, C-in-C (Middle 
East), drawing on the support of British C-in-Cs in other theatres, petitioned the WO 
to reinstate the death penalty to reduce the desertion rate and underpin sagging 
morale.1037 This attempt failed, again as a matter of political expediency.1038 However, 
as David French has been able to demonstrate both the Army Council’s earlier fears 
and those of Auchinleck later proved unfounded.1039 
Conclusion: Attainment of Unity-of-Moral-Effort in the BEF 
As alluded to the tools and the evidence do not exist to determine with any 
precision the degree to which unity-of-moral-effort was achieved in the BEF. 
However, bearing in mind the caveats discussed above, an indicative answer is 
revealed by the few remaining troop letter censorship reports that exist in archives 
that comment upon the fluctuating state of the BEF’s morale during Haig’s tenure.  
In the first report (March 1917) following the Somme campaign the censor 
concluded that ‘the sections dealing with the different Armies leaves a general 
impression that the spirit of confidence remains as high as ever, [and] that 
                                                 
1037 TNA/WO/32/15773, "Reintroduction of Death Penalty for Desertion in the Field." Memorandum. 
General C.J.E. Auchinleck, C-in-C Middle East Forces to Secretary of State for War, Annex I, 
07/04/1942 n.p. 
1038 TNA/WO/32/15774, "Reintroduction of Death Penalty for Desertion in the Field." Prime Minister’s 
(Winston Churchill) Personal Minute, 07/06/1914. 
1039 David French, "Discipline and the Death Penalty in the British Army in the War against Germany 
during the Second World War," Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 4 (1998) pp. 535; 540-543. 
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determination to see the war through [was] practically universal’.1040 In the second 
report (July 1918), after the costly German offensive and based upon 83,621 letters, 
the censor notes that ‘high quality of the moral which was especially evident…in the 
March report, was amply confirmed by later experience’. Elaborating the officer 
found that ‘general moral’ was ‘at its highest when fighting was in progress, some 
slackening during recent quieter periods, but all Armies [were] full of confidence’.1041 
Paradoxically, the censor concluded that ‘the loss of ground both on the Somme and 
further North acted as a powerful tonic on the moral of the Army as reflected in its 
correspondence’.1042  
After having read both reports carefully, and in the full knowledge of the 
operational context, the impression is created that the censor’s optimistic tone may 
not have entirely reflected the reality on the ground. To some extent this found 
support from Capt. M. Hardie, Censor at Third Army. In August 1917, based upon 
the censorship of 65,000 letters, he recorded ‘in regard to moral it must be frankly 
admitted that the letters show[ed] an increasing amount of war weariness. There 
[was] a tinge of despondence that has never been apparent before’.1043 Remarkably, 
Hardie reported an improvement in morale in October.1044  
When all of these factors that influence, determine and underpin morale are 
drawn together it does appear that their combined and pervasive effect across the 
BEF was positive. A fair and albeit subjective judgement does suggest that unity-of-
moral-effort to a relatively high degree was achieved by Haig during his tenure. In 
this respect, as J.G. Fuller observed: 
                                                 
1040 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)."Report: The British Armies in 
France as gathered by Censorship; March, 1917. p. 1. 
1041 Ibid. Report: The British Armies in France as gathered from Censorship; July 1918. Summary. 
1042 Ibid. p. 1. 
1043 IWM/Capt.M.Hardie-Papers/84/46/1. Report: August 1917.  
1044 Ibid. Report: October 1917. 
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 The BEF outlasted ‘friend and foe alike’. The French 
Army…underwent a crisis of morale after the profound 
shocks of the battles of the frontiers of 20-22 August 1914 
[and] was subject to widespread mutiny in the summer of 
1917.1045 By autumn of 1918, and arguably before, German 
resistance crumbled on the home front, and the great German 
military machine, let down by indiscipline concentrated in the 
rear areas ground to a halt’.1046  
Yet the British and Dominion forces on the Western Front kept going, 
withstanding the mightiest blows the German Army could deliver in spring 1918. 
The BEF took the leading part in the great war-winning offensive of that autumn and 
at no time did discipline collapse. The Fifth Army staggered under the weight of the 
German assault of the latter part of the war in March 1918, but no Caporetto-style 
collapse ensued.1047  
When at the end of the war, Haig asked Edmonds if he could explain the 
British victory, his immediate response was ‘because the troops are like yourself; 
they didn’t know when they were beaten’.1048 Haig could not have done better than to 
have summed up the impact of unity-of-moral-effort in this way. 
                                                 
1045Hew Strachan, "Training, Morale and Modern War," Journal of Contemporary History 41(2006) p. 
211 See also French, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany 
1919-1945. p. 122. 
1046 Strachan, Strachan, "The Morale of the German Army, 1917-18." pp. 385-396. 
1047 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918. pp. 1-2. 
1048 LHCMA:Edmonds:Memoirs. p. 434.  
 274 
 
7. The Management of Unity-of-Effort in the BEF 
In previous chapters, the nature and character of unity-of-effort as perceived by 
Haig have been investigated. The practical application of the principle in terms of 
unity-of-mental, physical and moral effort has been demonstrated. This chapter will 
explore how Haig aimed to optimise unity-of-effort in the BEF through the agency of 
his General Staff. Firstly, it will be shown that up to 1909 the improvised staff 
organization used by successive British armies in the field produced mixed and 
sometimes catastrophic results. The outcome depended largely, if not solely, on the 
organizational and administrative ability of the incumbent General Officer, C-in-C. 
Further, it will be explained how in 1909 ad-hocism was replaced by a permanent 
staff organization regulated by principles that Haig embodied in FSR-II. These 
principles found practical elaboration in the General Staff Manual, 1911 and the Staff 
Manual, 1912. Thus, for the first time, the attainment of unity-of-effort in the field 
by the British Army was transformed from being an ad-hoc and arbitrary process to 
potentially a formal and managed one. The organization and development of the GS 
within the BEF will then be considered. In particular, a new organizational construct 
will be introduced to explain how Haig expected the vital role of coordination, 
exercised by the GS, to work in British military organization from GHQ down to 
platoon HQ. Finally, evidence drawn from the Battle of Amiens will show how 
unity-of-effort was managed by the GS in an operational environment.  
To establish a firm basis for understanding, it is important to note that the 
following discussion is confined to the British GS system in the field, and at war, 
unless expressly stated otherwise. This will avoid any confusion with the GS branch 
at the WO, the British command staff organization in peacetime, or the temptation to 
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make false comparisons with the German Great General Staff and the General Staff 
of the French Army. As John Gooch observed the British General Staff was ‘a 
particularly Anglo-Saxon institution’.1049 
A Tradition of ‘Adhocism’ 
The modern British Army’s staff has its antecedents in Oliver Cromwell’s New 
Model Army formed in 1645. Although Cromwell fashioned his own staff loosely on 
the Continental model, its organization was firmly grounded in ‘adhocism’ where 
improvisation was the governing principle. Hence, when in 1650 he became Captain-
General to carry the Civil War into Scotland he took with him a Chief of the Staff 
(Sergeant-Major-General Skippon) and a cadre of administrative staff officers. 
Cromwell used the staff as the directing organ of his army and this method gave a 
degree of stability to the English way of warfare. However, Cromwell was not only a 
brilliant field commander, he was also an extremely competent organiser. His 
administration set a very high standard, and in this process he recognised the value of 
an efficient staff.1050 That said, Cromwell fashioned his own staff organization, and 
the roles of its officers were dedicated to his own needs and purposes. There was no 
formal organization, specific roles were not codified and Cromwell ‘founded no 
schools devoted to military learning, or the training of staff officers’.1051 His legacy 
for the Staff was a pattern of improvisation, which relied solely on the organizational 
and administrative abilities of future commanders for its success. 
                                                 
1049 Gooch, "A Particularly Anglo-Saxon Institution: The British General Staff in the Era of Two World 
Wars." p. 203. 
1050 Lieut.-Col J.D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development (Harrisburg PA.: Military 
Service Publishing Company, 1944) pp. 113-116.  
1051 Ibid. p. 117. 
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 In the immediate future the Army was fortunate in its commanders. Monck 
continued in Cromwell’s mould establishing the Adjutant General’s Department.1052 
Marlborough proved to be an exceptional commander and an able administrator.1053 
His ad-hoc staff organization was convened and reconvened to suit the particular 
circumstances of his annual campaigns. His principal staff officer was the 
Quartermaster-General, William Cadogan who at various times acted as ‘chief of 
staff, master logistician, and chief of intelligence’.1054 There is little doubt that 
Marlborough’s successes would not have been achieved without a highly efficient 
staff, but this was underpinned by his charisma and close attention to detail.1055 For 
example, ‘every gun at Blenheim was laid under his own eye’.1056 
Wellington never contemplated any other staff system, other than his own. As 
Brian Bond observed ‘it is entirely appropriate to speak in personal terms of 
“Wellington’s Staff”’.1057 His GHQ staff organization comprised the Adjutant 
General’s branch and that of the Quartermaster-General whose duties included 
operations and intelligence, all under Wellington’s strict supervision.1058 Unlike 
Napoleon who employed a Chief of Staff (État-Major) as ‘the pivot of all 
operations’, Wellington did not see the necessity for this officer and the post was not 
part of his staff organization. The Duke also ensured that the staff organization at his 
headquarters was extended and standardised in compressed form down to his 
divisions.1059 Moreover, he divided his staff into two sub-divisions, the Adjutant 
                                                 
1052 George Monck,  1st Duke of Albemarle (1608-1670). 
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1055 Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development. p. 121. 
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pp. 52-53. 
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General’s department and the Quartermaster-General’s department. The former was 
responsible for operations and intelligence and the latter supply. ‘There can be little 
doubt that an efficient staff was an important factor in Wellington’s consistent 
success’.1060 
Following the establishment of the Staff College in 1801 under the auspices of 
the C-in-C, the Duke of York, and  following the success of the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815, apathy took hold in relation to any further staff development in the British 
Army. Adhocism continued with Lord Raglan in the Crimea where his improvised 
staff organization and administration broke down with calamitous results.1061 This 
also appears to have been the case in South Africa where there was ‘chaos and 
confusion’ in the early campaigns under Buller.1062  
In 1900, when Roberts replaced Buller, he continued to improvise. Roberts was 
an able commander, but a much less able administrator. He appointed Kitchener as 
his Chief of Staff placing him in the invidious position of supervising the ill-defined 
and often conflictual duties of the operational and administrative staff. Kitchener’s 
position was further compromised when Roberts went over his head and dealt 
directly with the Directors of his administrative services.1063 With a degree of irony 
that was obviously lost on Roberts he complained to the Royal Commission on the 
War in South Africa of the ‘indifferent staff-work’, where mistakes were made which 
had the most serious consequences’.1064  
 As the evidence of the Elgin Inquiry showed, by the end of the war the 
deficiencies of the ad-hoc staff organization were abundantly clear to both the 
                                                 
1060 Ibid. p. 129. 
1061 Miles, "Army Administration." p. 25. 
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military and to politicians. There was no formal staff organization, the roles of staff 
officers and their duties were not defined, the Staff College was producing too few 
trained officers for anything other than imperial policing, and administrative staff 
officers had no access to higher education or training. Unity-of-effort within both the 
staff and army was compromised. The price of this failure was paid in blood and 
treasure. Arnold Foster in a forceful address to Parliament lamented that the Army 
‘imperfectly prepared, wasteful in its methods and unsatisfactory in results, [was] 
one of the most costly machines ever devised.’1065 
Evolution of Formal Staff Methods (1909-1912) 
In January 1904 the Esher Committee published its report abolishing the post 
of C-in-C and replaced the Army Board with a seven man Army Council (four 
military and two civil members), chaired by the Secretary of State for War who was 
analogous to the First Lord of the Admiralty. The military members included the new 
post of the Chief of the General Staff who had responsibility for preparation and 
training for war, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General and the Master-
General of Ordnance. Although these officers reported directly to the Secretary of 
State, the intention was that the CGS would be primus inter pares.1066 His GS branch 
would be the so called ‘brain of the army’.1067 Moreover, the Committee demanded 
field service regulations setting out ‘the accepted principles as regards the training of 
the Forces, and their administration in, war’ which the members stipulated were 
‘essential’.1068 While these proposals were approved by Parliament, the onerous job of 
military implementation finally fell to Haig, under Haldane’s political leadership.  
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Before Haig took up his post of DSD, work within the branch had already 
begun on FSR-II. 1069 It is highly likely that Lieut.-Col. Walter Adye was the original 
draftsman of FSR-II.1070 He supervised the publications section (S.D.2) of the newly 
formed Directorate of Staff Duties.1071 However, unlike the Combined Training, 1905 
manual, publication of FSR-II had been blocked by other departments at the WO, 
fearful of incursions on their own prerogatives.1072 This is perhaps fortunate because 
Adye had faithfully translated the Esher Committee’s proposal which effectively 
united command and administration under the C-in-C into the draft regulations.1073 
The unintended consequence of this action was that, as had happened in the past, 
there was a danger that top ranking officers in peace time could become ‘immersed 
in administrative and routine matters’, with training and command being relegated to 
quite a secondary place.1074 In addition, while the C-in-C retained unqualified control 
for these two great functions, perversely he was given ‘no financial responsibility’.1075 
Advised by Haig, Haldane drafted two memoranda for the consideration of the 
Army Council with a view to settling the question of financial responsibility in the 
field. He hoped that this action would open the way for the publication of FSR-II. It 
appears that Haldane received little response to the first document, but the second 
was debated at three Army Council meetings (nos. 89, 90, 91).1076 In July 1907, at the 
last of these meetings, the military members took the bold decision to convene a nine 
man committee chaired by the DSD, Maj-Gen. H.D. Hutchinson, to translate 
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Haldane’s proposals into FSR-II, already in draft. It was agreed that attention would 
focus on the first five ‘doctrinal’ chapters as the remainder were consequential upon 
their provisions.1077 This thankless task fell to the unfortunate Adye. Closely 
supervised by the Committee, and under the critical eye of the Military Members, the 
good Colonel’s difficulties in performing this duty can only be imagined.  
The matter remained in the Committee’s dead hand for a further four months 
until Haig succeeded Hutchinson in November 1907 when the body was dissolved. 
Unsurprisingly, no real progress had been made. To drive through the regulations, 
Haig was left in the onerous position of having to address the almost irreconcilable 
differences with, and within, the Army Council. Unfortunately, none of the revised 
drafts of FSR-II prepared by Adye under Haig’s supervision have been located. 
However, the original text for Adye’s first five chapters has been found.1078  The full 
extent of Haig’s influence is revealed by the simple expedient of comparing the first 
five chapters of Adye’s original draft with the final regulations published in 1909.1079 
This shows that Haig made a vital and far reaching contribution to the principles 
espoused, and to the structure and content of the doctrinal chapters. For the first time, 
Haig introduced a set of general principles applicable to War Organization; the first 
of which was the principle of unity-of-effort:  
The successful issue of military operations depends mainly 
upon the combination and unity of effort directed with energy 
and determination towards a definite object.1080  
 
 
                                                 
1077 Ibid. Front notes 3, 4, 6, 8.  
1078 Ibid. Field Service Regulations. (Part II) Chapters 1-5, n.p.  
1079 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration). 
1080 Ibid. p. 22. (Emphasis in original). 
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Elaborating on this principle, Haig insisted that: 
The essence of all efficient organization lies in the due sub-
division of labour and the decentralization of responsibility 
among subordinates, combined with central control and co-
ordination of subordinated parts for the attainment of 
common objectives.1081  
Haig then coupled the principle of unity-of-effort with the strategic outcome: 
Success in war can be attained only by the defeat of the 
enemy’s mobile forces. The efforts of all parts of an army 
must be combined to that end.1082  
The other principles of war organization articulated by Haig in FSR-II were unity of 
control, (generally referred to as unity of command); the division of labour, span of 
control, delegation of responsibility and the chain of command.1083 
It is a mark of Haig’s achievement that these fundamental organizational 
principles were later enunciated by Henri Fayol, considered to be the founding father 
of modern management science, in his famous work Administration Industrielle et 
Générale, first published in July 1916.1084 The obvious conclusion is that in matters of 
organization and administration, Haig was well ahead of his time. The principles 
established by Haig in 1909 are still considered best practice today in major 
institutions and corporations around the world. 
As shown in Figure 27 (below), the structure and content of the original and 
revised chapters are markedly different: 
 
                                                 
1081 Ibid. p. 23. (Emphasis in original).  
1082 Ibid. p. 23. (Emphasis in original). 
1083 Ibid. pp. 22-24. 
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Figure 27: Comparison of FSR-II Editorial Structure (1906 versus 1909) 
1906-07 Text (Pre-Haig):1085  
 
1909 Text (Post-Haig):1086  
 
CHAPTER I. CHAPTER I. 
ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND 
ADMINISTRATION 
PREPARATORY MEASURES. 
CHAPTER II. CHAPTER II. 
THE STAFF. WAR ORGANIZATION. 
CHAPTER III. CHAPTER III. 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS, AND 
OFFICERS HOLDING SPECIAL, AND 
PERSONAL APPOINTMENTS. 
GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF THE 
EXECUTIVE AND OF THE 
COMPONENT PARTS OF THE 
FORCES IN THE FIELD. 
CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER IV. 
LINES OF COMMUNICATION. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
MAINTENANCE OF THE FORCES IN 
THE FIELD. 
CHAPTER V. CHAPTER V. 
MAINTENANCE OF AN ARMY. PROVISION AND MAINTENANCE OF 
PERSONNEL. 
 
Of particular importance is the comparison between Chapter II ‘The Staff’ in 
the original, and Chapter III of Haig’s FSR-II. This reveals that in the original, the 
responsibility for command and administration was combined under the C.-in-C. 
(‘The instructions of C-in-C are conveyed to the army through three officers, viz. – 
the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant General, and the Quartermaster 
General.’).1087 By contrast, FSR-II made a clear demarcation between the 
responsibility for command and administration. The regulations stressed that: 
                                                 
1085 TNA/WO/32/4735, "The Incidence of Administrative Responsibility in the Field," (1907). FSR Part 
II n.p. 
1086 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration), (London: HMSO, 1909). 
1087 TNA/WO/32/4735, "The Incidence of Administrative Responsibility in the Field." Chapter II, The 
Staff, section 6, p. 4). 
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The C.-in-C. issues such orders on all matters connected with 
the efficiency and maintenance of the forces in the field as he 
considers necessary for the execution of his plan of 
operations, for the success or failure of which he is 
responsible. But it is a principle of war organization the  
C.-in-C. is relieved of the responsibility for the conduct of the 
business of providing for the requirements of the forces in the 
field, unless he sees fit to interpose.1088 
The original only alluded to the coordinating role of the Staff: 
The members of the staff convey the commander’s 
instructions to the troops and administrative services under 
his command and see that they are duly observed. The staff, 
therefore, acts as a directing and explaining body towards the 
troops and administrative services. An officer of the staff is 
vested with no military command.1089 
FSR-II made this role plain:  
An officer of the staff, as such, is vested with no military 
command, but he has a two-fold responsibility; first, he 
assists a commander in the supervision and control of 
operations and requirements of the troops, and transmits his 
orders and instructions; secondly, it is his duty to give the 
troops every assistance in his power in carrying out the 
instructions issued to him.1090  
In 1923, presumably to reflect the experience gained in the field, the role of the 
staff was elaborated further in FSR-I (Organization and Administration): 
The main object of staff organization is to ensure smooth and 
efficient cooperation of every part of the force, directed with 
energy and determination to the defeat of the enemy.  
                                                 
1088 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) p. 27. (Emphasis in original). 
1089 "The Incidence of Administrative Responsibility in the Field." Chapter II, Section 5, p. 4. 
1090 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) p. 35. (Emphasis in original). 
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No perfection of organization, however, can make up for the 
absence of care, forethought, knowledge, and cordial 
goodwill through the staff. The relationship between all 
officers serving on the staff must therefore be close and 
cordial. It must be realized that though the work is organized 
in different branches, there is only one staff – and this has but 
one purpose – to assist the commander in framing his plan 
and the troops in carrying it out.1091  
In 1911, building upon the foundation established by FSR-II, a General Staff 
Manual, albeit issued in provisional form, was published to set out in detail the 
organization, functions and specific duties of the branch in the field.1092 The origins of 
this manual remain obscure. However, a footnote in Adye’s original 1907 draft of 
FSR-II referred specifically to the volume suggesting that it was in gestation at this 
time.1093 In January 1908, at Haig’s first GS Conference in his capacity of DSD, he 
drew attention to the dysfunctional organization of the staff during the South African 
War where ‘three entirely different systems were adopted concurrently by three 
different headquarters’. He advocated that it was ‘necessary to have some book of 
regulations that would show the normal conditions’ allowing the GS to be organised 
‘as efficiently as possible’ for a large-scale campaign’.1094 Given the context of the 
meeting and the specific discussion on staff organization, it is most likely that Haig 
was referring to the General Staff Manual which he knew was in preparation, and 
where public recognition of his full backing was necessary to fend-off any potential 
opposition. Following the meeting, Adye’s team prepared the volume under Haig’s 
close supervision. Although the manual was published in July 1911, 18 months after 
                                                 
1091 Field Service Regulations Vol I: Organization and Administration. p. 23. (Emphasis in original). 
1092 TNA/WO/279/861, General Staff Manual. War. (Provisional). 
1093 TNA/WO/32/4735, "The Incidence of Administrative Responsibility in the Field." Chapter II, The 
Staff, p. 4. 
1094 TNA/WO/279/18, "Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College 7th to 
10th January 1908." pp. 26-27. 
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Haig had left the WO to take up his post as CGS in India, it is unlikely that any 
changes of substance were made to the regulations prior to publication. Haig had 
recommended Maj.-Gen. L.E. Kiggell, as his replacement as DSD precisely because 
he wanted to ensure continuity of his ideas within the directorate.1095 Moreover, in the 
lengthy correspondence between the two men, where it is apparent that Kiggell 
sought and followed Haig’s advice on even relatively trivial matters, no mention was 
made of the GS regulations. This suggests that progress to publication proceeded as 
Haig originally intended.1096  
The General Staff Manual is instructive because it not only re-confirms the 
coordinating role of the body, but it also leaves no doubt as to how Haig believed this 
role should work:  
13. Decentralisation and co-ordination of Staff duties: 
1. The more thoroughly the will and influence of the 
Commander-in-Chief permeates the whole army, the higher 
the degree of combination attainable. The chain of command 
is the main channel through which this will and influence 
must flow, but the physical and mental powers of individual 
being limited, this chain of command is only sufficient in 
itself to attain the desired end in the case of small forces 
acting under the eyes of the commander. With larger forces, 
the Staff, working through this main channel, is intended to 
furnish the means to so assist the natural powers of a 
commander that he may be enabled to keep in close touch 
with every part of his command. The duties of the Staff are, 
therefore multifarious. 
2. In order to provide for the efficient performance of Staff 
duties, it is necessary to arrange for the division of labour 
                                                 
1095 LHCMA:Kiggell:1/1-37, "Letters Haig to Kiggell (1909-1914)." Letter: Haig to Kiggell 18/5/1909; 
14/07/1910; 21/05/1909. 
1096 Ibid. Letters (1909-1914). 27/04/1911; 14/04/1911; 04/05/1911; 25/05/1911; 13/07/1911. 
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combined with central control. With these two objects in 
view Staff work at General Headquarters is grouped into 
three branches, as described in Field Service Regulations, 
Part II.; and it is laid down that the “the power and 
responsibility of co-ordinating Staff work at General 
Headquarters is vested in the Commander-in-Chief.” 
3. Another important principle in military organization, 
however, is that no individual should be burdened with more 
work that it is possible for him to do thoroughly; and it is 
essential that the Commander-in-Chief should be relieved, so 
far as possible, of all detail in order that he may be enabled to 
devote himself to the more important work of his high office. 
He is empowered therefore, by Field Service Regulations, to 
delegate the duty of co-ordination to the Chief of the General 
Staff, but with the proviso that the latter is not to be charged 
with responsibility for the inner working of the other 
branches. It is further laid down that the Chief of the General 
Staff is the Staff officer through whom the Commander-in-
Chief “exercises his functions of command, and by whom all 
orders issued by him will be signed…”1097 
The first passage showed that in Haig’s mind the coordinating role of the GS in 
the field was one of its primary functions, if not the principal one, within the whole 
force at each level of command. The intention was that the GS would achieve 
coordination mainly by the preparation (Section O(a)) and despatch of orders 
(Section O(b)) under the signature of the commander.1098 Furthermore, while the  
C-in-C was responsible for coordinating the Staff, this duty in effect rested with the 
CGS, and through him to his direct subordinates.  
                                                 
1097 TNA/WO/279/861, General Staff Manual. War. (Provisional.) pp. 16-17. See also sec. 2. Position 
of the Staff in Relation to Commanders pp. 9-10. 
1098 Ibid. Chapter IV. Operations Section, pp. 32-49. 
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To summarise, the C-in-C had the specific power and responsibility for 
coordinating the Staff at GHQ.1099 To avoid overburdening the C-in-C, the regulations 
gave him leave to delegate the coordination of the Staff, as he saw fit, to the CGS, 
and through this officer to members of the GS branch.1100 By virtue of the CGS’s 
position, he had the capacity to issue instructions under his Chief’s signature to the 
C-in-C’s immediate subordinate commanders whose rank was normally superior to 
his own, and to heads of the specialist fighting services under the C-in-C’s command. 
The CGS, through the GS branch, worked out the detailed arrangements demanded 
by the C-in-C’s instructions and drafted the orders thereto. These were issued 
through the GS branch to lower formations whose HQ organization mirrored that of 
GHQ in progressively compressed form. Vitally, the Staff was vested with no power 
of military command outside their respective branches. They merely animated the  
C-in-C’s instructions.1101 In this sense the Staff commanded no one, but the body did 
assist the C-in-C to command everyone.1102 Crucially, the regulations anticipated that 
the effective and efficient work of staff officers in pursuit of the C-in-C’s instructions 
would be facilitated by a productive network of personal contacts of all kinds within 
the three staff branches, regular fighting formations and specialist fighting 
services.1103 A subtlety of this arrangement which has not been widely acknowledged, 
is that by right of this vested authority, staff officers were deemed to have access to 
the C-in-C’s personal network of contacts, and on equal terms.1104 
The General Staff Manual was superseded by the Staff Manual, 1912. The 
main difference between the two volumes is signalled by the abbreviation of the title. 
                                                 
1099 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) para 3. p. 36.  
1100 Ibid. Para. 3. p. 36. 
1101 Ibid. Para 2. p. 35. 
1102 Urwick, "Organization as a Technical Problem." p. 63. 
1103 Ibid. p. 67. 
1104 Ibid. p. 63. 
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The Staff Manual was revised and extended to include the organization and duties of 
the administrative staff branches and departments. The passages quoted above were 
reproduced without change except those required to include the added staff branches.  
The General Staff – The Third Dimension in British Military Organization 
The use of the GS acting as the vehicle dedicated to achieving a high degree of 
coordination, and thereby unity-of-effort, was a uniquely British and a potentially 
revolutionary organizational concept. An updated version of General Bronsart von 
Schellendorff’s standard work, The Duties of the General Staff observed: 
The English Army is in every respect so entirely different 
from any of the great European armies, not only as regards 
the system of recruiting of the Army, but also as regards 
administration and the duties of the higher military 
authorities, that it must not appear surprising if the character, 
duties and business of the General Staff belonging to it are 
totally different from that of any other Army.1105  
Lyndall Urwick, a distinguished former BEF GSO, was possibly the only 
contemporary management scientist who publicly recognised the potential of this 
innovation for large-scale organizations. However, his important paper Organization 
as a Technical Problem published in 1937 was largely overshadowed by the work of 
the American scientific management school, including that of its much celebrated 
founding member, Frederick Winslow Taylor.1106 Urwick also misjudged his primary 
American audience with his dense writing style and totally Anglo-centric exposition. 
Even today, the full significance of the British GS’s coordinating role has not fully 
                                                 
1105 General Bronsart von Schellendorff, The Duties of the General Staff (London: HMSO, 1905) p. 
105. This opinion has been reaffirmed by modern historians. Eugene O. Porter, "The Evolution of the 
General Staff," The Historian 8, no. 1 (1945) p. 35. Gooch, "A Particularly Anglo-Saxon Institution: 
The British General Staff in the Era of Two World Wars." 
1106 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers, 1919). 
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been recognised by military historians and top managers of institutional, commercial 
and industrial organizations. This is perhaps not surprising because there have been 
‘few systematic studies’ of the GS on the Western Front.1107  
The latest work in the field by Dr Paul Harris, acknowledged but omitted to fill 
this particular gap in our knowledge. In a thoroughly well researched study supported 
by deep quantitative analysis, his focus was primarily on who the GS were and what 
they did, rather than how they did it. Harris defined the GS as ‘assistants to their 
commanders and servants to the troops’.1108 While this pithy interpretation is correct, 
it obscures the vital importance of the GS’s coordinating role. Harris did discuss this 
duty, but he did not elaborate much beyond positing that ‘conferences played a 
significant part in the planning process and the life of a staff officer’.1109 He also drew 
attention to the communications difficulties GSO’s experienced in field, which to 
some extent would have impaired their ability to carry out their coordinating role.  
To illuminate fully the novelty of the British staff system as devised by Haig it 
is first necessary to make a small mental leap. Since at least 1896, the ubiquitous two 
dimensional organogram has been used to illustrate the structure and relationships 
within organizations including the military.1110 One way to quickly grasp how the 
staff system worked as articulated by Haig in FSR-II is to consider the organogram 
depicted in three dimensions. The first dimension is represented by the First Line 
fighting services; the second dimension by the Second Line supporting services and 
the third dimension by the Third Line coordinating service, namely the General Staff. 
This treatment immediately reveals the GS’s functional organizational relationship.  
                                                 
1107 Harris, "The Men Who Planned the War: A study of the Staff of the British Army on the Western 
Front." Harris provides a thorough review of the existing literature in his thesis, demonstrating its 
paucity. pp. 8-38. 
1108 Ibid. p.75. 
1109 Ibid. pp.139-143. 
1110 J. Slater Lewis, Commercial Organization of Factories (London: E. & F.N. Spoon, 1896) pp.474-
476: Diagram of Staff Organization.  
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It illustrates how the Branch was able to exercise its coordinating role upon the First 
and Second Line arms and services, directly impacting unity-of-effort at each level of 
command from GHQ down to the platoon, or its equivalent in the non-infantry 
fighting arms.  
‘The chief purpose of coordination is to secure correlated action by 
individuals’.1111 Visualised in three dimensions, the GS can be personified as the 
‘spinal cord’ of the organization acting as the conduit for the transmission of orders, 
which acted to deliver perpendicular coordination.1112 The GS promoted horizontal 
coordination, within and between the First Line and Second Line through the active 
‘service of knowledge,’ meaning the provision of information, advice and counsel.1113  
Building on FSR-II, The General Staff Manual, 1911 elaborated further: 
The duties of the General Staff, as laid down in Field Service 
Regulations, Part II may be conveniently considered 
generally as consisting of: 
(a) Obtaining and communicating to responsible 
commanders information:— 
i. Of their own forces. 
ii. Of the enemy and the country. 
(b) Conveying the instructions and orders of the responsible 
commanders to those who have to act on them, and 
assisting the latter to carry out these instructions and 
orders in such a manner as will conduce to bringing the 
operations to a successful issue. 
                                                 
1111 Urwick, "Organization as a Technical Problem." p.60. 
1112 Hubert Foster, Organization: How Armies Are Formed For War (1911)  (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd, 
1911). Foster observed that the ‘Staff forms the nervous system of the Command’. p. 58. 
1113 Mooney, "The Principles of Organization." pp. 93-95 This distinction, implied by FSR-II was made 
explicit by Mooney, Vice President of the General Motors Corporation and a leading American 
organizational practitioner in 1937.  
 291 
 
(c) Keeping the necessary records, both of the purposes of 
war and for a subsequent history of it. 
(d) Miscellaneous duties, such as censorship, control of the 
press correspondents, charge of foreign attachés, and 
drafting despatches.1114 
It should be mentioned that the Staff Manual 1912, added an extra duty for the GS 
namely ‘furnishing timely information to the staff and administrative services and 
departments as to the situation and probable requirements of the troops’.1115 
Although there was a direct reporting relationship in the chain of command 
between GSOs, in fact, this was a ‘dotted line’ relationship characteristic of modern 
matrix organizations.1116 These officers reported directly to their respective formation 
or unit COs, while their training, discipline and career prospects were the ultimate 
responsibility of their GS superiors, and the branch to which they belonged. 
The foregoing explanation provides a summary of what GS officers did; it is 
now possible to outline how they did it. Henri Fayol enumerated 14 principles of 
administration and identified five elements comprising the process of management in 
his treatise. As elaborated previously in FSR-II, the principles included unity of 
direction, unity of command, the scalar chain, division of work, and decentralised 
responsibility foreshadowing mission command.1117 However, it is Fayol’s five 
elements of management, characterising the management process that are of the 
greatest value here: Prévoyance – this French term combined both the idea of 
foresight with that of planning. The process included forecasting, goal setting and 
action determination. Organizing – this provided the organization with everything 
                                                 
1114 TNA/WO/279/861, General Staff Manual. War. (Provisional.) pp. 20-21. 
1115 TNA/WO/32/4731-34, Staff Manual  (HMSO, 1912). p. 27 
1116 http://www.global-integration.com/matrix-management/matrix-structure/solid-line-reporting-
dotted-line-reporting-matrix-organization-structure/ 02/12/2015. 
1117 Daniel A. Wren, The History of Management Thought (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2005) 
pp. 214-219. Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration); Fayol, General 
and Industrial Management.General Principles, pp. 22-24. 
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useful to its function. Commanding – this involved setting the organization’s assets 
into motion. Coordinating – this harmonised the organization’s activities so as to 
facilitate its working. Controlling – this verified that everything occurs in conformity 
with the plan adopted, the instructions issued and the principles established.1118  
As can be seen in Figure 28, (below) these activities provide a matrix that 
neatly encapsulates GS’s duties enunciated in FSR-II, the General Staff Manual, 
1911, and added to in the Staff Manual, 1912. If the allocation of staff duties within 
the matrix is accepted, then it can reasonably be concluded that the GS performed its 
duties by what is now recognised as the management process. In effect, GS officers 
might be named ‘military managers’ to more accurately signal their role. The staff 
duties identified in Figure 28 all impinged in characteristic ways on the overall 
coordinative function.1119 Prévoyance (which in of itself requires information and/or 
intelligence) delivered the operational and other types of plans, which created, 
among other things, the contexts for coordination. Organizing brought manpower 
and resources into play in accordance with the plan. Commanding involved issuing 
orders, putting the plan in action. Coordinating ensured that all First and Second Line 
activities were harmonized, in accordance with the plan typically through meeting 
and conferences. Controlling monitored the outcomes and results of the plan. At the 
macro level of organization the GS utilised these management elements to promote 
unity of mental, physical and moral effort. In pursuit of unity-of-effort, coordination 
was the object of these elements of management in toto. At the micro level of 
organization, the function of coordination, like that required by an operational plan 
for instance, remained a discrete element within the management process. 
                                                 
1118 Wren, The History of Management Thought. pp. 219-222 . Fayol, General and Industrial 
Management. Chapter 5, Elements of Management pp. 43-110; 104-105. 
1119 Urwick, "Organization as a Technical Problem." p. 60-69. 
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Figure 28: Staff Duties Encapsulated by Henri Fayol’s Elements of Management 
 
 Prévoyance Organizing Commanding Coordinating Controlling 
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Unity-of-Effort at the Battle of Amiens (August 8th-12th 1918)  
As argued above, the GS’s principal responsibility at all levels of command 
was coordination. To demonstrate how this process worked in the field, a case study 
has been made of the GS’s role at the Battle of Amiens in August, 1918. Specifically, 
the staff practices and processes used by Fourth Army, working through the 
Australian Corps, the 5th Australian Infantry Division, the 15th Australian Infantry 
Brigade, and the 57th Australian Infantry Battalion, have been examined.  
The Battle of Amiens has been chosen because by 1918 the British GS system 
had arguably reached its full elaboration, and its officers were thoroughly versed in 
their respective roles. The Australian Corps, rather than the British III Corps or the 
Canadian Corps, have been selected simply because Monash was considered to be an 
able manager, and like Haig he would not have knowingly tolerated poor staff 
practices under his command. The 5th Division was chosen because its staff records 
have been retained in unusual detail and are readily accessible on-line from the 
Australian War Memorial. The establishment of the Imperial General Staff, again 
with Haig’s close involvement, ensured that the Australians adopted the GS 
principles, practices and work processes specified in FSR-II and the later 1912 Staff 
Manual. The records of the Australian Corps, 5th Division and lower formations 
provided evidence of the similarity of staff practices between the Australian and 
British formations which extended down to the use of identical printed stationery. 
The staff records of the formations included in this study have been assessed 
through the prism of Fayol’s management process. Broadly, this work examined the 
period between July 12th 1918, when the battle plan was in formulation, to August 
10th 1918 when the main thrust of offensive action was concluded, whereupon the  
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5th Australian Division went into Corps reserve. The detailed examination focused on 
the period from July 28th, when the offensive was approved by Foch, to August 9th.1120  
The findings of the case study are based upon the primary source material 
presented in Appendix 1. This evidence was drawn from the July to August 1918 war 
diaries maintained by the relevant formations and units. This information has been 
augmented by entries and original documents contained in the relevant volumes of 
Haig’s ‘typed’ war diaries, orders and memoranda in the Fourth Army: Operations 
(July 17th to August 30th 1918) file, and where necessary the British Official 
Histories.1121  
As can be seen from Appendix 1, the order and information flow has been 
marshalled by GHQ, formations (Fourth Army, Australian Corps, 5th Aust. Division, 
and 8th Brigade) and battalions (57th Aust. Bn.). It has been assembled under Fayol’s 
management elements (prévoyance, organising, commanding, coordinating and 
controlling). The primary object was to illuminate the overarching coordinating role, 
both perpendicular and horizontal, of GSOs in carrying out these management 
processes in respect to operations and administration. The role played by Haig as the 
‘coordinator in chief’ is also shown on the matrix.  
It is important to note that Appendix 1 suffers from at least two limitations. 
First, the information in the matrix is not comprehensive and reflects only those 
documents and other written material (messages, telephone reports, telegrams, etc.) 
                                                 
1120 Under ideal circumstances, earlier British operations would have been included in this study to 
trace the evolution of General Staff work practices and processes. In addition, it would have been 
useful to include all of the British formations that took part in the offensive to examine in what ways 
and to what extent the staff process and work practices differed between them. However, within the 
word constraint these two exercises have not been possible. 
1121 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." (July-August 1918); 
TNA/WO/158/241, "Fourth Army File No 11 (17th July-30th August 1918)." AWM4/1/35/7-8, 
"Australian Corps (July - August)," (1918). AWM4/1/50/20-30, "5th Australian Division: General 
Staff HQ July - August," (1918). AWM4/23/15/30/3, "15th Australian Infantry Brigade War Diary 




retained on file. Relevant information may not have been filed in the first place, and 
some information that was collated could subsequently have been ‘weeded-out’. It 
appears that administrative communications in particular suffer from these problems. 
Secondly, it is also the case that the coordinating role of the GS relied on informal 
meetings, face-to-face communication of other kinds, and telephone calls. Again, it is 
probable that the substance of many of these contacts has not be been recorded. 
Nonetheless, based on the evidence included in Appendix 1, it is possible to draw the 
following primary conclusions:  
First. It is clear that the GSOs including battalion adjutants, exercised their 
coordinating responsibilities (perpendicular and horizontal) within the framework 
that Fayol defined as the management process.  
Prévoyance 
In respect to the planning process, Haig and his CGS Lieut.-Gen. Sir Herbert 
Lawrence were primarily responsible for establishing the operational objectives, 
selecting Rawlinson’s Fourth Army to conduct the offensive, and augmenting its 
strength with the addition of the Canadian Corps. Haig also proposed the idea of a 
combined Anglo-French attack with the First French Army covering the Canadian 
flank on the right wing. Rawlinson’s MGGS, Montgomery-Massingberd, and his 
SOs prepared the offensive plan in outline including objectives and dispositions for 
each army corps (III, Australian and Canadian Corps). Following evaluation, 
approval by GHQ, and ultimately with Foch’s sanction, Montgomery-Massingberd 
prepared a detailed administrative plan to support the operation. At the same time 
each corps commander together with his staff elaborated and then distributed the 
plan down to divisional level. The Australian Corps plan was set-out in 21 high-level 
battle instructions prepared by the BGGS, Brig.-Gen T.A. Blamey, under the close 
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direction of Monash. These instructions included the method of attack; dispositions 
of the infantry divisions; the deployment of heavy counter-battery and field artillery; 
the vital element of secrecy; the critical question of tanks; the organization of 
communications and HQs; the programme of action; road access; light signals, 
message and smoke protocols; intelligence and disposal of POW’s; co-operation of 
infantry and aircraft; the role of cavalry and the Armoured Car Battalion; and other 
essential matters. This process was repeated by division, brigade and battalion HQs. 
Instructions of increasing granularity were issued, and in some cases amended. The 
formal order to launch the offensive was issued on August 7th confirming ‘Z’ day 
(August 8th) and hour (04.20).  
Two novel aspects of this process deserve special attention. The first is the 
speed with which these plans were prepared and issued. In this case, the whole 
process was completed in a matter of weeks, rather than the months required for the 
first battle of the Somme.1122 It has been estimated that planning for the Amiens 
offensive was completed in 26 days, while that on the Somme took 115 days.1123 
Secondly, because these instructions were issued progressively and the process was 
repeated by division and brigade HQ, each formation down to battalion was given a 
welcomed ‘heads-up’ allowing more preparation time. The benefit of the process was 
experienced by Lieut.-Col. Chas. A. Denehy, commanding the 57th Aust. Inf. Bn.: 
Issue of Orders: I cannot speak too highly of the system 
adopted days before the operation and continued right up to 
the issue of the final operations order, of giving Battalions 
advanced information in the shape of preliminary 
                                                 
1122 As Professor William Philpott has noted, the Somme planning was extended by the complex 
political machinations that were taking place alongside the military planning. William Philpott, 
Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth Century (London: 
Little, Brown, 2009). See Chapters 2 & 3.  




instructions. The old practice of issuing a large operation 
order at the last moment when all information had to be 
collected and condensed seldom gave time to Battalions to 
make their dispositions and arrangements, without imposing 
tremendous pressure on senior Officers right up to the last 
moment. Certainly a lot of paper was employed but the “look 
ahead” principle was amply justified and at no time were we 
overwhelmed with a mass of orders. We thus had our 
arrangements thought out and completed well ahead of 
time.1124  
Denehy’s opinion does suggest that the principles established in FSR-II including 
unity-of-effort did take time to bed-down during the course of the war.  
Organizing 
At the operational, as opposed to the administrative level, the organizing that 
took place in the strict sense of the word involved the reshuffling of commands and 
the movement of formations and units into the theatre of operation and within the 
theatre to assembly areas. The GS, at all levels of command including the battalion 
adjutants, were responsible for this action providing the overall direction, 
coordination and control.  
Liaising with the GS, the AG’s & QMG’s branch organised and coordinated 
the administrative aspects of the operation through the relevant attached departments. 
The scope of this work encompassed railways, railheads, roads, canals, ammunition, 
supplies, water, ordnance, labour, medical, remounts, veterinary, traffic control, 
prisoners of war, accommodation and civilian inhabitants. In this case, it appeared 
that the DQMG, Maj.-Gen. H.C. Holman at Fourth Army HQ took the organising 
lead in this process, issuing orders which were translated down through the 
                                                 
1124 AWM4/23/15/30/3, "15th Australian Infantry Brigade War Diary (August)." Report: (Issue  
of Orders). (Emphasis in original). 
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DA&QMG Brig.-Gen. R. A. Carruthers, at Australian Corps, then on to the 
DAA&QMG Col. J.H. Bruche at the 5th Australian Division, to the Staff Captain at 
the 15th Brigade before finally reaching the QMS via the Adjutant at the 57th 
Australian Infantry Battalion. At each level, the requirements were adapted to the 
needs of the formation and units concerned.  
Commanding 
It is within the functions of commanding and that of coordinating where the 
true value of the GS in action is revealed within the context of the three-dimensional 
organizational structure. As per FSR-II, Haig in his capacity sat at the top of the 
command structure and exercised his function of command and coordination through 
his CGS who issued Haig’s orders under his signature.1125 In this way, on July 23rd the 
CGS advised Rawlinson, via his MGGS, that his proposal for the Amiens offensive 
had been approved with the order to ‘proceed with preparations as soon as possible’ 
(OAD/900). In due course, Haig issued further orders to Rawlinson via his CGS, 
altering in particular the final objective of the offensive. On August 6th, on Haig’s 
instructions, the CGS issued a formal order (OAD/15) to Rawlinson and Debeney, 
commander of the French First Army, whose 1 Corps was under Haig’s command, to 
commence operations on August 8th at 04.20 hours. All orders cascaded down the 
staff system from GHQ to battalion adjutants.  
As described above, warning orders in the form of battle instructions prepared 
by GSOs were issued to allow commanders to anticipate their orders and advance 
their battle procedure in a timely manner. In this particular case, owing to the need to 
maintain strict secrecy, the timing of these orders was staggered later at each level of 
command. Thus, while Fourth Army received official confirmation from Haig of the 
                                                 
1125 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration) p. 36. 
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operation on July 23rd, formal orders were withheld from battalion commanders until 
August 7th. However, through this use of the staff system, Haig could be confident 
that every man in the operation received his orders on a timely basis. 
While this process worked well prior to “Z” day and the whole offensive began 
in a high state of preparedness, the same cannot be said for the two subsequent days. 
FSR-I made it clear that during an operation, orders should be prepared and issued on 
the day previous to the required action. Further, FSR-I advised that ‘if detailed orders 
cannot be issued till late in the evening for early operations the next day, great 
inconvenience will often be prevented by the issue of a preliminary order notifying 
the time of assembly or of starting’.1126 This did not happen. In the case of the 
Australian Corps this problem was further compounded by Rawlinson’s decision to 
leave the start time for operations on the second day to the Canadian Corps 
commander. As a result, on August 9th costly confusion ensued; while the 
Australians achieved their objectives momentum was lost. This allowed the enemy 
time to regain composure and resistance stiffened bringing the offensive to an end as 
far as the 5th Division was concerned on August 10th.   
Coordinating 
Prior to “Z” day, in addition to instructions and orders, the GS coordinated 
both the operational and administrative aspects of the offensive through a series of 
conferences attended by relevant commanders and their senior staff officers. These 
conferences took place at GHQ with Haig in the Chair, at army, corps, division and 
brigade levels. The senior GSOs at each level convened the meetings, prepared the 
minutes and ensured that the agreed actions were not left undone. The express 
purpose of these meetings was to ensure a common understanding among 
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commanders and resolve any concerns. Coordination was also rendered through 
personal visits by GSOs. For example, Haig with either his CGS or his BGGS 
(Operations) visited Monash at Corps HQ on several occasions to personally explain 
his views and plans.  
This does not necessarily imply that Haig lacked confidence in Rawlinson or 
was micro-managing the planning process. Rather, it was Haig’s habit prior to a 
major operation to visit subordinate HQs to show his interest and to offer his support 
and encouragement.1127 He also made similar visits to the subsidiary formations of his 
other armies.1128 At brigade level the brigade major was responsible for ensuring that 
the battalion commanders and their adjutants had a firm grasp of their instructions 
and orders. This included trips to observe the ground from the immediate back areas.  
After “Z” day commanders and their staff were personally otherwise engaged, 
and coordination was effected by telephone and messaging services. Dispatch riders 
were used to carry written orders where the roads permitted and runners were used 
where they did not. At all levels of command liaison officers were used to maintain 
lateral contact and communications.  
Controlling 
Prior to “Z” day, Haig maintained control of proceedings by personally 
reviewing, amending if necessary, and approving all instructions and orders prepared 
and issued by his GS. Subordinate commanders exercised control in the same way. 
Real problems of control emerged as soon as the offensive was launched. An 
assessment of staff message logs at army, corps, divisional and brigade HQs 
                                                 
1127 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry: 31/07/1918; 01/08/1918; 
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1128 Ibid. 25/09/1918, Third Army; 27/09/1918; 18/09/1918, First Army; 18/09/1918, although Haig had 
meetings with Plumer (Second Army) at his HQ, he does not appear to have visited Second Army’s 
subsidiary formations. This is most likely because of their deployment adjacent to Cassel 3 hours to 
the north ‘fast travel’.  
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indicated a constant stream of information mainly flowing upwards from the 
subordinate units to the superior formations. Communications between GHQ, Army 
HQ, Corps and Divisional HQ tended to be by telegram or telephone. However, 
messaging from units in the field, which rapidly out-ran the availability of the cable 
network, came in by runner, pigeons, power buzzer-amplifier sets, contact aeroplanes 
and even message carrying rockets. By necessity, the common feature of these 
messages was their brevity, generally giving information on position and the state of 
enemy resistance. It appears from the content of messages, that no attempt was made 
to amend the existing orders of lower formations. Primarily, this may have been 
because the messaging logs showed it took between 45 minutes and five hours for 
information to pass from the battalions in the field to the higher decision making 
formations. Thus, the degree of higher control achieved once the battle was joined 
was passive rather than active. In short, while the higher commanders were aware of 
progress, albeit in some cases many hours after the event, their capacity to react was 
strictly limited. 
Second. The results indicate that unity-of-mental-effort was also facilitated by 
the GS through the application of principles established in FSR-I and FSR-II, S.S.135 
The Training and Employment of Divisions (January 1918), and  
S.S.143 The Training and Employment of Platoons (February 1918). In addition, the 
lessons learned as recently as the battle of Hamel on July 4th 1918 were rapidly 
disseminated by the GS and applied in the lower formations.1129 Although at the start 
of the war ‘battle procedure’ was ‘a rudimentary notion’1130 it is clear that, despite the 
pressure on planning, in accordance with FSR-I superior orders were issued in 
                                                 
1129 TNA/WO/158/244, "Summary of Operations, Fourth Army. 01/03/1916 to 08/11/1918." Summary 
of Operations from 29th June to 5th July 1918. Battle of Hamel. 
1130 Peter Pedersen, "Maintaining the Advance: Monash, battle procedure and the Australian Corps in 
1918," in 1918 Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, ed. Ashley 
Ekins (Auckland: Exisle Publishing Limited, 2010) p. 131. 
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sufficient time to enable subordinate commanders to frame and distribute their own 
orders.1131 As discussed, in accordance with S.S.135 these orders were issued at each 
level of command in the form of instructions dispatched sequentially and 
concurrently as the planning process progressed. As affirmed by S.S.135, this method 
was adopted precisely because it allowed commanders in lower formations to 
anticipate their orders, opening up as much time for preparation and training as 
possible. In addition, ‘preliminary measures’, which FSR-I alluded to as concurrent 
reconnaissance, planning, orders and preliminary movement, that today forms the 
fundamental basis of battle procedure, were clearly in evidence in the relevant War 
Diaries as preparation progressed in the days immediately prior to the attack.1132 
Moreover, the procedure for framing orders determined by FSR-I was strictly 
adhered too. This included setting a definite task for each body of troops, distinctly 
stating the direction of attack for each formation, ensured the planned simultaneity 
occurred in reality, and allowed the subordinate commanders to set out the manner of 
the attack.1133  
On the basis of lessons learned in the campaigns of 1914 and the spring of 
1915, the French Army abandoned its costly recipe for offensive success that relied 
on size and mass, i.e. more guns and more men.1134 A new operational doctrine But et 
conditions d’une action offensive d’ensemble (Goals and Conditions for a General 
Offensive Action or Note 5779) was substituted in its place.1135 As Jonathan Krause, 
the author of Early Trench Tactics in the French Army points out, this was ‘a 
monumentally important work’ that emphasised the need for rigorous and methodical 
organization which placed the infantry in a verified favourable position to attack 
                                                 
1131 Field Service Regulations, Part I (Operations) p. 28. 
1132 Ibid. Preliminary Measures, Sec 104, pp. 112-114. 
1133 Ibid. p. 113. 
1134 Jonathan Krause, Early Trench Tactics in the French Army (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) p. 26. 
1135 Ibid. p. 23. 
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through the decisive support of artillery before and during operations. This approach 
tied in with ‘Foch’s mantra of slow, methodical and prolonged preparation…[where] 
troops advance on small realisable objectives in a series of limited offensives’.1136 The 
method were mooted by Rawlinson following the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in the 
form of ‘bite and hold’ tactics, skilfully deployed by Plumer at Messines, and 
perfected at Cambrai when ‘breakthrough had been achieved’. However, these tactics 
were not applied on a large scale until Amiens where they were underpinned by ‘a 
true weapons system, with interlocking roles assigned to tanks, aeroplanes, a variety 
of forms of communication, artillery, infantry, and even horse-soldiers’.1137  
Third. Unity-of-physical-effort was achieved by training organised via the 
GSOs. As the intervention of armour was planned to be a major feature of the all-
arms attack, infantry of the fighting battalions were put through a two-day training 
programme in cooperation with tanks organised by brigade majors in the week prior 
to August 8th. To ensure uniformity of method the course of instruction was based on 
S.S.204 Infantry and Tank Co-operation and Training.1138 Haig witnessed this 
training session: 
Remarkable progress has been made since Cambrai, not only 
in our pattern of Tanks, but also in the methods of using 
them. Tanks now go first, covered by shrapnel barrage, and 
break down all opposition, (sic) Enemy in strong points and 
machine gun nest are then flattened out by the Tanks. The 
latter then signal to Infantry to “come on”, and these then 
advance in open order and mop up the remaining defenders, 
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and collect prisoners. During consolidation Tanks zig-zag in 
front to cover the operation.  
Some Australian Infantry were used to demonstrate first of 
all, and then the onlookers from another battalion were put 
through similar exercises on the same course. The result of 
these methodical exercises has been to render the Tank more 
effective and much less costly to us. Sir H. Rawlinson, 
General H. Elles and Staff of Tanks met me at the Tank 
ground.1139 
Further, S.S.143 was specifically identified as the basis for platoon training prior to 
the attack.1140 At a conference on July 29th, Haig emphasised that: 
Army Commanders must do their utmost to get troops out of 
the influence of trench methods. We are all agreed on the 
need for the training of Battalion Commanders who in their 
turn must train their Company and Platoon Commanders. 
This is really a “Platoon Commanders’ War”.1141 
Given the detailed nature of the instructions and the known wariness of 
Australian troops to working with tanks, the emphasis on training at brigade and 
battalion level was surprisingly absent in the preliminary battle instructions issued by 
GHQ, Army HQ and Corps HQ. This indicates that the higher commanders believed 
that the general state of troop preparedness was satisfactory. However, the reality on 
the ground was somewhat different particularly as regards the poor state of training 
of junior officers supplied as reinforcements.1142   
Fourth. Unity-of-moral-effort was promoted by a number of factors. 
Experience had shown that in general troop morale rose when successful fighting 
                                                 
1139 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry 31/07/18. 
1140 AWM4/23/74/30-31, " 57th Australian Infantry Battalion War Diary (July - August)."  
Appendix 33.  
1141 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)." Entry 29/07/1918. 
1142 IWM/Maxse-Papers/69/53/13/53/2. Note: Byng to Maxse, 20/07/1918.  
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was in progress.1143 Thus, following the stunning Australian success at Le Hamel on 
July 4th, there was a marked improvement of morale in July and subsequently in 
August. As a result of this offensive, confidence in Monash’s generalship was high 
and the Australian Corps were in good spirits on “Z” Day. This improvement in 
Australian morale was reflected by statistics on the BEF’s prison population in 
France. Australian inmates in custody dropped from an all-time high in February of 
8.8 to 6.8 per thousand in August, a positive movement of 30%.1144 However, 
following ‘months of almost continuous hard fighting, heavy casualties and 
dwindling numbers of reinforcements sapped the strength of units and produced an 
inevitable decline in discipline and morale’.1145 By November the population of 
Australian inmates had scaled new heights, approaching 9 convictions per thousand.    
Fifth. Given the success of the offensive at Amiens, it does appear that the GS 
achieved unity-of-effort through its overall coordinating role. In particular, the 
findings show that the GS at all levels of command, including battalion adjutants 
fulfilled their primary responsibility as stipulated by FSR-II and the Staff Manual, 
1912. These officers assisted their ‘commander[s] in the supervision and control of 
the operations and requirements of the troops, and transmitted [their] orders and 
instructions’. Furthermore, they coordinated the work of the administrative staff 
branches as required.1146  
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Before 1909, the attainment of unity-of-effort in the field was an ad-hoc 
process. Success was largely dependent on the organizational and administrative 
skills of the C-in-C. Under Wellington in the Peninsula War, the organization and 
administration was of a high standard. Infamously, this was not the case in the 
Crimea. In the South African War, the standard under Buller and Roberts was 
heavily criticised and most unsatisfactory.  
In 1909, FSR-II brought ad-hocism to an end. Thanks to Haig, for the first time 
the British Army had a formal GS system responsible for both vertical and horizontal 
coordination. The role of the GS, as conceived in FSR-II and elaborated upon in the 
General Staff Manual, 1911 can be revealed by depicting the organization of the 
BEF in three rather than the traditional two dimensions. As seen in previous chapters, 
Haig made the GS responsible for the development and dissemination of doctrine. 
This was also the case at Amiens, promoting unity-of-mental-effort. Specialised 
training organised by the GS delivered unity-of-physical-effort. High standards of 
operational and administrative staff work contributed to the maintenance of morale 
and discipline, helping to achieve unity-of-moral-effort. The attainment of these 
factors promoted overall unity-of-effort within the Australian Corps. The GS, as 
coordinators, performed their duties through the elements of management as defined 
by Henri Fayol. The guiding principles of this process were foreshadowed by FSR-II. 
The net result was that the Australian Corps in concert with the British and Canadian 
divisions made August 8th the ‘black day’ for the German Army, paving the way for 
the ultimate Allied victory.1147 
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In 1909, Haig established unity-of-effort as the first principle of war 
organization as determined by FSR-II. He did not define the principle, most probably 
in the belief that the term was a commonplace and required no elaboration. Had this 
not been the case, given his deep personal experience of doctrine and training manual 
writing, Haig would have provided a definition for the principle as was the common 
practice in his cavalry training manuals.1148 Hence, it can be safely asserted that in all 
probability Haig subscribed to the contemporary common understanding of unity-of-
effort as revealed and defined in Chapter 3.  
On the Western Front, Haig strove to achieve unity-of-mental-effort through 
the development and inculcation of doctrine. The firm basis of the BEF’s doctrine 
were the operational principles embodied in FSR-I, which reflected Haig’s world-
view on warfare. During his tenure as C-in-C, the BEF evolved into a successful 
learning organization. This facilitated the evolution of tactical doctrines based on 
these principles, leveraged by rapid advances in technology and adapted to the novel 
conditions of trench warfare. By 1918, an effective all arms doctrine had been 
evolved and was deployed at the battle of Le Hamel on July 4th. As Jonathan Bailey 
has successfully argued, a military revolution did take place where the fighting was 
transformed from two to three dimensions, giving rise to the birth of modern 
warfare.1149 Of course this was not just a British phenomenon, the French and the 
Germans had made similar progress.  
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However, there is disagreement over the degree to which doctrine was 
uniformly inculcated across the armies of the BEF. Three schools of thought have 
emerged. The first, which included Haig, have claimed that driven from GHQ the 
British armies had conceived and widely adopted the right tactical methods, 
vindicated by the German defeat. The second school, mainly comprising military 
historians, have asserted that effective tactical methods had been developed, but this 
occurred within the lower formations and units with the result that there was little 
uniformity in the BEF.1150 The third school, supported by many young revisionist 
historians, take the middle course. These people have argued that learning was driven 
in both directions from the top and from the bottom, concluding that while learning 
was less than perfect particularly below battalion level, ultimately the performance of 
the BEF proved better than that of the enemy.1151 Based upon the balance of the 
evidence, this can be regarded as the settled opinion. 
Haig drove unity-of-physical-effort by establishing and promoting the BEF’s 
training organization. When he assumed command of the force in December 1915, 
the responsibility for training was elevated to his DCGS. In 1917, in recognition of 
the rapidly evolving training needs of his armies, Haig created a TB at GHQ 
supported by specialist GSOs at army, corps and divisional level. In July 1918, he 
went further and established the IT and charged the organization with the specific 
responsibility for achieving uniform training standards across the BEF, and for 
coordinating methods and standards of training at home with those in France. 
However, Haig can be justly criticised for not acting sooner, particularly in regard to 
the establishment of the IT, given the wealth of his relevant pre-war experience. As a 
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consequence, this body had little beneficial impact during the closing stages of the 
war on the standards and uniformity of training within the BEF and between GHQ 
and the training organizations at home. 
Haig readily supported the widely accepted notion that the ‘moral’ of an army 
was fundamental to battlefield success. This principle received formal authority in 
FSR-I. To sustain the ‘moral’ of his armies, Haig pursued multiple initiatives to drive 
unity-of-moral-effort. He based his administration upon meritocratic principles with 
the aim of ensuring the best leaders were promoted to the right positions of 
command. Haig co-opted the clergy to promote the belief of his troops in the British 
fighting cause. He ensured that the physical welfare of his soldiers, most particularly 
in respect to the quantity, quality and supply of food, was maintained to a high 
standard. He lent his personal support to popular and widespread forms of rest and 
recreation from traditional sporting activities to novel musical hall and other 
theatrical entertainments. To bolster morale on the home front, with its causal impact 
on his troops at the Front, Haig implemented a modern, sophisticated and highly 
effective press relations campaign.  
Haig underpinned ‘moral’ by judicious application of exemplary punishment.1152 
Of course this reference to ‘judicious’ use is not a settled opinion as demonstrated by 
the sustained and ultimately successful campaign against the Ministry of Defence to 
exonerate all 351 officers and men who were executed by the British Army during the 
war.1153 Nonetheless, for Haig’s part, he sanctioned the death by firing squad of three 
officers, 15 NCO’s and 232 private soldiers. In 85% of these cases the soldiers 
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concerned were convicted for desertion. Haig did not generally interfere with the due 
process of field discipline, and was an unwavering supporter of strict regimental 
discipline including Field Punishment No 1.  
In summary, the programmes that Haig deployed to sustain the ‘moral’ of the 
BEF were successful to the extent that, unlike the French and German armies, there 
was no systemic breakdown in British morale or discipline. In October 1918, the 
Australian Corps was judiciously withdrawn from the line to prevent possible serious 
breaches of discipline. That said, Australian morale, as with the rest of the BEF, may 
have faltered, but it was never broken. 
In pursuit of unity-of-effort, Haig established the coordinative function of the 
GS in FSR-II published in 1909. At the time this role was peculiar to the British 
Army, but was formally adopted later in 1917 by the US Army.1154 The GS’s role 
received further elaboration in the General Staff Manual, 1911, which also benefitted 
from Haig’s attention. The simplest way to understand Haig’s conception of the GS’s 
role is to visualise the typical organogram in three dimensions. Here the GS provides 
the third dimension, facilitating both vertical and horizontal coordination of the 
entire organization. To personify this construct, the role of GS is equivalent to the 
spinal column, providing the conduit to facilitate mental, physical and moral 
coordination. If the spinal column is severed, the individual concerned is partially or 
wholly incapacitated. 
GSOs conducted their business through the employment of what Henri Fayol 
later articulated as the management process. In July 1916, Fayol identified five 
elements of the management process, as distinct from his 14 principles of 
management: Prévoyance – this embraced the ideas of both foresight and planning 
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and the process included forecasting, goal setting and action determination. 
Organizing – provided the organization with everything useful to its function. 
Commanding – involved setting the organization’s assets into motion. Coordinating 
– harmonised the organization’s activities so as to facilitate its working. Controlling 
– verified that everything has occurred in conformity with the principles established, 
the plan adopted, and the instructions issued. A case study based on the Battle of 
Amiens illustrated how GSOs successfully employed these elements of the 
management process to execute their coordinating role to drive unity-of-effort, 
resulting in a war-winning victory for British and Allied forces.  
Research Outcomes and their Importance 
It is undoubtedly wishful thinking to suppose that this new representation of 
Haig as the “Heroic Manager” will release his reputation from the lieu de mémoire, 
in the British public’s mind at least. However, it does suggest that within the context 
of ‘total war’ in the main theatre of operations, attempts to represent the C-in-C as a 
“Heroic Warrior” is an anachronism. Furthermore, the desire by contemporary 
British politicians including Lloyd George and modern Francophile military 
historians to fit this mantle on other candidates like Foch for example, is misjudged. 
It is hoped that one of the canards that this study has set aside is the notion that 
Haig presided over a command vacuum which led to ideas, and changes in tactics 
and training, filtering upwards and sideways to avoid GHQ, rather than downwards 
from GHQ.1155 This of course feeds into the institutional learning debate that has been 
much discussed in relatively recent scholarship. From this work the idea of a 
‘learning curve’ has emerged as a metaphor for the learning process, which it is 
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judged, the BEF ascended as it came to grips with the novel conditions of trench 
warfare. Historians have now moved beyond the simplistic limitations of this 
device.1156 However, judging by the number of operational, organizational and 
administrative innovations that Haig directly participated in, or used his influence to 
promote, it appears that he actively encouraged the development of as many 
‘learning curves’ as he could, in all parts of his organization on and behind the front 
line. Furthermore, it is apparent that he was much more concerned that learning did 
take place, rather than where or how it happened.  
This study shows that any assessment of the modern high commander should 
be judged in the round, both on and off the battlefield. This reinforced the opinion 
held in the British General Staff after the war that ‘effective administration was what 
mattered most’.1157 It also draws on Morris Janowitz’s illuminating social and 
political portrait The Professional Soldier. Within the framework of the Second 
World War, he made the distinction between ‘heroic leaders who embody 
traditionalism and glory, and military “managers” who were concerned with the 
scientific and rational conduct of war.’ He further insisted that the military manager 
reflected ‘the scientific and pragmatic dimensions to war making,’ while the heroic 
leader is ‘a perpetuation of the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodied the 
martial spirit and the theme of personal valor.’1158 Janowitz took his inspiration from 
Alfred Vagts, who in his formulation of the “military way,” suggested that military 
management was characterised by a ‘primary concentration of men and materials on 
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winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with the least 
expenditure of blood and treasure’.1159  
This study has produced a systematic definition of unity-of-effort relevant to 
unitary military organizations, albeit based on the contemporary understanding 
largely in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Going forward, this definition 
could be used to frame and inform better military policy decisions both during peace 
and at war. It can be also used to illuminate historical military events, not least of 
which is the Allied victory on the Western Front. Furthermore, it can help resolve 
historical puzzles including Lloyd George’s failure to sack Haig when as Prime 
Minister he showed the strong desire to do so, particularly in 1917 during the prelude 
to the Nivelle Offensive and again later in 1918.1160  
On January 21st 1918 Lloyd George despatched General Jan Christian Smuts 
and Sir Maurice Hankey to France in part to see if they could identify a suitable 
alternative for Haig. They both concluded that ‘there was no better General in sight’. 
In July, Lloyd George gave consideration to replacing Haig by Gen. 10th Earl Cavan, 
the C-in-C of British forces in Italy, although nothing came of this. This may have 
been because Hankey, who was Secretary of the War Cabinet and Lloyd George’s 
trusted adviser, ‘was not greatly impressed by him’.1161  
Apparently, the Prime Minister was deterred from dismissing Haig by a 
number of factors: He could not rely on the support of his Cabinet or Dominion 
representatives for this decision; the press and public opinion was against him; and 
he did not believe that the replacement of Haig would necessarily resolve the 
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‘intrinsic defect’ of the Allied strategy, which according to him was the lack of a 
common or united front. 1162  
There was one other factor, and one that is probably the most important of all. 
In a generally damning assessment, Lloyd George admitted that Haig had ‘a large 
measure of…business capacity’ with a ‘mastery of [his] profession’. He also 
conceded that while there were other eminent Generals in the British Army…‘none 
of them was fitted to lead an army five time as large as Napoleon ever had under his 
command, in a military undertaking which would have tested even his genius to its 
utmost’.1163 Thus, it can be surmised that the Prime Minister did not sack Haig 
primarily because he feared that there was no other British commander who offered 
the leadership and command talents, in combination with the proven organizational, 
administrative and management skills, and the experience required to address the 
huge scale, complexities and dynamics of the BEF’s five army group. Lloyd George 
lent support to this assertion in his Memoirs when he concluded that ‘there was no 
conspicuous officer in the Army who seemed to be better qualified for the Highest 
Command than Haig’.1164  
The elaboration of the principle of unity-of-effort and its practical application 
by Haig in the BEF provides the basis for the development of a conceptual toolbox 
necessary to drive unity-of-effort within the modern British military. The current 
British Army capstone doctrine, Operations (2010) uses the phrase unity-of-effort 23 
times in varying contexts, and without elaboration.1165 This research demonstrates that 
unity-of-effort is not simply a platitude of good intent. It is a tangible organizational 
                                                 
1162 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (1917), VI vols, vol. IV (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1934) pp. 2223, 2228, 2266, 2271, 2342-2346.  
1163 George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (1917), IV, pp. 2267-2268. 
1164 George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (1918), VI. p. 3424.(Emphasis in Original) 
1165 "Army Doctrine Publication: Operations," (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, 2010). 
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principle whose mental, physical and moral components must be managed and 
optimised, as manifestly demonstrated by Haig. 
This study alludes to the important notion that unity-of-effort is vital to military 
success because it drives organizational efficiency and operational effectiveness. 
This assumes, as other practitioners have done, that these two qualities are linked in 
some relationship to victory.1166 Of course, this does not mean that an army displaying 
a high degree of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness can overwhelm 
sheer mass, which at some point it surely cannot. Haig intuitively understood this 
causal relationship, confirmed by his decision to make unity-of-effort the first 
principle of war organization and administration in FSR-II. In Haig’s war diary, he 
constantly used the term ‘efficiency’ as a catch-all phrase in relation to the military 
in general and his troops in particular. It is readily apparent that he coupled the 
deterioration or improvements in moral, discipline, training, and the inculcation of 
doctrine with decreases or increases in efficiency. Haig also used the term ‘effective’ 
throughout his diaries alluding to it as a pre-requisite for goal attainment in whatever 
military context he was discussing.1167 
It is true that the notions of organizational efficiency and operational 
effectiveness are not clearly defined or commonly agreed concepts, at least in the 
military context.1168 Attempts have been made including those of Messrs Millett, 
Murray and Watman who have suggested that ‘military effectiveness is the process 
by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective 
military is one that derives maximum combat power from resources physically and 
                                                 
1166 Maj.-Gen. E.A. Altham, The Principles of War, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1914) 
p. 35. William C. Martell, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 12 Military Power and Policy pp. 265-290. 
1167 NLS-Acc.3155/98-136, "Haig's Great War Diary (Typed Version)."Entry 15/01/1916; 17/10/1916; 
Report, 21/11/1916, Appendix, p. 7; 01/12/1916 . 
1168 Eugene Gholz, "Military Efficiency, Military Effectiveness, and Military Formats," in APSA 
Annual Meeting (Philadelphia, P.A.2003) p. 1. 
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politically made available. Effectiveness thus incorporates some notion of 
efficiency’.1169 This definition is less than satisfactory because it introduces but leaves 
open the awkward question of maximum combat power, and conflates effectiveness 
with efficiency, without defining the latter. Other authors are even less forthcoming 
and have defined ‘military effectiveness implicitly – as victory in battles, nominally 
controlling for the amount of resources that each side brings to the fight’.1170 To 
engage further in this debate is beyond the scope of this thesis; suffice to say it 
presents a ripe opportunity for further study. 
Perhaps one of the most far reaching revelations of this study is the 
coordinating role of the GS, understood within the context of an organization 
depicted in three dimensions. In large part, it was through the effective use of the 
coordinating role of the GS that Haig managed the exponential growth of the BEF, 
without any severe organizational or administrative dysfunction, driving unity-of-
effort. Haig was satisfied with the way this arrangement worked. Commenting on a 
conversation with Haig in 1915 Esher confided to his diary: 
 I told [Haig] that the French were rather critical of our staff 
work, and thought their own very superior to it. He agrees 
that the paper work of the French General Staff is very 
superior to ours, but he does not consider that their staff 
officers are as good as ours in seeing work carried out.1171  
Furthermore, after the war, Haig’s continued satisfaction with the GS’s 
coordinating role is expressed by comments he made addressed to Lieut.-Gen. Sir 
                                                 
1169 Allan R. Millett; Williamson Murray; Kenneth H. Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military 
Organizations," International Security 11, no. 1 (1986) p. 37. 
1170 Alan C. Stam Dan Reiter, Democracies at War (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002) 
pp. 58, 60. 
1171 Lord Esher, "Journal," in Viscount Esher Papers: ESHR 2/14 (Churchill Archive, 1915). I am 
indebted to Professor William Philpott for this reference. 
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Walter Braithwaite, chair of a committee appointed by him in December 1918 to 
review the staff organization during the war:  
I am in agreement…that the work of the Staff during the war 
has been accomplished with remarkable success and is strong 
evidence of the soundness of the doctrine taught in the 
antecedent period.  
Haig also expressed his ‘entire sympathy’ with a recommendation of the Braithwaite 
Committee to increase the coordinative functions of the GS by insisting that the GS 
in all formations should coordinate all branches of staff work in conformity with the 
policy laid down by the commander and be the ‘one Military Adviser, through whom 
the Commander exercises his function of command’.1172 
Bain & Co, one of the world’s most respected management consultancies, have 
claimed that approximately 70% of organizational change programmes fail and the 
consequent costs are huge.1173 The example of the British GS with its unique 
coordinative function, set within the novelty of the three-dimensional organization, 
may hold the key to reversing this failure. Led by Haig, the BEF was transformed 
from an imperial police force into a modern continental army capable of defeating 
the most formidable first class adversary of its day. This result, achieved within an 
astonishingly short period of only three years, provides an exemplar to follow for 
other large-scale organizations in the public, financial, commercial, industrial and 
other spheres. Of course, the increase in operating costs that would flow from the 
establishment of a staff acting as the third coordinative dimension would be strongly 
resisted by accountants. But there are a number of cost effective ways in which this 
could be achieved. For example, consideration could be given to the creation of 
                                                 
1172 TNA/WO/32/5153, "Staff Organization," (1919). Letter: Haig to War Office 24/03/1919. 
(Emphasis in original). 
1173 Brunes, Managing Change: A Strategic Approach to Organizational Change. p. 2. 
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temporary or virtual proxies for the staff organization, deployed to address the needs 
of major change programmes for their duration.  
Towards a General Theory of Military Unity-of-Effort 
It is now possible to project Haig’s principle of unity-of-effort forward from 
the past to outline a general theory that may well have application today in the 
modern military deployed for the security of advanced countries. A schematic of this 
theory is shown in Figure 29. 




Unity-of-effort requires unity of object.1174 Agreeing unity of object presents 
large-scale military organizations with their first and perhaps most important 
challenge, and one that cannot be taken for granted. Having established a clear goal, 
subscribed to at least by the high-ranking political and military leadership, and with 
programmes in place to obtain the support of the whole organization to this common 
cause, the process of unity-of-effort must be actively managed to deliver the requisite 
organizational efficiency and the operational effectiveness. Clearly, this is a critical 
necessity for the modern military at war, but it is also vitally important that the 
requisite preparations are made during peace. In turn, formal and managed impetus is 
required to achieve unity-of-mental, physical and moral effort, which in combination 
will help drive the military organization towards its goal. It is self-evident that as 
military organizations increase in size and complexity, unity-of-effort becomes 
progressively more difficult to secure, demanding additional GS management 
resources that must be deployed on a timely basis. 
Unity-of-mental-effort is made manifest by doctrine, a corpus of principles and 
values used to guide an organization to its agreed destination. To capitalise on the 
opportunities and accommodate the pressures thrown up by rapidly changing 
external and internal environments, military organizations must have the motivation 
and capability to learn, innovate and adapt. 
Unity-of-physical-effort is inculcated by training. This should be a progressive 
process in response to the organization’s changing needs. Crucially, some form of 
independent training inspectorate is required to ensure high and uniforms standards 
are achieved across the general and specialised functions of the organization. 
                                                 
1174 Donovan, Prof. Robert John, Dr. Julia Anwar McHenry and Anthony J. Vines, "Unity of Effort 
requires unity of object: why industry should not be involved in formulating public health policy," 
Journal of Public Affairs doi: 10.1002/pa.1553 (2014). 
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Unity-of-moral-effort is characterised by morale, underpinned by discipline. 
Morale provides organizations with the human will and determination to achieve 
their goals. The process of obtaining and sustaining high morale must be based upon 
meritocratic organizational principles, and be the subject of active management. 
The process of achieving unity-of-effort is a management function like any 
other and requires its own coordinative agency for efficient and effective 
implementation. One approach, the success of which has been proven, is to adopt and 
adapt the coordinative model of the British GS system viewed within a three 
dimensional organizational setting and practiced on sound management lines like 
those used by Haig and espoused by Henri Fayol. 
This résumé allows a further iteration of the working definition for unity-of-
effort within the context of a military organization: 
Unity-of-effort is the raison d’être of all forms of human organization 
including the military. It is a tangible and effective principle, rather than a mere 
rhetorical gesture or oratorical flourish. The nature of unity-of-effort is immutable 
and singularly coordinative. The principle finds expression in its compound 
character, which has distinct mental, physical and moral components, specific to 
each type of organization. It is a normative ideal, as opposed to an absolute standard.  
In military organization, unity-of-effort is optimised by the development of 
operational, organizational and administrative doctrines to obtain unity-of-mental-
effort; by inculcating the principles of doctrine through progressive training to 
achieve unity-of-physical-effort; and by promoting the will to fight through sustained 
morale underpinned by discipline to attain unity-of-moral-effort. 
Unity-of-effort drives organizational efficiency and operational effectiveness. 
The concept of organizational efficiency inherently implies economy of effort, which 
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is the judicious exploitation of manpower, material and time in relation to the value 
and attainment of objectives. Operational effectiveness is ultimately demonstrated by 
mission or goal attainment. 
In all military organizations, unity-of-effort is created and optimised through 
the coordinative function of the GS, although the ultimate responsibility rests with 
the C-in-C in the field. This body executes its coordinating role through the process 
of management, which itself is characterised by forecasting, planning, organising, 
commanding, coordinating, and controlling. 
Directions for Future Research 
The principle of unity-of-effort offers a new prism to review the performance 
of the BEF on the Western Front, in other theatres, and by comparison to Allied and 
enemy armies. Thus far, military historians have understandably focused attention on 
forward operations, while the organization, administration and management of forces 
have not been given due consideration. Comparative studies are rare, if they exist at 
all. Apart from other benefits, a comparison of the application of unity-of-effort in 
the French and German armies on the Western Front will provide fresh perspectives 
and may offer alternative explanations for the Allied victory and possibly for the 
German defeat.  
Facilitators of unity-of-effort should also be identified and investigated. In the 
case of the BEF, ground-breaking studies concerning logistics and communications 
have already been made.1175 But comprehensive investigations of British command 
and control processes and systems during the war offer opportunities for further 
detailed study.  
                                                 
1175 Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919.; Hall, "The British Expeditionary Force 
and Communications on the Western Front." 
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While this thesis has focused on unity-of-effort in the BEF as a unitary 
organization, it would be of great service to the modern military, with its dependence 
on coalition warfare, to investigate the nature and application of the principle in the 
Anglo-French alliance. A useful starting point is the series of US Army doctrinal 
manuals addressing multinational operations where the vital value of unity-of-effort 
is indicated.1176 A chapter length study has already been drafted on this topic, but its 
inclusion in this thesis has not been possible. 
The crucial relationship between unity-of-effort, and its corollaries 
organizational efficiency and operational effectiveness requires detailed study and 
articulation. This is not a trivial exercise, and one that is likely to be much more 
challenging than suggested by intuition. As discussed, part of this difficulty arises 
from the lack of commonly agreed definitions. The other challenging aspects will be 
to relate theory to practice, combined with obtaining the relevant supporting 
evidence. Nonetheless, the results of this research will undoubtedly be of great value 
to all large-scale military organizations, helping to reduce costs and improving the 
process by which resources are converted into fighting power.  
The Verdict: Haig’s Competence as a Military Manager 
This study was originated to assess Haig’s managerial competence with 
particular reference to his tenure as C-in-C of the BEF on the Western Front. To 
frame and inform this study an examination of his formation as a military manager 
has also been made. 1177 The results of this work show that the attributes that Henri 
Fayol ascribed to the management process came instinctively to Haig and he was 
                                                 
1176 FM 3-16 (FM 100-8) The Army in Multinational Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2010). 
1177 Anthony J. Vines, "Sir Douglas Haig - The Making of a Military Manager" (KCL, 2007). This 
paper was presented to examiners as part of a PhD upgrade package.  
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able to put them into practice prior to the war, reforming the British Army with a 
high order of competence. For example, his prévoyance was demonstrated by his 
contribution to the formation of the office of the CIGS in 1909. His organizing 
ability was shown by the realisation of the Territorial Force in 1908. His 
commanding talent was in evidence when he dealt with the thorny dissolution of the 
militia, thus mobilising manpower for the Special Reserve. His coordinating skills 
were shown by the success he had in driving through all of Haldane’s reforms. His 
controlling ability was proven by the fact that all of these initiatives including the 
formation of the BEF were accomplished in just three years. 
Between 1916 and 1918 Haig was confronted with the novel conditions of 
trench warfare, the huge growth of the BEF manned by green and untrained officers 
and men, rapid changes and advances in technology, and the most formidable enemy 
on earth. He overcame this supreme management challenge by the successful 
application of the principle of unity-of-effort, and its constituent mental, physical and 
moral components. Haig delivered the military means to obtain the military end of 
assisting the French nation to drive out the German army from their territory. 
It is also relevant to mention that after the war, Haig added a new managerial 
process to his armoury, and one that can be called convening power.1178 In June 1921, 
he used his considerable influence behind the scenes to weld the competing and 
fractious organizations of returned servicemen into a single unified body in the shape 
of the British Legion, before becoming its President and establishing the Haig Fund. 
Haig’s aim was to present the Government, still led by his nemesis Lloyd George, 
with a united front to obtain much better financial provision, welfare and support for 
disabled and jobless ex-servicemen’s organizations’. It was also Haig’s way of 
                                                 
1178 See p. 99. 
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dissuading many of these men from engaging in left wing politics, which as he saw 
it, could damage the national interest.1179 
In 1928, Brig.-Gen. G.F. Ellison, Haldane’s private secretary at the WO, wrote 
to Lady Haig and concluded:  
I wish to add briefly my own impressions of Haig’s achievements 
during the time I worked with him at the War Office. He 
combined in quite unusual degree great administrative capacity 
with innate powers of command. The only person with whom I 
was brought in contact, who at all equalled him in this respect, 
was Lord Wolseley on whose staff I served for two years (1896 – 
97). Haig was indeed fortunate in this opportunity which fell to 
him of using in the Field the instrument he had so largely helped 
to fashion in the Office.1180 
When the evidence is considered in the round, it is not an overstatement to 
claim that Haig was an outstanding military manager, with exceptional military 
organizational, administrative and management ability. Haig may not have been the 
“Heroic Warrior” of military legend, but there can be absolutely no doubt that he was 
a “Heroic Manager”. Hopefully, this revelation will solve the enigma of Haig. 
                                                 
1179French, "Sir Douglas Haig's Reputation: A Note."p. 957; Graham Wootton, The Official History of 
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Appendix 1: General Staff Coordinating Duties – Amiens (July 3rd – 9h August, 1918:) 
 Prévoyance Organising Commanding Coordinating Controlling Ref: 
GHQ  03/07/18: Haig stresses to his 
C.G.S. (Lieut.-General Sir Herbert 
Lawrence) the necessity of 
improving situation east of Amiens 
ASAP. 
 04/07/18, 9.55 am: Telegram 
Operations Special Priority. Haig 
is made aware of the successful 
Australian attack at Le Hamel.  
 05/07/18: Ahead of Army 
Commander’s conference, 
Rawlinson requests Haig’s 
permission to make another attack 
south of Somme. Haig demurs 
because in his opinion the 
operation would extend the British 
line without having sufficient 
covering reserves. Nonetheless, 
Haig instructs Rawlinson to make 
a plan for the attack, which would 
be deployed in the event that the 
necessary reserves become 
available. 
 12/07/18, Letter 2021to Haig: 
Foch asks the British to attack on 
the front Festubert-Robecq, 
providing German reserves are 
absorbed in the Champagne battle. 
 [Foch and Haig were haggling 
over enemy intentions, detaching 
British reserves, and the nature of 
British offensives to support the 
French.] 
 16/07/18: At a meeting with 
Rawlinson, Haig asks him to make 
preparations for a major operation 
to push the Fourth Army’s right to 
the River Luce near Caix with the 
line running northwards through 
Harbonnieres to Chipilly on the 
Somme. Haig indicates he will ask 
Foch to order the French Army on 
the right [First French Army] to 
cooperate in a movement to pinch 
the salient formed by the rivers 
Luce and Avre between the 
villages of Caix and Pierrepont.  
 [Rawlinson and his staff had been 
working on an offensive plan since 
05/07/18 was able to submit his 
formal proposal the next day.] 
 17/07/18 OAD 895: With 
Rawlinson’s proposals in mind 
Haig presses Foch to adopt the 
Amiens plan, in preference to his 
own for an attack further north 
between Festubert and Robecq. 
(12/07/18: – LETTER 2021) Haig 
stressed that ‘secrecy and north 
surprise will be of the utmost 
importance.’ 
 20/07/18: (État-Major Général No 
22481) Foch agrees to the Amiens 
operation. 
 24/07/18: In a meeting between 
Haig and Foch, with Generals 
Lawrence and Weygand present, it 
is agreed to ‘proceed with 
operations East of Amiens as soon 
as possible.’ 
 26/07/18: Conference with Foch, 
Lawrence, Rawlinson, 
Montgomery, Weygand (C.-of-S. 
to Foch) and Debney (sic) to settle 
details of Amiens operation. 'R. 
was very anxious to carry out his 
operation alone without French 
cooperation; but in view of limited 
number of divisions I agreed that 
Debney (sic) should operate on our 
right'.  
 29/07/18: In a meeting with 
Rawlinson, Haig advances launch 
date by two days.  
 03/08/18: Haig confirms to Foch 
that he has set Ham (across the 
 16/07/18: Haig confides to 
his diary that he intends to 
instruct Rawlinson to ‘send 
the 4 Canadian 
Divisions…to carry out the 
attack which I had 
suggested in cooperation 
with the Australians’.  
 [It appears that in this 
instance, Haig is taking 
credit where credit is not 
due. Rawlinson, if not 
Monash was the initiator of
this offensive.]  
 28/07/18: Foch places First 
French Army under Haig’s 
command to coordinate 
Allied effort at Amiens-
Montdidier. ‘F. wishes 
operations hurried on…I 
am pleased Foch has 
entrusted me with this 
operation’. 
 29/07/18: OAD 904: Army 
HQ’s advised Canadian 
Corps and ‘certain 
Artillery and Tanks units 
will concentrated in Fourth 
Army area. Special 
instructions regarding the 
probable use of these 
troops and reconnaissance 
to be carried out will be 
issued to Commanders 
concerned.’ 
 29/07/18: OAD 900/4 
Kavanagh advised that 
Cavalry Corps will placed 
under Rawlinson’s 
command. 
 02/08/18: OAD 900/8 
advice to Rawlinson 
(personal and very secret) 
regarding RAF cooperation
with Fourth Army and 
First French Army during 
Amiens offensive.  
 21/07/18: Haig advises C.G.S. 
that he intends to attack on 
Amiens front if German 
reserves are absorbed 
elsewhere.  
 23/07/18: OAD 900: Informs 
Rawlinson that his proposal 
GSHQ 200(G) ‘is approved 
generally and you should 
proceed with preparations as 
rapidly as possible…’ C.G.S.. 
 28/07/18: Directive 
Particuliere No 2467. Haig 
receives his formal orders from 
Foch for Amiens offensive.  
 28/07/18: OAD 900/2: Formal 
order issued to Rawlinson, 
Fourth Army and Debeney, 
French First Army via GHQ in 
accordance with instructions 
Foch ordering Amiens 
offensive ‘with the objective of 
disengaging Amiens and Paris-
Amiens railway.’  
 29/07/18: OAD 900/3: Formal 
order from C.G.S. to 
Rawlinson and Debeney 
establishing objectives for 
Amiens offensive. Fourth 
Army is tasked with keeping 
its left flank on the Somme and 
press the enemy in the 
direction of Chaulnes. (Ref: 
03/08/18:) 
 05/08/18: OAD/13 Fourth 
Army HQ. Final verbal order 
to proceed with Amiens 
Offensive from Haig to 
Rawlinson and Debeney in 
presence of C.G.S., MGGS 
O(a) Fourth Army MGGS 
(Montgomery) and Cavalry 
Corps Cmd. (Kavanagh).  
 05/08/18: OAD900/14 in 
continuation of OAD 900/3 
dated 29/07/18:, formal order 
from C.G.S. to Rawlinson and 
Debeney reaffirming the first 
objective (Old Amiens 
Defensive Line – Hangest to 
Harbonnieres vide O.A.D. 
900/3 dated 29th July) and 
establishing a second 
objectives in general direction 
of Roye-Chaulnes, which 
should be pursued with the 
least possible delay, thrusting 
the enemy back with 
determination in the general 
direction of Ham, and so 
facilitating the operations of 
the French from the front 
Noyon-Montdidier.  
 06/08/18: OAD 900/15 Formal 
order from C.G.S. to 
Rawlinson and Debeney 
establishing 8th August as ‘z-
day’ for Amiens offensive. The
two generals were ordered to 
arrange zero hour directly 
between them.  
 08/08/18: At 7 am, Haig 
receives report from Fourth 
Army HQ, via (Ob) at 
advanced HQ, that ‘attack 
apparently a complete surprise 
and is progressing 
satisfactorily’. Later Haig 
motored to Fourth Army HQ 
accompanied by his MGGS 
(Davidson) to meet Rawlinson. 
Haig tells Rawlinson to 
‘organise his left strongly; if 
opportunity offers to advance 
it to line Albert – Bray. With 
his left strongly held he will 
push his defensive front our to 
line Chaulnes - Roye.’ Further, 
 25/07/18 Haig holds 
meeting with Rawlinson 
regarding forthcoming 
operation. Davidson 
(M.G.G.S. O (a)) and 
Montgomery present.  
 27/07/18: OAD 900/1 
Outline of Amiens 
offensive sent to all Army, 
RAF and Tank Corps 
commanders FYI.  
  26/07/18: Haig attends 
conference with Foch, 
Lawrence, Rawlinson, 
Montgomery, Weygand 
(C-of-S. to Foch) and 
Debeney to settle details of 
Amiens operation. 'R. was 
very anxious to carry out 
his operation alone without 
French cooperation; but in 
view of limited number of 
divisions I agreed that 
Debney (sic) should 
operate on our right'. 
 29/07/18: At a conference 
at Advanced H.Q. Haig 
briefs all Army 
Commanders on Foch’s 
future policy and 
forthcoming operations. 
 31/08/18: Haig visits 
Monash at Bertangles 
Château on latter’s return 
from leave. Monash tells 
Haig he “had all the 
threads of the operation un 
his hands”. Haig insists 
‘getting some Cavalry 
under his command, and 
suggested getting a 
Brigade from the Cavalry 
Corps as he said his own 
Corps mounted troops 
were not enough well 
trained for this work. 
 01/08/18: Haig meets 
Kavanagh to discuss 
cavalry’s role in 
forthcoming operation.  
 05/08/18: Haig chairs a 
conference at Fourth Army 
HQ assisted by G.C.S. 
(Lawrence). Rawlinson, 
Kavanagh and Debeney in 
attendance. Haig 
comments on Fourth Army 
orders. He thinks that the 
orders ‘aimed too much at 
getting a final objective on 
the old Amiens defence 
line, and stopping counter-
attacks on it’. In Haig’s 
opinion, if the element of 
surprise worked, the line 
should be put in a state of 
defence but not to delay – 
at once reserves must be 
pushed on to capture the 
line Chaulnes – Roye with 
the cavalry pressing 
through further.  
 05/08/18: Haig with 
Lawrence visit Monash at 
Château Bertangles to 
explain his views and plan. 
 10/08/18: P.M. Haig visits 
Canadian Corps H.Q. 
(Currie) where he is joined 
by Rawlinson where upon 
Haig ‘explained [his] 
intentions and orders’. 
 11/08/18: Haig and 
Lawrence visit Monash at 
Aust. Corps H.Q. 
(Bertangles). The latter 
reports that none of his 5 
 28/07/18: After making 
some amendments, Haig 
approves Rawlinson’s and 
Debeney’s detailed plans 
for Amiens offensive. z 
day agreed 8th August.  
 27/07/18: Haig modifies 
operational plan to include 
French and extends 
objective to general 
direction of Chaulnes. [08-
16 p. 3942] 
 28/07/18; Haig approves 
GHQ’s final draft of 
orders.[08-16 p.3942] 
 29/07/18: In a meeting 
with Rawlinson, Haig 
advances launch date by 
two days.  
 02/08/18: Fourth Army 
20(G) from Montgomery 
to Davidson (MGGS O(a) 
advising amplification of 
orders 20(G) issued to 
Corps commanders on 
31/07/18: 
 04/08/18: Haig reviews 




 04/08/18: Haig reviews 
and annotates orders to be 
issued by Rawlinson and 
Debeney. 
 05/08/18: At Army 
Conference, Haig urges 
Rawlinson not to delay at 
the old Amiens defence 
line, and advance as 
rapidly as possible – as per 
his orders.  
 07/08/18: Haig goes to 
Fourth Army H.Q. 
(Flexicourt) to ensure 
plans are progressing 
satisfactorily. Rawlinson 
confirms ‘everything is 
going without a hitch and 
the enemy seems ignorant 
of the impending blow!’ 
He then visits Currie at 
Canadian Corps H.Q. 
(Dury). He then returned to 
his Advanced HQ in a train 
stationed at Wiry au Mont. 
Haig has 9 officers living 
in his train and his General 
Staff of 8 officers occupy a 
second train, the whole 
being ‘very long, half a 
mile about!’ 
 09/08/18: Haig establishes 
from his liaison officer 
(Col. Cavendish) that 
Debeney is hanging back 
waiting for Canadians 
rather continuing his 
advance. Haig calls in 
Debeney to his Advanced 
H.Q. at 4pm and persuades 
him to advance and take 
Roye. Haig wryly notes 
‘all opposition had been 
removed by the British 
advance of course!’. 
 09/08/18: 11.15 pm Haig 
advised as result of a 
telephone message 
received by GS (Ob) from 
Fourth Army H.Q. that 
Australians have captured 
Lihons.  
 10/08/18 Haig gets mixed 
messages regarding enemy 
resistance. Cavalry Corps 
suggest “enemy’s 
 HD 04/07/18 [3748] 
 HD 05/07/18 [3758] 
 HD 12/07/18 [3814] 
 HD 12/07/18 [3823] 
 HD 16/07/18 [3837] 
 HD 16/07/18 [3837] 
 HD 17/07/18 [3842-
3843] 
 HD 20/07/18 [3879] 
 HD 24/07/18 [3896] 
 HD 25/07/18 [3909] 
 HD 26/07/18 [3922] 
 HD 28/07/18 [3938] 
 HD 29/07/18 [3942] 
 HD 29/07/18 [3943] 
 HD 28/07/18 [3945] 
 HD 31/07/18 [3952-
53] 
 HD 01/08/18 [4046] 
 HD 03/08/18 [4060] 
 HD 04/08/18 [4080] 
 HD 05/08/18 [4082] 
 HD 05/08/18 [4090] 
 HD 07/08/18 [4097-
98] 
 HD 08/08/18 4114-
4116 
 HD 09/08/18 [4121] 
 HD 09/08/18 [4122] 
 HD 10/08/18 [4133-
4134] 
 HD 10/08/18 [4135] 
 HD 11/08/18 [4139] 
 WO 158/241[2] 4th 
Army OAD 900 
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
OAD 900/1 
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
OAD 900/2 
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
OAD 900/3 
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
[2] OAD 900/13 
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
[2] OAD 900/14 
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
[2] OAD 900/15 
[4091] 
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
OAD 904 
 WO 158/241[2] 4th 
Army OAD 900/8. 
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Somme river) as final objective for 
offensive. Foch had wanted a 
position south of Chaulnes but 
agrees with Haig's proposal. 
Haig is advised that the 
‘Australians on final objective 
(Old Amiens Defence Line) all 
along their front’. 
 10/08/18: A.M. Foch meets 
Haig and wishes to continue 
the advance to the line Noyon 
– Ham Peronne and to get 
bridgeheads on the Somme. 
Haig counters by outlining an 
alternative proposal to halt the 
advance, and strike with First 
Army at Aubers Ridge freeing 
up Bethune coal mines. 
Nonetheless, Haig issues 
orders according to Foch’s 
wishes with caveat that the 
advance should only be 
continued providing ‘present 
battle front is not stiffening’.  
divisions have lost 1,000 
men which Haig considers 
‘wonderfully small’. Haig 
explains his plan to 
Monash and instructs him 
to prepare to put in an 
attack with the objective of 
breaking the enemy’s 
present battle front in the 
direction of Bapaume 
opposition was 
diminishing”, while 32nd 
Division Cmdr. (Lambert) 
reported ‘enemy’s 
opposition had stiffened 
up’. Haig sided with 
Lambert, ‘and came away 
more determined that ever 
to press our offensive from 
the Third and First Army 
fronts (see August 14th)’. 
Fourth 
Army 
 17/07/18: AHQ No. 220(G): In 
response to Haig’s instructions 
(05/07/18 and 16/07/18:), 
Rawlinson’s formal proposal for 
the Amiens offensive is submitted 
to GHQ for consideration. 
 21/07/18: AHQ No. 220 (G) 
Amiens proposal discussed in 
conference with Aust. and Cdn. 
Corps Commanders and their 
respective senior Staff at Fourth 
Army H.Q. (Flixecourt). Army 
Cmd. MGGS, GOCRA and GSO1 
attended. 
 23/07/18: AHQ 220(G) approved 
in principal by GHQ. in an order 
signed by Davidson (MGGS) for 
C.G.S. 
 29/07/18: At conference (HQ III 
Corps, Villers Bocage) between 
Rawlinson, his staff and corps 
commanders (III, Aust. Cdn.) 
permission is to advise Div. 
Commanders of the impending 
Amiens operation. (WO 95/437 
Appendices [14])  
 31/07/18: Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: - First part 
issued by M.G.G.S.to Corps. 
(1.Secrecy. - 2. Reserves - 3. 
Artillery - 4. Tanks - 5. 
Communications - 6. Maps - 7. 
Roads.) 
 01/08/18 Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: Second part 
issued to Corps by M.G.G.S. (3. 
Artillery. Field artillery barrages, 
heavy artillery barrages, normal 
activity, counter battery action, 
close support of the infantry, 
action in case of bombardment by 
hostile artillery previous to zero. - 
4. Tanks - 5. Communications. - 6 
Date and Hour of Attack. ‘Zero 
hour will be communicated to 
Corps in writing at 12 noon on “Y” 
day’.- 9. Reliefs - 10. Army Policy 
on Reaching Objective. 
Preparations had to be made to 
meet any counter attack, build a 
defensive system in depth, await 
further order. 11. Special 
Companies R.E.  
 02/08/18 Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: Third part 
issued to Corps by M.G.G.S. 4. 
Tanks. 7. Roads. 11. Special 
Companies R.E. 
 02/08/18 Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: Fourth part 
issued to Corps by M.G.G.S. 5. 
Communication. 7. Roads 
 03/08/18 Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: Fifth part 
issued to Corps by M.G.G.S. 12. 
R.A.F. 
 04/08/18 Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: Sixth part 
issued to Corps by M.G.G.S. 3. 
Artillery 5. Communications 9. 
Reliefs 
 04/08/18 Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: Seventh part 
issued to Corps by M.G.G.S. 3. 
Artillery 5. Communications 13. 
 31/07/18: Fourth Army 
20(G) Advice to Corps 
Commanders incl. Cavalry,
RAF and Tank Bde. setting 
out organization for 
Amiens offensive. 
 03/08/18: Fourth Army 
20(G) Organization of 
right (Canadian) and centre 
(Australian) Corps 
boundaries. [III Corps 
operated on left] 
 06/08/18: Fourth Army 
Administrative 
Arrangements issued by 
D.A. & Q.M.G. Maj.-Gen. 
H.C. Colman.  
 31/07/18: Fourth Army 
ORDER 20G: issued to Corps 
Commanders for Amiens 
attack. ‘The Fourth Army will 
attack the enemy’s position 
between Morlancourt and the 
Amiens – Roye Road 
(inclusive) [about 18,000 yds. 
– 4th Army WD Aug 1918-1] 
on a date to be notified later. 
The III, Canadian, Australian 
and Cavalry Corps carry out 
this attack’. In conjunction, 
‘the First French army will 
attack the enemy’s position 
between the Amiens-Roye 
Road (exclusive) and the Avre 
valley’.  
 01/08/18: Fourth Army 20(G) 
amendment issued revising III 
Corps, Cde. and Aust. Corps 
objectives for attack.  
 1. In continuation of Fourth 
Army Order No. 20(G) dated 
31/7/18:. 
2. ‘In view of the extensive 
nature of the operations 
which are being undertaken 
by the French, as described 
verbally to Corps 
Commanders today, it is 
probable that, in the event of 
initial success, the battle will 
develop into one of 
considerably magnitude. 
4.‘The first object of the 
operation is to disengage 
Amiens and the Paris-Amiens 
railway line by pushing 
forward and seizing the old 
Amiens defence line Hangest 
– Harbonnieres = Mericourt 
(vide Fourth Army No 20(G) 
dated 31/07/18, para 1 and 
map.’ 
5. ‘The next object is to push 
forward in the general 
direction of the line Roye – 
Chaulnes with the least 
possible delay, thrusting the 
enemy back with 
determination in the general 
direction of Ham, and so 
facilitating the operations of 
the French from the front 
Noyon – Montdidier. 
8. The Australian Corps, 
pivoting on the Somme 
between Mericourt and 
Etinehem, will swing their 
right so as to keep touch with 
the advance of the Canadian 
Corps.  
 02/08/18: Fourth Army 20(G) 
MGGS amplification of Corps 
orders issued on 31/07/18. 
 03/08/18: Fourth Army 32(G) 
General Instruction issued by 
MGGS to staff of all Corps 
HQs taking part in offensive. 
 08/08/18: Fourth Army 32(G) 
Clarification of “General 
Instructions” Artillery (1) 
issued to Corps regarding the 
 30/07/18: Conference at 5th
Tank Bde HQ was held 
between Fourth Army staff 
(MGGS; GSO 1(o); Tanks 
Corps (GOC, GSO1 
AA&QMG, GSO 2(i) and 
5th Tank Bde. H.Q. COs 
3rd, 4th and 5th Tank Bdes 
concerning tank 
cooperation.  
 30/07/18: Similar meeting 
with GOC 3rd Cavalry Div. 
held at Fourth Army HQ.  
  06/08/18: Fourth Army 
Administrative 
Arrangements issued by 
Maj.-Gen. H.C. Holman 
D.A. & Q.M.G.  
 Plans coordinated in a 
series of staff conferences 
held on 25/07/18: at Aust. 
Corps HQ Bertangles; 
25/07/18: at AHQ 
Flixecourt; 27/07/18: at 
AHQ Flixecourt; 29/07/18: 
III Corps HQ Villers 
Bocage; 30/07/18: 5th Tank 
Bde HQ; 30/07/18: AHQ 
Flixecourt; 01/08/18: III 
Corps HQ at Villers 
Bocage; 04/08/18: Cavalry 
Corps HQ at Auxi-le-
Château; 05/08/18: AHQ 
Flixecourt (attended by 
Haig and all top ranking 
GHQ staff officers); and 
06/08/18: AHQ Flixecourt. 
 11/08/18: Army 
Conference between 
Rawlinson and his 
M.G.G.S General Staff, 
and Corps commanders 
and their staff to review 
situation and agree future 
action. All agreed that ‘the 
enemy’s resistance was 
stiffening’. Rawlinson 
assured the meeting this 
this being the case, there 
was ‘no intention to try 
and burst through [the 
enemy line] regardless of 
cost’. It was agreed that 
best course of action was 
hold current positions, 
meet any counter attacks.  
 08/08/18: 4.23 A.M. (3 
min. after attack began) 
Fourth Army H.Q. receives 
message from Adv. Report 
Centre ‘Off! Very few 
enemy flares and no 
shelling’. 
 08/08/18: 5.33 A.M. Aust. 
Corps noted ‘reports 
received for both divisions 
that attack started to time: 
all going well’.  
 08/08/18: Progress reports 
continued coming in by 
telephone, runner and 
pigeon all day and through 
into the night mainly from 
Corps H.Q.’s Three 
reports, summarising 
progress, were sent to 
GHQ at 7.05 am, 10.12 
am, and 5.20 pm.  
 WO 95-437 4th Army WD 
(01-13 08 1918:) [37-47] 
 There was no mention in 
Aust. Corps H.Q. reports 
of artillery fire falling 
short.  
 Messages below are from 
AWM 4th Army WD 1918 
(1)  
 8.15 A.M. Aust. Corps 
H.Q. reports 3rd (left) 
Division on Green Line. 
 9.05 A.M. Aust. Corps 
H.Q. reports 2nd (right) 
Division on Green Line. 
 12.40 P.M. Aust. Corps 
H.Q. reports 5th Division 
on Blue line at 11.53 A.M. 
 2.55 P.M. Aust. Corps 
H.Q. (Monash) report 
‘Australian Flag was 
hoisted over Harbonnieres 
at mid-day today.  
 3.25 P.M. Aust. Corps 
H.Q. reports ‘all brigades 
now reported established 
on Blue line’.  
 6.05 P.M. Aust. Corps 
H.Q. reports ‘our infantry 
on Blue Line and if they 
wished could go further. 
All is clear’.  
 7.35 P.M. Aust. Corps 
(Monash) ‘Troops are 
advancing along 
Warfussee Road towards 
Red Line’. 
 AWM 4th Army WD 1918 
(2) 
 09/08/18: It was originally 
intended that the 1st Aust. 
Div. should move through 
the 5th Aus. Div., who were
hold the Blue Line and 
renew the advance towards 
Lihons at 11 A.M. ( time 
arranged between Cdn. 
Corps H.Q. and Aust. 
Corps H.Q.) but they did 
not actually move through 
the 5th Aust. Div until 1 
 OH 1918 Vol IV 
Appendix IV. pp. 526-
558. 
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
220(G) See also WO 
95-437 4th Army WD 
Appendices (Aug 
1918:) 
 WO 95/437 Fourth 
Army WD: Conference 
proceedings 
 WO 95/437 Fourth 
Army WD: OAD 900. 
Personal and Very 
Secret. To Rawlinson 
from C.G.S..  
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
OAD 900 
 WO 158/241 4th Army 
Order 20(G) [30/07/18: 
conferences incl. in ref.
 WO 158/241[2] OAD 
900/15 
 WO 95/437 Fourth 
Army WD: Army 
20(G). [ORDER 
31/07/18]  
 WO 158/241[2] 4th 
Army 32(G). See also 
WO 95-437 4th Army 
WD Appendices (Aug 
1918:) [38] 
 WO 158/241[2] 4th 
Army 20(G). 
[AMPLIFICATION] 
  WO 158/241[2] 4th 
Army 20(G). 
[BOUNDARIES]] 
 WO 95-437 4th Army 
WD Appendices (Aug 
1918:) Fourth Army 
No. 32 (G). 
 OH 1918:, Vol IV 
Appendix VII Fourth 
Army Administrative 
Arrangements  
 WO 95/437 Fourth 
Army WD: Army 
32(G). 
[CLARIFICATION] 
 WO 95-437 4th Army 
WD Appendices (Aug 
1918:) Con. Minutes 
29/07/18:. 
 WO 95-437 4th Army 
WD Orders 20(G) 
(Aug 1918:) [135] also 
WO 95-437 4th Army 
WD App. [29] 
 WO 95-437 4th Army 
WD Orders 20/1(G) 
(Aug 1918:) [138] 
 WO 95-437 4th Army 
WD Orders 20/3 (G) 
(Aug 1918:) [140] 
 WO 95-437 4th Army 
WD Orders 20/5 (G) 
(Aug 1918:) [142] 
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Cavalry. 
 05/08/18 Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: Eighth part 
issued to Corps by M.G.G.S. 13. 
Cavalry. 
 05/08/18 Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: Eighth part 
issued to Corps by M.G.G.S. 
 05/08/18 Fourth Army No 32 (G) 
General instructions: Ninth part 





intervention of counter battery 
fire on Zero night in the event 
of a heavy hostile artillery 
barrage 
 08/08/18: Fourth Army Order 
20(G) (Received overnight on 
09/08/18): Orders advance to 
be continued to Roye - 
Chaulnes-Bray sur Somme - 
Dernacourt.  
Aust. Corps, conforming in the 
first instance to the advance of 
the Canadian Corps, will 
advance tomorrow (09/08/18) 
with a view to establishing 
themselves on general line 
Lihons - Framerville - 
Mericourt. 
 09/08/18: Fourth Army Order 
20(G) This order was a repeat 
of Order 20G above, but 
contained in the first paragraph 
the latest positions attained by 
the British and French 
Formations on 08/08/18.  
 09/08/18: Fourth Army Order 
20/1(G) Orders advance to be 
continued. Aust. Corps to take 
over from III Corps as far 
North as the Corbie-Bray Road 
(exclusive) as far East as K.17. 
central. Aust. Corps will 
advance left flank tomorrow 
and occupy general line Lihons 
– Chuignolles –L.28 –L.7. 
 10/08/18: Fourth Army Order 
20/3 (G) The Fourth Army has 
been ordered to press on to the 
Somme between Ham 
(exclusive) and Peronne and 
establish bridgeheads on the 
right bank of the river. The 
Australian Corps will continue 
its advance with a view to 
securing the line of the Somme 
between St. Christ (inclusive) 
and Bray and establishing 
bridgeheads on the right bank 
of the river.  
 11/08/18: Fourth Army Order 
20/5 (G) The advance of the 
Fourth Army to the Somme 
will not be continued until all 
available artillery can be 
brought up in support and the 
number of tanks now with the 
Corps increased.  
  
p.m. Meanwhile the latter 
to conform with the 
advance of the Cdn. Corps 
on the right, pushed 
forward and enveloped 
Vauvillers, which was 
cleared of the enemy by 
the time the attacking 
troops arrived. Tanks 
suffered heavily in the 
advance, but at 4.20 P.M. 
2nd Aust. Div. moved 
through the 5th Div 
immediately south of the 
Amiens Foucaucourt Road 
and attacked Framerville 
on a two bde. front.  
 6.39 A.M. Morning Report 
– Quiet night. 
 9.50 P.M. Monash reports 
by telephone that the Aust. 





 30/07/30-07/08/18: Immediately 
prior to receipt of Fourth Army 
Order 20G ordering the Amiens 
attack Aust. Corps (BGGS) under 
ACO No 140 issues Instructions 
No 1. 
 This is the first of 21 Battle 
Instructions issued by BGGS in 
memo form to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 
5th division and their respective 
brigades between 5th and 7th 
August. Unfortunately these battle 
instructions are missing from the 
relevant Aust. Corps War Diary. 
However, a copy is available in 
Australian Victories in France in 
1918: by Lieut.-Gen. Sir John 
Monash, the Corps Commander. 
 01-03 /08/18 AC Artillery 
Instructions No 249, 250, 255 Plan 
for Amiens offensive. 
 05/08/18 AC Heavy Artillery 
Order No 150. Plan of Amiens 
offensive. 
 06/08/18 Counter Battery Op 
Order No 12. Plan for Amiens 
Offensive. 
 These artillery communications 
were both plans and orders. 
 24/07/18: ACO 135 
organization of reliefs (58th
Div. III Corps reliving 5th 
Div.) 
 27/07/18: ACO 137 
organization of relief. 
(Aust. Corps by III Corps) 
 29/07/18: ACO 138 
organization of artillery 
relief involving 4th, 5th Div. 
artillery and III Corps. 
 29/7/139-01/08/18: ACO 
139-148 organization of 
formations in Corps area 
 27/07/18: H.A. Order 149 in 
support of 5th Division 
preparatory attack. 
 27/07/18: H.A. Op. Order 11. 
in support of 5th Division 
preparatory attack. 
 05/08/18:-07/08/18: Corps 
Orders for the Amiens 
offensive took the form of 
battle instructions.  
 07/08/18 AC issues advice to 
Divs. 07/08/18 is “Y” day. 
[2nd Div WD Aug 1918 (1)] 
 07/08/18: General Staff Memo 
AC/42 ‘ZERO will be for 4.20 
am on 8th instant. [Battle 
Instructions no 21 p. 344] 
 
 01/08/18: Div. 
Commanders and staff 
(2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th div.) 
attend conference at Corps 
HQ to be briefed on 
Amiens offensive. 
 02/08/18: Conference held 
to coordinate 
administrative matters 
attended by div. 
AA&QMG staff officers.  
 04/08/18: Div. 
Commanders and staff 
attend conference at Corps 
H.Q. 
 NOTE: These conferences 
have not been recorded in 
Aust. Corps WD but they 
are referenced in 5th Div. 
WD as below.  
 NOTE: An analysis of 
inward wires (Aust. Corps 
WD Aug 1918 (4) shows 
that where it has been 
possible to time these 
wires it took:  
D.H.Q. to C.H.Q.: 
Approx. 2 hrs.  
A.H.Q. to C.H.Q.: 1.5 to 
5 hrs. 
Balloon Co to C.H.Q. 
45min – over one hr. 
 
 
 08/08/18: In total 249 
inward messages were 
received by Aust. Corps 
H.Q. from formations 
above Bde. In the main 
these messages indicated 
progress, position, 
casualties, prisoners and 
equipment captured, and 
enemy response. It appears 
from the descriptive detail 
of these messages that 
Corps HQ was able to have 
a clear and accurate picture 
of proceedings.  
 08/08/18: In total Corps 
HQ despatched 53 outward 
messages mainly to 4th 
Army H.Q. Of the 
messages sent to Divs. 
these were used to provide 
relevant information that 
would be useful to decision
making on the ground. No 
attempt was made to direct 
proceedings.  
 09/08/18: The same 
general comment can be 
applied as above. 
 AC WD July (2) ACO 
135 
 AC WD July (46) 
HAO 135 
 AC WD July (2) ACO 
137 
 AC WD July (46) 
HAOpO 11 
 AC WD July (2) ACO 
138 
 AC WD July (2) ACO 
139-141; AC WD Aug 
(1) ACO 142-148. 
Note: 146 missing. 
 Monash, Lieut.-Gen 
Sir John Monash, The 
Australian Victories in 
France, Appendix C. 
pp. 317-344. 
 As above. Battle 
Instruction 21. 
 Aust. Corps WD Aug 
1918 (3) (Inward 
Wires) 
 Aust. Corps WD Aug 
1918 (3) (Outward 
Wires) 
 5th Div WD Aug 1918 
(17) OD 249-250-255 
 5th Div WD Aug 1918 
(17)-2 HA Order 150 
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 28/07/18: “C” Division – Aust. 
Corps Defence Scheme. Following 
the successful Morlancourt attack, 
5 Div. moved into Corps reserve 
and a highly detailed defence 
scheme was issued.  
 29/07/18: Although 5th Division 
Commander, Maj.-Gen. Joseph 
Talbot-Hobbs, became aware of 
the Amiens offensive when 
extemporising for Monash. Due to 
the secrecy that underpinned the 
operation, Talbot Hobbs was only 
formally given notice of the 
proposed attack by Aust. Corps on 
29/07/18:.  
 01/08/18: Battle Instruction No 1 
issued under the signature of The 
GSO1to 5th Div brigades and other 
Divisional formations participating 
in offensive. The format of the 
plans was similar to the those 
issued by Aust. Corps G.S. but the 
instructions adapted and applied in 
detail to the 5th Div formations. 
 02/08/08 ‘Plan of Attack’ 
submitted to Aust. Corps for 
approval. 
 02-07/08/18: Battle Instructions 
No 2-33 prepared and issued. 
 09/08/18 Artillery Instruction No 6 
issued at 8.30 A.M. 
  09/08/18 Artillery Instruction No 
8 issued at 3 P.M. cancelling 
Instruction No 7 [no copy] 
 
 25/07/18: Div. Order 216 
issued in response to ACO 
135 by GSO 1 (Lieut.-Col. 
J.H. Peck) 
 25/07/18: Order 216 
partially postponed until 
further orders.  
 25/07/18: AAMC Order 16 
issued to field ambulance 
units to promulgate Order 
216. 
 25/07/18: Artillery Order 
49 issued to effect 
positional changes. 
 28/07/18: Order 219. 5th 
Div. is relieved by 18:th 
Division and moves into 
Corps Reserve.  
 04/08/18: Order 220. 
Organization and 
movement of participating 
formations effected.  
 06/08/18: Order 221. 
Organization and 
movement of participating 
MG Cos effected.  
 23/07/18: Talbot-Hobbs 
assumes temporary command 
of Aust. Corps from Monash. 
 27/07/18: Order 218: instructs 
8th and 14th Aust. Inf. Bde to 
attack and capture enemy line 
adjacent to Morlancourt. The 
advance is to be made astride 
the Corbie-Bray road (5th Div. 
[Ellis] p. 318:) 
 07/08/18: Order 222. ‘5th 
Australian Division will carry 
out an attack in accordance 
with Battle Instructions and 
amendments thereto previously 
issued and which are hereby 
confirmed’.  
 05/08/18: AAMC Order No 
19. Sets out arrangements and 
orders for divisional Field 
Ambulances. 
 06/08/18 Art. Order 63. ‘The 
5th Australian Division will 
attack the enemy on 8th August 
1918…’ 
 09/08/18 Battle Instruction 
Series B. ‘The attack will be 
resumed on 9th Instant….It is 
not anticipated that the attack 
will be launched before 10 
A.M. ZERO will be notified as 
soon as it is ascertained’. 
{From Canadian Corps H.Q.]  
 In so far as the 5th Division 
was concerned, according to 
this order, only the 8th Inf. Bde.
was involved. The rest of the 
Division was to remain on the 
defensive while the attack was 
carried by 1st Aust. Div.  
 In the event ZERO hour was 
confirmed at 11 A.M., the 1st 
Aust. Div was late, and the 
Division moved forward in 
support of the Canadians to be 
relieved later in the day by 1st 
Aust. Div.  
 10/08/18 – 13/08/18 The 5th 
Div took no further active part 
in the offensive.  
 
 
 01/08/18: Talbot-Hobbs 
and staff attend Corps 
conference. [WD] 
 01/08/18: Talbot hold 
presides at conference to 
brief subordinate brigade 
and other unit commanders 
and their staffs on 
forthcoming operation. 
[WD] 
 01/08/18: Talbot Hobbs 
visits 2nd Aust. Div. to 
coordinate arrangements. 
[WD] 
 02/08/18: AA&QMG 
attended conference at 
Corps HQ regarding “Q” 
arrangements for 
forthcoming operation. 
 03/08/18: Talbot-Hobbs 
visits HQ’s of 8th, (Tivey) 
14th, and 15th Bdes to 
discuss forthcoming 
operations with 
commanders and staff. 
[WD] 
 03/08/18: (Admin) 
Conference of Brigade 
Staff Captains regarding 
arrangements for 
operations. [WD]  
 04/08/18: (Admin) 
‘Several conferences held 
in order that responsible 
Officers would clearly 
understand all 
arrangements in 
connection with the 
operation…’ [WD] 
 04/08/18: Talbot-Hobbs 
attends conference at 
Corps HQ to explain plan 
for forthcoming operations 
and to receive any last 
instructions. [WD] 
 04/08/18: Talbot-Hobbs 
meets with Commander of 
5th Tank Bde concerning 
tank and armoured car 
cooperation. [WD] 
 05/08/18: Conference held 
at 5 Div. HQ with 
commanders and staff 
participating in offensive 
to ensure clear 
understanding and close 
cooperation between all 
formations.[WD]. 
 
 08/08/18: Over 300 
incoming messages 
received by Div. HQ from 
units in the field providing 
progress, position, 
casualties, prisoners and 
equipment captured, and 
enemy response.  
 
 5th Div WD July 1918: 
(16) Defence Scheme 
 WO 95-437 4th Army 
WD Appendices (Aug 
1918:) Con. Minutes 
29/07/18:. 
 5th Div. WD July (1). 
 5th Div. Art WD Jul 
1918: (2) Div. Order 
216. 
 5th Div Art WD Jul 
1918: (2) 012/2649. 
 5th Div. WD July 1918: 
(15) AAMC Order 16 
 5th Div. WD July 1918: 
(15) Art Order 49 
 5th Div. WD July 1918: 
(11) Order 219. 
 WD Aug 1918 (9) Plan 
of Attack 
 5th Div. WD Aug 1918:
(7) Order 220 
 5th Div. WD Aug 1918:
(7) Order 221 
 5th Div. WD Aug 1918:
(4) Battle Instructions 
1-18:. 
 5th Div WD Aug 1918: 
(5) Battle Inst. 19-31 
[Copy in 5th Div. WD 
(16) 
 18:0807 5th Div WD 
Aug 1918: (7) Order 
222 
 5th Div Admin WD 
Aug 1918:.  
 5th Div WD Aug 1918:
(5) AAMC Order 19 
 5th Division WD Aug 
1918 (5) Art. Order 63 
 5th Division WD Aug 






 02/08/18: Conference of Bn. 
Commanders held at H.Q. (Bois de 
Mai) to be briefed on forthcoming 
offensive. [WD] 
 03-07/08/18: Battle Instructions 1 
to 26 together with Administrative 
instructions prepared by Bde 
Major and Staff Capt. and issued. 
[WD]. 
 
 30/07/18: Brigade Order 
196. Adjustments of 
defensive organizations 
takes place.  
 02/08/18: Bns. practiced 
battle formations [leap 
frogging] [WD]. 
 07/08/18: Formations and 
units move to assembly 
areas. [WD]. 
 07/08/18: Order No 198 
issued. ‘The 8th Aust. Inf. 
Brigade will carry out an 
attack in accordance with 
Battle Instructions and 
Amendments thereto, and 
which are hereby confirmed.  
 
  04/08/18: Conference of 
Bn. Commanders, together 
with O.C. 8th L.T.M.B. 
[Light Trench Mortar 
Battery] Artillery and Tank 





 05/08/18: Bde Commander 
attends meeting at 
Divisional H.Q. [WD] 
 Staff Capt. visits all units. 
Attend further conference 
of O.C.s and staff. [WD] 
 06/08/18: formation [staff] 
officers visit H.Q. to 
finalise arrangements. 
[WD] 
 06/08/18: C.O.s conference
at H.Q. [WD]. 
 07/08/18: Final conference 
of all Cos and staff held at 






  8th Infantry Bde WD 
July 1918: Order 196 
 8th Infantry Bde WD 
(Aug) 1918: Battle 
Instructions and Orders 
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 02-07/04/18: Preliminary 
Instructions 1 to 23 prepared and 
issued by Bde Major, culminating 
in No 23, establishing Zero hour at 
4.20 A.M. on 8th instant. 
 03/04/15 Administrative 
Instruction 21 prepared by Staff 
Captain and issued. 
 04/08/18: Administrative 
Instruction 21 prepared by Staff 
Captain and issued. 
 
 04/08/18: Order 183 - 184. 
Units moved to assembly 
areas. 
 07/08/18: Admin. Order 23 
supply and transport units 
moved into support areas. 
 07/08/18: ‘Battalions 
reached assembly areas 
safely. [WD] 
 10/08/18 Bde moves into 
reserve.  
 03/08/18 Brig-Gen. H.E. 
Elliott resumes command after 
being recalled to Brigade from 
leave in England.. [WD]  
 07/08/18: Order No 185 issued 
with a high level of detail 
confirming attack. Note zero 
hour confirmed in ‘Preliminary 
instruction no 23. 
 10/08/18: Order No 186 issued 
moving the Bde into reserve.  
 01/04/18: Acting Bde 
commander (Lieut.-Col 
J.E.C. Lord of 40th Bn.) 
attends conference at Div. 
HQ where he is informed 
of the forthcoming 
offensive. Necessity for 
secrecy stressed. [WD] 
 01/08/18: Conference held 
at Brig HQ where all 
commanders and staff are 
similarly advised by 
A/Brig. commander.  
 04/08/18: Bde Commander 
holds conference with O.C. 
and staff to coordinate 
plans. 
 05/08/18: Conference 
including ‘Brigadiers, 
Brigade Majors, and Heads 
of Administrative Services 
and Departments, also 
Specialist Commanders’, 
held at Div. H.Q. to 
coordinate plans. [WD] 
 05/08/18 57th Bn. Order 
No 148. Bde placed under 
tactical command of 2nd 
Aust. Div on night of 5/6 
August. This was to 
facilitate the tight 
coordination of the leap-
frog advance through the 
Green Line. Once the Bde 
had passed through 2nd 
Aust. Div. on 08/08/18 
tactical command would 
revert to 5th Div.  
 06/08/18: HQs of !5th, 8th 
Bdes and 13th and 14th 
Aust. F.A. Bdes share 
same dugout to ensure 
close coordination. [WD]  
 03/08/08 ‘Brigade Major 
reconnoitred the forward 
area with officers of each 
battalion’. [WD] 
 08/08/18: 7.50 am: Bde 
HQ receive hand written 
message from 57th Bn. ‘We
are at La Bastile Mill – All 
well – Tanks are in 
Marcelcave. We are in 
touch with Canadians who 
report they are doing well’. 
[Message recorded as 
being sent at 7.35 am at 
Bn. HQ, thus it took only 
15 minutes for the hand 
written message to reach 
Bde HQ presumably by 
runner.  
 15th Infantry Bde WD 
Aug 1918: (2) Prelim 
Instructions 1-23. 
 15th Infantry Bde WD 
Aug 1918: (1) Admin 
Od 21 
 15th Infantry Bde WD 
Aug 1918: (1) Admin 
Od 21 
 15th Infantry Bde WD 
Aug 1918: (1) Order 
18:3 - 18:4 
 15th Infantry Bde WD 
Aug 1918: (2) Order 
18:5 
 15th Infantry Bde WD 
Aug 1918: (1) Admin 
Od 23. 
 15th Infantry Bde WD 
Aug 1918: (3) 
Messages [11 BN WD 
[84]] 





 03-07/08/18: Preliminary 
instructions prepared and issued. 
[WD] In total 19 preliminary 
instructions were issued under BN. 
Order No 146. 
 29-07-18: Bn. Order 145 
from the Adjutant. Bn. to 
move by route march to 
Querrieu where it will 
embus to HEM. [WD]  
 04/08/18: Bn. Order No. 
147 directs BN. to 
assembly area.  
 05/08/18: Bn. arrives at 
assembly area. [WD] 
 
 03/08/18: Lieut.-Col C.A. 
Denehy resumes command of 
Bn. [WD] 
 05/08/18: Bn. Order No 148, 
issued by Adjutant concerns 
administrative and marching 
orders.  
 07/08/18: Under Bn. Order No 
146 the offensive is confirmed 
with exception of zero hour. 
 08/08/18: At 2 a.m. the bn. (27 
officers and 617 other ranks) 
were ordered out of the 
assembly positions to the lie 
positions in the order A, B, HQ 
C and D Coys. These units 
‘proceeded via the out skirts of 
Villers Bretonneox (sic) to 
taped positions’. [WD] At 5.20 
am the 57th Bn. commenced its 
advance to the Green line.  
 10/08/18 ‘Order received from 
Bde. to effect the Division 
would move back into Corps 
Reserve starting at 10.30 
A.M.’ WD {19] 
 11/08/18 The Bn. was 
inspected by the King.  
 02/08/18: Bn. Acting C.O. 
attends conference at Bde 
HQ and is advised of 
forthcoming offensive. 
Necessity for secrecy 
stressed. Through 
equipping of men to be put 
in had at once. [WD] 
 03/08/18: A party of one 
officer and four other ranks
accompany Brigade Major 
on a reconnaissance of the 
assembly area. [WD] 
 Acting C.O. holds 
conference of company 
C.O.s to brief them on 
forthcoming operation. 
[WD] 
 04/08/18: C.O. and 
Adjutant attend conference 
at Bde H.Q.[WD] 
 05/08/18: C.O. and 
Adjutant attend a second 
conference at Bde H.Q. 
‘Officers from Tanks, 
Engineers, Machine Gun 
Bn. Brigade exploiting 
party and Trench mortars 
were present. [WD] 
 07/08/18: C.O. called 
Company Commanders 
together for a final 
briefing. [WD] 
 08-09/08/18: 42 messages 
recorded messages passed 
between the fighting Cos. 
Bn. HQ and Bde HQ. 
 08/08/18: These messages 
were mainly from the Coy. 
C.O.s reporting their 
positions and condition. It 
is clear that control of the 
fighting rested in the hands 
of Coy C.O.s and Platoon 
Cos. 
 08/08/18: 8.05 am: A Coy 
reported ‘18: prs dropping 
short on about our line’. At 
8.50 am the Bn. C.O. 
notified Bde. HQ that 4.5 
hows. shooting short in 
V6c aaa Can you lift 
please. At 8.55 am this 
message was repeated. At 
9.24 am and 9.40am 4.5 
and 6 inch howitzers were 
reported by Bn CO to be 
shooting short and holding 
up cavalry and infantry.  
 08/08/18: At 12.55 pm 
communications were 
opened between the Bn. 
CO and 59th Bn. and 24th 
Canadian Bn. regarding a 
potential enemy counter-
attack and movements of 
the cavalry. CO attempts to 
coordinate movements of 
advance. 
 08/08/18: Communication 
between Bde. HQ and Bn. 
HQ is not reported.  
 09/08/18: 8.48 am: All 
Coys report to Bn. CO that 
‘Amiens line [Blue] is 
occupied’.  
 57th Inf. Bn WD Aug 
1918: Report inc. 
orders. 
 57th Inf. Bn WD Aug 
1918: Order 146 
 57th Inf. Bn. WD Aug 
1918: Order 147 
 57th Inf. Bn. WD Aug 
1918: Order 148 
 57th Inf. Bn. WD Aug 
1918: Report inc. 
orders(Summary of 
messages -5.15 am To 
Bde H.Q. from C.O. 
‘Moving in 5 minutes 
aaa All correct’. [23] 
 1918: Report inc. 
orders(Summary of 
messages) [23-27] 
 57th Inf. Bn. WD Aug 
1918: [19] 
Sources: 
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